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Note on Transliteration 
 
 
Following the example of many scholars of the Middle East and North Africa who write 
in the English language, I have taken the liberty of using a slightly modified version of 
the transliteration system as outlined by the International Journal of Middle East Studies 
(IJMES). A couple points warrant specific mention. To distinguish between the third 
Shiʿite Imam, Husayn, and Mir Hussein Mousavi, the main opposition candidate in 2009, 
I have spelled their names accordingly in order to avoid confusion. Furthermore, I have 
used the words or names as they commonly appear in English, such as Mossadeq, 
Shiʿite/Shiʿites, and Yasser Arafat, as opposed to Mossadegh, Shiʿi/Shiʿa, or Yasir 
Arafat—as noted in the IJMES.  Unlike many authors, however, who are increasingly 
choosing not to use diacritical marks, I have consciously included all such marks for 
good reason. Activist slogans are an integral part of this study yet their rhythmic efficacy 
is, despite my best efforts, partially lost in translation.  Like so many languages around 
the world, Persian has a rich poetic tradition, which was brought to bear in the streets of 
Iran through the expression of creative and potent slogans. Thus, in a desperate attempt to 
respect that ingenuity, I have translated all the relevant slogans and have accompanied 
each with an in-text transliteration that includes all the diacritical marks. 
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CHAPTER I: Situating the 2009 Green Uprising 
 
 
 
I. Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
Iran is but one country that gives real-world application to the Orwellian mantra 
that “history is written by the victors.”1  Indeed, the militant clerics, who consolidated 
power at the expense of all the revolutionary factions, have worked tirelessly to present 
their version of the Iranian Revolution’s history as the only version—one best 
encapsulated by the state’s preferred revolutionary slogan: “Independence, Freedom, 
Islamic Republic” (esteqlāl, āzādī, jomhūrī-ye eslāmī).  For years, the Iranian 
government has presented this one-sided history to the benefit of its ruling class and self-
affirming ideology.   
Just as the events of 1978-79 are far more complex and disputed than the state 
would like to admit, the historic uprising of 2009 is equally contentious.  More than five 
years after the revolt, the Iranian government continues to refer to the Green Movement 
as “the sedition”—a conspiracy orchestrated from abroad and without organic roots 
within the country.2  Inspired by the studies that contested the “official” narrative of the 
                                                 
1 The famous quote is tellingly attributed to Winston Churchill, the British premier who ordered his secret 
service to work hand-in-hand with the American CIA in order to orchestrate the overthrow of the Iranian 
government on August 19, 1953.  
2 “Fetneh-ye 88 toṭ’eh-ye doshman ʿalayh-i īrān būd”. Fars News Agency.  10 Aug  2014. 
<http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13931007001669>.  Also see: “Fīrūzābādī: yowm allāh-i 
nohom-i dey maḥṣūl-i ensejām-i ʿomūmī-ye mardom shod”. ISNA.  1 Jan 2014. http://goo.gl/Ymi2h3. 
There is no doubt that the US government, especially during the second Bush administration, was 
spending millions of dollars to “promote democracy” in Iran. There is significant doubt, however, about 
the destination of the allocated $75 million—an amount that was increased in later years.  While the 
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Iranian Revolution, this work aspires to do the same with the “official” narrative of the 
uprising in 2009. 
The events of 2009 are historically consequential not only because they could 
have dire consequences for the Iranian government in the long-term, but also because of 
what they tell the reader about the critical juncture in which Iran’s experiment with 
Islamism finds itself. After 30 years of Islamic rule, a new generation of activists, who 
were raised under the ideology and authority of the Islamic Republic, challenged that 
state by co-opting the system’s discourse, history, and symbolism, all of which they 
reprogrammed with subversive meaning and leveled against the state with a profound 
sense of purpose.  In doing so, activists brought to the fore in a fiery manner the post-
Islamist shift that has been taking place in Iran in recent years.  
This study takes the archival footage from the events in question, interviews, 
memoirs, diplomatic cables, activist articles, news data, all of which are intertwined with 
the research material from the history of the Iranian Revolution in order to produce the 
context necessary to understanding the tectonic shift the uprising in 2009 represents.  
The first chapter demonstrates how the movement crystallized under the cover of 
the presidential campaign, and morphed into a protest movement in its contentious 
aftermath whereby activists appropriated the state’s symbols and history in order to 
condemn both the election results and the government. The second chapter focuses on a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Iranian government suspected that the money was used to finance dissidents and groups to launch a 
velvet revolution, the bulk of the funds—according to one seasoned observer—were used for Persian 
language programming such as Radio Farda and Voice of America.  What is certain is that the news of the 
funds’ establishment undermined “the kind of organizations and activists it was designed to help, with U.S. 
aid becoming a top issue in a broader crackdown on leading democracy advocates over the past year, 
according to a wide range of Iranian activists and human rights groups.”  See Wright, Robin. “Iran On 
Guard Over U.S. Funds”. The Washington Post.  28 April 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042701668.html>. 
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specific date in the history of the protest movement:  Jerusalem (Quds) Day.  Quds Day, 
as with other state-sanctioned political holidays, was co-opted and subverted as a means 
by which to denounce the state.  The ʿAshura protests of 2009, likewise the subject of its 
own chapter, illustrate how protesters similarly appropriated what has become a religio-
political holiday in order to condemn the regime.  The final chapter explains how and 
why the state was able to deliver a temporary but meaningless “defeat” to the movement 
on February 11, 2010, the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution’s triumph (22 Bahman).  
The concluding chapter will also show how the ramifications of the uprising endured 
beyond 2009. 
 
II. Background 
More than two years before the protest movement in Tunisia ignited the firestorm 
of revolution—known as the “Arab Spring” in the West or the Arab Uprisings 3  in 
Arabic—the region and the wider world bore witness to Iran’s protracted post-election 
uprising—the Green Movement.  Iran’s revolt was hailed as the largest and most 
formidable challenge to the Iranian state since the events of 1978-79—a history that has 
shaped the manner in which regional leaders, military officers, foreign heads of state, 
journalists, analysts and commentators, and, most consequently, various peoples view 
Iran and the Middle East.  Indeed, the Iranian Revolution of 30 years prior, perhaps more 
than any other revolution of the twentieth century is ubiquitous insomuch as its 
                                                 
3 “Arab Spring” is a misnomer because it incorrectly implies that Arabs were apathetic and complacent 
until 2011. Indeed, Arabs have busied themselves with violent and nonviolent uprisings throughout the 
modern period in the Middle East and North Africa.  The Palestinian uprisings (1987-93 and 2000-05) are 
but two examples that exemplify both the violent and nonviolent historical occurrences that predate the 
“Arab Spring.” 
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ramifications created a “shock-wave” that was “felt round the world” 4  and which 
continues to reverberate throughout the region. 
In 2011, for instance, observers and politicians viewed Egypt—an Arab country 
that has not had formal relations with Iran since the Iranian Revolution—through the 
prism of the very revolution that precipitated the severance of ties between the two more 
than three decades prior. As popular forces engulfed Egypt in revolt against Hosni 
Mubarak, the country’s “Arab president for life,”5 American and Israeli leaders invoked 
the specter of Egypt becoming the “next Iran.” Israeli Premier Benyamin Netanyahu 
stated, "Our real fear is of a situation that could develop … and which has already 
developed in several countries, including Iran itself: repressive regimes of radical 
Islam."6  American Senator Mark Kirk wrote a public letter essentially calling for direct 
US intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country by beseeching President Obama to 
support the “secular nationalists” and take action to “defeat” the Muslim Brotherhood so 
the organization does not “follow Iran’s revolution, turning Egypt into a state-sponsor of 
terror.”7  In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) declared that “Egypt will not be governed by another Khomeini.”8  Even 
                                                 
4 This phrase is a headline to a news piece in The Observer. See “Shock-wave felt round the world”.  The 
Observer. 7 Jan. 1979, pp. 9.  
5 To quote the title of Roger Owen’s The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
6 Black, Ian.  “Egypt set for mass protest as army rules out force”. The Guardian.  31 Jan 2011.  Accessed 
25 March 2011.  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/egyptian-army-pledges-no-force>. 
7 Kirk, Mark.  “Press Release of Senator Kirk: Senatork Kirk Statement on Muslim Brotherhood”.  Personal 
Website.  2 Feb 2011.  Accessed 25 March 2011.  <http://kirk.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=330818>. It’s also 
important to note that Senator Kirk’s obsession with the Iranian government has led him to advocate 
policies that not only target the Iranian government but also harm the civilian population, callously 
arguing “‘It’s okay to take the food out of the mouths’ of the Iranian people to punish their government 
for its misdeeds.” Clifton, Eli, and Ali Gharib. “Pro-Sanction Group Targets Legal Humanitarian Trade with 
Iran”. The Nation. 13 Nov 2014. Accessed 22 May 2015. <http://www.thenation.com/blog/190601/pro-
sanctions-group-targets-legal-humanitarian-trade-iran> 
8 “Army says no to ‘Khomeini rule’ in Egypt,” Associated Foreign Press, 4 April 2011, Accessed 4 April 2011. 
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Ayatollah ʿAli Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, magnanimously credited Iran’s 
revolution for serving as the exemplar for action for fellow Muslims in the era of the 
Arab Uprisings: 
“Today’s events in North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and several others, have 
a different meaning for the Iranian nation.  They have a special meaning. 
These events are part of the Islamic Awakening, which can be said is itself 
a result of the victory of the great Islamic Revolution of the Iranian 
nation.”9 
 
 According to Kirk, Netanyahu, the SCAF, and Khamenei, it didn’t matter that the 
Iranian Revolution and the uprising were separated by more than three decades with an 
abundance of differences.  
 “Such a generalization and simplification minimizes the social, political, 
cultural, geographical, and historical factors that distinguish these two 
countries and their historical trajectories.   In brief, the blurring of history 
conveniently overlooks many significant variances encompassing 
economic factors; the fundamental differences between Iranian Shiʿism 
and Egyptian Sunnism and the subtle but important variations in these 
countries’ Islamist movements; the Cold War context important to Iran in 
1979 compared to the contemporary political nuances relevant to Egypt; 
cultural differences between predominantly Persian Iran and Arab Egypt; 
geographical realities between an Iran bordering the Soviet Union in 1979 
and an Egypt bordering Israel and a Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip in 2011; all 
are overlooked to draw needless and dubious parallels.”10 
 
What’s more, such a narrow perspective ignores the crucial role of the sizeable Christian 
minority in Egypt that makes it all the more difficult for Egypt to become the “next 
Iran.”11 
                                                 
9 Khamenei, ʿAli.  “Khoṭbehhāye namāz jom’eh-ye tehrān + tarjomehye khoṭbeh-ye ʿarabī”.  leader.ir. 5 
February 2011.  <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=10955>. 
10 Alimagham, Pouya.  “The Iranian Legacy in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Military Endurance and U.S. 
Foreign Policy Priorities”.  UCLA Historical Journal.  Vol. 24 Iss. 1, 2013. 
11 The fact that Copts constitute 10 percent, or nearly 10 million Egyptians, means that it is far more 
difficult to establish an Islamic government in Egypt than in Iran, which did not have such a large religious 
minority in 1979. 
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 Similarly, the Green Movement of 2009 could not evade the references to the 
Iranian Revolution. The actual connection between the two, however, is much more 
profound. Whereas in 2011, leaders either drew upon their limited knowledge of the 
Iranian Revolution in anxiety or invoked that history to score political points, journalists 
inside Iran referenced the Iranian Revolution when reporting nearly every momentous 
occasion in the uprising in order to underscore its historical gravity.  For instance, Al 
Jazeera’s opening line in reporting the second day of the uprising referred to it as “the 
biggest unrest since the 1979 revolution”12 while Reuters called the protests “The largest 
and most widespread demonstrations since the 1979 Islamic revolution…”13 To be sure, 
for outsiders the uprising invoked the Iranian Revolution because it likewise brought 
millions of Iranians to the streets in defiance of their government.   
The street marches were one of the most awe-inspiring and memorable aspects of 
the Iranian Revolution.  Literally, millions of Iranians marched often under the threat of 
state violence to register their revolutionary protest against the monarch’s absolutism.  
Charles Kurzman, author of The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, notes that  
“It is almost unheard of for a revolution to involve as much as 1 percent of 
a country’s population. The French Revolution of 1789, the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, perhaps the Romanian Revolution of 1989—these 
may have passed the 1 percent mark. Yet, in Iran, more than 10 percent of 
the country marched in anti-Shah demonstrations on December 10 and 11, 
1978.”14   
 
                                                 
12 “Poll results prompt Iran protests.”  Al Jazeera. 14 June 2009.  Accessed 7 August 2010.   
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009613172130303995.html>. 
13 Hafezi, Parisa.  “Thousands mourn Iranians killed in protests”.  Reuters. 19 June 2009. 
<http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-40437520090618>. 
14 Kurzman, Charles.  The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 
121. 
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Anywhere between 6 to 9 million took part in demonstrations on those two days (Hamid 
Dabashi puts the number at 17 million15) in what Kurzman believed could quite possibly 
be “the largest protest event in history”16 until that point.  So vaunted and historically 
consequential were these street demonstrations that post-revolutionary17 Iranian leaders 
rather wishfully advised Palestinians “to deploy the multi-million tactic to destroy the 
Israeli army and Israel itself.”18    The long span of three decades did not dissuade 
journalists from invoking the events of 1979 when the 2009 post-election uprising 
likewise witnessed millions of Iranians flooding Iran’s streets against their government.  
As before, they voted with their feet against a government they believed did not respect 
the ballot box, and they did so under the threat of state violence.  
 The uprising in 2009, however, shares a deeper history with 1979 that transcends 
the space and time of the momentous street demonstrations.  Indeed, the repertoires of 
action that were cemented in the state-sanctioned narrative of the revolution informed the 
actions of Green Movement activists in 2009 thereby giving their reprogrammed methods 
historically-infused importance.  As a consequence of so much of the Green Movement’s 
symbolism, slogans, and strategies being rooted in the Iranian Revolution, it is prudent to 
first outline some of the major works on the Iranian Revolution because that history and 
scholarship inform the framework by which the Green Movement will be analyzed and 
understood. 
 
                                                 
15 Dabashi, Hamid.  Iran, the Green Movement and the USA.  London & New York: Z Books, 2010, pp. 207. 
16 Kurzman, pp. 122 
17 By “post-revolutionary” I mean the period after February 11, 1979—the date of the revolution’s 
victory—and not a period in which Iran has begun to move past the goals and ideals of the revolution. 
Although to be certain, such an argument can be made.   
18 Jaberi, Faleh A.  The Shiʿite Movement in Iraq.  London: Saqi Books, 2003, pp. 250. 
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III. The Iranian Revolution and its Historiography Matter 
 Nikki Keddie’s Roots of Revolution, one of the first books published regarding 
1979, places the Iranian Revolution in the context of the West’s century-long economic 
and cultural penetration and political domination of Iran.  The revolution, Keddie argues, 
is part of a longer historical occurrence of Iranian resistance against the country’s 
economic, political, and cultural subjugation. Starting with the Tobacco Revolt of 1890-
92 and moving through the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, Muhammad 
Mossadeq’s oil nationalization movement of the early 1950s, and culminating in the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, Keddie shows how Western penetration provoked a nativist 
political, cultural, and ideological reaction not only to foreign domination but also 
towards its local agent, the government of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1941-79).  
The Shah worked in tandem with imperialism to the benefit of large domestic and foreign 
industrial and agricultural companies, all of which was conversely detrimental to the 
wider population. 
 Ervand Abrahamian’s magnum opus, Iran Between Two Revolutions, which was 
inspired by Hanna Batatu’s exhaustive The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary 
Movements of Iraq19, approaches the history of modern Iran via class formation and 
structural factors, while also placing special emphasis on the history of Iran’s communist 
party—the Tudeh (Masses) Party.  Employing a class analysis, Abrahamian outlines 
Iran’s twentieth century history to argue that the transition from tribalism into social 
classes without the necessary political modernization served as the main mechanism for 
                                                 
19 The full title of Batatu’s masterpiece is The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: 
A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bʿathists, and Free Officers 
(London: Saqi Books, 2000). 
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the revolution.  Under the Qajar dynasty (r. 1796-1925), Iran was divided among 
linguistic, tribal, and ethnic groups, and the Qajars used a policy of divide-and-conquer 
and tactical retreats in order to stay in power. The Qajars weren’t necessarily strong, but 
persisted because society was weak in terms of organization, class consciousness, and 
unity.  Imperialism, however, affected Iran in a manner that prompted people to act 
through a class perspective. For instance, Qajar economic concessions to the West 
affected tobacco growers in all regions and ethnic groups in Iran, causing them to act as a 
social group to safeguard their economic interests.  Imperialism and its political 
dominance over the Qajars, therefore, threatened the livelihoods of many causing an 
uproar and the impetus to protect the Iranian economy by limiting the power of the 
monarchy via the establishment of a constitution.  As the Pahlavi dynasty (r. 1925-79) 
modernized and expanded the bureaucracy, army, and economy, Iran experienced further 
class formation without the requisite political modernization, which sowed the seeds of 
the revolution: 
“…the revolution came because the shah modernized on the 
socioeconomic level and thus expanded the ranks for the modern middle 
class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize on another 
level—the political level; and that this failure inevitably strained the links 
between the government and the social structure, blocked the channels of 
communication between the political system and the general population, 
widened the gap between the ruling circles and the new social forces, and, 
most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past 
connected the political establishment with the traditional social forces, 
especially with the bazaars and the religious authorities. Thus by 1977 the 
gulf between the developing socioeconomic system and the 
underdeveloped political system was so wide that an economic crisis was 
able to bring down the whole regime. In short, the revolution took place 
neither because of overdevelopment nor because of underdevelopment but 
because of uneven development.”20 
                                                 
20 Abrahamian, Ervand.  Iran Between Two Revolutions.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 
427. 
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Misagh Parsa’s Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, however, argues that structure 
and class action are important, but they alone cannot account for the revolution.   What is 
also needed, Parsa argues, are resources as well as solidarity structures and organizations, 
all of which the modern middle class lacked at the time of the revolution.  Parsa, a 
sociologist, affirms Keddie and Abrahamian’s understanding of Iran’s structure by the 
late 1970s, when  
“State development policies clearly served particular rather than general 
societal interests, as claimed by the government. These policies gave rise 
to widening economic inequality and burgeoning inflation. In industry, 
agriculture, and commerce, the government’s development strategies 
consistently favored the upper class over the working classes, urban over 
rural, and large, modern enterprises over small, traditional ones.”21 
 
The state intervened in the economy to the benefit of the few and the detriment of the 
many thereby making it the primary target of the revolution. Employing Charles Tilly’s 
resource mobilization theory of collective action, Parsa goes on to argue that the bazaari 
class was especially hurt by the state’s policies and was equipped with the requisite 
solidarity structures and financial power but not the springboard from which to launch the 
revolution.  Intense state repression meant that political activity in the bazaar was 
impossible. Thus, they found a resourceful ally in the militant clergy who were able to 
harness the power of the mosque network, which spanned the country, in order to 
mobilize the population for revolution. 
 Parsa’s work, a giant in the study of the Iranian Revolution, is also not without its 
shortcomings.  Parsa bases his argument on the premise that the mosque was autonomous 
and safe enough to avoid state repression and was free to organize a revolution; that the 
                                                 
21 Parsa, Misagh.  Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution.  New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989, pp. 63. 
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state had decimated all other opposition groups while leaving the clergy unscathed and 
able to launch and lead the revolution.  The truth is, however, that after Khomeini’s 
uprising in 1963-64, the mosque was one of the most dangerous places for political 
activity in Iran. Khomeini himself was imprisoned several times and ultimately exiled 
while all of the revolution’s key clerical leaders including Khamenei—Khomeini’s 
successor—Rafsanjani, Taleqani, and Montazeri—the one-time designated heir to 
Khomeini—spent years in prison for their political activities. Taleqani, one of the most 
politically influential clerics after Khomeini, died shortly after the revolution’s triumph 
after being “frequently ill, apparently due to torture suffered in nearly 15 years of 
imprisonment under the regimes of the shah and his father.”22 State surveillance of the 
clergy was so severe that one cleric, for instance, was imprisoned for two years for “the 
crime of receiving a letter from Khomeini and answering it.”23  Parsa even seems to 
contradict himself when he notes that several thousand clerics were informants on the 
SAVAK payroll.24  The Shah himself admitted that “for some time my government had 
been providing our clergy with substantial support.”25 One reviewer of Parsa’s work went 
so far as to call his assumption that ‘the mosque was the only organization that had 
maintained relative autonomy from the state’ a “fantasy.”26 
 Dabashi, Moaddel, and Algar to varying degrees place special emphasis on the 
role of ideology in the making of the revolution.  Dabashi’s classic, The Theology of 
Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran does not 
                                                 
22 “Iran grief-stricken over Taleghani’s death”.  The Jerusalem Post. 11 Sept 1979, pp. 4. 
23 “The Shah’s Divided Land”. Time.  18 Sept 1978, pp. 35. 
24 Parsa, pp. 197. 
25 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.  Answer to History: By Mohammad Reza Pahlavi The Shah of Iran.  New York: 
Stein and Day Publishers, 1980, pp. 155. 
26 Dabashi, Hamid.  Rev. of Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, by Misagh Parsa.  Contemporary 
Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Mar., 1991), pp. 211-212. 
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suggest that ideology was the only or even the main engine for the revolution, but a 
critical one nonetheless: 
“‘The Islamic Ideology’ was the quintessential prerequisite of ‘the Islamic 
Revolution’ in Iran. Although I am not suggesting that this ideology 
caused the Revolution, I do submit that ‘the Islamic Revolution’ could not 
have occurred without ‘the Islamic Ideology.”27 
 
Algar, however, goes a step further by arguing that Khomeini’s leadership of the 
revolution and the subsequent clerical consolidation of power afterward was a logical 
outcome of Shiʿite doctrine: 
“If the sole legitimate successor of the Prophet, if the sole wielder of 
legitimate authority after him is no longer present on the earthly plane, 
that means that inherently any worldly power that claims to exercise 
authority must ipso facto be illegitimate unless it can demonstrate in a 
clear and indisputable fashion that it exercises on behalf of the absent 
Imam.”28 
 
Accordingly, only the Hidden Imam has the right to rule and all worldly authority is 
illegitimate in his absence. A qualified mujtahid, a learned Islamic scholar who has the 
skill to engage in independent reasoning with respect to legal questions using the sources 
of law as defined by the Shiʿism, can exercise authority “on behalf of the absent Imam.” 
In other words, with the Hidden Imam in a State of Occultation since 874 CE, such a 
mujtahid is the least illegitimate authority because he is most in tune with the will of the 
only legitimate authority—the Hidden Imam.  The mujtahid “is not merely a legal 
authority, one who can give an expression of opinion in this fashion concerning a 
problem of Islamic law; he is also a person whose views, under certain circumstances, 
                                                 
27 Dabashi, Hamid.  Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  
London and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008, pp. 7. 
28 Algar, Hamid.  Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  Oneonta and New York:  Islamic Publications 
International, 2001, pp. 15. 
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must be followed.”29 Thus, Khomeini’s ideology and leadership is a direct consequence 
of this logic in which he endowed the mujtahid’s authority with state power. 
 Mansoor Moaddel’s Class, Politics, and the Iranian Revolution is without a doubt 
one of the more comprehensive works in considering the role of ideology in the 
revolution. His criticism of Parsa’s analysis effectively sets the stage for his own 
contribution to the debate: 
“It is one thing to argue that the bazaaris were antagonized by the state’s 
policies and therefore supported the Islamic alternative to the Shah’s rule. 
It is quite another to explain the emergence of coordinated actions by 
members of diverse classes in the revolution and their fascinating harmony 
in demanding the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of 
Islamic government.”30 
 
Moaddel doesn’t discount the role of structure and class. Rather, he employs a class 
analysis that is intertwined with the discourse of Islamic ideology to explain the 
revolution: 
“A …major problem in these theories involves their excessive emphasis 
on the notion that people act piece by piece according to their interests or 
values.  But action is necessarily integrated into larger assemblages called 
strategies of action, and ideology plays an independent causal role because 
it shapes ‘the capacity from which such strategies of action are 
constructed.’”31 
 
He goes on to say: “Revolutionary ideology tends to transcend all the class, ethnic, and 
even sex differences among the participants (those ‘locked’ within its discursive field), as 
if they have formed an undifferentiated mass tied together within the imageries and 
symbolic systems generated by the ideology itself.”32 Indeed, there was class conflict 
                                                 
29 Algar, pp. 22. 
30 Moaddel, Mansoor.  Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution.  New York and Oxford: 
Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 14. 
31 Moaddel, pp. 16. 
32 Moaddel, pp. 19. 
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before, but no revolution. The revolution happened in 1979 because class conflict now 
had an Islamic ideology that was mutually negating with the Shah’s ideology: 
“The revolutionary crisis began when the social discontent was expressed 
in terms of Shiʿi revolutionary discourse. Dual sovereignty emerged 
because the state and the opposition were constituted by and through two 
mutually negating ideological universes.  The themes of Shiʿi 
revolutionary discourse (that Iran’s problems were related to the West’s 
cultural domination and the un-Islamic nature of the institution of 
monarchy, and that there was a religious solution to these problems) 
contradicted in essence the monarchy-centered nationalist discourse.”33   
 
Thus, according to Moaddel, “ideology is not simply another factor that adds an 
increment to the causes of the revolution. Ideology is the constitutive feature of 
revolution. Ideology makes revolution a phenomenon distinct from the routine contention 
for power or class conflict.”34 
 Amir Said Arjomand, a sociologist and author of The Turban for the Crown: The 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, is another scholar’s work that warrants attention.  Utilizing a 
social movement model merged with breakdown theories, Arjomand argues that the rise 
of the centralizing state under the Pahlavi dynasty stripped the clergy of their authority by 
placing the judiciary and the education system under that of the state’s. What’s more, the 
Shah’s land reform affected their financial interests as much waqf land was re-distributed.  
The clergy, vested with religious authority, wielded their influence over rural immigrants, 
who were residing in Tehran’s shantytowns as a result of the land reform’s failures.  
Disconnected with city-life, these migrants found solace in the familiarity of religion 
through clerically-run neighborhood religious organizations, or hayats. This alliance 
incorporated other opposition groups who were either aggrieved politically (the Tudeh, 
                                                 
33 Moaddel, pp. 268. 
34 Moaddel, pp. 2. 
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Liberation Movement, National Front, et al) or economically (the bazaaris), or both (i.e. 
the clergy) in order to bring about the revolution.  Asef Bayat’s Street Politics: Poor 
People’s Movements in Iran, however, contradicts a main point in Arjomand’s thesis by 
utilizing statistical data to argue that urban migrants did not participate in the revolution 
en masse until the final months before its victory.  
 Charles Kurzman is another sociologist who contributed to the discussion of the 
causes of the Iranian Revolution with his The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.  He 
methodologically considers each theory while opining that they are only partially 
complete.  For instance, in terms of the economic factors serving as the catalyst for the 
revolution, he argues:  
“Revolutions occur when economic problems worsen, especially after a 
period of relative prosperity. In Iran, the oil boom of the mid-1970s gave 
way to a troubling recession in 1977. But this recession was no more 
severe than previous ones, and the groups that suffered the most were not 
the most revolutionary.”35  
 
The organizational theory, which Parsa championed in Social Origins, is also 
problematized: 
“Revolutions occur when oppositional groups are able to mobilize 
sufficient resources to contest the regime’s hold on the population. In Iran, 
the Islamists mobilized the nationwide ‘mosque network’ against the 
regime. But the mosque network was not a preexisting resource for the 
Islamists and had to be constructed and commandeered during the course 
of the mobilization.” 36 
 
Rather, Kurzman argues that there’s too much confusion in a revolution to try to explain 
with complex theories. Rather, it’s a real-time decision on the ground in which “fence-
sitters” decide at a critical juncture that revolution is viable and that an alternative to the 
                                                 
35 Kurzman, pp. 6. 
36 Kurzman, pp. 6. 
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regime is possible—an epiphany that subsequently prompts their participation. According 
to Kurzman, until those fence-sitters—the bulk of the people who ultimately made the 
revolution—crossed that mental threshold, only the die-hard revolutionaries were on the 
streets fighting for revolutionary change. 
 His explanation, or what he calls the “anti-explanation… runs counter to the 
project of retroactive prediction… Instead of seeking recurrent patterns in social life, 
anti-explanation explores the unforeseen moments when patterns are twisted or broken 
off.”37 In the winter of 1978, Iranians joined the revolution by the millions crossing that 
unpredictable mental threshold because they realized that a revolutionary alternative was 
indeed viable, that their presence made it even more viable, and that the millions sharing 
the streets with them meant it was safer to participate.  It became a self-sustaining cycle 
that ultimately brought down one of the Developing World’s most powerful dictatorships.  
As with previous treatments of the Iranian Revolution, however, Kurzman’s work is not 
without its flaws. He analyzes each theory of the revolution separately without 
considering the possibility that a combination of the explanations could effectively 
explain the “roots” of the revolution.  
 Without a doubt, the most fascinating aspect of these manuscripts is how they are 
in conversation with one another. Each author considers the works of his predecessors 
and offers an invaluable theoretical contribution to assess the same historical event. They 
may not agree with one another, but they all complement each other’s work in a fashion 
that benefits the reader who considers all the arguments in tandem with one another.  As 
a result, these warrant careful consideration not only because they inform the framework 
                                                 
37 Kurzman, pp. 138. 
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in which the Green Movement is analyzed, especially with regards to Moaddel’s focus on 
ideology, Kurzman’s anti-explanation, and Parsa’s emphasis on resources, solidarity 
structures, and organizational structure, but also because the Iranian Revolution itself is 
crucial to the historical weight and background of the movement in 2009.  
 Thus, while Senator Kirk, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Ayatollah Khamenei 
mistakenly analyzed Egypt in 2011 by unjustifiably employing the prism of the Iranian 
Revolution, and journalists referenced 1979 in order to highlight the historic nature of the 
demonstrations in 2009, a new generation of Iranians on the street and on the Internet 
were doing something entirely different with regards to their past and present: They were 
contesting the ownership and the very meaning of the Iranian Revolution and its symbols 
in order to condemn the outcome of the Iranian Revolution—the Islamic Republic. 
 In 2009, 60 percent of Iran’s population was under the age of 30.38  The Islamic 
government facilitated this baby boom during its first decade in power in order to 
radically increase the country’s population after the revolution: 
“When the Iranian monarchy was overthrown in 1979, the leaders of the 
new Islamic republic drew attention to a tenet of the Quran that 
encourages early marriage and large families. Population growth became 
part of the national agenda, with incentives to reward families for each 
additional child. Everything from TVs to cars to food was distributed on a 
per capita basis through a rationing system, making it advantageous to 
have many children. These incentives remained in place through the 1980-
88 Iran-Iraq War, when population growth was viewed as a strategic 
advantage: more children, more future soldiers.”39 
 
                                                 
38 This “youth bulge” is not unique to Iran as nearly the same percentage of the Arab world is under the 
age of thirty. See James Gelvin’s The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
39 Berson, Caroline. “The Iranian Baby Boom: Why the Islamic republic has such a youthful population”.  
Slate.  12 June 2009.  Accessed 28 Feb 2014.  
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/the_iranian_baby_boom.html>. 
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With the end of the war in 1988 and an economy in tatters, the government continued to 
compromise ideology in favor of pragmatism40 when it implemented one of the most 
advanced contraceptive and family planning systems in the world.41  The state was able 
to curb the post-revolutionary baby boom but it still had to contend with those who were 
born during the war years—a generation that eventually came to constitute a burgeoning 
youth population.  
This generation experienced no other state authority but that of the Islamic 
government, which began its consolidation the very moment the revolution made its final 
push towards the total destruction of the monarchy during the Ten Days of Dawn.42 The 
clerical domination of the reins of power was completed by 1983 when the main armed 
opposition to the Islamic government, the Mujahidin-i Khalq Organization (MKO), was 
decimated with the death of its field commander, Musa Khiabani.43   
                                                 
40 Pragmatism superseding ideology began well before the end of the war. One obvious example occurred 
when the revolutionary government circumvented its own opposition to Zionism and imperialism in order 
to purchase American arms and spare parts at inflated prices through Israel in the mid-80s.  The US 
government used those profits to circumvent Congress’ embargo against supporting the right-wing 
militias in Nicaragua.  Iran in turn used its influence with Lebanese groups sympathetic to Tehran to get 
Americans held hostage during the Lebanese civil war released.  When these dealings were uncovered, 
the subsequent scandal was termed the “Iran Contra Affair.”  Iranian revolutionaries who had long 
derided the US as “The Great Satan” were as embarrassed as the Reagan Administration, which had 
promised to never “negotiate with terrorists” and was legally prohibited from both selling arms to Iran 
and financing the Contras in Nicaragua. America’s ally, Saddam Hussein, who was locked in a bitter war 
with Iran, predictably felt betrayed by his American counterparts.  To read more on how the government 
compromised ideology in favor of national interest, see Tarock, Adam. Iran’s Foreign Policy Since 1990: 
Pragmatism Supercedes Islamic Ideology.  Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 1999. 
41 To read more about Iran’s prized family planning program, see Weisman, Alan. “What Started the 
Biggest Population Boom in History? How Iran’s explosive expansion warns us about our overpopulated 
future—and shows us how to fix it”. Medium. 5 Feb 2014. <https://medium.com/matter/what-started-
the-biggest-population-boom-in-history-1909ce55ada2>. 
42 The Ten Days of Dawn (dah-i fajr) refers to the climactic days in the revolution in which Khomeini 
returned to Iran on February 1 after his long exile and the final stages of the struggle that culminated in a 
two-day insurrection that precipitated the state’s total collapse on February 11, 1979. 
43 The post-revolutionary power struggle effectively ended during the summer before Khiabani’s death. I 
chose to mark the occasion of Khiabani’s demise as the end of the power struggle in order to 
acknowledge that the MKO continued to pose a military threat, however nominal, to the clerical 
government until his death on February 8, 1983. The MKO responded to the domestic dismantling of its 
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From the beginning, the clerics labored to ensure that the government was Islamic 
not just in name but also in form. They achieved this by Islamizing not only the state’s 
institutions including the constitution and system of governance, the armed forces, and 
judiciary, but also the education system, arts and culture, and even the physical and 
aesthetic landscape of the country.  In doing so, statues and murals, some of which cover 
entire sides of buildings, visualized in aggrandizing form the leadership, symbols, and 
martyrs of both the revolution and Iran-Iraq War. 44   The state aimed to create a 
population that was both pious in faith and obedient and Islamist in political persuasion. 
 The result was a generation’s birth and emergence that corresponded with the 
thirty-year history of the Islamic Republic.  These youths were raised fully cognizant of 
the state’s ideology, history, and symbolism, all of which glorified a radical Islam and a 
politically selective reading of the Iranian Revolution’s history.45 The state—borne of the 
revolution—rooted its legitimacy on the religious and revolutionary authority of its 
undisputed leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 1400 years of Islamic history 
intertwined with a militant interpretation, and the historic mobilization of 1978-79 that 
shocked the world by bringing one of the Third World’s most powerful (and seemingly 
stable) dictatorships to a definitive end at the hands of a protracted popular movement.  
                                                                                                                                                 
organization by regrouping abroad in France and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the latter of which provided 
the MKO with a military base. To read more about the Mujahidin, see Ervand Abrahamian’s fascinating 
The Iranian Mojahedin (New Yaven, Yale University Press, 1989). 
44 The Islamic government refers to the Iran-Iraq War as the “Imposed War,” and its war effort as the 
“Sacred Defense.” 
45 I consciously use the word “selective” because there were many factions that participated in the Iranian 
Revolution. Describing the revolution as an Iranian one affords the appropriate space to include all those 
factions, including the Tudeh Party, the various radical Marxist factions of which the Fada’iyan was the 
most important, the MKO, the Mossadeqist National Front, Mehdi Bazargan’s Liberation Front, as well as 
the militant clergy who rallied behind the leadership of Khomeini. The revolutionary government refers to 
the Iranian Revolution as Islamic in order to marginalize the contribution of all those non-Khomeinist 
factions that were integral to the revolution.  
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So important is this revolutionary history to the ideological foundation of the Islamic 
Republic that the founder’s successor, Ayatollah ʿAli Khamenei, is hailed as “the Leader 
of the Revolution.”  Although he certainly was not the leader of the revolution, such a 
title emphasizes the continuity of the revolution in the form of his succession thereby 
bestowing Khomeini’s legitimacy onto Khamenei, a cleric dwarfed by the religious and 
political stature of his predecessor as well as many of his peers in the wider Shiʿite 
world. 46  To put it differently, if Khomeini’s charisma and revolutionary credentials 
legitimated the Islamic system before his death, then the system institutionalized and 
“routinized” that charisma and history in order to legitimize his successors through such 
titles as “the Leader of the Revolution.”  The most obvious visualization of this 
legitimating continuity encapsulated in such a title is the simple but ubiquitous display of 
Khamenei’s pictures beside that of his exalted predecessor (Figure 1.1). To be sure, such 
history and symbols afford the revolutionary state with the claim to authority in Iran and 
beyond.47 
 
                                                 
46 Khamenei himself acknowledged his political and religious standing relative to his towering predecessor: 
“Imam Khomeini was so great that among the great men and world leaders in history, one could hardly 
imagine a man with such characteristics, except among prophets  and the infallibles. Neither I as a humble 
theology student with all shortcomings and defects, nor any other man in the Islamic Republic can reach 
the summit of that distinguished and exceptional personality.” Translation provided in Ashraf, Ahmad. 
“Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran”. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and 
Society. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 142. 
47 I don’t want to digress, but it can certainly be argued that these symbols and history were and continue 
to be employed not only to afford the state with the legitimacy to rule Iran, but also to serve as the 
vanguard of the wider Muslim world.  
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Figure 1.1. The caption at the top of this Tehran propaganda mural reads: “We will continue on the path of 
the Imam [Khomeini] and the martyrs of the revolution.” Visualizing that very point, Khamenei’s image is 
located below his predecessor, the charismatic leader who founded the Islamic Republic and bequeathed it 
to his successors to “continue.”48 
 
 In order to cement its legitimacy in a manner that ensured political durability, the 
revolutionary government instilled such symbols and history in a new generation of 
Iranian youth who were raised under the ideological authority of the state.  Although this 
ideology, history, and symbolism were designed to authenticate the state, they also 
equipped the population, especially the youth, with the discourse and symbolic tools to 
attack that same state.   
 
IV. Contesting the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in 2009 and Post-Islamism 
                                                 
48 Fotini, Christia. “We will continue on the path of the Imam and the martyrs of the revolution”.  Tehran 
propaganda mural collection. July, 2006. JPEG File. <http://goo.gl/lN4yjS>. 
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In 2009, Green Movement activists contested the ownership of the state-
sanctioned history and symbolism by appropriating and subverting them for their own 
anti-state purposes. They contested the very meaning of those ideological symbols by 
reprogramming and leveling them with devastating ferocity at the state whose very 
legitimacy was rooted in those symbols—a strategy one activist referred to as “political 
jiu-jitsu”: 
“Among the martial arts, jiu-jitsu is a method of fighting in which one 
fighter neutralizes the opponent by turning the opponent’s attack against 
himself while expending the least amount of energy… Green activists can 
use these legitimated symbols in order to de-legitimize the state.49 
 
In other words, if the Iranian state championed the history of the Iranian Revolution to 
justify its authority—a rule that came about as a consequence of the revolution—then 
Green Movement activists contested the meaning and ownership of the Iranian 
Revolution in order to legitimate their own uprising against the very outcome of that 
revolution: the Islamic Republic and “the Leader of the Revolution.” 
Thus, the Green Movement may have failed in terms of canceling the election 
results or altogether bringing down the state, but they succeeded in delivering a 
debilitating discursive blow to that state’s ideological foundations.  If it is possible to 
transcend the arbitrary win-lose binary that inevitably marginalizes other historically 
consequential victories of the Green Movement 50 , then it is possible to understand 
phenomena in 2009 that may very well have ramifications beyond Iran and into the wider 
realm of Islamic political thought in what Asef Bayat calls the “post-Islamist turn.”   
                                                 
49 Salehpour, Jalal.  “Cheh ghazeh cheh īrān”. Rahesabz.  17 Sept 2009.  Accessed 13 Mar 2015. 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/1653/> 
50 For a prime example, see the article in The Economist titled “The revolution is over” (1 Nov 2014) in 
which the author simplistically refers to the 2009 uprising as “the failed Green revolution” because it was 
unable to “topple” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21629338-
changes-iran-make-nuclear-deal-more-likelynot-month-perhaps-eventually>. 
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In Bayat’s formulation,  
“….post-Islamism represents both a condition and a project, which may be 
embodied in a master (or multidimensional) movement. In the first place, 
it refers to political and social conditions where, following a phase of 
experimentation, the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of 
Islamism are exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters. Islamists 
become aware of their system’s anomalies and inadequacies as they 
attempt to normalize and institutionalize their rule. Continuous trial and 
error makes the system susceptible to questions and criticisms. Eventually, 
pragmatic attempts to maintain the system reinforce abandoning its 
underlying principles. Islamism becomes compelled, both by its own 
internal contradictions and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself, but it 
does so at the cost of a qualitative shift...Yet Post-Islamism is neither anti-
Islamic nor un-Islamic nor secular, it endeavors to fuse religiosity and 
rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the 
underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights 
instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, 
historicity rather than fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past.  It 
strives to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with 
democracy and modernity (something post-Islamists stress), to achieve 
what some scholars have termed an ‘alternative modernity.’ Post-Islamism 
is expressed in acknowledging secular exigencies, in freedom from 
rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious truth. In short, 
whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, 
post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights.”51 
 
The Green Movement’s challenge to the Islamic state in 2009 repudiated the government 
by co-opting and subverting its ideology in order to attack it, which is part of a historical 
occurrence in which large segments of the population in tandem with “scores of old 
Islamist revolutionaries” who “renounced their earlier ideas and warned of the dangers of 
a religious state to both religion and the state,”52 brought the conflict with the state’s 
ideology into the open on Iran’s streets and virtual spaces in the aftermath of the 
presidential election.  They did so in order to challenge the state’s “rigidity” and obtain 
                                                 
51 Bayat, Asef.  Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn.  Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 10-1. 
52 Bayat, pp. 11-2. 
  
 
 
24 
their “civil rights,”53 which does not necessarily contradict religion.  Quite the opposite, 
the movement harnessed the power of both religion and the state’s religio-political 
symbols in order to emphasize “rights” and attack the state’s “monopoly” on Islamic 
truth—an Islamic truth the government used to legitimize itself. 
Thus, Iran’s Green Movement may have lost in the simplistic sense by failing to 
force the government to cancel the election results, but it nevertheless prevailed in 
fostering a language and space that robbed the Iranian government of its legitimacy 
thereby challenging its monopoly on self-legitimating religious discourse.   It did so not 
only because it forced the government’s hand by exposing it as a state that rules not 
through the ballet box but through coercive power, but also because the state lost its 
hegemony over the history and symbolism through which it derived its legitimacy.  In 
other words, Green Movement protesters irreversibly challenged the state’s ideology—
symbolism, Islamic roots, and revolutionary history—thereby depriving it of its 
legitimacy. If, for example, Imam Husayn’s 7th century martyrdom was a vaunted symbol 
in the state’s ideological repertoire, then activists in 2009 appropriated that legacy to 
sanction their protest as a day of action in which the righteous weak stood in 
revolutionary defiance of the illegitimate state “usurper of power.”  If Palestine (and with 
it Jerusalem), one of the Iranian government’s most valued international causes and a 
core tenet of the Iranian state’s ideology, extended legitimacy to the Iranian state for 
championing its liberation, then Palestine too became a symbol of protest that dissidents 
appropriated in 2009 in order to attack the state’s “occupation” of power in Iran.  Thus, 
                                                 
53 In harmony with Bayat’s conception of “rights,” Dabashi refrains from referring to the Green Movement 
as a revolutionary movement and instead calls it a “civil rights movement.” See Dabashi, Hamid.  “Expert: 
Protesters want civil rights, not revolution”. Interview by John Roberts. CNN.  June 22, 2009.  
<http://am.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/22/expert-protestors-want-civil-rights-not-revolution>. 
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the Green Movement’s effectiveness came not only from its million-man marches in the 
street, but also from the consequential discourse it employed against the government.   
 
V. The Ideological Universes of 1979 and 2009 
During the era of Reza Shah (r. 1925-41), the founder of the short-lived Pahlavi 
dynasty, “The dominant cultural trend within civil society and Reza Shah’s cultural 
policies belonged, in principle, to the same ideological universe: secularism and 
nationalism.  The Shah’s modernization policies were supported by his critics, although 
on the whole they were ambivalent about his rule.”54  During the reign of the last Pahlavi 
monarch, however, the ideology of the opposition began to change.  As a result of the 
pervasive influence of such ideologues as ʿAli Shariʿati, Jalal Al Ahmad, Ayatollah 
Taleqani, Ayatollah Motahhari, Ayatollah Khomeini and others, the Shah’s critics started 
to analyze and critique him through the prism of Islam.  Consequently, the movement in 
1978-79 differed from its predecessors insomuch as its ideology effectively canceled the 
ideological universe of the state, precipitating a revolutionary predicament in which the 
triumph of one inevitably meant the total destruction of the other: 
“A revolutionary situation is shaped by revolutionary discourse. It is not 
simply a condition of dual sovereignty. It is a dual sovereignty constituted 
by and through two mutually negating ideological universes—the state’s 
ideology and the ideology of the opposition. Revolutionary discourse 
contradicts the discourse of the state and advances an alternative way of 
viewing—a seeking solutions to—the problem of social life through 
direct, unmediated revolutionary action of the masses.”55 
 
In 2009, the Green Movement did not necessarily put forth an ideology that “negated” the 
state’s worldview the way the revolutionary movement did in 1979.  Rather, it did 
                                                 
54 Moaddel, pp. 144. 
55 Moaddel, pp. 18-9. 
  
 
 
26 
something entirely different but equally forceful: the uprising in 2009 contested the 
ownership and meaning of the “sacred” symbols of the Iranian Revolution—as 
championed by its offspring—the Islamic Republic. In doing so, they appropriated those 
symbols and history, reprogrammed them, and used them to sanction their attack on the 
ideology and legitimacy of the Islamic Republic—the entity borne of that very 
revolution. 
It is important to note that the Green Movement’s use of “Islamic” symbols to 
contest the legitimacy of an “Islamic state” is not without precedent.  According to 
Hamid Dabashi: 
“From the Umayyads (661-750) to the ʿAbbasids (750-1258) down to all 
other major and minor Islamic empires and dynasties, there has never been 
an Islamic form of government that has not been radically challenged and 
opposed in precisely Islamic terms. As soon as a dynasty has come to 
power in Islamic terms of legitimacy, a revolutionary movement has 
arisen to challenge it in precisely Islamic terms.”56 
 
The Green Movement is the latest manifestation of this historical trend. Certainly, the 
dynamism of the Green Movement cannot be reduced and categorized as “Islamic,” but it 
undoubtedly arose to challenge the Islamic Republic “in precisely Islamic terms.” 
Strategically appropriating the core Islamic symbols of the state, the uprising in 2009 
fired an ideological blow to the state more powerful than any weapon, which is precisely 
why the government dealt more harshly with the protesters arrested on ʿAshura than on 
any other day of action.  The state accused captured demonstrators with “waging war on 
God”57 and “desecrating”58 the anniversary of Husayn’s 7th century martyrdom simply 
                                                 
56 Dabashi, Hamid.  Iran: A People Interrupted.  New York and London: The New Press, 2007, pp. 218. 
57 “Ezheī  az eʿdām-i 3 nafar az dastgīrshodegān-i ʿashūrā khabar dād”. Rahesabz.  1 Jan 2009 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/6865/>. 
58 “Rāhpaymāī-ye mardom sarāsar-i keshvar ʿalayh-i bīḥormatī beh ʿashūrā”. KhabarOnline. 30 Dec 2009 
<http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/33396/>. 
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because they used Husayn’s sacrality and Islamic legacy to castigate the Islamic 
government. 
In the year 680 CE in the desert city of Karbala, Husayn, the quintessential figure 
in Shiʿism, died a martyr’s death that has reverberated throughout Islamic history and 
beyond.  Surrounded and outnumbered, Husayn and his small band of followers refused 
to pledge allegiance (baīʿah) to those they believed usurped the Caliphate and subverted 
the message of Husayn’s grandfather, the Prophet Muhammad.  This death, according to 
Dabashi, solidified defiance and resistance as an integral component to Shiʿism, which 
can be activated at any juncture in history.  
The death of the Prophet’s grandson created a legacy in which its moral authority 
is based on its posture of resistance.  Once it achieves power, it ceases to be the Shiʿism 
of Husayn’s martyrdom—one of defiance against power and oppression—and instead 
assumes the mantle of those that murdered Husayn.  It is “morally triumphant when it is 
politically defiant, and that it morally fails when it politically succeeds.”59   In other 
words, Shiʿism thrives on failure and fails upon success.  This explains why Shiʿism has 
a long history of revolt—from the time of Husayn and those who after his martyrdom 
sought to avenge his death—to subsequent Shiʿite uprisings such as the Nuqtavi, the 
Hurrifiyya against the Ilkhanids in Sarbedaran, and the relatively recent Babi revolts, all 
of which were rooted in Shiʿite millenarianism.60   Dabashi affirms that in order for 
                                                 
59 Dabashi, Hamid.  Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest.  Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011, xvi. 
60 That is not to say that Shiʿism has not experienced moments of political quietism or has not been used 
to empower the state. ʿAli Shariʿati has written and talked extensively about the difference between 
Safavid Shiʿism (Black Shiʿism), which is clerically-supported and designed to maintain an unjust status quo, 
while ʿAlavi Shiʿism (Red Shiʿism) is revolutionary and breeds resistance to tyranny.  See Shariʿati’s 
Tashīʿeh ʿalavī va tashīʿeh ṣafavī.  For a more thorough reading on Shariʿati’s life and impact, see 
Rahnema, Ali. An Islamic Utopian: A Political biography of Ali Shariʿati. New York, I.B. Tauris, 2000.  
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Shiʿism to remain morally potent, it “must always be in a posture of resistance.”61  Thus, 
while the Islamic government in Iran is doctrinally rooted in Shiʿism, it is paradoxically 
assuming the mantle of those who murdered the Prophet’s grandson, the cornerstone of 
Shiʿism’s martyrology.62  Conversely, the Islamic Republic has produced a resistance to 
it in the form of the Green Movement that is not necessarily “Islamic” but has utilized the 
emotive power of Shiʿism and the ideological universe of the Islamic government in 
order to legitimize its defiance while delegitimizing the authority of the state. 
Beyond the discussion of idealogy, it is important to note that the Green 
Movement shares other important characteristics with its predecessors. Modern Iran’s 
political movements—starting with the Tobacco Revolt (1890-1892) and moving through 
to the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11), Mossadeq’s nationalist movement (1951-53), 
the Iranian Revolution (1978-79), and reaching the Green Uprising (2009)—underscore 
an unrelenting popular struggle to create a political system that respects the rule of law in 
which nobody, especially the country’s leadership, is above it.   In other words, the 
Iranian people of all political backgrounds have fought and sacrificed throughout the 
years to foster a system in which its head of state—Nasir al-Din Shah in the case of the 
Tobacco Revolt—does not freely sell the rights to an important cash crop to foreign 
interests, or “the Leader of the Revolution” does not validate an election wrought with 
irregularities. What’s more, generations of Iranians have struggled for a government that 
is not overrun by corruption and does not arrest and torture political prisoners in order to 
                                                 
61 Dabashi, Shiʿism, pp. 313 
62 For more on the topic of martyrdom in Islam, see Cook, David. Martyrdom in Islam.  Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
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induce confessions to shamefully broadcast to national audiences—an undeniable reality 
under both the the last Pahlavi shah and the Islamic Republic.63 
 
VI. Outline and Methodology of the Dissertation 
 This study will illustrate how the Green Movement activists negated the state’s 
ideology not by producing an alternative to the ideological universe of the state the way 
revolutionaries did in 1978-79, but by taking ownership of the symbols of the state, 
Islam, and the Iranian Revolution in order to legitimize their activism and discredit the 
rule of the Islamic government.   
All these chapters will also show how technology, the Internet, and social media, 
are changing the way activists register their protest.  In doing so, they will demonstrate 
how the protests transformed and continued even when the government took full control 
of the streets.  YouTube, the global online video sharing website, constitutes an important 
archive that hosts thousands of videos uploaded by citizen journalists.  This video archive 
provides the Persian-language researcher with a digital window through which to view 
the events in question in order to ascertain the uprising’s common themes, demands and 
slogans of the demonstrators, activists’ strategies, state conduct, and much more.   As 
such, if the Iranian Revolution was the “world’s first televised revolution,”64 then the 
Green Uprising was the world’s first socially broadcasted revolt in which citizens were 
                                                 
63 See Abrahamian, Ervand.  Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.  For a personal account of forced confessions, see Bahari, 
Maziar.  Then They Came for Me: A Family’s Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival.  New York: Random 
House, 2011. 
64 Ansari, Ali.  Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Conflict in the 
Middle East.  New York: Basic Books, 2006. pp. 83. Bani Sadr called it “the first revolution in the world 
whereby the leadership enjoyed such unprecedented coverage.” See Abolhassan Banisadr. Interview 
recorded by Zia Sedghi, 21, 22 May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, 
Transcript 5 (seq. 101). Accessed 22 April 2015.   
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their own cameramen and reporters, and social media and YouTube were the channels by 
which their raw footage reached national and international audiences. In other words, 
they televised their own revolution.  
One YouTube account holder, Mehdi Saharkhiz, became a main source of videos 
from events in Iran.  He first began uploading videos that he received in a mass email.65   
The videos became widely circulated when mainstream media outlets like CNN “picked 
it up and broadcast them”66 to people around the world.  Consequently, activists learned 
about his online presence and began sending the videos directly to him, which became 
especially important since the state blocked their access to YouTube and social media 
websites after the start of the uprising. Thus, Saharkhiz, who posted the videos with 
English and Persian titles, served as a conduit for hundreds of time-stamped videos that 
activists risked their lives to record and transmit to him through file sharing websites such 
as Dropbox and Media Fire.67  He spent hours organizing, translating, and uploading the 
files because he knew that the uprising was “very historical” and he wanted it “to be 
recorded in history because it wasn’t something that happened very often.” 68  
Furthermore, there were an estimated 200 foreign media journalists 69  covering the 
election, after which they were either “invited” to leave the country when the post-
election uprising erupted, or left after burdensome restrictions prevented them from doing 
their job effectively.70 Saharkhiz, and presumably the countless citizen journalists filming 
                                                 
65 Saharkhiz, Mehdi.  Personal interview.  19 May 2013. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Director Ramin Asgar, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., June 13, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI247_a.html. 
70 Kay McGowan, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., July 29, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI306_a.html. 
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events, wanted the government to know that although foreign journalists were no longer 
on the ground to record the state’s brutality, a watchful eye nevertheless ensured that the 
“regime’s brutality was recorded and broadcast to the world” with the hope that the visual 
documentation of the bloodshed would render the state “less likely to harm people.”71 
Governments are indeed freer to suppress when there is nobody to bear witness to the 
injustice, but recording government repression makes it far more difficult for the state to 
deny or commit wholesale violence.  As Saharkhiz put it: “We’re able to identify a police 
car run over a protester and have proof of this, not from one angle, not from two angles, 
but three different angles. That makes even governments change the way they behave 
because there is proof of every wrong move.”72   Thus, as a consequence of foreign 
journalists being expelled from Iran, activists’ unfiltered raw footage from the events 
uploaded onto YouTube constitutes invaluable data through which to study and analyze 
the history of the Green Movement. 
Unfortunately, many of these videos serve as incriminating personal evidence of 
involvement in anti-state activity so many Iran-based users have had the foresight to 
remove their uploaded videos in order to protect themselves. As a researcher who has 
been chronicling the uprising from the onset in 2009, it was very alarming to learn that 
the footage was being taken down.  One cannot help but think about the safety of those 
who have risked their lives in order to document for the world the details of their historic 
uprising.   
                                                 
71 Mehdi Saharkhiz. Personal Interview. 
72 Mehdi, Saharkhiz.  “My YouTube Story: Mehdi Saharkhiz”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  12 May 2010.  
Accessed 2 October 2014.  <http://youtu.be/AbKqXt8F8fo>. 
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For the purposes of this manuscript, however, I have used software to download, 
reference, and archive all of the footage cited in this manuscript in order to ensure that 
the citations of the work can indeed be located in the long-term as the availability of these 
videos becomes increasingly limited.    If users subsequently delete their personal videos, 
I will abide by their wishes and not jeopardize their safety by uploading the copied 
versions that are stored in my archive. 
Other digital sources equally empower this study.  According to Abrahamian, the 
eminent historian of modern Iran, “the State Department has failed to observe its own 
declassification rule and has found various excuses for delaying the release of documents 
on Iran…” and that “it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a 
historian to gain access to the CIA and MI6 files on the coup.”73  The Anglo-American 
coup culminated on August 19, 1953, yet seasoned historians such as Abrahamian 
struggle to acquire state files on a fateful event that transpired more than half a century 
ago.  Diplomatic and intelligence files pertaining to the 1978-79 revolution are even 
harder to access.  Yet, the massive and historic diplomatic leaks orchestrated by such 
people of conscience as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden provide an invaluable 
opportunity to access files on the 2009 uprising that may not otherwise have been 
accessible for another 50 or more years. Thus, it is fitting that the study of one of the 21st 
century’s first and most dynamic uprisings has the good fortune of harnessing such recent 
data as American diplomatic cables—as well as information available through modern 
mediums such as YouTube, social media, and the Internet in general—to record personal 
                                                 
73 Abrahamian invokes chapter 7 (verse 40) of the Qur’an to highlight the impossibility of gaining access to 
such files. See Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian 
Relations. New York and London: The New Press, 2013, pp. 6, 149. 
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testimonies, analyze acts of protest, and consider invaluable writings of those on the 
ground in Iran who struggled on behalf of the Green Movement.74 
Since crowd action was such a spectacular and memorable part of the movement’s 
history, the second chapter utilizes such digital sources in order to explain how and why 
the demonstrations contested the state’s control of the streets while also showing how the 
street protests were an integral part of the wider campaign of co-opting the state’s 
ideology through the appropriation of already legitimated celebrations, holidays, and 
anniversaries.  Street marches, long a part of the repertoire of the Iranian Revolution and 
the state, which held annual demonstrations to mark important political and religio-
political holidays, became a potent nonviolent weapon in the Green Movement’s range of 
action against the government when the former systematically and strategically upended 
those holidays to register its protest against the state. 
 One such religio-political day of action is the subject of the third chapter.  Quds 
Day (Jerusalem Day) takes place every year on the last Friday of the holy month of 
Ramadhan in which Muslims across the Muslim world protest in solidarity with the 
Palestinians and against Israel’s occupation, especially its seizure of East Jerusalem 
(Quds). East Jerusalem is the location of Islam’s third holiest mosque and its first 
Qibla—the direction in which Muslims the world over pray.75  Quds Day is especially 
important to Iran as it was the revolutionary Islamic government that established the day 
of solidarity, which subsequently spread to other Muslim countries.   
                                                 
74 The United States embassy in Iran has, of course, been defunct since the hostage crisis of 1979-81. 
American embassies in neighboring countries, however, have unofficially served the same capacity, 
whereby Iranians from Iran visit for their visa and travel needs. Specifically, the US embassy in Dubai has 
also served as a major center for intelligence and data gathering.  
75 Jerusalem was indeed the first Qibla during the early years of Muhammad’s prophethood.  After several 
years of revelation, however, he designated Mecca to serve as the Qibla, the first and last change in the 
direction of Muslim prayer.  
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 Every year the state organizes mass rallies across Iran in which the government 
and its supporters walk lockstep around a unifying issue—Palestinian liberation.  More 
importantly, the symbolic protests are designed to highlight the state’s support of the 
Palestinian movement thereby underscoring the Islamic government’s revolutionary 
credentials and its legitimacy.  In other words, the day is not confined to expressing 
solidarity with Palestinians but is also a means by which to express solidarity with the 
state that champions the Palestinian cause.  In 2009, however, Quds Day protests were 
unprecedented in the thirty-year history of the holiday.  
 Green activists subverted the state’s Palestine-centered symbolism in a variety of 
ways.  Either they denounced Palestine in order to negate the Islamic Republic, or they 
altogether appropriated it so as to equate the state with the Israeli occupation. In doing so, 
they situated their resistance against the regime with that of the Palestinian struggle 
against the Israeli occupation.  The tactic of negating Palestine was the more dominant 
trend within the movement, but the latter in which they co-opted Palestine to denounce 
the state was decisively more scathing and troubling for a government that rested its 
legitimacy on its support for the Palestinians.  In other words, it was one thing for the 
state to denounce Green activists for repudiating Palestine as part of a “foreign” and 
“Zionist plot,”76 going as far as referring to them as “Israeli mercenaries,”77 but it could 
say little when other activists placed the state in the same breath as the Israeli occupation. 
This day of action unlike the others outlined in the second chapter warrants its 
own treatment because of the wider historical context important to Palestine as a symbol 
                                                 
76 “Hoshdār-i sepāh-i pāsdārān; ekhlālgarān dar rāhpaymāī-ye rūz-i qods bā barkhord-i farzandān-i ghoyūr-
i mellat movājeh khāhand shod”. Fars News Agency.  26 June 2009 
<http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8806260664>. 
77 “Farātar az khaṭā”. Kayhan.  13 September 2009. 
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and political cause in relation to Iran and Iranians. That historical backdrop helps to 
highlight the meaning behind the Quds Day protests in 2009. The chapter will show what 
Palestine meant to the generation that fought for the revolution of 1978-79, and how the 
revolutionary government institutionalized Palestine as a core ideological tenet and 
drilled an entire generation of Iranians raised under its authority in the justness and 
righteousness of the Palestinian cause.   Only then will the subversive magnitude of the 
anti-regime Quds Day protests, the final segment of the chapter, be fully appreciated.   
 The fourth chapter briefly addresses Ayatollah Montazeri’s life and death, which 
occurred in the tumultuous month of December (2009), and became another occasion for 
protest.  His passing and the anti-government mourning processions provide an 
opportunity to examine Montazeri as a case study in post-Islamism.  An architect of the 
Islamic system, Montazeri eventually morphed into one of its fiercest critics. Thus, 
Montazeri’s evolution and death exemplify the growing trend of post-Islamism unfolding 
in Iran in 2009 and onwards.  
What’s more, the customary 7th day of mourning in observance of his death 
coincided with Tasuʿa and ʿAshura, the two days in which Shiʿite Muslims all over the 
world commemorate the 7th century martyrdom of the third Imam, Husayn—the 
Prophet’s grandson—and the Imam’s valiant half-brother, ʿAbbas (Abolfadhl).   ʿAshura 
has special meaning to the Islamic Republic not only because it governs theoretically 
according to the will of the Hidden Imam, the twelfth direct descendant of the Prophet 
Muhammad, but also because the historic mobilization on ʿAshura in 1978 helped bring 
the Iranian Revolution to its crescendo.  
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In the 1970s, Shiʿite Muslims in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain 
used the occasion of ʿAshura not simply to customarily mourn his death, but to mobilize 
against the injustice they were facing as Shiʿites.  Revolutionary Iranians in the most 
populous Shiʿite Muslim country in the Islamic world harnessed ʿAshura’s defiant 
message and organized the largest anti-government march in the entire history of the 
Iranian Revolution.  The enormity of the march in 1978 helped persuade the Shah, who 
had been resisting the uprising for nearly a year, to abdicate and leave the country a 
month later.  In other words, the Islamic government came to power atop such a massive 
ʿAshura protest, and has since employed rhetoric imbued with Husayn’s legacy in order 
to legitimize its Islamic credentials and authority.   
On December 27, 2009, however, Green activists appropriated already legitimated 
mourning ceremonies by subverting Husayn’s legacy in order to equate the state with the 
murderers of the Third Imam.   Just as protesters likened the state to the Israeli 
occupation and themselves to the oppressed Palestinians on Quds Day, demonstrators on 
ʿAshura similarly cast themselves as righteous rebels akin to Husayn, and the state in the 
same vein as Yazid—the infamous caliph that ordered the massacre at Karbala.  In other 
words, they co-opted and subverted the state’s Islamic discourse and leveled it to 
devastating effect against the Islamic government. 
Both ʿAshura and Montazeri’s death are the subject of a single chapter because 
they occurred within days of each other and are conceptually linked. Indeed, the 7th day 
of mourning for his death coincided with Tasuʿa and ʿAshura, and Husayn’s anniversary 
and Montazeri’s passing work in tandem with each other in terms of the discussion of 
post-Islamism.  As with chapter two, foregrounding is necessary for this unit. ʿAshura’s 
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history and its meaning as a cataclysmic event in Islamic history, as well as its role in 
mobilizing protests across the Middle East in the 1970s, especially the single largest 
demonstration in the history of the Iranian Revolution, are crucial to understanding the 
blistering message deployed against the state on ʿAshura, 2009.    
The conclusion will explain how the government’s “defeat” of the Green 
Movement on February 11, 2010, the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution (22 Bahman) 
is a simplistic reading of history.  Indeed, the final chapter will update the reader on the 
legacy of the Green Movement, its impact on the 2013 presidential election in which 
centrist, Hassan Rouhani, succeeded the disputed winner of the 2009 election, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  The conclusion will not end with a prediction of what to expect in terms 
of the final outcome of the historic events of 2009 because, as with other complex 
histories, it is increasingly difficult (and amateurish) to predict the future of Iranian 
history. 
Before the study proceeds, however, it is important to posit a disclaimer. The 
Green Movement belongs to those who fought for it, risked their lives, livelihoods, and 
futures, and ultimately paid a heavy price for it. The question of who is allowed to speak 
for such a multi-faceted movement is a delicate matter.  This work does not pretend to be 
the impossible voice of those millions of people who came out onto the streets of Iran to 
repudiate a state that has long been lording over them.  Instead, this study takes their 
writings, posts on social media, footage from the events in question, interview data, 
memoirs, both written and through the Iranian Oral History Project at Harvard 
University, illuminating opinion pieces penned by activists, diplomatic cables, and 
Persian and English news articles (from the 1970s and 2009), all of which are intertwined 
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with secondary sources in order to outline Iran’s modern history and put forth an analysis 
that transcends the oppressive win-lose binary. In doing so, this work deconstructs the 
limiting simplicity of viewing the Green Uprising through the narrow lens of 2009 
thereby allowing for a more non-linear, in-depth, and revealing discussion of the protest 
movement. 
 As for objectivity and neutrality, it is fitting and prudent to quote the fearless Sara 
Roy, author of Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, “neutrality is 
often a mask for siding with the status quo and objectivity—pure objectivity—does not 
exist and claiming it is dishonest.”78  My interest in modern Iranian history, a history I 
consider to be one of continuous resistance and revolution, is heavily rooted in the fact 
that I am an Iranian-born citizen whose family obtained political asylum when we came 
to the US in the mid-eighties after the Iranian Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War.  I 
was raised in an Iranian household where that revolution and war, regardless of how far 
we were from them both, were a big part of us and our family history. My interest in Iran 
and the wider region took an academic turn at the University of California where I had 
the opportunity to learn beyond my family narrative. Thus, I do not delude myself with 
any notion of neutrality or objectivity when approaching the Green Movement—the next 
chapter in Iran’s long and storied resistance history.   
Having said that, I trust that the reader, who will likewise be invested in this work 
with emotion as he or she undertakes the journey of reading it, will judge this study based 
on the facts and evidence. 
                                                 
78 Roy, Sara.  Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.  London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 
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CHAPTER 2: Co-opting the Past: Crowd Action on the Streets and 
Beyond 
 
 
 
I.I. Introduction 
This chapter places the crowd as a central agent of change and contestation in 
modern Iran.  In doing so, the chapter affirms Charles Tilly’s emphasis on the importance 
of ‘opportunity’ in facilitating social movement activity, such as when the Iranian crowd 
used the opportunity of the election campaign to mobilize—only to change strategies by 
taking advantage of state holidays to re-emerge and renew their protests after the state re-
instituted the repressive climate.   The nighttime chants of “Allahu akbar” as well as 
activists’ appropriation of Beheshti’s anniversary, Rafsanjani’s Friday sermon, the 
anniversary of the US embassy takeover, and Student Day are all integral to the 
discussion of how the movement upended Iran’s political calendar and discourse for the 
sake of giving weight and legitimacy to their demands.    
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of how the crowd was discussed in 
history in order to contextualize and underscore the importance of studying the crowd 
and its role in making history.  
 
I.II. Significance of the Crowd as a Social Concept 
Until the 1960s, historians and other academics have largely neglected studying 
the political crowd, considering it unworthy of scholarly attention.  Gustav Le Bon, the 
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nineteenth century “arch-conservative” 79  social psychologist, describes the crowd as 
composing “criminal elements, riffraff, vagrants, or social misfits.”   Indeed, “social 
historians of the eighteenth century in England have tended to adopt this view: though 
avoiding the more prejudicial of these labels, they have been inclined to see the urban 
‘mob’ in terms of the ‘slum population’ of large cities or the poorest of the poor.”80  With 
this predisposition, it is understandable why there was such a dearth of material 
pertaining to the study of the crowd.  Historian Ervand Abrahamian notes that this 
disregard is “especially true of the Middle East.”81  To date, only a handful of academics 
have written about the historical role of the crowd in the region.  
Several scholars of enduring influence eventually challenged and undermined Le 
Bon’s summation that the crowd was undeserving of academic consideration.  British 
Marxist historians such as E.P. Thompson, George Rudé, Christopher Hill, Eric 
Hobsbawm, and Raphael Samuel, along with Marc Bloch and Georges Lefebvre, who 
coined the term “history from below,” and sociologist Charles Tilly, all contributed to the 
study of history that circumvents the typical focus on white men of power and nation-
states in favor of a “bottom up” approach that emphasizes the role of people and 
collective action in the making of history.  Hobsbawm specifically credits Bloch and 
Lefebvre for their role in establishing a new method by which to view history: “…it was 
the French tradition of historiography as a whole, steeped in the history not of the French 
ruling class but of the French people, which established most of the themes and even the 
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methods of grassroots history...”82 Abrahamian, as the Iranian heir to that tradition, is one 
of the first historians to study Iranian “history from below” with his “The Crowd in 
Iranian Politics 1905-1953” and “The Crowd in the Persian Revolution.”83 
It is important to note that Le Pen was not alone in his disdain of the crowd, as 
“local conservatives have frequently denounced it as ‘social scum’ in the pay of the 
foreign hand…”84 On June 14, 2009, two days after the disputed Iranian presidential 
elections, the incumbent and declared winner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, unwittingly 
affirmed Le Bon’s notion by referring to protestors alleging fraud as “riffraff” or “street 
trash” (khas o khāshāk). 85   Other hardliners accused protestors of being “Israeli 
mercenaries”86 and opposition leaders of constituting a “fifth column”87 in the service of 
the foreign “enemy,” all of which was “part of a plan by the US and Britain to destabilize 
Iran.”88  
 A comprehensive study of the crowd not only disproves such sentiments but also 
affords the reader the opportunity to study “history from below.”  By focusing on the 
political crowd—its actions, slogans, and strategies—it becomes apparent that the crowd 
was not only highly disciplined and sophisticated thereby dispelling Ahmadinejad’s 
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claims of hooliganism, but also served a deeper function that transcends the aim of 
revoking the election results or repudiating the incumbent’s allegations of “riffraff.”  
Studying the crowd in 2009 both before and after the June 12 election provides the reader 
with the opportunity to witness a development unprecedented in Iran’s modern history.  
Indeed, the Green Movement’s challenge to the Iranian government in 2009 amounts to a 
total attack on the state’s Islamist ideology and brings into the open the historical 
occurrence in which a large segment of the Iranian population, including veteran leaders 
of the Islamic system, have entered into what Asef Bayat refers to as the “post-Islamist 
turn.”89 
 Although researching the crowd and the context in which it operated offers unique 
insights into a complex history, its study has historically been wrought with difficulties 
because participants in crowd action have “rarely left archival material of their own…”90 
Fortunately, remedies abound with the rise of the Digital Age and the citizen journalist.  
Equipped with digital cameras and hi-tech cellular phones, crowd participants record 
history as it unfolds and broadcast it to the world via the Internet in general and YouTube 
and social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter in particular. 
 Thus, with the advent of digital sources, the Persian language researcher has the 
opportunity to shed light on the multi-faceted role of the crowd in the election campaign 
that overnight turned into a mass movement and shook the foundations of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  By surveying the slogans of the crowd, participants’ attire, actions and 
strategies, and placing it all in proper context, it is evident that the crowd was anything 
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but riffraff or street trash.  On the contrary, this chapter argues that the sophistication of 
the crowd empowered its participants to harness Islamic history, ideology, and 
symbolism of the state in order to subvert the ideological universe of that very state.  
  Throughout the study, the proper political context will be highlighted in order to 
understand the role of the crowd in the important episodes of the Green Movement’s 
short but eventful and consequential history.  The chapter will document the 
circumstances of the crowd’s emergence, its ingenuity in conducting protests in an 
increasingly repressive environment by leveraging Iran’s own revolutionary history 
through specific strategies.  Nighttime “Allahu akbar” chants and co-opting Iran’s 
political calendar in particular gave potency to their actions.  Specifically, the study will 
survey the events and slogans pertaining to the week before and after the presidential 
election; the anniversary of the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a main 
regime architect; Ayatollah ʿAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Friday sermon; the 
anniversary of the US embassy takeover; and Student Day—all of which provide an 
extraordinary window into the crowd’s actions—actions that repudiate allegations of 
banditry while demonstrating the efficacy of the crowd’s ideological challenge to the 
regime. Jerusalem Day, Iran’s appointed day of global solidarity with the Palestinian 
people, along with the death of Ayatollah ʿAli Montazari and Tasuʿa and ʿAshura, the 
anniversary of the 7th century death of Imam Husayn and his half-brother, are allotted 
their own treatment in order to adequately outline the history crucial to understanding the 
gravity of those days of action.  
Studying crowd action as “history from below” serves other important purposes 
as well. All too often history has focused almost exclusively on “the Great Men” who 
  
 
 
44 
have “made” history—such an approach is at the expense of those men and women who 
have actually turned the tide of events on the ground or created their own space and 
discourse that is also consequential.  The Green Movement was a popular uprising that at 
certain junctures in its storied history often surprised its own leaders, Mousavi and 
Rahnavard, Karroubi, and Khatami. Thus, by viewing the movement “from below,” this 
chapter rightfully places the crowd at the center of events in this electrifying history.  
What’s more, studying history through such a lens also affords the opportunity to 
dispel dangerous government accusations. States categorize political crowds as “street 
trash” in the “pay of foreigners” in order to justify their violent suppression thereby 
conveniently avoiding the crowd’s legitimate grievances.  This generalization aptly 
describes the post-election Iranian street scene in 2009.  On the other hand, by focusing 
on the crowd in terms of its acts and specific days of action then it becomes all the more 
difficult to believe the state’s allegations that validate the government’s repression. To be 
sure, the crowd as a subject of historical study disallows such white-washing; history may 
be written by the “victors,” but that history is contested—as is the victory.91  
 The political climate in which the crowd came to dominate the streets is an 
opportune starting point as it provides the reader with a chronology of events crucial to 
understanding the transformation of the movement.  Obtaining awareness of the proper 
political atmosphere is indeed important because it explains how and why the crowd 
emerged when it did, and eventually how it evolved in response to the re-instated 
suffocating political atmosphere. The political climate will be continuously revisited 
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throughout the chapter in order to understand how intense pressure from the state above 
affected the crowd below and how the crowd strategically acted in response.   
 
II. Situating the Phenomenon of the Iranian Crowd 
 
Sociologist Charles Tilly argued that “to the extent that relations between 
governments and their subjects remain intermittent, mediated, coercive, and particular, 
incentives to join in collective, public claim making by means of social movement… 
displays remains minimal, indeed mostly negative.”92  Expressly, the lack of democratic 
freedoms and legal protection from the state’s monopoly on violence generally precludes 
crowd action and social movement activity:  
“Repression is a key factor affecting opportunities for action. In general 
reduced repression increased the likelihood of insurgency, while an 
upsurge in repression reduces the likelihood of protest by raising the cost 
of mobilization and collective action. Under repressive situations, victims 
of social processes find themselves incapable of overcoming their 
adversaries, not because they cannot conceive of alternative possibilities, 
but because they are unable to maintain their resources, networks, and 
solidarity structures in the face of repression.”93 
 
Iran has experienced few short-lived intervals in which the population enjoyed protection 
from the state’s repressive capacity and was able to mobilize politically. 1941 marked the 
resuscitation of the country’s political life when the Allies occupied Iran during the 
Second World War and deposed Iran’s strongman, Reza Shah.94  Mossadeq’s premiership 
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(r. 1951-53) was especially noteworthy for its commitment to constitutional laws—a 
commitment that the British and American intelligence agencies exploited to stage the 
overthrow of Iran’s democratically-elected government. 95  Consequently, Iran’s 
burgeoning political life came to an abrupt end with the Anglo-American coup in 1953, 
which effectively terminated Iran’s short-lived experiment with democracy for a quarter 
century. 96   The Iranian Revolution once again created the space whereby a vibrant 
political life emerged in the period between the collapse of the monarchy and the militant 
clergy’s consolidation of power.  Unlike its counterpart in the middle of the century, the 
“Iranian Spring” in 1979 lasted only a few months.  In keeping with precedent, Iran’s 
next opening was even shorter, spanning only a few weeks in 2009, but its brevity does 
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not in any way diminish the historic opportunity that was seized upon by millions of 
Iranians. 
 Before the start of election season in Iran, the country had experienced years of 
social and political restrictions, which were tightened under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. 
The government’s security forces in tandem with its paramilitaries ensured that student 
gatherings and demonstrations were a costly undertaking.  What’s more, access to sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter were blocked and critical journalism often resulted in 
arrest and the closure of newspapers.  If political rights and civil liberties were severely 
curtailed in Iran, and social movement activity generally takes place in an environment 
where such rights and liberties exist, then how did the crowd come to rule the streets of 
Iran in 2009?  
 
III. The Crowd before the Elections 
 
 Antonio Gramsci, one of the most important Marxist thinkers of the 20th century, 
understood that there must first be preparation for a popular uprising before it can occur: 
“Every revolution has been preceded by an intense labour of criticism, by diffusion of 
culture and the spread of ideas…”97 Iran’s Reform Movement that became a powerful 
political force from the late nineties onwards, wasn’t necessarily revolutionary but it 
called into question much of the Iranian government’s dogma.  Reformist President 
Muhammad Khatami (r. 1997-2005) tried to emphasize the republican aspects of the 
system by strengthening the power of the elected government bodies—namely the 
parliament and the presidency—and the individual rights of citizens.  He argued that for 
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nearly two decades, Iran experienced more of the “Islamic” in the “Islamic Republic” at 
the expense of the “Republic,” and he aimed to curtail the veto power of unelected 
clerical bodies.  It is important to note that Khatami did not start the Reform Movement, 
which was a consequence of pressures from below.  Indeed, Iranian men and women had 
long been organizing themselves into women’s groups and student associations to 
demand a relaxation of social controls, more equitable rights between the sexes, freedom 
of assembly, speech, thought, freedom from arbitrary arrest and torture, and much more.  
 Large segments of the population displayed this refusal to abide by the 
government’s dogma in miniscule acts that were tantamount to little victories over the 
state’s ideological rigidity. Alcohol consumption and mingling of the sexes, for example, 
are banned, but members of Iran’s youth98 attended underground social gatherings and 
consumed alcohol, often at great personal risk.   Similarly, women who did not wish to 
don the hijab, the Islamic headscarf that is mandatory in Iran, did so but on their own 
terms.  Wearing lightly colored scarves, sometimes even slightly transparent ones, and 
pushed back as far as legally possible all represented for many a subversive repudiation 
of the Islamic government’s social and ideological controls.  According to Asef Bayat,  
“Iran’s postrevolutionary young had turned into ‘youth,’ a collective social 
agent. Their movement did not embody a coherent organization, ideology, 
and leadership (unlike the student movement), but rather ‘collective 
sentiments’ in asserting youthful, albeit fragmented, identities. Theirs was 
a movement whose principal expression lay in the politics of presence, 
tied closely to everyday collective being, cultural struggle, and normative 
subversion. This mass of fragmented individuals and subgroups shared 
common attributes and expressed common anxieties in demanding 
individual liberty and in asserting their collective identities.”99 
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They gave meaning not only to what they did, but simply for how they were as well: 
“The youth movement’s identity is based not so much on collective doing as on their 
collective being; and they make their claims less through collective protest than collective 
presence.”   In other words, the youth were a threat to the state’s ideology simply by 
wearing certain clothes or sporting certain hairstyles, which were indirect markers of 
protest—what Bayat later called “Life as Politics.”100 ʿAli Akbar Nateq Nouri, a regime 
stalwart and former speaker of the parliament, affirmed that the youth express passive 
political dissent in their clothing when he contrasted the political attire of the revolution 
with the subversive “style” of today:  
“During the monarchy, if a youth wanted to resist the government, he 
would raise the flag of Islam and change his appearance accordingly… 
Boys would don shirts that had a cleric’s collar and beard, and girls would 
go to public places such as universities with a complete veil or chador.  
And now, when a youth wants to behave in a way to show opposition to 
the government… they show their protest by changing their appearance 
and with bad veiling.”101  
 
On the eve of the Shah’s final departure from Iran in the face of the revolutionary 
uprising, Time noted, “One striking feature of the anti-Shah demonstrations has been the 
presence of masses of Iranian women. In Tehran they marched by the thousands, encased 
from head to foot in black, shapeless chadors… as a form of political involvement and 
protest against the Shah’s autocratic rule.”102  Conversely, if the hijab and facial hair 
signified one’s revolutionary predisposition in 1978-79, then “bad hijab” and the 
“changing” of “appearance” underscored anti-regime sentiment in 2009.  To put it 
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plainly, Iranian youth “wore their politics on their sleeves” in both 1979 and 2009, but 
inverted the meaning of the revolution’s stylistic protest symbols in 2009.   
Their collective presence during the presidential campaigns showed signs of what 
Gramsci referred to as the ‘War of Movement,’ in which some campaigners—even 
before Mousavi and Karroubi’s campaign and supporters alleged fraud—used the cover 
of the election to protest the state proactively and directly, as opposed to passively. After 
the June 12th vote when millions accused the state of rigging the election, the campaign 
morphed into a full-scale “frontal attack” on the government in which passive dissent was 
supplanted in favor of open confrontation on the streets and in cyber space. Their “frontal 
attack” did not necessarily offer a new ideology to supersede that of the Islamic 
government but rather repudiated the state’s ideology as a whole.  
 Gramsci argues that the elite controlling the state constitute the ruling 
“Hegemon,” which pushes a set of self-affirming ideas or ideology unto the population 
eliciting the requisite consent in order to perpetuate its rule: “… each individual is 
fundamentally influenced by the ideas of the ruling ‘hegemon’… this influence is felt 
unconsciously through the hegemon’s projection of ‘common sense’ which are a set of 
ideas  
“…used to acquire the 'consent' of the masses to its rule—[and] are 
nothing more than the narrow and selfish interests of the elites 
superimposed on the general interests of the people. As a result, the 
masses accept the morality, the customs, and the institutionalised rules of 
behaviour disseminated throughout society as absolute truths that cannot 
or should not be questioned.”103   
 
In other words, by accepting the state’s ‘common sense’ view of the world, citizens are 
acquiescing to the power dynamic of the ruler and the ruled.  Gramsci further argued that 
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citizens become revolutionaries when they refute the ‘universal truths’ of the state 
thereby freeing the mind to find its true revolutionary consciousness.  In 2009, however, 
protesters didn’t reject the state’s ‘universal truths.’  Rather, they “freed” their minds 
from the belief that those universal truths were fixed or belonged exclusively to the state. 
In doing so, they appropriated and subverted them, giving them new meaning that 
rendered them as powerful nonviolent symbols and occasions of protest against the state.  
What’s more, the election provided the ‘opportunity’ to transform the youth’s “collective 
being” into a full-scale frontal assault on the state, or what Gramsci called the “War of 
Movement.” 
In its 2009 Iran report, the controversial Freedom House104 acknowledged that 
“supporters of all candidates seemed to enjoy a relatively relaxed and politically vibrant 
atmosphere”105 in the months leading to the vote.  The presidential campaigns allowed for 
a political opening—an ‘opportunity’ for people to come onto the streets under the guise 
of supporting their candidate’s campaign.  The state wanted its citizenry to take interest 
in the vote and to participate in the elections because it feared disinterest or voter apathy 
would lead Iranians to shun the process, which could have amounted to a no-vote for the 
system that organized the elections. In other words, the state feared that voter apathy 
would jeopardize the legitimacy of the Islamic system as a whole.  The opposite, the 
government believed, was also true: if Iranians went to the polls then they would be 
participating in an important state-sanctioned political event thereby acknowledging and 
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affirming the state’s legitimacy and authority.106  Thus, the state encouraged a relatively 
free climate in which Iranians could develop an interest in the election by reading, 
discussing and exchanging their views, and organizing and campaigning for their 
candidates.  To facilitate the free flow of ideas, “the two ministries of Information and of 
Islamic Guidance, under the supervision of the Leader, unblocked Facebook (along with 
other social networking websites) with the aim of encouraging young voters to participate 
in the June elections.” 107   The availability of increased connectivity empowered 
candidates to relay their political platforms to a savvy youth population. It was indeed the 
first Iranian presidential election in which candidates harnessed the social power of 
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to reach a wider audience.108 The Mousavi campaign 
went so far as to send succinct text messages to citizens’ mobile phones to garner 
support.109 One supporter especially credits the former prime minister’s election team for 
its ability to harness Facebook’s organizing capacity in order to run a “successful 
campaign,” noting that the “campaign managers organized supporters, planned gatherings 
and garnered support through Facebook pages dedicated to the Reformist candidate.”110   
Additionally, many Mousavi supporters developed a Facebook presence inviting their 
peers to “become green”111—the color of the campaign. Most importantly, the use of 
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such technologies enabled candidates to “level the playing field” with the state’s 
preferred candidate, who had greater access to state resources, especially radio and 
television airtime.112 
Just as with previous movements in modern Iranian history, technology played an 
important role in 2009 in terms of facilitating the communication and coordination. In the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, revolutionaries used the telegraph to organize 
and communicate across large swaths of territory.  In the 1950s, nationalists used the next 
generation of communication—the telephone—to spearhead the national movement 
against the British Empire’s control over Iran’s natural resources. During the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-79, revolutionaries smuggled cassette tape recordings 113  of 
Khomeini’s fiery anti-Shah speeches 114  back into Iran where the likes of Ayatollah 
Beheshti transmitted “them by telephone to mosques and villages all over the country.”115 
The immediate audience of such speeches would then relay Khomeini’s messages to their 
friends and neighbors thereby assuring that even those who did not frequent the mosques 
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or did not have access to the tapes received his political messages nonetheless.116 In 2009, 
technology spanning cell phones equipped with the capacity to make phone calls, send 
messages, and to capture pictures and footage, as well as the Internet—encompassing the 
blogosphere, video sharing and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—
were instrumental in relaying messages to a larger audience. As noted earlier, the Internet 
was especially useful in terms of its organizing capacity for the presidential campaigns 
prior to the uprising.  Afterward, however, its role should not be overstated.  While 
Western media hailed Iran’s uprising as a “Twitter Revolution”117 (one former Bush aide 
even argued that Twitter should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in 
facilitating the uprising118), the reality on the ground was a bit more complicated, as will 
be discussed further below.   
The relaxation of political restrictions and censorship signaled to Iranians that the 
repressive climate was temporarily suspended. Sensing the change in the political 
environment presiding over them, they seized the opportunity of the election season to 
organize.  Thus, Iran’s tenth presidential elections created the space and relative safety 
for the political crowd to emerge onto the streets.  Unlike the US119, there are only 4-5 
weeks of active campaigning in Iran with one respondent likening the brevity of the 
elections to a “high school student body election.”120   
                                                 
116 “A Case of Warring Perceptions: Some voices, pro- and anti-Shah, in Iran’s internal debate”. Time. 25 
Dec 1978, pp. 38.  
117 “Editorial: Iran’s Twitter revolution”. The Washington Times.  16 June 2009.   
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution/>. 
118 Pfeifle, Mark.  “A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?”.  The Christian Science Monitor.  6 July 2009.   
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0706/p09s02-coop.html>. 
119 The American electoral process is the exception not the norm.  Election season in the US is abnormally 
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120 Rezaian, Jason.  Telephone interview.  26 July 2010.   
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Interest in the contest gradually grew in the weeks preceding the elections.  
Specifically, excitement piqued with the occurrence of the one-on-one televised 
presidential debates, the first in modern Iran.121  Iran had televised presidential debates in 
the past but this was the first time in which the candidates faced off against each other on 
a one-on-one basis, thereby allowing for more focused and adversarial debates that 
sparked the population’s interest.   The second of six television debates was especially 
electrifying for both camps. Mousavi faced a combative Ahmadinejad, who accused his 
chief rivals—Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rezai—of being part of a plot financed by 
Rafsanjani to unseat him. The idea was that each candidate appealed to a certain aspect of 
Ahmadinejad’s base: Rezai, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was 
thought to be able to siphon off votes from the military establishment that was 
customarily loyal to Ahmadinejad; Karroubi, a seasoned cleric and politician, could erode 
his support amongst the clerical and religious classes; and Mousavi and his wife, Zahra 
Rahnavard, can appeal to the leftists, secularists, and female voters.122   According to the 
incumbent, Rafsanjani was seeking vengeance for losing the presidential race in 2005, 
and epitomized the corruption that afflicted Iran both past and present.  Interestingly 
enough, the president of the Islamic Republic presented himself as an “anti-establishment 
candidate” 123  battling against those who want to undo the revolution from within.  
Mousavi, in turn, condemned Ahmadinejad’s foreign and economic policies, his focus on 
the Holocaust as harmful to Iran’s national interest, and accused the president of putting 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 Director Ramin Asgard, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., June 3, 2009, Wikileaks, 
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Iran on the path to “dictatorship.”124 Without a doubt, the most distasteful part of the 
debate transpired when Ahmadinejad “named and shamed” Mousavi’s wife by accusing 
her of obtaining her academic credentials through dubious means.125  It is very likely that 
Ahmadinejad was trying to undermine Rahnavard’s role, which was especially 
noteworthy as she actively campaigned for her husband—an unprecedented occurrence in 
modern Iran—and helped generate interest among female voters in Mousavi’s candidacy. 
The impact of this singular television debate cannot be understated. Accusations 
of fraud, corruption, and embezzlement were broadcast to a shocked national audience.  
According to one respondent, “All the things people had been talking about at home” 
were now being debated on live television and the historical importance of the occasion 
“clicked”126 for viewers, creating a sort of “political chemistry.”127 One activist believed 
that it was during the television debates when people realized “who is on the side of the 
people and who is not, who sides with the government and who sides with the people.”128 
Apathy gave way to the conviction that although all the candidates were screened by the 
Guardian Council, a powerful conservative body of 12 unelected clerics and laymen129, 
there was a real difference between the candidates, especially between incumbent 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mir Hussein Mousavi—the former prime minister-turned-
reformist.  One source went so far as to say that the television debate between Mousavi 
and Ahmadinejad changed the state’s “sense of control” over the election with green 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 “Matn-i kāmel-i monāżereh-ye musavī va aḥmadīnezhād”. Aftab News.  4 June 2009. 
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126 Rezaian, Jason.  Telephone interview.   
127 Chargé d’Affaires Richard LeBaron, London, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, June 18, 2009, 
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appearing “everywhere” overnight.130  Indeed, after the first televised debate, excitement 
translated into a Mardi Gras-like atmosphere in Tehran in which the four main 
candidates’ bases, especially that of Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, were out in force.  With 
election fever in full swing, the crowd emerged onto the streets with slogans, placards, 
pictures, and signs of unity.  Participants marched throughout the streets everyday until 
the day before the actual elections, where a mandatory 24-hour lull was customarily 
enforced.   
Young people constituted the bulk of the street crowds.  The youth of Iran are the 
overwhelming majority of the citizenry and they live under a system in which political 
rights are limited and civil liberties are severely curtailed.  With much of the constitution 
inspired by a conservative interpretation of Islam, the youth are disallowed from 
mingling with the opposite sex—to the degree that is enforceable—and are limited in 
their ability to voice political criticisms.  Needless to say, dancing on the streets, playing 
music loudly from car speakers, and shouting overtly political slogans inter alia are 
forbidden. The opportunity of the election facilitated an environment in which regular 
prohibitions were either suspended or unenforceable, prompting the crowd to circumvent 
a number of the state’s social and political taboos.  
This normally forbidden Mardi Gras-effect gripped the streets everyday and did 
not dissipate with nightfall.  One witness to the election carnival attested: 
“As afternoon fades into evening, the streets grow increasingly crowded 
and restless. Tehran’s notorious rush hour traffic morphs into a 
supercharged campaign carnival that marches non-stop until around 2:00 
a.m. The throngs of pedestrian campaigners absorb ever greater numbers, 
                                                 
130 Chargé d’Affaires Richard LeBaron, London, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, June 18, 2009, 
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and inch further and further on to the streets, choking the flow of traffic. 
Drivers honk their horns when they see likeminded campaigners. Crowds 
boo at cars boasting a rival’s poster. By late evening, electioneering 
dissolves into frenzy... A car suddenly stops mid-traffic, its stereo blasting 
party music. Its passengers, almost certainly Mousavi supporters, 
disembark and break into frenetic dancing, joined by gleeful 
onlookers.”131 
 
Thousands clogged the streets and walked alongside cars stuck in bumper-to-bumper 
traffic.  People clapped their hands over their heads repeating Mousavi’s name: “Hands in 
the air, Mousavi! Hands in the air, Mousavi!” (dastā bālā, mūsavī!), as if they were fans 
at a soccer match.132  Similar scenes were replicated elsewhere in the country, such as 
when a massive pro-Mousavi rally concluded with large numbers of people roaming “the 
city in cars and on foot, honking horns, and chanting slogans” that equated Mousavi with 
freedom (mūsavī, āzādī!).133  Such street festivals also gave way to more inspiring means 
of bringing attention to Mousavi’s candidacy.  
On June 8, 2009, four days before the election, young men and women formed a 
20-kilometer human chain spanning from Tajrish Square to the Tehran Train Station 
through a main Tehran thoroughfare, Vali Asr Street.  Young women, who comprised the 
majority of the human chain, lined along the street with like-minded young men, bidding 
Ahmadinejad farewell with a resounding pro-Mousavi slogan: “Ahmadi bye bye.”134  
Such campaigners used the occasion of the election not only to support their candidate, 
but also to voice their protest against the government as a whole; Iranians holding hands 
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as part of the human chain chanted: “Assistance from God [leads to] imminent victory, 
death to this deceptive government”135  (naṣron min allāh fatḥon qarīb, marg bar īn 
dowlat-i mardom farīb136).  Perhaps, the most fascinating aspect of the slogan was the 
fact that it was popularized during the Iranian Revolution. In other words, campaigners 
were employing Iran’s revolutionary past to condemn the revolutionary government even 
before the post-election crisis gripped Iran. To be certain, the election climate afforded 
Iranians the opportunity to voice subversive political sentiments, such as when 6,000 
supporters chanted in unison, “Death to the Taliban – in Kabul and Tehran”137 at a pro-
Mousavi election rally in which they explicitly attacked clerical rule in Iran.  Such 
slogans underscored the anti-government sentiment even before campaigners believed 
their victory was stolen from them.  Mashalah Shamsolvaezin, a political commentator 
and former director of several reformist newspapers, observed: “What’s happening now 
is more than what should happen before an election…This is an expression of protest and 
dissatisfaction by people. They are venting their frustration and feeling very powerful.”138 
The massive rallies and street marches for Mousavi imbued campaigners with a 
sense of confidence that their candidate was going to be Iran’s next president unless he 
and his supporters were robbed of their electoral destiny. Recognizing such a possibility, 
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they declared, “If fraud doesn’t occur, Mousavi will win” 139  (agar taqalob nasheh, 
mūsavī avval mīsheh).140  The fear of a rigged election was so real that it prompted 
hundreds of University of Tehran students to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of the 
Interior, warning, “If fraud takes place, Iran will revolt.” (agar taqalob besheh, īrān 
qīyāmat mīsheh).141    
The crowd’s immense presence on the streets, coupled with overtly political 
slogans was cause for great concern among regime authorities.  Brigadier General 
Yadollah Javani, the deputy commander of political affairs for the powerful Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps, accused the presence of Mousavi supporters on the streets 
as being part of a “velvet revolution” and promised that “any kind of velvet revolution 
will not be successful in Iran.”142  Causing the regime even more consternation, the 
crowd coupled its massive street presence with the appropriation of a potent Islamic 
symbol.   
For the first time in contemporary Iran, a candidate adopted a color to symbolize 
his campaign.  The Mousavi camp selected the color green “to symbolize the fact that 
Mousavi is a descendant of Prophet Mohammad.”143  The color choice was designed to 
give both Mousavi and his campaign an aura of religious legitimacy in the eyes of the 
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conservative establishment.  Green is considered the color of Islam because it was 
“supposedly Mohammed's favorite color,” and it is said that he wore “a green cloak and 
turban, and his writings are full of references to the color.”  Furthermore, the Qur’anic 
chapter, “The Human,” describes heaven as a place where people wear “garments” of 
“fine green silk.”144  For these reasons and others, Islamic groups, states, and empires 
have historically employed green in their flags in order to convey an Islamic character 
and legitimacy to their authority. 145   Iran’s pre- and post-revolutionary flag likewise 
incorporates green. 
That green afforded Mousavi’s candidacy and campaign an Islamic legitimacy 
posed a significant challenge to the state.  The former premier, who was the longest 
serving prime minister during Khomeini’s guardianship (velāyat), provided the early 
leadership to the Islamic Republic when it was creating its political and ideological 
foundations, causing many to refer to him as the “Imam’s prime minister.”146  Now, 
however, campaigners had donned the color and were campaigning for Mousavi who 
promised reform. Moreover, others garbed in Islamic green used the cover of the 
campaign to denounce the entire Islamic system, using slogans that either invoked the 
anti-government revolutionary fervor of its predecessor, the Iranian Revolution, or put 
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the theocracy in the same breath as the Taliban—a movement that the Iranian 
government opposed ideologically and militarily.147 
The Mousavi campaign’s strategy of adopting Islamic green as its color, however, 
garnered the suspicion of the authorities not only because of the specific choice but also 
because a color was adopted in the first place.  Weeks before the elections, conservative 
media outlets accused “Mousavi’s supporters of following in the footsteps of those who 
staged color revolutions in some former Soviet republics.”148  Regime authorities grew all 
the more nervous as Iran’s youth controlled the streets in the run-up to the election while 
wearing a single unifying color.   Consequently, three days prior to the election, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards warned that the adoption of a color for the “first time in 
the elections signaled that a velvet revolution was underway for the 10th presidential 
elections” and promised that it will be “nipped in the bud.”149 
 The 20-kilometer human chain, which was “cause for excitement” among 
spectators who were increasingly interested in the campaign, was peppered in green.150  
Young men and women lined the streets holding a green rope, which served as a chain 
linking the campaigners. Participants clenched the rope wearing headscarves, headbands, 
armbands, wristbands, visors, shirts and ties, all of which were green. Several were even 
wearing green capes.151  Merchants exploited the opportunity by selling all sorts of green 
goods, from Mardi Gra-style beads to pom poms, and some painted their faces 
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“resembling the Incredible Hulk.”152  In more obvious political fashion, demonstrators 
hoisted green campaign posters that placed Mousavi alongside former president 
Mohammad Khatami, a reformist cleric who endorsed Mousavi’s candidacy and was 
widely popular among students.  So widespread was the use of the color to show 
solidarity with the Mousavi campaign that Iran’s national football team jumped in the 
fray of the post-election turmoil by coming onto the field in South Korea in green 
wristbands.153   
 The campaign’s decision to adopt green as Mousavi’s color was designed to 
bestow the candidate an aura of Islamic legitimacy.  In the aftermath of the election when 
the political crisis brought Iran to a standstill, campaigners morphed into committed 
protesters and voiced their politically scathing demands while wearing green.  In doing 
so, the meaning of these political acts became amplified when considered in tandem with 
the Islamic color.  When activists shouted slogans invoking the Iranian Revolution at a 
government that came to power through that same revolution, those slogans were imbued 
with greater intensity and posed a more serious ideological challenge because those 
activists uttered those slogans while wearing the quintessential Islamic color.  In doing 
so, activists transformed green from being merely an Islamic color that affirmed 
Mousavi’s “religious” credentials into an Islamic color that became a marker of protest— 
one that constituted a central nonviolent weapon in the movement’s arsenal—which they 
deployed to attack the Islamic regime on a discursive and ideological level.  In other 
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words, the government’s own Islamic symbols including green and revolution-era 
slogans were now part of the opposition’s repertoire of action that was used to contest the 
product of the Iranian Revolution—the Islamic Republic. 
 Before such a dramatic transition, however, there was a mandatory lull in 
campaigning for the day before the elections.  The crowd, high spirited and hopeful, 
retired home in order to rest before the fateful June 12th vote.  In hindsight, this was the 
proverbial “calm before the storm”—one that wasn’t entirely unexpected.  On the eve of 
the election, classified American documents aptly describe the possible outcomes that 
lied ahead:  
“Similar to the campaign period itself, which has been punctuated by 
personal attacks and the massive mobilization of voters across Iran's 
fractured society, the outcome of the election is likely to be polarizing. 
Either of the probable outcomes - a Mousavi win in the first or second 
round, or the re-election of Ahmadinejad tainted by the perception of fraud 
- will, at a minimum, spark a struggle over verification of the results. 
There are signs that both camps are setting the scene to contest the results, 
with Ahmadinejad supporters also alleging malfeasance by his opponents' 
camps and laying down unrealistically high bench marks of the number of 
votes Ahmadinejad should in [sic] a fair contest. Social unrest is also 
possible given the conviction among large swaths of society now that 
Ahmadinejad can not [sic] win fairly; conversely, Ahmadinejad has 
portrayed himself as a champion of disenfranchised Iranians and a 
potential martyr at the hands of a corrupt establishment. His supporters are 
not likely to take defeat well.”154 
 
 
IV. The Crowd in Relation to Iran’s Presidential Elections and the Aftermath 
 
 The Interior Ministry reported that nearly 40 million Iranians or 85 percent of the 
electorate voted in the elections with incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sweeping his 
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closest rival Mir Hussein Mousavi by more than 10 million votes.155  The disparity with 
which Ahmadinejad won caused widespread outrage as many believed that gross 
irregularities occurred.  The final result becomes especially suspicious when one 
considers that Iranian youth voted in droves, and precedent indicates that the more the 
youth participate in the elections, the higher the probability of a reformist victory.156  
What’s more, the speed with which the election results were released shocked many.  
Although votes were cast by paper ballot, the Interior Ministry “released results from a 
first batch of 5 million votes just an hour and a half after polling stations closed.  Over 
the next four hours, it released vote totals almost hourly in huge chunks of about 5 
million votes—plowing through more than half of all ballots cast.”157  Semi-official news 
agencies even “began indicating he had won before polls closed and before counting was 
to have begun.”158 Furthermore, Mousavi alleged that the number of votes for nearly 170 
electoral precincts exceeded the number of voters.159   
There continues to be considerable debate whether fraud took place and the 
degree with which it occurred.  What really transpired is actually unimportant.  Rather, 
the perception of the truth is far more consequential and millions of Iranians believed that 
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widespread fraud took place, which prompted a popular nonviolent uprising in the days 
and months after the June 12th presidential election.  
 The regime’s fear of a velvet or color revolution seemingly became a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  The morning after election results were announced, the political 
crowd—enraged at what they perceived to be a rigged election—took to the streets.160 
With the ballot a closed avenue, crowd action in the streets became the only real 
alternative for political expression in Iran.  The crowd flooded the streets again, this time 
shouting, “We told you that if fraud occurs, Iran will revolt!” (goftīm taqalob besheh, 
īrān qīyāmat mīsheh!), and pelted the riot police from afar with stones.161  The Associated 
Press reported that “Thousands of protesters—mostly young men—roamed Tehran 
looking for a fight with police and setting trash bins and tires ablaze.  Pillars of black 
smoke rose among the mustard-colored apartment blocks and office buildings in central 
Tehran.  In one side road, an empty bus was engulfed in flames.”162  Protests were also 
reported elsewhere, including the holy city of Mashhad.163 
At the start of the revolt, the government re-instated its usual restrictions on such 
websites and even slowed the speed of the Internet to dissuade people from going 
online—even if they could break through the government’s filtering of websites such as 
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YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.164  If activists were unable to access YouTube, then 
they adapted by sending the video files to supporters abroad who would then upload them 
onto the video sharing website on their behalf.  Furthermore, they learned to decrease the 
size of the video files thereby making it easier to send through a government-induced 
Internet slowdown.165  Thus, such tools served as a conduit to convey to the world the 
reality on the ground in Iran.  
Mehdi Saharkhiz, a main source of videos from Iran that included footage of 
politically sensitive events, noted that “Social media was more about sending information 
out of the country than about organizing. It allowed people to transmit information from 
Iran to the world in a remarkably quick fashion. The Internet was too slow for 
coordination.”166  Basic word of mouth, however, was instrumental in the coordination of 
the uprising.167  One activist, who was arrested the first week after the uprising and held 
in Iran’s notorious Evin Prison, observed that word of mouth was far more important to 
organizing events than social media.  He attested that he even saw an activist holding a 
sign that included information about the next day’s protest time and location while 
standing in the middle of an ongoing demonstration.168  Iran’s famous cab drivers169, who 
have developed a keen sense of categorizing and labeling passengers based on their attire, 
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style, and speech170, played a pivotal role in spreading information about forthcoming 
demonstrations to would-be activists and sympathizers.171  To be sure, many were able to 
circumvent government filters and access Mousavi’s Facebook page172, which provided 
useful information about protest times and places 173 , but social media’s role in 
coordinating protests should not be overstated.  In sum, while technology was important 
in organizing the campaigns before the election, it functioned more as a means by which 
to inform the world about what was transpiring inside Iran than to organize the uprising.  
The part Twitter played in the so-called “Twitter Revolution” 174  was especially 
exaggerated.175  
YouTube videos were indeed instrumental in chronicling common themes 
pertaining to what was transpiring on the ground in Iran.  One such video, for instance, 
shows protestors walking peacefully only to be interrupted by policemen on motorcycles 
cutting through the march causing demonstrators to rush aside.  Most of the motorcycles 
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carried two policemen, one of which was a driver while another straddled behind him 
striking at protestors with his baton.  Once satisfied that they had adequately disrupted 
the march, the police would rush back the same way they came.  The crowd, angered and 
provoked by the seemingly unjustified assault, attacked the rear motorcyclist knocking 
him onto the ground. As he tried to run away, the crowd descended upon him with one 
person yelling “hit him” as the crowd-turned-mob sought revenge.  Though bruised, 
exhausted, and shocked, he was carried to safety by demonstrators while others called for 
him to “come out” as they torched his motorcycle.176  This scene was not an isolated 
incident and was replicated several times.177  The impulsive desire to fight back when 
provoked was repeated throughout the history of the protest movement but most, if not 
all, of these incidences have one significant trait in common: whenever the crowd was 
able to descend upon one of its attackers, female activists played an important role in 
saving the paramilitary’s life.  Women repeatedly either beseeched their countrymen to 
stop their assault or often thrust themselves into the melee to shield the attacker-turned-
attacked.  
 The intensity of popular anger over the election results is not to be understated.  
Iranian journalist Saeed Kamali Dehghan interviewed Morineh Tahmasebi, a 57-year-old 
mother, and her insight offers a window to a commonly shared sentiment: 
"I lost one of my sons in the Iran-Iraq war, he was killed for defending his 
country and now my mouth is completely shut. [The election results are] 
not what my son and my family wanted—it doesn't have anything to do 
with Islam. These riot police are worse than any criminals in the world. 
Now I feel ashamed to say that there was a time when I defended the 
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Islamic Republic. It's not what we wanted. It's worse than a dictatorship. I 
regret that I lost my son for this regime now."178 
 
Such resentment helps explain why the first day after the elections was marred by 
rioting—provoked or otherwise.  
In his seminal book, The Crowd in History, George Rudé writes, “…the intrusion 
of the unexpected might create a panic or otherwise divert the crowd from its original 
purpose: in such cases, the charge of fickleness would appear to have some substance. 
But, in general, such ‘mobility’ of behavior was not typical of the riotous crowd.”179  
Although subsequent days saw more clashes, often times provoked by riot police, the 
crowd showed extraordinary restraint even as its size increased dramatically.  Certainly, 
the limited incidence of violence should not detract from the crowd’s disciplined 
approach to street protest.  
 For example, on June 16, four days after the elections, hundreds of thousands 
marched on Vali Asr Street against the election results and they did so in a manner that 
rebuked the regime’s characterization that they are thugs, hooligans, or riffraff.  They 
marched with remarkable self-control, gesturing the victory symbol with hands raised 
above their heads and walking in near complete silence.180  “Anxious not to be falsely 
depicted as hooligans by authorities,” 181  they marched in front of Iran’s Radio and 
Television Station carrying signs that stated: “Lies are forbidden.”182 Their silence not 
only showcased the crowd’s discipline but also protested bias reporting as well as the 
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lack of media coverage, which in the days after the election focused on Ahmadinejad’s 
victory rallies and street interviews with his supporters. One frustrated activist explained 
in her own words the reasoning behind the silent protests: 
“…You flip through the channels of Iranian TV and see Ahmadinejad 
supporters, you see Ahmadinejad making light of this situation and other 
officials calling the pro-Mousavi protesters ‘sore losers’ or ‘no good 
looters who want to cause havoc in society’.   Since their voices are not 
heard, the protesters have been protesting in silence.  They say silence 
speaks louder than words and this is a prime example of that (both the 
silence of the protesters and the silence of the government on this 
issue).”183 
 
 Thursday, June 18, 2009, Mousavi called for a funeral procession to be held in 
Tehran to mourn those that had died in the post-election violence.  Responding to his call, 
hundreds of thousands184 of opposition mourners gathered at Imam Khomeini Square in 
Tehran holding gruesome photographs of those killed and signs that pledged "Our 
martyred brothers, we will take back your votes," and asked "Why did you kill our 
brothers?" 185   Cloaked in black, the traditional color of mourning, and green, the 
campaign color that had been transfigured into a color of protest, the crowd sang 
nationalist and anti-state revolutionary songs.186   As will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters, revolutionary slogans and mourning ceremonies became powerful symbols and 
occasions for protest. 
 Perhaps no single day in post-election Iran was as breathtaking and memorable as 
June 15, 2009.  According to Tehran's mayor, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, nearly three 
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million people, the largest protest event since the revolution 30 years prior, marched on 
Freedom Square.187  Sociologist Charles Kurzman, author of The Unthinkable Revolution 
in Iran, argues that the larger the protests, the greater the participants feel a sense of 
“safety through numbers.”188  The protestors en route to Freedom Square gave voice to 
this notion when they chanted, “Don’t be afraid, don’t be afraid, we are all together” 
(natarsīn, natarsīn, mā hameh bā ham hastīm).189 
One participant effectively captured the sentiment behind the momentous 
occasion by offering his initial reaction when laying eyes on the massive march: 
“I had heard that people were converging on Freedom Square so my 
friends and I drove there but nobody was around. We assumed that they 
hadn’t arrived yet so we decided to go find a parking spot that had easy 
access to a freeway in case paramilitaries attacked and we’d have to 
escape quickly.  Finding a parking spot and getting back to the square took 
nearly 30 minutes. But when we got there, we began to feel the ground 
tremble from under our feet.  I climbed a pedestrian cross bridge and got 
very emotional at what I saw.  The march was so immense that I could not 
see the end of the approaching crowd.  Tears filled my eyes because I was 
proud of my countrymen’s unity - it was a beautiful thing.”190  
 
The view from a civilian overpass directly over the immense crowd confirmed the size 
and magnitude of the march onto Freedom Square with protestors filling the main street 
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leading to the square literally as far as the eye could see.191  The sheer vastness of the 
crowd made it impossible to see where the protest began and where it ended—leaving 
one journalist, Maziar Bahari, who was imprisoned shortly after, to attest “that the 
horizon had become green.”192   Indeed, two years before Egypt’s Tahrir (Liberation) 
Square captured the world’s attention as the epicenter of the Arab Uprisings, Iranians 
converged by the millions on Azadi (Freedom) Square in Tehran. 
 Freedom Square was a focal point for crowd action during the Iranian Revolution 
of 1978-79 and is the site of annual state-sponsored mass marches marking the victory of 
the revolution.  Before the revolution, however, it was known as Shahyad, 
‘Remembrance of the King,’ which symbolized “Iran’s 2,500 unbroken years of 
monarchy” and was a symbol of the Shah’s White Revolution.193 On December 10, 1978, 
the largest protest event in the history of revolutionary movement culminated in the 
royalist square, where millions gave new meaning to such public space by negating the 
monarchy’s ideological universe.  One Iranian who witnessed the revolutionary 
gatherings at Azadi Square in 1978 returned as a journalist in 2009, observing that “the 
scene” reminded him “of the demonstrations against the shah.”194  He interviewed a 54-
year-old man who marched in both historic gatherings and likewise saw many parallels: 
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“We walk along this route because it has taken us a long time to reach freedom since the 
revolution… I see many similarities between what happened then and now.”195  
In 2009, millions once again appropriated the same politically significant square, 
which had served as a rallying point in 1978-79 to demand the abolition of the monarchy, 
and used the public space to condemn the election results.  In other words, the square that 
was associated with the Shah and his White Revolution during the Pahlavi dynasty—and 
was the scene of the most significant demonstration of the Iranian Revolution—served as 
the location where the Green Movement brought the largest upheaval in post-
revolutionary Iran to a crescendo.  Furthermore, belying allegations of hooliganism, the 
political crowd displayed increasing sophistication by using a repertoire of revolutionary 
slogans, songs, and nonviolent resistance to target the regime.  Such street 
demonstrations are only one tool in the crowd’s toolbox of protest tactics. 
 
V. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of the Past – “Allahu akbar” 
   
The crowd demonstrated a high degree of ingenuity when it invoked history in 
order to give weight and meaning to their contemporary demands.  Slogans, places of 
political significance like Freedom Square, important dates on Iran’s political calendar, 
and powerful methods of expressing opposition, all of which had their historical 
precedents rooted in Iran’s revolutionary past, were co-opted, subverted and re-
programmed to convey dissatisfaction and opposition to the Islamic regime.  
 One such method was the tantalizing and highly symbolic nighttime rooftop 
chants of “Allahu akbar” (God is greatest), a common means by which people showed 
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their opposition to the monarchy and their support for the revolutionary movement in 
1978-79.196  ‘Allahu akbar,’ the cornerstone of the Islamic faith that affirms that there is 
no greater being than the Almighty, became a means by which revolutionaries in 1978 
voiced their opposition to the Shah’s US-backed rule of Iran.  Revolutionaries kept hope 
and the momentum of the revolution alive during the darkest days of the Shah’s military 
crackdown when the streets were unsafe for protest activity by going on their rooftops 
and repeatedly declaring two authoritative words: “Allahu akbar.”  One contemporaneous 
observer noted that the tactic was “an ingenious way to harness the momentum of the 
marches, to literally raise the volume of fury and discontent…”197 On December 2, 1979, 
for example, when the Shah had backtracked on political reforms and installed an 
emergency military government that imposed a strict 9 P.M. curfew, protesters emerging 
from evening prayers “almost exactly at 9 P.M.” shouting slogans against the monarchy.  
From the rooftops in “the poor and working-class neighborhoods, thousands cheered the 
demonstrators on by shouting their rallying cry over and over…‘God is great.’”198 These 
revolutionaries, wearing white burial shrouds signifying their readiness to die for the 
revolution, met their fate when “the sounds of machine-gun and automatic-weapons fire 
mingled with the chants.”199   
For three decades, the Islamic Republic has exalted such history to demonstrate 
the emotive power by which it established its authority, and “orders people out onto their 
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roofs on the twenty-second of Bahman [February 11th] in memory of those nights…”200  
In 2009, a new generation of activists learned this lesson in a manner that contradicted 
the government’s aims.  
Green activists revamped this tactic of “powerful passive resistance”201 to express 
opposition to the Islamic government—an authority that came to power riding a wave of 
such innovative protest activity thirty years prior.  In the words of one participant, 
“Allahu akbar” was “the symbol of the [Iranian] revolution.”202  If shouting “Allahu 
akbar” in 1978 professed revolutionaries’ support for Khomeini, then in 2009 it 
proclaimed opposition to the system Khomeini bequeathed—the Islamic Republic.   
 The first night after the election results were announced, and after a day of clashes 
with security personnel, protestors across Iran took to their rooftops to chant “Allahu 
akbar” under the cover of darkness.  One Iran correspondent claimed, “All of Tehran is 
shouting ‘Allahu akbar’ from rooftops.”203  The chants were so loud and numerous that it 
prompted one observer to refer to the phenomenon as the “wailing of wolves.”  To ensure 
that the chants echoed across the country, Mousavi’s Facebook page relayed the 
information to users nationwide who were able to circumvent the government’s filtering 
of Facebook.  Thus, those users who accessed Mousavi’s page on June 14, 2009, were 
advised to begin the “Allahu akbar” chants at 9:00 PM until 11:00 PM “tonight and every 
night.”204 
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 The occurrence of the “Allahu akbar” chants, often times punctuated with “Death 
to the dictator,” served several important purposes.  First and foremost, it was a way for 
the crowd to harness the power of the revolutionary past in order to express outrage at the 
present political situation.  One veteran observer, who participated in the Iranian 
Revolution, noted, “The shouting from the rooftops already has some regime leaders 
thinking of 1978-79 rather than 1999.”205  1999 was the year of the short-lived week-long 
student protests, whereas 1978-79 was the era of the revolution that brought the 
monarchy to its tumultuous end. In other words, the chants served as an indicator to the 
authorities that the 2009 uprising constituted a more formidable challenge than its more 
recent predecessor in 1999.  Furthermore, it was a means by which the movement 
authenticated itself and dispelled accusations of serving a foreign plot in pursuit of a 
velvet revolution—a point affirmed by Mousavi: “A generation had been accused of 
having fallen out of religion. But it rose with the chants of Allahu akbar… How unjust 
are those whose minor self-interests propel them to declare this Islamic miracle a foreign 
plot and ‘velvet revolution.’”206 
Additionally, the nighttime chants were also a means by which citizens reminded 
their compatriots that they were not alone in the struggle:  “It’s the way we reassure 
ourselves that we are still here and we are still together,” says Nushin, a young housewife 
who never participated in oppositional activity prior to the 2009 protests.207  She noted, 
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“Even my little daughter joins me, and I can see how she feels that she is part of 
something bigger” 208 —sentiment that was echoed by a woman who recorded such 
anonymous resistance to the backdrop of her defiant words: “They can take away our 
SMS, our Internet, and our cell phones but we can show them with our cries of ‘Allahu 
akbar’ that we can still gather amongst ourselves.”209    This sense of solidarity was an 
especially pressing message a week after the elections when the state implemented a 
widespread crackdown stifling the street protests.  Indeed, it enabled activists and 
sympathizers to continue to protest after security forces had “cleared” the streets.210  The 
chant’s effect on unity even persuaded those unconvinced that fraud took place to 
participate as it was their way to show their sympathy for the protestors who were feeling 
the wrath of government repression.211   
Alongside the theme of unity, the act was a discursive challenge in which even 
the state’s hegemony over God was shattered.  One Tehran resident who recorded the 
chants as they pierced the night, referenced the regime’s derogatory remarks about the 
crowd to make her divine appeal:  
“Once again cries of ‘Allahu akbar’ are rising – one of the most simple 
and effective ways to call people to come together.  They can take away 
our text messaging, they can take away our Internet, they can even take 
away our phones, but with our cries of ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ we will show we 
can still come together.  People are calling God with all their heart.  
Maybe their voices will shake the Kingdom of God.  Defenseless people 
who have been called thugs and vagrants, defenseless people who have 
been called dirt and dust, defenseless people who have expressed 
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themselves with silent and peaceful protest, now at night from the 
Kingdom of God ask for help.”212  
 
It is important to note that the overtly religious nature of the chant should not distract 
from its oppositional significance; the chants are a popular means through which Iranians 
from all religious persuasions participated.  Indeed, the same Tehran resident attested:  
“Many of us don’t even believe in God, but each night we come and on 
God we call for the others, for those who died, for me, for you, for Iran.  
The voices are coming from far away. They [the chants] leave you shaken.  
They give you hope, but they also show helplessness. They show that 
there are still people searching for justice and show how defenseless they 
are – that the only thing left for them to do is cry ‘Allahu akbar.’”213 
 
Shouting “Allahu akbar” also served as a warning.  Nushin, cognizant of Iran’s 
revolutionary past, noted, “This is what people did before the revolution and I hope it 
warns the regime about what could happen if it doesn’t change its way.”214  Above all, it 
was a potent declaration of anti-state conviction best encapsulated by one Facebook user 
who reminded his compatriots to begin shouting “Allahu akbar” at a certain hour in order 
to “backhand this bastard cleric [Khamenei] in the mouth.”215 
 Although crude political language, there is something historically forceful about 
hitting somebody “in the mouth” in the context of modern Iran.  Specifically, Khomeini 
gave his first official address to the nation upon his triumphant return to Iran in February, 
1979, memorably proclaiming that he will “hit” the last vestiges of the Shah’s 
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213 Mightierthan.  “Poem for the Rooftops: Let Us Not Forget”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  21 June 2009.  
Accessed 9 August 2010.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QocvegFNuzc>. 
214 Fletcher, Martin.  “’Wailing of wolves’ in Iran as cries of Allahu akbar ring from roofs”. 
215 Sabz, Mani. “Emshab alaho akbar saat 22 faramosh nashe baraye to dahani zadan be in akhound 
harom zade.V.”. Facebook Comment.  30 Dec 2009.  
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government216 “in the mouth.”217  For an entire generation of Iranians who had been 
reeling under the heavy boot of the Shah’s military apparatus and vaunted intelligence 
agency, SAVAK, and were on the verge of their revolution’s final push towards total 
victory218, such words from the aged leader of the unfolding revolution was full of 
redemptive revolutionary zeal.  In other words, after more than three and a half decades 
of the Shah’s rule, and after more than a year of revolutionary struggle on the streets of 
Iran, this frail 76-year-old man uttered such simple but powerful words that gave potent 
affirmation to millions who were on the cusp of bringing the hated and once-feared 
government to a definitive end.   In 2009, in a twist of political fate, Iranian citizens were 
likewise proclaiming their self-affirmation by symbolically striking Khomeini’s 
successor “in the mouth” through electrifying and historically charged nighttime chants 
of “Allahu akbar.”  
Indeed, the appropriation of such protest activity with a revolutionary precedent is 
a powerful means by which to cast doubt both on the election’s legitimacy and that of the 
regime as a whole.  For a government that bases its legitimacy on religious discourse and 
symbolism to face protestors shouting “Allahu akbar” in opposition must have been 
highly disturbing for the state—a state that came to power atop nighttime chants of 
“Allahu akbar” three decades prior.  “Allahu akbar” the quintessential Islamic slogan, on 
                                                 
216 By “last vestiges of the Shah’s government,” I mean the state institutions, including the army, and the 
then recently appointed premiership of Shahpour Bakhtiar—an opposition leader who broke ranks with 
his National Front to take the reigns of power in order to prevent the total collapse of the system.  He 
subsequently fled the country and was assassinated in France 12 years later by agents of the Islamic 
Republic. 
217 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Ghayreqānūnī būdan-i majles va dowlat-i manṣūb-i shāh va mafāsed-i rezhīm”. 1 
Feb 1979. Tehran. Vol. 6, pp. 16. http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=6&tid=7. 
218 The Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979. Khomeini returned to Iran after 14 years of exile on February 1, 
1979. Ten days later, the revolution was completed after a two-day armed insurrection spearheaded by 
guerrilla groups, mass defections in the armed forces, a revolutionary seizure of Iran’s police station, army 
barracks, and state radio and television stations, and the announcement of the military’s neutrality.  
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par with “There is no god but God,” predates the emergence of the Islamic Republic by 
nearly a millennium and a half, and came to be an integral part of the state’s set of 
“universal truths” in the modern era.  After the election, however, it was not negated the 
way Gramsci outlined as a necessary precondition to obtaining “true consciousness,” but 
rather was altogether appropriated and redirected as a nonviolent assault on the state’s 
ideological monopoly and hegemony over the “sacred.” In doing so, “God” no longer 
belonged strictly to the state, but was also on the rooftops of those who invoked His 
emotive power against the Islamic government. 
The rooftop chants were not the only means of protest appropriated from Iran’s 
revolutionary past.   The government’s stifling and systematic response to the post-
election demonstrations prompted a new approach for crowd action that was likewise 
ingenuous and historically significant.    
 
VI.I. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of the Past: Iran’s Political 
Calendar 
 
 
On the first Friday after the elections, the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah 
ʿAli Khamenei delivered Iran’s most important sermon at the University of Tehran.  
Typically, “Friday prayers are led by a rotating roster of imams throughout Iran, chosen 
by the supreme leader… to relay his message every week… When Khamenei delivers the 
sermons himself, making a rare public appearance, it means there is something very 
important at stake.”219  As such, he endorsed the legitimacy and fairness of the vote and 
called for an end to the demonstrations, accused America and Israel of a conspiracy to 
                                                 
219 Bahari, pp. 87. 
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provoke unrest in order to stage a velvet revolution akin to the one that transpired in 
Georgia in 2003, and warned that if the demonstrations continued then the government 
would not be held responsible for the blood that would inevitably be shed.220  Though 
clashes had occurred throughout the prior week and dozens had been killed, Khamenei’s 
Friday sermon 221  amounted to a declaration of war against the protesters in which 
compromise was impossible and a total end to the street protests was the state’s only 
objective.  From that moment onwards, a comprehensive crackdown was fully 
implemented.    
According to one observer, the security operation was overwhelming: 
“They [security personnel] have blocked off the roads and have not been 
allowing anyone to approach the meeting point for the protest.  Friends 
who tried to go, returned scared and alarmed, they warned that we should 
stay home and not even think about leaving. Everyone is calling their 
friends and family to tell them about the number of police who have lined 
the streets leading up to Enghelab and Azadi (Freedom) Square.  Anyone 
who has seen the police are advising others to not come close to the 
area.  I have heard reports from friends working in different parts of town 
that the police are out on the streets in large numbers (Vanak Square, Villa 
Street and many other main areas leading up to Enghelab Ave).  The fully 
geared Special Forces police and the helmet-wearing plain clothed Basijis 
(militiamen) are staged all over Tehran's major squares and their presence 
has been stern and threatening.”222 
 
Another observer noted that there were various groups of security personnel each of 
which served a different function. One group, for example, aimed to disperse gatherings, 
make arrests using stun grenades to demobilize demonstrators in order “to bind their 
hands and put them into black vans,” and engage in intelligence gathering work such as 
                                                 
220 Khamenei, ʿAli. “Khoṭbehhāyeh namāz jomʿeh-ye tehrān ”. leader.ir. 19 June 2009. 
<http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=7190>. 
221 It is interesting to note that the state hailed the Friday sermon as “historic” while activists called it “the 
Sermon of Blood.” See, for example, “Sokhanān-i rahbarī-ye enqelāb dar namāz jomʿeh-ye tārīkhī-ye 
tehrān”. Alef.  19 June 2009. <http://alef.ir/vdcawany.49n0u15kk4.html?47820>. 
222 Anonymous.  Email Interview.  20 June 2009. 
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taking photographs and filming videos of activists.223 Another served as a deterrent by 
lining up in rows in order to prevent entry into main squares such as Revolution 
Square.224   In other words, the security operation to bring the protests to an end was 
wide-ranging, systematic, and very effective. 
 Khamenei’s speech and subsequent crackdown, however, did not address or 
assuage the crowd’s grievances. In fact, Khamenei’s endorsement of Ahmadinejad and 
the election results, and his decision to unleash the security forces as a solution to the 
protests meant that he was now party to the conflict on the side of the incumbent and 
against the demonstrators. Consequently, widespread resentment persisted and the 
demonstrators had a new target in Khamenei and the Islamic system that he personified 
and over which he presided. Thus, since he left little room for compromise and the 
protesters’ demands remained unfulfilled, they continued with their protest movement in 
order to give voice to their grievances while evolving and adapting to the new security 
situation. 
  As security personnel flooded the streets in even greater numbers than before, 
the crowd needed a new kind of political cover to come out into the open and protest the 
regime.   Sociologist Charles Tilly argued: 
 “When connected dissidents face authoritarian regimes, they commonly 
have three choices: bide their time in silence, engage in forbidden and 
clandestine acts of destruction, or overload the narrow range of tolerated 
occasions for assembly and expression. In the third case, criticism of 
regimes often occurs in the course of public holidays and ceremonies – 
Mardi Gras, inaugurations, funerals, royal weddings, and the like – when 
authorities tolerate larger and more public assemblies than usual.”225 
 
                                                 
223 Kay McGowan, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., June 23, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI258_a.html. 
224 Ibid. 
225  Tilly, Charles.  The Politics of Collective Violence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 73. 
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Iran’s political and cultural calendar provided a plethora of opportunities in which the 
government tolerated “larger and more public assemblies than usual” but with 
unexpected consequences.  The crowd, reeling from the security crackdown, improvised 
using specific state-sanctioned political holidays as a cover and opportunity for continued 
action.  
 From the Islamic government’s onset, regime authorities have worked tirelessly to 
utilize politically significant calendar days—especially days pertinent to the Iranian 
Revolution—as a means by which to have the masses and the regime walk instep.  
Million-man marches, the main engine of the Iranian Revolution, are recreated and re-
enacted in order to harness the history of the revolution for the sake of legitimating the 
product of that revolution, the Islamic Republic. Such days abound: Jerusalem Day226, 
which falls on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadhan; the anniversary of the 
seizure of the US embassy on November 4; the anniversary of the assassination of 
Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and other top leaders on June 28 (haft-i tīr); Student Day 
(December 7); the ten days leading up to the triumph of the revolution and culminating 
on the revolution’s final victory (February 11); and others are all official days on which 
the regime mobilizes shows of support.  What’s more, the government blurred the line 
between state and religion by incorporating Islamic holidays into its political calendar—
the most significant of which is ʿAshura, the anniversary of the 7th century martyrdom of 
Imam Husayn, a Shiʿite figure of monumental religious and historical importance.  Under 
                                                 
226 Although Iran is based on the solar calendar, the Islamic calendar relies on the lunar calendar. Thus, 
lunar-based religious holidays fall on different days on the solar calendar. In 2009, Jerusalem Day occurred 
on September 18, 2009. 
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the cover of such politically important days, the crowd turned events on their heads by 
emerging onto the streets in order to denounce the election results and the regime. 
 
VI.II. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of the Past: Beheshti’s 
Anniversary 
 
 Mir Hussein Mousavi, opposition leader and Ahmadinejad’s main challenger in 
the presidential election, gave voice to the strategy of appropriating Iran’s religio-
political calendar for crowd action when he said: 
“The most important issue is that the vast ‘Green’ social movement that 
has been formed across the country… should use all these religious 
celebrations by relying on their creativity… Every day, we can have an 
agenda for illuminating and for pursuing the long-term goals of our 
extensive ‘Green’ movement.”227 
 
 
                                                 
227 Mousavi, Mir Hussein.  “Matn-i kāmel-i sokhanān-i mīr ḥussein-i musavī dar jamʿ-i farhangīān va 
tashakol hāyeh moʿalemān-i īrān”. Ghalam News.  27 July 2009.  Accessed 16 August 2010.   
<https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=112950157605>.  
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Figure 2.1. Mousavi’s Facebook page published what is presumably an activist-made image, visualizing the 
strategy of co-opting state-sanctioned political holidays in order to stage anti-regime marches and rallies. 
Posted on November 26, 2009, the goal was to underscore the continuity of the movement by 
demonstrating on Student Day (December 7) as noted at the bottom with the clock’s long hand, which in 
the color of the movement points to the next Green day of action—the preceding one of which is 
highlighted at the right as the anniversary of the embassy seizure, or “National Struggle Against Global 
Arrogance Day.” The caption plans two protest actions: One a march starting at 4:00 pm from Revolution 
Square to Freedom Square, and the other a protester-induced traffic jam to block the main roads at 6:00 
pm.228 
 
The crowd, however, had already begun refining its strategy, or perhaps informed 
Mousavi of the strategy through its actions. (Figure 2.1)  Before Mousavi’s speech, a 
large crowd gathered in front of the Qoba mosque to mark the twenty-eighth anniversary 
of the June 28th bombing229 that killed many top leaders of the Islamic Republic, of which 
Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti was the most significant.  Beheshti was one of the 
founders of the Islamic Republic and one of the most powerful men in post-revolutionary 
Iran.  Through his leadership of the Islamic Republic Party, he played an integral role in 
facilitating the militant clergy’s consolidation of power during the post-revolutionary 
power struggle that eventually led to the decimation of virtually all the other factions that 
united to make the revolution.  Furthermore, he was instrumental in the writing of the 
Islamic constitution and implementing it when he led the campaign to Islamize Iran’s 
judiciary, one of the most important power centers in the burgeoning Islamic system.  
                                                 
228 Mir Hossein Mousavi Facebook Page.  “Like clockwork - Co-opting political holidays”.  26 Nov 2009.  
Facebook Post. 
<https://www.facebook.com/mousavi/photos/a.172726419453.118347.45061919453/186592639453/?t
ype=3&theater>. 
229 There is still considerable debate about who carried out the bombing. The government blamed the 
MKO, which at the time was waging an armed struggle, of which suicide attacks, mail bombs, and hit-and-
run tactics were commonly deployed against the post-revolutionary clerical consolidation of power.  
Many, however, argue that regime insiders orchestrated the mass assassination as part of an internal 
power struggle.  Those who are of the latter opinion credit Rafsanjani with the bombing as part of 
campaign of eliminating his rivals, namely Beheshti. That he is believed to have been expected at the 
meeting but was absent or was present but left early gives some credence to the theory. 
  
 
 
87 
Killed in a bomb blast in 1981, the government has since lionized his 
“martyrdom” as a sacrifice for the Islamic system.230  Accordingly, “his martyrdom is 
trumpeted annually by the Islamic Republic in a commemoration ceremony open to the 
public—and as such, fully licensed.”231  In sum, the day provided the crowd with a legal 
loophole to gather in a climate where crowd action was otherwise forcefully prohibited. 
There could be no doubt that the commemoration enjoyed a large presence of 
Green Movement activists. After Beheshti’s son and a top Mousavi adviser, ʿAlireza, 
concluded his speech, the crowd broke out chanting “Greetings to Beheshti, Salutations 
to Mousavi” (dorūd bar beheshtī, salām bar mūsavī).232  By placing Mousavi’s name 
along that of Beheshti’s, the crowd subverted a day typically reserved for mourning one 
of the founding fathers of the system in order to denounce that very system.  That 
Beheshti was one of Khomeini’s most trusted lieutenants and a regime architect didn’t 
prevent the crowd from appropriating Beheshti’s legacy in order to present their case for 
Mousavi. What’s more, the state, with all its organizational and military capacity, was 
seemingly disarmed and unprepared to deal with the ingenuity of these Green Movement 
activists who legally seized the opportunity of Beheshti’s commemoration to register 
their protest. Indeed, had the government prevented the crowd from congregating at the 
Qoba mosque, it would have effectively disallowed people from “observing” the 
“martyrdom” of one of the regime’s most revered personalities.  The crowd transformed 
the anniversary into a rally, reminiscent of the pre-election atmosphere, as campaigners-
                                                 
230 Beheshti was the head of the Islamic Republican Party and spearheaded the campaign to Islamize 
Iran’s judiciary system. 
231 Mahtafar, Tara.  “Beheshti’s Ghost”.  Tehran Bureau.  28 June 2009.  Accessed 10 August 2010.  
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/beheshtis-ghost.html>. 
232 FreeIran4life.  “Front of Ghoba mosque in Tehran”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  28 June 2009.  
Accessed 10 August 2010.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7njmARTzzKU>. 
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turned-protesters raised their hands above their heads clapping and chanting in unison: 
“O’Husayn, Mir Hussein.”233   
When people heard the rumor that Mousavi had arrived, the “People, hands raised 
in the 'V' sign, as far as the eye could see in both directions down the street, [began] 
chanting pro-Mousavi slogans. The chorus spread like lightening, and indoors erupted as 
well with fervid chanting.”234  When they heard that mosque officials had barred him 
from entering the mosque compound, the crowd of 4,000 inside went onto the streets 
chanting, “Long live Karoubi, long live Mousavi.”235  Furthermore, marchers on Shariʿati 
Street leading up to the mosque shouted “Allahu akbar,” “Death to the dictator,” and 
“The Iranian will die before accepting humiliation and suffering” (īrānī mīmīrad, ẕellat 
nemīpazīrad).236  
George Rudé notes that slogans serve a particular function such as “to unify the 
crowd itself and to direct its energies toward precise targets and objectives.”237  The 
slogans help explain the crowd’s motives and the significance of the occasion “as [the 
slogans] may help to throw further light on the event itself and tell us something of the 
social and political aims of those that took part in it.”238  Indeed, the last slogan, “The 
Iranian will die before accepting humiliation and suffering,” especially underscores the 
efficacy of the crowd’s use of history. 
                                                 
233 Khajesharif.  “Yā hussein, mīr hussain – tajamoʿ-i eʿterāzāmīż-i mardom – masjīd-i qobā”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  28 June 2009.  Accessed 10 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/oney1QF03iM>. 
234 Mahtafar, Tara.  “Beheshti’s Ghost”.   
235 TheElection88.  “Karoobi among the people in Ghoba street”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  28 June 
2009.  Accessed 10 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/TZupydS90jY>. 
236 SamaniAli.  “Tehran Shariaty St. 28 June 2009”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  28 June 2009.  Accessed 
11 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/B2vjeXJk6Jc>. 
237 Rudé, pp. 245. 
238 Rudé, pp. 11. 
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The slogan was popularized during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, which 
attests to the degree of the crowd’s historical awareness and its ability to harness that 
history to its advantage.  In sum, they were using slogans from the Iranian Revolution on 
the day of the “martyrdom” of one of the founders of the product of the revolution—the 
Islamic Republic—in order to denounce a system in which its head is considered “the 
Leader of the Revolution.” In doing so, they contested the ownership of Beheshti’s 
anniversary and the slogans of the revolution in order to cast doubt on the state which in 
part rested its ideological legitimacy on that revolutionary history.   
The co-opting of Beheshti’s anniversary served as a key juncture in the unfolding 
of the protest movement. The state’s inability to prevent activists from gathering under 
such a political umbrella convinced organizers of the utility of such a tactic—one that 
was replicated in a more organized and systematic manner as the uprising continued 
sporadically in the coming months. In addition to political days on Iran’s calendar, such 
historically poignant slogans were also appropriated and turned against the regime—a 
common strategy revisited throughout the post-election turmoil.  The method carries 
enormous symbolic value as such slogans were once used to denounce dictatorship in 
1978-79, yet the crowd reprogrammed and re-deployed these profound and often poetic 
declarations in order to draw a parallel between then and 2009; that dictatorship endures 
in Iran and so does the resistance against it. 
 
VI.III. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of ‘Sacred’ Political Space: The 
Friday Sermon 
 
Sociologists such as Tilly stress the importance of ‘opportunity’ when 
understanding mobilization for collective action.  In the run-up to the election, the 
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occasion of the presidential campaigns prompted the temporary suspension of state 
repression thereby affording activists and campaigners the opportunity to mobilize.  A 
week after the election and consequent protests, however, Khamenei ordered a 
crackdown in an attempt to end street protests, which prompted the opposition to evolve 
and adapt to the reinstituted and more stifling security climate.  Yet, divisions at the top 
provided space to maneuver as political leaders within the state openly backed the 
opposition. 
 Parsa, referencing both Tilly and Korpi, opines that 
“Another key variable affecting mobilization and collective action, 
especially by groups with few resources, is the structure of opportunities, 
or balance of power, among contenders. In general, as the balance of 
power changes in favor of aggrieved groups over their adversaries, it 
increases the likelihood that such groups will instigate conflicts.  On the 
basis of this principle, the likelihood of insurgency by aggrieved but 
weakly organized groups increases under the following conditions: when 
weakly organized groups anticipate a favorable response from government 
authorities or are able to form alliances with more powerful groups, such 
as a segment of the dominant class. Such situations arise especially when a 
reformist government comes to power, promising social change, or when 
the dominance class is divided. Under such conditions, weak aggrieved 
groups will benefit from the resources and support of others to mobilize 
for action.”239  
 
Ayatollah ʿAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the billionaire “consummate insider”240 who 
in 2009 was the chairman of two powerful government institutions, the Expediency 
Council241 and the Assembly of Experts242, has long been one of the most politically and 
                                                 
239 Parsa, pp. 23-4. 
240 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 10, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI532_a.html. 
241 The main purpose of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System, or the Expediency Council in 
short, is to arbitrate between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The fate of legislation passed by 
the parliament but vetoed by the Guardian Council is decided by the Expediency Council.  The parliament-
approved legislation that contradicts Islamic law may still be ratified by the Expediency Council if that 
legislation is deemed to serve the greater good.  The governing principle is maṣlaḥat, or the interest of 
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financially powerful people in post-revolutionary Iran, and openly championed the 
opposition in defiance of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  In doing so, his support and that 
of many others within the government effectively meant that the government was not 
speaking with one voice with regards to the protest movement thereby creating the space 
for the movement to endure, which bore fruit on July 17, 2009.  Rafsanjani was permitted 
to give a Friday sermon in the country’s most important and politically sensitive Friday 
Prayer, the congregation hall at the University of Tehran.  His Friday sermon provided 
Green activists the opportunity to once again gather as they did with Beheshti’s 
anniversary and protest the election results and the state.  Alternative media sources 
advised activists to avoid wearing green armbands until they were inside—presumably to 
ensure admission into the hall—and to chant “the opposite” of the state-sanctioned 
slogans.243 That they did so during a Friday Prayer is also very telling of the larger 
historical prowess of the movement.  
 The nationwide mosque network was instrumental in mobilizing the population 
for the revolution in 1978-79, as it was with the Arab Uprisings of 2011 and beyond. The 
mosque has a natural organizing capacity—especially on Fridays when Muslims, pious or 
not244—congregate for Friday prayers.   Parsa argues that the mosque provided the 
militant clergy, their pious followers, and political allies the “autonomous organizations 
                                                                                                                                                 
the community. Some scholars of Islam have opined that the incorporation of such a principle has 
resulted in Iran’s Shiʿite system becoming “Sunnified” in this specific regard.  
242 The Assembly of Experts is a council of Islamic theologians who are vested with the power to appoint, 
and in theory, to dismiss the Supreme Leader. The council, for instance, was instrumental in appointing 
Khamenei to succeed Khomeini after his death in 1989.  
243 Chargé d’Affaires Don Lu, Baku, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., July 21, 2009,  Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BAKU575_a.html. 
244 One does not have to be “pious” to attend Friday prayers and some do so merely because of custom or 
to find solace. 
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and resources, communication networks, and favorable opportunities”245 to carry forth 
the revolution in 1978-79—a point affirmed by one contemporaneous dissident lawyer 
who contrasted his disadvantaged organizational capacity with that of the clergy:  
“We have not been allowed to form political parties. We have no 
newspapers of our own. But the religious leaders have a built-in 
communications system. They easily reach the masses through their 
weekly sermons in the mosques and their network of mullahs throughout 
the nation.”246 
 
 Parsa prophetically noted that the Islamist consolidation of power after the revolution 
and the subsequent state takeover of the mosques effectively meant that the nationwide 
mosque network could not serve as a launching pad for dissident activity as it did during 
the Iranian Revolution.247  Indeed, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the 
Office of the Supreme Leader is responsible for appointing all the Friday Prayer leaders 
of the country’s mosques. In doing so, the state ensures the political obedience of the 
imams and precludes the mosques from becoming centers of dissidence. One month after 
the elections in 2009, however, both divisions at the upper echelons of power and the 
organizational capacity of the mosque were exploited to once again facilitate protest 
activity.  
On July 17, 2009, in a bid to appease Rafsanjani and the opposition, the 
government allowed him, a staunch Mousavi supporter and bitter Ahmadinejad rival, to 
give the country’s main Friday sermon at the University of Tehran.  In addition to the 
presence of expected pro-regime attendees, countless opposition activists amassed under 
the cover of the Friday sermon to renew their denunciations of the election and the 
                                                 
245 Parsa, pp. 22-3. 
246 “The Shah’s Divided Land”. Time.  18 Sept 1978, pp. 35.  
247 Parsa, pp. 314. 
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system that ratified them.  That they did so using the pulpit and University of Tehran’s 
prayer hall only adds potency to their actions and demands. 
Inside, Rafsanjani invoked the Iranian Revolution, his role in that “sacred” 
history, and his proximity to Khomeini to authenticate his legitimacy and his critical 
words: 
“What you are hearing now is from a person who has been with the 
revolution moment by moment from the very beginning of the struggle, 
which our leader Imam [Khomeini] started. We are talking about 60 years 
ago until today. I know what the Imam wanted and am familiar with the 
basis of the Imam's thoughts.”248 
 
After invoking his revolutionary credentials to authenticate his words, he proceeded to 
discuss the election results and aftermath in a diplomatic manner that nevertheless 
favored the opposition: 
Doubt [about the election results] came down on our nation like the 
plague. Of course, there are two separate currents. There is a group of 
people who have no doubts… But there is also another group whose 
numbers are not few and include a great section of our erudite and 
knowledgeable people, who say: "We doubt." We should take measures to 
remove this doubt.”249 
 
The seasoned politician adept at balancing his interests—opposition towards the status 
quo but without undermining the system’s continuity and his political power—urged 
unity, the release of political prisoners, and a relaxation of the opposition’s media, all 
while beseeching attendees “to not contaminate the position and the sanctuary of Friday 
prayers by inappropriate comments and slogans,” to which the crowd responded with 
cries of “Freedom! Freedom!”250   
                                                 
248 Shabakeh-ye khabarī-ye tebiān-i īrān.  “Fīlm-i kāmel-i namāz jomʿeh-ye 26 tīr 1388”.  Online video clip.  
YouTube.  17 July 2009.  Accessed 20 August 2014.  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1OlYlESRDU>. 
249 Ibid. 
250 “Rafsanjani: Iran in crisis”.  Al Jazeera English.  17 June 2009.  Accessed 11 August 2010.  
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/07/200971793040418381.html>. 
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Although many activists were able to attend the sermon bringing the hall to full 
capacity, thousands more gathered outside.   Numerous sources attested to the vastness of 
the crowd.  One young participant, for example, observed that it was the largest Friday 
prayer gathering he had seen in his short life,251 while state media acknowledged the 
presence of hundreds of thousands252, and the opposition claimed that one million people 
attended.253  
Walking alongside the university, the crowd denounced Ahmadinejad’s victory by 
shouting “Liar, shame on you, leave the country” (dorūghgū, ḥayā kon, mamlekato rahā 
kon) and “O’Husayn, Mir Hussein.”  As they passed the university’s main gate, the 
crowd walked passed the police, who were in riot gear and standing guard behind an iron 
gate, prompting marchers to ask: “Brother soldier, why kill your brother?” (barādar 
arteshī, cherā barādar koshī?)254—a slogan from the Iranian Revolution particularly 
effective in sapping the morale of conscripts.  Indeed, protestors in 1978-79 famously 
marched passed soldiers posing this very same question as they pleaded with their fellow 
countrymen to avoid fratricide, causing many to defect to the revolutionary movement.255 
Invoking the bygone era, they also chanted “The canon, the tank, the basiji, no longer 
have an effect” (tūp, tānk, basījī, dīgar asar nadārad).256  The basij is the regime’s hard-
line paramilitary force used to violently disperse crowds and, under normal 
                                                 
251 V., Shahin.  Personal Interview. 
252 Timothy Richardson, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., July 20, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI293_a.html. 
253 Daragahi, Borzou and Ramin Mostaghim. “Tehran’s streets erupt after a key cleric speaks”. The Los 
Angeles Times. 18 July 2009 <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/world/fg-iran-prayer18>. 
254 Irsngreen1.  “namāz jomeʿh-ye tehrān dāneshgāh-i tehrān”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  17 July 2009.  
Accessed 11 August 2010.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRQQydgYBLU>. 
255 Keddie, Nikki. Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran.  New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1981, pp. 255. 
256 Irsngreen.  “namāz jomeʿh-ye tehrān dāneshgāh-i tehrān”.  Online video clip.   YouTube.  17 July 2009.  
Accessed 11 January 2014.  <http://youtu.be/IkgW44w9tuI>. 
  
 
 
95 
circumstances, serve as the country’s morality police and reserve force.257  “The canon, 
the tank, the machine gun, no longer have an effect” (tūp, tānk, mosalsal, dīgar asar 
nadārad)—the original slogan from the Iranian Revolution—was appropriated and re-
configured against the basij and the regime that used them to suppress the crowd.  
Such reprogramming of slogans from the Iranian Revolution demonstrates how 
the aims, meaning, and symbolism of the Iranian Revolution were being contested.  The 
state rests part of its legitimacy on the revolution that brought it to power, and it has 
drilled the population, especially the youth who were raised under its authority, in the 
images, symbols, slogans, and history of that revolution.  On the occasion of Rafsanjani’s 
Friday sermon, activists co-opted those revolutionary slogans and subverted them thereby 
infusing them with new meaning and purpose.  If those slogans were designed to oppose 
the Shah’s repression in 1978, then those slogans—slightly modified—now took aim at 
the Islamic government’s repression in 2009. What’s more, that they gave voice to such 
slogans during the occasion of a Friday Prayer, the quintessential Islamic space sacred to 
the Islamic Republic, further affirms that the Green Movement was determined to 
appropriate not just slogans important to the government, but even its public spaces—the 
very same ones that were used to mobilize the population for the Iranian Revolution that 
brought it to power.  
The government was privy to the opposition strategy of using the ‘opportunity’ of 
political and religious events to gather and give continuity to the movement and its 
demands, and responded in kind.  For instance, Khatami was scheduled to be the prayer 
                                                 
257 On the post-war mandate of the basij, see Ostovar, Afshon. Guardians of the Islamic Revolution: 
Ideology, Politics, and the Development of Military Power in Iran (1979–2009). (PhD Thesis). University of 
Michigan, 2009, pp. 140-2. 
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leader for the Night of Power (shab-i qadr in Persian, laylat al-qadr in Arabic), the night 
Muslims believe the first Qur’anic verses were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.  The 
annual event, which in 2009 fell on September 8, typically takes place at Khomeini’s 
shrine, a site of national and transnational importance run by his grandson, Hassan 
Khomeini—a supporter of the opposition.   
Reports abounded that the opposition was planning on using the event, as it did 
Rafsanjani’s sermon and the anniversary of Beheshti’s martyrdom, to “turn out in force 
as a show of strength.” 258   Consequently, the government put pressure on Hassan 
Khomeini to prevent Khatami from speaking in the hope that it could control the event at 
the expense of the opposition’s strategy. Thus, the government was embarrassed and 
infuriated when Khomeini refused to disallow Khatami from speaking and instead 
canceled the event259—a tradition which for the past two decades had been broadcast to 
the nation from Khomeini’s shrine. The state’s aim was not to cause the event’s 
cancellation, but only to deprive the opposition of the ‘opportunity’ to stage a “show of 
strength.”  That Khomeini shut down the event not only snubbed the government, but it 
prevented the authorities from presenting an image in which the post-election crisis was 
winding down and a sense of normalcy was returning to Iran.  
To ensure that there was no doubt behind the meaning of his decision to cancel 
the event, Hassan Khomeini, who sparked controversy after being absent from 
Ahmadinejad’s inauguration, subsequently visited Mousavi’s advisor—ʿAlireza 
                                                 
258 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., September 8 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI373_a.html. 
259 “Marāsem-i shab-i aḥyā-ye ḥaram-i khomeinī laghv shod”. Tabnak. 4 September 2009. 
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Beheshti—after his recent release from detention.260  Responding to the rebuke, state 
media along with allies in the conservative press attacked Khomeini, bemoaning: “The 
least that was expected was for you to not cancel the religious gathering at the holy shrine 
of the Imam for the sake of somebody like Khatami.”261 
Although the government also came out of the Night of Power incident bruised, it 
nevertheless succeeded in preventing the opposition from co-opting another state-
sanctioned event to gather and register its protest.  Days later, the government’s attempts 
to rob the opposition of another occasion for renewed protest met with continued success 
when it disallowed the annual commemoration of Ayatollah Taleqani’s death.  
Iranian Marxists often referred to Taleqani, a black-turbaned cleric, as the red-
turbaned cleric (ākhūnd-i ʿamāmeh qermez) to emphasize his populist worldview.262  The 
Mujahidin-i Khalq Organization, for instance, a group that during the revolutionary 
period blended Islamic monotheism with Marxist economic theory263, continues to refer 
to the revolutionary as “Father Taleghani.”264   
                                                 
260  Arash Motamed.  “Hamalāt-i jadīd-i kayhān va īrnā beh ḥassan khomeinī”. Rooz Online. 14 September 
2009. <http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/archive/2009/september/14/article/-
053a405c12.html>. 
261 Ibid. 
262 That Taleqani fused Islamic discourse with Marxist terminology certainly helped garner such a 
populous standing. Furthermore, Montazeri, who spent time with Taleqani in the Shah’s prisons, 
observed in his memoirs that Taleqani was exceptional in his warm relations with revolutionaries of 
various worldviews in prison.  See Montazeri, Hossein ʿAli. “Khāṭerāt: khāṭerātī rājeʿ beh zendegī-ye 
āyatollāh ṭāleqānī”. Los Angeles: Ketab Corp, 2001, pp. 381-82.  It’s important to also note that Taleqani’s 
son, Mojtaba, was a Mujahid who subsequently converted to Marxism. Rafiqdoost talks about Mojtaba’s 
problems with the regime after the revolution in some detail. See Rafiqdoost, Mohsen.  Barāye tārīkh 
mīgūyam: khāṭerāt-i moḥsen-i rafīqdūst (1978-1989). Tehran: Andisheh Press, 2013, pp. 83. Abrahamian 
documents Mojtaba’s letter to his father whereby he outlines his conversion in spectacular fashion. See 
Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 157-62.  
263 I refer to the MKO’s ideology in the past tense intentionally. The closer to western and Israeli 
intelligence agencies and American neo-conservatives the group has grown, the further it has moved 
away from the radical ideology of its founders, many of whom died for those beliefs waging an armed 
struggle against the monarchy.   See, Hersh Seymore. “Our Men in Iran?” The New Yorker. 5 April 2012. 
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/our-men-in-iran>. I also refuse to call them “Marxist-
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Taleqani, a principled and committed dissident who was a “symbol of 
revolutionary purity”265 and “commanded the streets of the capital,”266 was critical of the 
post-revolutionary clerical consolidation of power, opposed the imposition of the hijab—
a state mandate he believed was intended to prompt women to stay at home267—and 
specifically objected to the establishment of the vilāyat-i faqīh. 268   The first post-
                                                                                                                                                 
Islamists,” which was a propaganda label deployed by the Shah to attack and discredit the MKO as a 
group that was “eclectic” in its naïve and deviant blending of Islam and Marxism.  See Mohammad 
Shanehchi. Interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi, 4 March 1983, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History 
Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 2 (seq. 48). Accessed 30 April 2015. Massoud Rajavi, the MKO’s 
leader (along with his wife), argues that they are not only Muslims, but believers in the “true Islam,” and 
found it incredibly insulting when after the revolution Khomeini required Rajavi to profess his faith. Rajavi, 
despite the insult, wrote a letter affirming his belief via the shahada, which was subsequently published 
on the front page of various Iranian dailies as “The Mujahidin professes their faith.” Rajavi says that he 
accepted this insult in order to deprive Khomeini of the ability to accuse the MKO of unbelief.  See 
Massoud Rajavi. Interview recorded by Zia Sedghi, 29 May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History 
Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 1 (seq. 20). Accessed 23 April 2015.   
264 Rajavi, Maryam.  “On 4Mar, 100th anniversary of Father Taleghani's birth, true spirit of Iran's anti-
monarchical revolution, we honor his memory #iranelection”. 4 March 2010, 8:45 a.m. Tweet.  Massoud 
Rajavi likewise referred to him as “Father Taleqani,” as well as the MKO’s “spiritual father.” See Massoud 
Rajavi. Interview recorded by Zia Sedghi, 29 May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, 
Harvard University, Transcript 1 (seq. 20-1). Accessed 23 April 2015.   
265 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., September 8 2009,  Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI373_a.html.  
266 Butler, David, et al. “The Mullah’s Men”. Newsweek.  12 Feb 1979, pp. 47. Taleqani was so popular that 
he garnered the most votes in the country’s first election for the Assembly of Experts—the council tasked 
with drafting a new constitution.  See Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989, pp. 54-5.  His chief aide noted that Taleqani was especially close to university 
students, intellectuals, scholars and professors, with all of whom he was in constant contact through his 
Hedayat Mosque. It was such relationships, according to the aide, that set Taleqani apart from other 
clerics in terms of his thought, awareness, and understanding. Consequently, unlike other clerics, he 
never viewed the Marxists and secularists as his enemies. See Mohammad Shanehchi. Interview recorded 
by Habib Ladjevardi, 4 March 1983, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, 
Transcript 2 (seq. 35, 48). Accessed 30 April 2015.  
267 Talegani, Tahereh.  “Pedaram mokhālef-i ḥejāb-i ejbārī būd”. Rahesabz.  13 Sept 2013. 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/75520/#taheretaleghani>. 
268 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: bakhshī az khāṭerāt-i faqīh va marjʿa ʿalīqadr hażrat-I āyatollāh al’oẓmā 
montaẓerī”, pp. 455-8. Taleqani’s death after the election, however, removed a major obstacle to 
enshrining the vilāyat-i faqīh in the Islamic constitution.  Consequently, his untimely death has prompted 
some to believe that hardliners killed him to facilitate their consolidation of power.  Shanehchi details the 
suspicious circumstances regarding Taleqani’s death by heart attack. See Mohammad Shanehchi. 
Interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi, 4 March 1983, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, 
Harvard University, Transcript 2-3 (seq. 53-62). Accessed 30 April 2015. 
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revolutionary Friday prayer leader of Tehran,269 Taleqani died less than a year following 
the revolution after being “frequently ill, apparently due to torture suffered in nearly 15 
years of imprisonment under the regimes of the shah and his father.”270  To this day, he 
continues to epitomize an Islamic revolutionary ideal that transcends the rigidity of 
clerical rule in Iran.  Consequently, the Islamic government in 2009 feared that the annual 
commemoration of his life and his legacy would result in another opportunity for anti-
regime protest, and required for the first time in 30 years that Taleqani’s family obtain 
permission to hold the gathering, which was expectedly denied upon his granddaughter’s 
official request.271 
The government willingly insulted its previous presidents such as Khatami, or the 
iconic personalities of its revolution, including Taleqani—a man many called the “Father 
of the Nation”272—because of the overriding necessity to prevent the protest movement 
from enduring through such opportune annual events.  The inescapable problem for the 
government, however, was that it had programmed too many such events into Iran’s 
political calendar and not all could be cancelled.  
 
VI.IV. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of the Past: The Anniversary of 
the US Embassy Takeover 
 
                                                 
269 Ibid, 441-443. This is an especially noteworthy point as it was the first time in the modern period in 
which the Friday prayer leader also gave a khutba, or sermon.  According to Montazeri, clerics disallowed 
such sermons before the Islamic Republic, arguing that sermons were only permitted in the instance of 
just leadership. Thus, when the revolution toppled the unjust monarch thereby facilitating the emergence 
of an Islamic government, so the argument goes, it was permissible to reinstitute Friday prayers complete 
with sermons. Also, see Fischer, Michael.  Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980, pp. 217.  
270 “Iran grief-stricken over Taleghani’s death”.  The Jerusalem Post. 11 Sept 1979, pp. 4. 
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 Iran’s political calendar has an abundance of holidays in which the Iranian 
government encourages its supporters to stage demonstrations in order to underscore its 
popular support and revolutionary roots. Mass rallies are especially important because 
they were the cornerstone by which millions of Iranians demanded the revolutionary 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1978-79, and the post-revolutionary government 
orchestrates such rallies to invoke the legacy of the popular movement thereby affirming 
its own revolutionary history and legitimacy.  On November 4, 2009, however, Green 
Movement activists again used the occasion of a political holiday to renew their protest.   
The security climate, in full force since Khamenei delivered his first Friday sermon 
exactly one week after the June 12th elections, was relaxed in order to encourage 
government supporters to participate in the mass rally marking the anniversary of the US 
embassy seizure.  Green Movement activists exploited the opportunity afforded to them 
by the temporary lifting of the ban against street gatherings and poured onto the streets to 
use the state’s symbolism against itself.  Once again, the historical backdrop behind the 
US embassy seizure is important in understanding the gravity of the activists’ challenge 
on that day. 
In 1953, in concert with the British and the Iranian army, the American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) staged the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq.  The US embassy in Tehran served as the base of operations for Operation 
Ajax.273    Twenty-six years later the Shah, then in exile less than a year after the 
revolution’s triumph, was admitted into the US for cancer treatment on October 22, 1979, 
provoking concern among revolutionaries that the US wanted to repeat history in Iran by 
                                                 
273 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Patrick Moon, Kathmandu, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
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overthrowing the new revolutionary order and re-installing the ousted monarch.  
Revolutionary forces were especially alarmed after the publication of pictures showing a 
meeting between moderate Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Foreign Minister 
Ibrahim Yazdi with President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, in Algiers.274  Fearing that the meeting and the arrival of the Shah into the US 
indicated another covert American plan for yet another coup in Iran, radical students 
breached the walls of the US embassy on November 4, 1979.  After initially releasing 
some of the staff, 52 American personnel were held for 444 days.  Khomeini did not 
order the attack, but its popularity prompted his endorsement for the capture of what he 
came to call “the Nest of Spies” 275—a label that has become part of the official lexicon 
of the state.276  Khomeini initially planned to use the hostages as a bargaining chip to 
pressure the Carter administration to return the Shah277, who at the time of the embassy 
seizure was in New York for cancer treatment.278 Khomeini failed to secure the Shah’s 
return to Iran to stand trial, yet he refused to order the release of the hostages even after 
the Shah left the US, as the hostages had become pawns in the post-revolutionary power 
struggle.  Thus, when the moderates within the government were unable to have the 
embassy personnel released, they resigned from their positions marking what Khomeini 
referred to as the “Second Revolution” and a milestone in the Islamist takeover of all the 
reigns of political power.    
                                                 
274 Keddie, Nikki R.  Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran.  New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1981, pp. 262. 
275 It is also often translated as “Den of Spies.”  
276 “13 ābān-i emsāl porkhorūsh tar az hamīsheh sīlī-ye mellat, ashk-i āmrīkā rā darāvard”. Kayhan.  4 Nov 
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Since 1979, marking the anniversary of the embassy seizure has been a state-
sanctioned event to highlight the ongoing struggle with the US and imperialism. The day, 
officially known as “National Struggle Against Global Arrogance Day,”279 is designed to 
shed light on America’s interventionist role in pre-revolutionary Iran, the Middle East, 
and the wider world and to underscore the Iranian state’s revolutionary anti-imperialist 
credentials280 while also emphasizing Iran’s “will to remain independent.”281  November 
4, 2009, however, proved to be a unique day in the history of its commemoration. 
Weeks before the event, organizers and supporters were preparing to co-opt and 
subvert the event, which the government could not prevent through cancellation because 
it was a national event and a fixture in the state’s political calendar. The Mousavi 
campaign used social media three weeks in advance to inform supporters who were able 
to circumvent government filters of the necessity to come out by the millions.282 With 
official media either not covering Green protests or presenting such demonstrations in a 
negative light, the campaign urged voters to spread the news of the forthcoming event as 
“you are the media.”283  
While thousands came out in solidarity with the regime and against the US and 
imperialism, a large crowd congregated at Haft-i Tir Square to continue protesting both 
the election results and the regime that ratified them. They did so as the first major anti-
                                                 
279 “13 ābān-i emsāl porkhorūsh tar az hamīshe sīlī-ye mellat, ashk-i āmrīkā rā darāvard”. Kayhan.  4 Nov 
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regime gathering in nearly two months284 and despite the Revolutionary Guards warning 
that the “Iranian nation will not allow any group to impose itself and use diversionary and 
false slogans on 13 Aban [Nov. 4].”285   
With green ribbons tied to their wrists and clenched in their hands, they once 
again appropriated and subverted slogans from the revolution strategically switching key 
operative words to make new slogans: “The canon, the tank, Kahrizak 286  [detention 
center], no longer have an effect” (tūp, tānk, kahrīzak, dīgar asar nadārad).287  They used 
yet another slogan from the revolution to attack the head of the Guardian Council, the 
conservative body that affirmed the election results: “Damn you Jannati, you are the 
nation’s enemy” (jannatīye la’natī, to doshman-i mellatī). 288  The original slogan 
                                                 
284 The last major demonstration until November 4 occurred during the Quds Day rallies on September 
18—the subject of the next chapter.  
285 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., November 2, 2009, Wikileaks, 
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a potential fate. See Timothy Richardson, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al, July 27, 2009, 
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May 2015. https://goo.gl/iE14n0. “‘Rāmīn āqāzādeh’ chahāromīn qorbānī-ye kahrīzak moʿarefī shod”. 
Kaleme. 23 Jan 2010. Accessed 13 May 2015. <http://www.kaleme.com/1388/11/03/klm-9298/>; Alan 
Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., January 12, 2010, Wikileaks, 
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unequivocally stated: “Shah you American, you are God’s enemy” (ey shāh-i emrīkāyī, to 
doshman-i khodāyī).   
Instead of the typical anti-American slogans, the crowd usurped Khomeini’s 1979 
rhetoric in order to condemn one of the few countries that congratulated Ahmadinejad’s 
victory: “The Russian embassy is ‘the Nest of Spies’” (lāneh-ye jāsūsīyeh, sefārat-i 
rūsīyeh).289   Green activists specifically targeted Russia since their neighbor to the north 
was perceived to be protecting the regime.290 
What’s more, the marchers brazenly shouted, “Khamenei is a murderer, his 
authority is null and void” (khāmeneī qāteleh, velāyatash bāṭeleh)291, and committed acts 
that were illegal and simply unfathomable before the post-election turmoil.  In one such 
incident, the crowds chanted “O’Husayn, Mir Hussein,” as one protestor climbed atop a 
billboard of Khamenei and tore it down to loud cheers and hands raised.292    
They even took aim at the physicality of Khamenei’s body, of which his right arm 
lost its function after a mail bomb nearly claimed his life during the post-revolutionary 
power struggle when many of the Islamic Republic’s early leadership died in bomb 
blasts, hit-and-run operations, and even suicide attacks.293  His disabled right arm is a 
potent reminder that he derives his revolutionary credentials not only through his 
proximity to the Iranian Revolution’s undisputed leader, Khomeini, but also from the fact 
that he physically contributed to the struggle by serving considerable time as a dissident 
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in the Shah’s prisons and surviving a near-death assassination attempt that caused 
permanent injury to his arm. So important are such political bona fides that he poignantly 
and in a cracking voice invoked his ailment in the closing remarks of his first post-
election sermon, which he gave at the height of the crisis to a sobbing audience: “I have 
only my humble life. My body is handicapped. I have a good name that you have 
bestowed upon me, and I am ready to sacrifice all I have for the sake of Islam and the 
revolution…”294  It is precisely this nobility in physical suffering that protesters on the 
“National Struggle Against Global Arrogance Day” challenged through mockery, 
shouting: “Our Leader is a jack ass, crippled in one arm” (rahbar-i mā olāgheh, ye 
dastesham cholāqeh).295 To put it plainly, they ridiculed his injury in order to discredit 
those very physical and revolutionary credentials that affirmed his political legitimacy.  
Khamenei’s authority and stature was theoretically above the factionalized 
politics of the state, yet he intertwined his political standing with Ahmadinejad the 
moment he endorsed his election “victory.”  Thus, although the slogans after the first 
week of the elections were directed against the results and Ahmadinejad’s persona, 
Khamenei—Khomeini’s successor as “the Leader of the Revolution”—also became the 
target of the Green Movement’s wrath ever since his Friday sermon, especially as the 
protests endured in the months after the June 12th vote.  By the anniversary of the 
embassy seizure, Khamenei, as the personification of the state that ratified the election 
results, nearly supplanted Ahmadinejad insomuch as he bore the brunt of activists’ 
slogans, anger, and subversive zeal. 
                                                 
294 Khamenei, ʿAli. “Khoṭbehhāyeh namāz jomʿeh-ye tehrān ”. leader.ir. 19 June 2009. 
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In contrast to the Quds Day protests, crowds were not entirely free to use the 
cover of the occasion to protest without experiencing violent reprisals.296  Indeed, there 
was a noticeable increase in the degree to which the state was willing to forcefully 
repress crowds.  Security forces, working in tandem with Revolutionary Guards, police, 
and Basij units, deployed tear gas, clubbed protesters with batons, and even shot into the 
air in a bid to prevent large crowds from congregating.297  Zeynab, a 22-year-old student, 
attested: “We started our protest very peacefully but riot police attacked us with batons 
and teargas on our way in Vali-e-Asr Street. I saw people who were bleeding badly from 
the head.”  Another participant stated, "They chased us down a dead end.  We were all 
crushed together and the riot police shot something like five teargas canisters into the 
alley." 298   Even Karroubi, who attended the opposition rallies, was tear-gassed and 
slightly burned by a canister.299  Without a doubt, the increased repression signaled the 
state’s growing frustration with a movement that persisted in its refusal to accept the 
election results as  fait accompli. 
Nevertheless, protests were reported in Rasht, Isfahan, Zahedan, Kermansha, 
Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz, which saw its first large protests in months, and, of course, 
Tehran—the focal point of the street movement against the state.300  While there is no 
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verifiable data with regards to the numbers of demonstrators that braved the regime’s 
threats, estimates range from tens of thousands to as much as a million.301 
 The ability of the Green Movement to produce such numbers is even more 
impressive considering the timing of 2009’s “National Struggle Against Global 
Arrogance Day.”  One of the most noteworthy successes of November 4, 2009, was the 
fact that it showed to both the state and many Green sympathizers—the “fence-sitters”—
that given the opportunity, protesters will take to the streets to renew their demands even 
after long gaps between days of action—the last day of mass protest, Quds Day, took 
place 7 weeks prior and nearly 5 months since the June 12 election.  
Iran’s political calendar provided many opportunities for crowd action but often 
times the days fell far apart from one another.  The month of December, however, 
afforded ample openings for the political crowd.  The first, Student Day, was on 
December 7 and it provided a natural day of spirited defiance since it was born of radical 
protest.  The second was the passing of a major regime critic and one of the most senior 
religious leaders in Iran and the wider Shiʿite Muslim world, Ayatollah Montazeri.  The 
last and the climax of crowd action in December took place on Tasuʿa and ʿAshura, the 
anniversary of the death of Imam Husayn and his valiant half-brother, which in 2009 
fatefully fell on December 26-7 and coincided with the 7-day mourning period for 
Montazeri’s passing. 
  
VI.V. The Crowd and the Symbolic Appropriation of the Past: Student Day 
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 Iran has a long and rich history of student activism that even transcends Iran’s 
national borders.302  In Iran, the site of contestation and repression, vanguard student 
activism inspired, affirmed, and echoed the voices of the wider populace.  As with 
mosques in the pre-revolutionary period, high schools and universities—especially the 
latter—provided a natural venue for organization, leadership, and collective action: 
“Schoolteachers were a social group that played a brief but significant role 
in the conflicts of the early 1960s. The unique position of teachers gives 
them the potential to influence political processes through their contact 
with students, who are often very active politically in developing societies. 
Student networks have linkages with other elements of society and can be 
activated during times of conflict. These networks are often critical in 
forming coalitions and escalating conflicts.”303 
 
It is also important to note that the university provides an environment conducive to the 
exchange of ideas. For many, it was through their newly established friendships with 
fellow radical students that enabled them to get access to banned literature that they 
shared amongst one another in secret.  The university not only provided a natural venue 
by which students established social networks and organized politically, but on a more 
basic level it facilitated the relatively free flow of radical ideas in the first place.  For 
example, one Marxist Feda’i activist, ʿAlireza Mahfoozi, was able to further develop his 
militant ideas through his tenure as a university student where such information was more 
readily accessible.304  Consequently, the university served as a hotbed through which 
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many students nurtured their subversive ideas and formed organizations in order to 
mobilize for revolutionary upheaval. 
A biographer of the Shah notes that university activism was so powerful that the 
teachers’ strike of 1961 “left an indelible mark on the Shah’s political psyche, as well as 
on the Kennedy administration’s perception of the internal situation in Iran.”305  What’s 
more, in exile after revolution, the Shah expressed his bitter disdain of student activism, 
which he in large part blamed for the tumult that led to his ouster: 
“Today I have come to realize that the events of 1978-79 are attributable 
in part to the fact that I moved too rapidly in opening the doors of the 
universities, without imposing a more severe preliminary selection. The 
entrance exams were too easy… Some of our students were not prepared 
to face so many novelties. They lacked the spiritual maturity to confront 
the apparent ease of their new lives. Sometimes they slid into laziness but 
most often took to confrontation and disputation. They had received so 
much without any effort that appeared natural to them to claim ever more. 
Like spoiled children, these students caused so many confrontations that 
Iranian universities finally sank into anarchy.”306 
 
 The Shah was justified for giving radical students partial credit for the revolution. 
The efficacy and potency of student activism reached a crescendo by the time of the 
revolution when university students and faculty came together to form the National 
Organization of Universities in 1978 in order to mobilize for the revolution.  So 
instrumental was their role in the revolution that they helped sustain the oil strike that 
brought the Shah’s state, which was highly dependent on oil sales, to its “knees,”307 when 
“…The National Organization of Universities requested all university employees to 
contribute one day’s salary to striking oil workers.” 308   Even the estimated 100,000 
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Iranians studying abroad took part in the revolutionary mobilization by forming a “vocal 
vanguard against the Shah in almost every major city in the [Western] world, airing their 
opposition with slogans in the London subway or demonstrations in Los Angeles, 
Washington or New York City.”309 
 The clerical government, keenly aware of the critical role Iran’s universities 
played in the making of the revolution, sought to neutralize that historic bastion of anti-
state radicalism immediately after the revolution.  Thus, the newly established Cultural 
Revolutionary Council, despite the opposition of Iran’s first president, Abolhassan Bani 
Sadr, sought to eliminate rival centers of power by ordering the closure of the nation’s 
universities in what effectively amounted to a systematic purge of leftist university 
students and faculty.310 Two years later when the universities reopened, Khomeini ruled 
that only those students without affiliations to foreign ideologies would be permitted to 
enter. 311   So disruptive was this purge to the organizational capacity of the student 
movement that when workers’ unions were subsequently attacked during the clerical 
consolidation of power, “the students could offer little assistance because they had 
already been partially demobilized by the closure of the universities.312 
                                                 
309 “The Shah’s Divided Land”.  Time.  18 Sept 1978, pp. 36.   
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 After the purge, the Islamic government implemented a two-pronged approach to 
ensure that Iran’s universities would not revert to their historical legacy of revolutionary 
activity: 
“The obvious approach has been to crack down on any student 
movement that has the gall to publicly challenge the government, 
whether by expelling protesting students, arresting and jailing them, or 
shutting down their newspapers and limiting their speech. The other 
approach has been to populate universities with the children of the 
children of the revolution, with the Basij, and with underprivileged and 
deeply religious youths from working-class families: exactly the kinds of 
people that the government can reasonably rely on to counter any threat 
to an Islamic Republic that has taken extremely good care of its own. 
And reliable they are, for every time a student pro-democracy movement 
crops up on any campus, other Islamic student organizations are there to 
challenge it, even violently.”313 
 
Perhaps nothing is more telling of the importance the Iranian government places on the 
political and social utility of the university than when the state established the country’s 
foremost Friday prayer hall at the University of Tehran.  That the Islamic government 
created a sacred space for Iran’s most important Friday Prayers314 at the University of 
Tehran of all places attests to the clerical desire to ensure that the Islamic forces have an 
undisputed presence in Iran’s most politically influential university.  Every Friday, 
thousands of the regime’s most hard-line supporters congregate at the University of 
Tehran, an institution with a potent pre-revolutionary legacy of radical activism.  Despite 
the government’s attempts to stifle student activism, including purges of the university 
system, the establishment of a Friday Prayer Hall in Iran’s most activist university, the 
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policy of granting admission and scholarships to students from within the ranks of its 
supporters, and more the state has not been entirely successful in diminishing university-
wide anti-government activism.  The student uprising in 1999 and student protests in 
2003, for example, serve as reminders that student dissent endured in the face of the 
government’s best efforts.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that universities were one 
of the early centers of the uprising against the election results, and consequently one of 
the first targets of the regime’s subsequent crackdown.  Specifically, at least 12 students 
were killed on June 14, 2009, when government paramilitaries forcefully tried to quell a 
“wave of campus rebellions” in Tabriz, Isfahan, Hamedan, Babol, Kermanshah, 
Amirkabir University (Tehran), the University of Tehran and the University of Shiraz, 
both of which stood above their counterparts in producing “martyrs.”315 
By December, 2009, when the government overran the streets with security 
personnel while maintaining its decades-long control of the mosques—the nationwide 
institution that provided the Iranian Revolution with its organizational and mobilizing 
capacity—the universities filled the void and kept the flame of the protest movement 
burning.  In particular, activists on Student Day (December 7, 2009) organized the largest 
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and most coordinated nationwide student protests since the closure of Iran’s universities 
in 1980.  As with before, University of Tehran warrants specific mention, as it was the 
university that served as the vanguard of protest activity in 2009. 
 Iran’s first modern institute for higher learning, University of Tehran, was 
founded in 1934.  Like other Iranian universities, University of Tehran has served as a 
“hotbed of political activism and protest since inception.”316  Its reputation for radicalism 
was cemented after British and American intelligence agencies overthrew Premier 
Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953.  
Three months after the overthrow, then Vice President Richard Nixon came to 
Iran to show the Eisenhower administration’s full support for the coup government317—a 
visit that kindled the Shah’s enduring friendship with one of the most controversial 
American presidents in US history. 318   Nixon’s endorsement of the Shah’s regime, 
however, outraged an already aggrieved populace and that anger manifested itself at 
Iran’s universities, of which the University of Tehran served as the main bastion of 
agitation.  Protests on December 6-7 led to the deaths of three students at the University 
of Tehran’s Faculty of Engineering (FOE).319  It was Iran’s Kent State massacre, or rather 
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the massacre at Kent State was America’s University of Tehran massacre (the tragic 
killings in Tehran predate the Kent State shootings by 16 years).  Since that turbulent 
year, December 7th (shānzdah-i āẕar or shūnzdah-i āẕar in colloquial Persian) has been 
unofficially marked as Student Day and is commemorated “as a symbol of the struggle of 
Iranian students against dictatorship.”320   
Throughout much of Iran’s twentieth century history (from the consolidation of 
Reza Shah’s rule in 1921 onwards), a strong central government stifled political 
activity.321  One student activist, however, attested to the important role of the university 
in such a climate:  
“You realize that outside of the universities, there was practically no 
political movement. That is, the strangulation and surveillance which had 
been introduced, which the regime had introduced in all official spheres, 
was very heavy… The only place it couldn’t completely control was the 
university, since the university was principally a place of gatherings…”322 
 
In keeping with the legacy of 1953 and exploiting the universities’ resource in which the 
organizational capacity and the proximity of students to one another provided a unique 
environment for coordination, each Student Day was marked by student demonstrations 
that raged across Iran’s university campuses.  One student who studied at the same 
Faculty of Engineering in the 1970s affirmed the endurance of student activism: 
“In the 1970s, when I was a student in the FOE, we always 
commemorated 16 Azar [7 December]. My freshman year in 1972-1973 
also coincided with the 10th anniversary of the Shah's so-called White 
Revolution of February 1973. The year before, 16 Azar was particularly 
                                                                                                                                                 
appealed to these students who felt that such worldviews spoke to their plight or that of their families 
they left behind to attend college. That engineering is so math-intensive certainly helped many of these 
students understand Marx’s Das Kapital. As is often the case, the truth as to why engineering students in 
Iran are so political probably lies somewhere in between the two theories.  
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powerful and marked by large demonstrations at the University of Tehran. 
The demonstrations in 1974 were so large that the engineering faculty was 
shut down for the entire 1974-1975 year. In 1975, two of my classmates, 
Mohammad Ali Bagheri and Hamid Aryan, who had started their studies 
at the FOE in the same year that I had, were killed by the Shah's security 
forces. In fact, many of my contemporaries in the FOE were jailed or 
killed, either by the Shah's regime or the Islamic Republic after the 1979 
Revolution.”323  
 
After the revolution, the Islamic regime officially recognized Student Day in an attempt 
to control its message; the state preferred to circumvent the day’s legacy of fiery anti-
government revolutionary activity in favor of a more “perfunctory occasion during which 
senior officials typically visit campuses and give speeches about the importance of 
students and higher education to Iran’s future.”324 In 2009, however, radical students re-
appropriated the day in order to denounce the regime.  The first Student Day after the 
election results, therefore, promised to be a day of fiery protest.   
Expectedly, the government was well aware of the potential for anti-state protests 
and implemented measures to prevent or control the day’s event as much as possible.  It 
placed between two to three “guards” at university entrances to prevent non-students 
from entering universities and using the opportunity of Student Day to augment the 
anticipated student crowds.325  Moreover, several streets were closed as security teams of 
three to four stood around Tehran’s universities while security personnel patrolled the 
area by motorcycle.326   In contrast to the pre-election climate where the restrictions on 
mediums of communication such as the Internet were relaxed in order to encourage voter 
interest and participation in the election, the mobile phone network and text messaging 
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were brought down on Student Day and the Internet was “sluggish and heavily filtered” 
to prevent activist coordination and transmitting non-state sanctioned news and 
information abroad.327  Furthermore, in the run-up to the event, pro-Ahmadinejad media 
announced that they planned to air the confession of Abdollah Momeni, a prominent 
student leader imprisoned since June 21—two days after Khamenei’s June 19th sermon. 
That the release of the purported “confession” was scheduled for Student Day prompted 
Momeni’s wife to argue that the government’s aim was to inspire “fear” among students 
ahead of their quintessential day of protest.328 
Coinciding with the government’s efforts, students around the country had been 
preparing since their last day of mass action, November 4th329, to transform Student Day 
into a “Green Student Day”330 and renew their protest.331  Likewise, Mousavi anticipated 
mass action when he attested to the historical importance of the day and what it meant for 
post-election Iran: 
“University Student day is ahead of us. In our modern history the student 
movement has always been the flag-bearers and has acted as the reason 
and purpose for people’s movement. During the bitter days following the 
coup, and in some of the darkest times in the history of our nation when all 
hope seemed to be lost, what happened in the 16th of Azar of 1332 
(December 7 of 1953) was a clear sign that the spirit of people and their 
historical demands are still alive. Those ‘three drops of blood’ and ‘three 
godly Azar’ that created a basis for the University student day are after 
half a century later still a vivid and enlightening reminder in the memory 
of the people because they signified the existence of greater reality in the 
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lives of the people. In the years and generations that followed these signs 
were maintained through the student movements and still does.”332 
 
Thus, December 7, 2009, despite government measures, became a day when university 
students around the country used their campuses as springboards to give continuity to the 
Green Movement and to denounce the Islamic government.   
 Most of the demonstrations shared similar attributes.  They all happened on 
school premises and virtually all the participants were students, men and women alike.  
Security personnel, sometimes unsuccessfully, blocked the entrances in order to both 
ensure that non-students could not join the protests and swell their numbers and to 
prevent the protests from spilling onto the streets.  Furthermore, many of the protests 
included the singing of a particularly significant political song: “My grade-school friend” 
(yār-i dabestānī-ye man). 
 The song was first sung in a revolution-era political film titled "From Cry to 
Terror” and its “stirring lyrics epitomize the country's longstanding struggle for 
freedom…”333  
My schoolmate 
You're with me and going along with me  
The alphabet stick is above our heads 
You're my spite and my woe 
Our names have been carved 
On the body of this blackboard 
The stick of injustice and tyranny 
Still remains on our body 
 
This uncivilized plain of ours 
Is covered with weeds 
Good, if good 
Bad, if bad 
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Dead is the hearts of its people 
My hand and yours 
Should tear up these curtains 
Who can, except you and I 
Cure our pain? 
 
My schoolmate 
You're with me and going along with me  
The alphabet stick is above our heads 
You're my spite and my woe 
Our names have been carved 
On the body of this blackboard 
The stick of injustice and tyranny 
Still remains on our body.334 
 
“My grade-school friend” first became prevalent during the presidency of Mohammad 
Khatami, and reached an unprecedented level of popularity during the post-election 
turmoil as it became “Iran's resistance anthem par excellence.”335  Although the people 
sang the song at many junctures throughout the 2009 protests, on Student Day it became 
alma mater of all universities in observance of December 7th.  Through the lyrics, crowds 
of students commonly conveyed their contempt for the government in a single melodic 
voice.   
 Dressed in green and with faces covered to conceal their identities, students at the 
University of Tehran marched while singing the song and clapping their hands above 
their heads in rhythm with the anthem.336  At Islamic Azad University, students walked in 
a large circle on the campus courtyard singing the alma mater while clapping. 337  
Students at Shahid Beheshti University filled an auditorium and clapped and sang along 
                                                 
334 “An Iranian Revolutionary Song: My Schoolmate (Yar-e Dabestani-e Man)”. Payvand News.  15 June 
2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://payvand.com/news/09/jun/1152.html>. 
335 Ibid. 
336 GREENPOWER0.  “Tehran uni protest 7dec/sorūd-i yār-i dabestānī dāneshgāh-i tehrān16āẕar”.  Online 
video clip.  YouTube.  7 December 2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/Myn_Cm6bgZI>. 
337 Mowjcamp.  “16 Azar, Azad University “Tehran Shomal”.  Online video clip.  YouTube. 7 December 
2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/ZdIVmrKEZGI>. 
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to a slideshow that featured the song.  The slideshow ended in defiance of Iran’s 
theocratic system by displaying Iran’s Islamic flag without the Islamic Allah emblem in 
the center, causing the audience to cheer.338  The Islamic government changed Iran’s 
historic flag339 replacing the lion and sun motif with that of “Allah” shaped like a tulip, 
the symbol of martyrdom in Shiʿism.  
That students sang the “resistance anthem” culminating in an image of the Iranian 
flag that was deprived of the Islamic Republic’s emblem—the symbol that represented its 
authority over Iran—attests to the Green Movement’s negation of the system’s 
ideological foundation. Indeed, students coupled “My grade-school friend” with a variety 
of slogans, banners, and acts of defiance in order to display their rejection of the state’s 
authority and legitimacy through the repudiation of its symbols. 
Students at Qazvin University marched behind a banner that proclaimed, “The 
university is alive” (dāneshgāh zendeh ast), as they chanted: “Rape, treachery, death to 
[Khamenei’s] authority” (tajāvoz, jenāyat, marg bar īn velāyat).340  Merely declaring that 
“The university is alive” is a profound statement given the state’s systematic attempts to 
consolidate its hold over the university system and suppress free thought in order to foster 
obedience. One university student who was expelled for her Green Movement activism 
expanded on the meaning of “The university is alive,” by affirming, “It means that if they 
[the government] can stifle thoughts and ideas everywhere, the university will remain 
                                                 
338 Farhad50626.  “Taẓāhorāt-i dāneshjūyān-i dāneshgāh-i shahīd beheshtī dar rūz-i 16 āẕar”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube. 7 December 2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/_IuUoFzD7bw>. 
339 Many Iranians mistakenly believe that Iran’s Lion and Sun flag belongs to the Pahlavi Dynasty.  The flag 
in fact predates the dynasty, and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi affirmed in his autobiography that the 
Lion and Sun flag “does not date from our dynasty, under whose folds millions of Iranians have sacrificed 
themselves during many centuries…”  (Pahlavi, pp. 190). 
340 IranFree88.  “Dāneshgāh-i qazvīn 16 āẕar”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  7 December 2009.   Accessed 
13 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/2kUOh1fzWWI>. 
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defiant in safeguarding those thoughts and ideas.”341 In “safeguarding” that freedom of 
thought and resistance in the face of government repression, students at Najafabad 
University gathered to voice their support for Mousavi and declared that “torture, rape, 
no longer have an effect” (shekanjeh, tajāvoz, digar asar nadārad).342   
What’s more, students at Hamedan University reassured one another by chanting 
“Don’t be afraid, we are all together” (natarsīn, natarsīn, mā hāmeh bā hām hastīm) and 
wished “death upon the Basiji” (marg bar basījī).343  At Polytechnic University, students 
shouting “Allahu akbar” tore down the gate that separated them from the crowd outside 
and chanted for the outsiders to “come in” (bīyā tū). 344   Students at Science and 
Technology University threatened: “We are men and women of war, fight with us so we 
fight!” (mā zan o mard-i jangīm, bejang tā bejangīm!)345  Indeed, on Student Day, the 
students responded to Khamenei’s crackdown with their own militancy as even the father 
of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, was not exempt from rebuke and suffered 
the indignity of having his picture torn up346—a highly inflammatory and illegal act in 
post-revolutionary Iran that signified the total rejection of Iran’s Islamic system.347 
                                                 
341 T., Golnar. Personal interview.  22 October 2013. 
342 GREENPOWER0.  “Taẓāhorāt-i dāneshjūyān-i dāneshgāh-i najafābād 16 aẕār”.  Online video clip.  
YouTube.  7 December 2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/7Kr1BPVWlnI>. 
343 Freedom Messenger.  “Dāneshgāh-i abū ʿali-i hamadān 16 aẕār”.  Online video clip.  YouTube. 14 
December 2009.  Accessed 24 April 2014.  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4R4PCwFiQAc>. 
344 Ghovaza.  “VIDE0524”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  7 December 2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  
<https://youtu.be/qG5xM8YTRng>. 
345 IranFree88.  “Dāneshgāh-i ʿelm o sanʿat 16 aẕār”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  7 December 2010.  
Accessed 12 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/u54Hva9a_eI>. 
346 “Desecration of Imam Khomeini portrait sparks protests”.  PressTV.  12 Dec 2009.  Accessed 14 August 
2010. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=113544&sectionid=351020101>.  There is considerable 
controversy surrounding this “desecration,” with some activists arguing that the regime staged the whole 
episode so as to incriminate the opposition while rallying regime supporters to counter such sacrilege.  
347 It warrants mentioning that opposition leaders alleged that the state staged the tearing of Khomeini’s 
picture in order to discredit the opposition.  Having said that, I do believe that there were strands within 
the Green Movement that were indeed capable of making such a provocative statement as tearing an 
image of Khomeini.  
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Opposition students at Mashhad University faced student supporters of the regime 
and took turns trying to drown each other out, with the Green activists eventually 
prevailing.  This scene was replicated at Sharif University, where students shouting 
“Death to the tyrant, whether the Shah or the [Supreme] Leader” (marg bar setamgar, 
cheh shāh bāshe, cheh rahbar) were temporarily interrupted by Islamist students—only 
to be drowned out by boisterous chants of “death to the basiji” (marg bar basījī).348   
By referring to “the Leader” in the same vein as the Shah, the students invoked 
the history of the Iranian Revolution throughout which the overwhelming majority of the 
populace was united in opposition to the Shah. In doing so, they legitimated their protest 
against what they deemed to be a dictatorship akin to that of the last Pahlavi shah.  If the 
Islamic authorities rode to power atop a popular wave of anti-Shah resentment, then they 
were now being equated with a reviled and popularly overthrown monarch.  In other 
words, the students contested ownership and the meaning of the Iranian Revolution in 
order to castigate “the Leader of the Revolution.”   Furthermore, such slogans 
simultaneously condemned the Shah and also belied allegations that the opposition was 
comprised of counter-revolutionaries trying to restore the monarchy.  Lastly, the severity 
of such political chants contrasts with the iconic slogan of the movement’s early days: 
“Where is my vote?”  The protracted crackdown either marginalized such voices or 
facilitated their transition to more radical political expressions. Wherein one demanded 
an equitable solution to the election crisis through either a recount or revote, more radical 
slogans that predominated in the uprisings’ latter days manifestly took aim at the entire 
system and its personification, Ayatollah Khamenei.  Perhaps no event is as memorable 
                                                 
348 Khajesharif.  “Marg bar setamgar, cheh shāh bāsheh, cheh rahbar / dāneshgāh-i sharīf 16 āẕar”.  Online 
video clip.  YouTube.  7 December 2009.  Accessed 12 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/zVfGynPs07Q>. 
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as the one that transpired at Amirkabir University in which the story of one seasoned 
activist both illustrates the state’s increasing repression and the corresponding change in 
the movement’s overall tone.   
It is often said that the leaders of tomorrow come from the youth of today, yet in 
Iran in the aftermath of the disputed elections the leaders of the day came from the youth 
of the day, and Majid Tavakoli is one such leader. With full knowledge of the state’s 
repressive capacity through his previous arrests349, he fearlessly gave an impassioned 
speech about the importance of Student Day, promising: “We will no longer accept 
tyranny.”350  The crowd of students punctuated his speech with heated chants of “death to 
the dictator” and “the student will die before accepting humiliation and suffering.”351 
 Two days later, the semi-official Fars News Agency reported that Majid Tavakoli 
was arrested.  Associated with Iran’s praetorian guard—the IRGC—Fars News 
provocatively called Tavakoli a “coward,” alleged that he wore women’s clothing in 
order to avoid detection, and went so far as to publish photos of him garbed in the Islamic 
headscarf. 352   Eyewitnesses belied the regime’s claims and activists accused the 
government of pettiness for trying to humiliate the activist by posting photos of him 
wearing women’s clothing.353   
                                                 
349 Tavakoli was arrested in 2007 and again in February 2009 (before the election), serving 15 months in 
prison and 115 days in solitary confinement respectively. 
350 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Majid Tavakoli's Speech December 7th 09 16”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  7 
December 2009.  Accessed 13 August 2010. <https://youtu.be/Lin9PWr55RU>. 
351 Ibid. 
352 “Dastgīrīye majīd tavakolī bā lebās-i zanān lakke nangī bar dāman efrāṭīyūn bāqī goẕāsht”.  Fars News 
Agency.  9 December 2009.  Accessed 13 August 2010.  
<http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8809171609>.  His image was published alongside a similar 
picture of President Bani Sadr, who allegedly wore the hijab to avoid detection as he fled the country 
after his ouster in 1981.  
353 Mackey, Robert.  “Iran’s State Media Mocks Arrested Student Leader Pictured in Women’s Clothing”.  
The New York Times Blog.  9 December 2009.  Accessed 13 August 2010.  
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 The most fascinating aspect of this episode in the dynamic history of the popular 
uprising against the government is how the hijab, one of the most visible signs of Iran’s 
Islamic rule, became the object of contention as well.  One of the most controversial 
aspects of the Islamists’ consolidation of power immediately after the revolution was the 
state policy that required all women, pious or not, Muslim or not, to dawn the Islamic 
headdress in public.354  The Iranian government, as with many governments around the 
world irrespective of religion, has long viewed the female body as a battlefield in which 
its regulation and control must be a priority if there is to be a “moral order” or a healthy 
functioning of society. 355   The Islamic government has, to the degree enforceable, 
separated the genders and has made the Islamic headscarf mandatory for women in order 
to promote modesty thereby facilitating the much idealized “moral society.”  If the 
Iranian government’s rule is apparent on the streets of Iran through the painting of murals 
honoring the leadership of the revolution as well as the martyrs of the revolution and the 
war, then the government’s authority is similarly apparent on the bodies of its populace in 
which mandatory dress codes for both men356 and women are enforced.  
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/irans-state-media-mocks-arrested-student-leader-
pictured-in-womens-clothing/>. 
354 Interestingly, the issue of attire is part of a wider discussion of Iran’s struggle to balance modernity 
while maintaining its sense of identity. Reza Shah constituted one extreme who outright banned the hijab. 
The Islamic government falls on the opposite but equally extreme end by mandating the Islamic 
headdress.  
355 See, for example, Laura Briggs’ Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002) in which she uncovers the consequences 
of colonialism that transcend economics and politics. Briggs factors in race and gender in order to 
underscore how American colonial administrators in Puerto Rico sought to control seemingly “deviant” 
working-class women’s sexuality through “scientific methods,” including hygiene and birth control (even 
sterilization), thereby preserving the racial purity and health of white men who partook in sexual activity 
with Puerto Rican women—the supposed incubator of venereal disease.  
356 Men are likewise prohibited from wearing certain articles of clothing such are shorts or tank tops 
which expose men’s shoulders. 
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 In December 2009, however, the “sacredness” of the hijab, the quintessential 
symbol of the government’s authority over the individuality of its population, was 
contested. When the state used the hijab to “humiliate” Tavakoli, as the opposition 
alleged, Green activists countered in a manner imbued with profound meaning that 
transcended the solidarity they wished to convey to Tavakoli.  As part of their “Be a 
Man” campaign, hundreds of Iranian men357 inside the country and abroad, including 
non-Iranians, posted pictures of themselves wearing the Islamic headscarf in order to 
express national and international solidarity with Tavakoli and to nullify the 
government’s humiliation of the activist.358  In doing so, they turned the hijab, the state’s 
mandatory “sacred” headdress proscribed for women, into a symbol of protest aimed at 
the Islamic government’s attempts to discredit one of the scions of the protest movement.  
What’s more, that they were men and not women donning the hijab further underscored 
the ideological challenge that was being leveled at the Islamic government.  
 In 1978, the Shah was rightly perceived to be a secular head of state beholden to 
Western powers, namely the United States, and many ideologues argued that he served as 
a conduit for Western culture overrunning Iran—a ‘cultural invasion’ deemed to be at the 
expense of the country’s native Islamic culture.  Discotheques, casinos, liquor stores, and 
brothels, all of which were considered foreign to Iran’s culture and clashed with the 
country’s Islamic norms, were legalized or tolerated by the state.  What’s more, the state 
even imported new living standards and dress styles such as toilets (as opposed to squat 
                                                 
357 For a compilation of the photos, see Īstādeh bā mosht’s video, “Mā hameh majīd tavakolī hastīm”. 
Online video clip. YouTube.  10 December 2009.  Accessed 2 February 2015. 
<http://youtu.be/xNgN1rbXjLc>. 
358 “Iranian men don hijabs in protest at student's arrest”.  BBC News.  12 December 2009.  Accessed 13 
August 2010.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8409778.stm>. 
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toilets)359 and neckties, which were not necessarily in violation of Islamic norms but 
symbolized the degree with which the Shah preferred foreign cultural tastes to his own. 
The Shah’s predecessor, Reza Shah, went so far as to even outlaw the hijab—a policy his 
son reluctantly abandoned in order to garner clerical support early in his nascent rule.   
In the build-up to the revolution, many female activists, even ones without a 
devout worldview, wore the hijab as a symbol of defiance against the state’s seeming 
betrayal of Iranian culture and the head of state’s subservience to foreign powers. To put 
it plainly, for many women the hijab became a symbol of the revolution.360  That is not to 
say that they wished to display their religiosity or to demand that the hijab become 
compulsory, though certainly many did for those very reasons, but it does illustrate how it 
became an icon of revolutionary defiance.  
 In 2009, the hijab as a mechanism for contestation had come full circle in an 
unexpected and unprecedented way.  Now, Iranian and non-Iranian men, some even with 
full beards, wore the hijab to snub the government in the same manner that pious and 
secular Iranian women garbed the hijab to show their opposition towards the government 
in 1978.  As such, Iranian activists and international sympathizers appropriated even such 
Islamic attire—a visible symbol of Iran’s ruling ideology—as part of the wider campaign 
to not only show their solidarity with one of the movement’s most spirited activists, but 
also to deliver a striking blow at the state’s ideological repertoire using its own symbols. 
                                                 
359 At the time of the revolution, both my parents, Shahram and Sonia Alimagham, worked in the state-
run National Iranian Oil Company’s computer division. After the revolution, they witnessed first-hand the 
Islamic authorities’ decision to have all the flush toilet bowls, which were perceived as symbols of the 
west’s cultural domination in Iran, ripped out in favor of flush squat toilets—considered indigenous to 
Iran and the region. Such disruptive and petty changes only took place in the NIOC-owned buildings, not 
ones in which the company held tenancy.  
360 Incidentally, that so many women donned the hijab to show their support for the revolution made it 
easier for Khomeini to make the headscarf compulsory.  
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 These acts of solidarity with Tavakoli, however, did not convince the government 
to show the imprisoned student leader any leniency. Tavakoli was convicted of a range of 
Orwellian charges, such as “participation in an illegal gathering with the aim of harming 
national security,” “propaganda against the state,” and “insulting” the Leader and the 
president, and was ultimately sentenced to eight and a half years in prison.361 A year later, 
the Revolutionary Court banned him from pursuing his education while in prison or even 
after the completion of his sentence.362  
Tavakoli’s arrest, prosecution, and sentencing underscore the severity of the 
state’s repressive measures and the hardening effect it had on certain segments of the 
opposition, which reached a crescendo in the bloody ʿAshura day protests three weeks 
later.  As the protests continued on specific political holidays throughout the months after 
the election, the government intensified its crackdown and augmented its security 
presence on the streets.  The regime stepped up its efforts to hinder access to the Internet 
and text messaging as specific days of action approached, making it more difficult for the 
de-centralized movement to coordinate.  Dissidents were being jailed with a greater 
frequency and reports of prisoner abuse became widespread, especially at Kahrizak. The 
death toll on the street continued to rise and the regime began executing dissidents in a 
bid to persuade people to de-mobilize and to dissuade them from gathering in crowds to 
mark upcoming official holidays.  
                                                 
361 “Ta’īd-i ḥokm-i hasht sāl o nīm-i zendān-i majīd tavakolī dar dādgāh-i tajdīdenaẓar”. Rahesabz.  18 Sept 
2010. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/23673/>. 
362 “Ḥokm -i jadīd-i dādgāh-i enqelāb: maḥrūmīyat-i dā’emī-ye majīd tavakolī az edāmeh-ye taḥṣīl”. 
Kalame.  18 Sept 2011. <http://www.kaleme.com/1390/06/27/klm-73521/?theme=fast>. 
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 Yet, student demonstrations occurred at more than a dozen universities and even 
several high schools363 throughout the country.364  Although there is no exact tally for the 
number of students who participated in the Student Day demonstrations, the estimates of 
“tens of thousands” 365 are highly probable—a profound showing given the intensity of 
the state’s repression.  Furthermore, it once again reminded both sympathizers and the 
state, whose officials avoided student wrath by not entering campuses to deliver their 
perfunctory annual Student Day addresses366, that the movement was alive and durable a 
month after the last day of mass protests and six months after the election despite 
increasing state repression.   
Before the regime succeeded in driving the movement underground, two final 
occurrences prompted mobilization, both of which took place during the same month of 
December: the passing of dissident cleric Grand Ayatollah ʿAli Montazeri and ʿAshura.   
The two events are merged into one chapter as a result of being intertwined both in terms 
of its historical subject matter as well as the fateful sequence of events.  Indeed, 
ʿAshura’s emotive power is derived from a long history which must be considered in 
order to fully appreciate the Green Movement’s explosive ʿAshura day protests.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
 The Islamic government came to power through million-man marches intertwined 
with an Islamic discourse that negated the ideological universe of the Shah.  Whereas 
                                                 
363 Freedom Messenger.  “Taẓāhorāt-i dānesh āmūzān-i yek dabīrestān-i dokhtāraneh”. Online video clip. 
YouTube. 7 December 2009.  Accessed 2 February 2015. <http://youtu.be/Ee60WyR3YZg>. 
364 Chargé d’Affaires Doug Silliman, Ankara, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, December 8, 2009, 
Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ANKARA1744_a.html. 
365 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 8, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI525_a.html. 
366 Ibid. 
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protests and challenges to power in the past used the same secular-nationalist discourse of 
the Pahlavi dynasty, the Islamic Revolution posited a discourse that was diametrically 
opposed to the monarchy’s ideological worldview.    
For three decades after the revolution, the Islamic government drilled an entire 
generation of youth raised under its authority in Islamist ideology. In 2009, however, 
aggrieved segments of the population used that discourse and symbolism to castigate the 
very regime that relied on such ideology for legitimacy.   These activists used what 
Gramsci referred to as the ruling elite’s “common sense,” not necessarily to negate the 
state’s ideological universe as in 1978-79, but as emotive tools that were appropriated, 
reprogrammed, and subverted in order to challenge the Islamic state.  In other words, 
Green activists harnessed the emotive power of the government’s Islamic symbols and 
revolutionary history to “backhand” the state using its own language and doing so on the 
most potent of days. 
 The election campaign created the necessary breathing room for voters to 
mobilize for their candidates.  Some even used the temporary lifting of repression to 
voice their rejection of the state as a whole.  The government, hoping the relaxation of the 
political environment would encourage voter participation in a state-sanctioned political 
event, grew increasingly concerned with what was more and more looking like a street 
movement than an election campaign. 
 After the election, Iranians from all walks of life participated in a week-long 
uprising as the state struggled to rescind the political opening that it facilitated for the 
sake of fostering interest in the election. Khamenei’s Friday sermon, however, affirmed 
Ahmadinejad’s “victory” and promised a full-scale security crackdown in order to bring 
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the uprising to a decisive end. Activists expanded the scope of their wrath to target the 
state and “the Leader of the Revolution,” and ingeniously evolved to adapt to the new 
security climate thereby facilitating the movement’s street presence on specific days well 
into the months after Khamenei’s sermon. 
 If the election campaign offered the crowd the “opportunity” to mobilize, then 
political occasions and holidays such as Rafsanjani’s own Friday sermon, Beheshti’s 
anniversary, the anniversary of the embassy seizure, Student Day, and others provided 
activists renewed opportunities to continue to register their protest in a climate that was 
otherwise hostile to any sort of non-state-sanctioned political activity.  The government 
cancelled several such events—the Night of Power and Taleqani’s anniversary—in order 
to rob the opposition of the opportunity to mobilize against the state.   Some events, such 
as the anniversary of the embassy seizure and Quds Day, could not be cancelled as they 
were a staple in the calendar of the Iranian state.  The government had an even more 
difficult time shutting down Student Day, the anniversary of which continues to evade 
government control despite its best efforts—a reality echoed by Majid Tavakoli, who 7 
months after his arrest wrote a letter from prison to mark the anniversary of student 
uprising in 1999, observing defiantly: “…the university remains the ruling government’s 
biggest nightmare.”367 
If the government could not cancel the event in question then it did its best to 
either suppress or control protests. That the state increased repressive measures in the 
run-up to the event may have persuaded some to stay at home and crowds did indeed 
                                                 
367 Tavakoli, Majid.  “‘My Bitter Memories’ | A Letter by Majid Tavakoli on the Anniversary of University 
Attacks”. Trans. By Negar Irani. Persian2English. 7 July 2010. Accessed 12 May 2015. 
http://persian2english.com/?p=12549. 
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decrease in size in comparison to the first week of protests after the June 12 election. Yet, 
the government could not altogether rob the opposition of the opportunity to protest on 
such days because segments of the opposition remained mobilized, the occasions for 
protest remained ripe, and the movement endured.  Such days imbued with a history that 
dates back to the Iranian Revolution were appropriated along with slogans and other 
symbols from the historic era to protest the very state that rode to power atop that 
unprecedented revolution.  
  Even “Allahu akbar,” the quintessential Islamic profession on par with “There is 
no god but God,” and its storied role in the Iranian Revolution when activists proclaimed 
their support for the revolution with those two authoritative words, were likewise 
appropriated along with Islamic green in order to attack the state’s legitimacy using its 
own discourse, symbolism, and “common sense.”  Even the Islamic headdress was 
subverted to express solidarity with Majid Tavakoli and to condemn the state’s repressive 
tactics as well as the system as a whole. 
Belying allegations of hooliganism, the protesters showed increased 
sophistication by leveraging Iran’s revolutionary past for the contentious present.  The 
Green Movement may have failed to cancel the election results but its continuity and 
endurance, ability to absorb the state’s repression, and the movement’s consequent 
evolution caused it to transcend its initial demand of canceling Ahmadinejad’s election 
win.  Khamenei and his position as the Supreme Jurisprudent, clerical rule as a whole, 
and the entanglement between religion and state were added to the movement’s list of 
demands as outlined in their slogans and actions, especially as the protest movement 
continued and hardened in the face of systematic state reprisals.  Although the Green 
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Uprising similarly failed to change the composition and nature of the state in the short-
term, it succeeded in casting a discursive challenge to the Islamic Republic unparalleled 
in its thirty-year history.  In doing so, activists did not renounce the faith of the 
overwhelming majority of Iranians. Rather, they contested the state’s hegemony over 
“God” and Islamic history, the ownership of the Iranian Revolution and its symbols and 
meanings, and used the state’s own discourse and symbolism in order to transcend the 
rigidity of the state in what Bayat argues amounts to a “post-Islamist turn.” 
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CHAPTER 3: Contesting Palestine: Generating Revolutionary Meaning 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. PLO and the IRA: One struggle 
 
For decades, the struggle in Palestine has captivated the imagination of millions 
across the region and beyond.  Although Arab leaders and Arab citizens of the Middle 
East and North Africa have long focused368 on the issue, it nonetheless transcends Arab 
identity, Islam, and even the region.  Perhaps nothing better encapsulates this point than a 
mural in Northern Ireland in which a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighter 
                                                 
368 In the case of Arab leaders, I can add a caveat that such focus typically only amounted to “lip service.” 
  
 
 
133 
stands next to an Irish Republican Army (IRA) militant jointly clutching a rocket-
propelled grenade above a caption that declares the two peoples as fighting “one 
struggle” for liberation (Figure 3.1).369  To be certain, many around the world have been 
able to make common cause with the Palestinians despite being separated by religion, 
language, and geography.  
Countless Iranians both before and after the revolution have likewise identified 
with the struggle in Palestine.  In the 1970s, for example, Iranian guerrillas bombed 
Israeli targets in Iran both in solidarity with the Palestinians and to defy their monarch’s 
proximity with the Israelis. After the revolution, the Islamic Republic positioned 
Palestine as a cornerstone of its ideology and foreign policy outlook. In other words, the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian movement amongst revolutionary circles in the 1970s was 
afforded state sanction in the post-revolutionary period.    In 2009, a generation of Iranian 
youth raised under the authority and ideology of the Islamic government co-opted such 
legitimated Palestine-centered discourse and subverted it in order to condemn the same 
state.  
                                                 
369 Gannon, Sean.  “Israel is continually delegitimized and demonized in Republican demonstrations and 
publications”. The Jerusalem Post.  7 April 2009. <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-
Contributors/IRA-PLO-cooperation-A-long-cozy-relationship>. The image of the mural is from 1982, on 
Beechmount Avenue, Belfast. Another mural depicts two political prisoners, one Irish and the other 
Palestinian, reaching through their respective prison bars in order to grasp one another’s hands in 
solidarity. One user on the social networking and news website, Reddit—where the image of the mural 
was posted—noted, “I live here in Belfast, about 20 minutes away from where this picture is taken. There 
are murals like that all over the place here, each with their own strong political agenda from both sides…” 
Another user responded to a question about the popularity of the Palestinian issue in Northern Ireland, 
stating: “Amongst Catholics/Republicans it is pretty popular… We usually just ignore it [the religious 
dimension of the conflict] in favour of taking an anti-American/British/Israel stance on the whole thing.” 
See “Pro-IRA/Pro-Palestine mural (Belfast, Modern)”. Reddit. 6 Nov 2014. Accessed 3 Mar 2015.  
<http://www.reddit.com/r/PropagandaPosters/comments/2ljxmm/proirapropalestine_mural_belfast_mo
dern/>. It’s also interesting to note that political memorabilia that underscore the unity of the two 
struggles are listed for sale on eBay and other online marketplaces.   
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By underscoring the revolutionary discourse related to Palestine and the Green 
Movement, the first part of this chapter serves as primer to set the tone for the rest of the 
unit.  The segment is especially important because it deconstructs common perceptions 
with regards to the uprising thereby clearing the way for alternative perspectives—as 
outlined by activists themselves. The following section chronicles a brief but crucial 
history of Palestine in relation to Iran before, during, and after the 1978-79 revolution in 
order to provide the backdrop necessary to understanding the emotive power of Palestine 
in the Iranian context.  The importance of this history, which outlines the manner in 
which Iranians of different political persuasions gave Palestine an exalted political status, 
is central to appreciating the magnitude of the Green Movement’s contestation of 
Palestine as an ideological symbol.  In other words, pre- and post-revolutionary Iranians 
heralded Palestine as a political symbol of monumental significance, and that history is 
important because it gives that very symbol tremendous weight and meaning in the 
Iranian context.  It is this weight and meaning that the Green Movement harnessed when 
they appropriated the state’s hegemonic discursive control of Palestine as a symbol and 
wielded it and all its emotive power against the Iranian state in 2009. 
The chapter then proceeds to show how the Islamic government used Palestine as 
an ideological pillar.  Only when the importance of Palestine to Iran under the Islamic 
Republic is established can the enormity of the Jerusalem Day anti-government protests 
in 2009 be fully understood.  The final part of the chapter will illustrate how the Green 
Movement co-opted Jerusalem Day, infused it with new meaning, and deployed it against 
the very state that legitimated itself through such a potent transnational symbol. 
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II. Generating Revolutionary Discourse 
The Green Movement did not begin as a protest movement but rather a street 
campaign that championed both reformist candidates, Karroubi and Mousavi, especially 
the latter.  Although there were rumblings of protest before the presidential election, as 
some of the reformists’ supporters used the cover of the campaign to protest the system 
of governance370, it did not become a bona fide protest movement until after the election 
results were announced and allegations of election fraud became widespread.  It was then 
that the campaign-turned-movement rallied to protest the government. 
 Much has been made of the character or aims of the protest movement. Some 
have called it revolutionary while others, notably Dabashi, have referred to it as a civil 
rights movement akin to the pivotal campaign that challenged the racial status quo in 
mid-century America.371  Among intellectuals and academics, Dabashi’s reference has 
gained the most traction, which is not entirely surprising as the Green Movement has 
been overwhelmingly nonviolent and calls from within the movement—as echoed by its 
                                                 
370 On June 8, 2009, four days before the elections, young men and women formed a 20-kilometer human 
chain spanning from Tajrish Square to the Tehran Train Station and through one of Tehran’s main 
thoroughfares, Vali Asr Street.  Young women, who comprised the majority of the human chain, lined the 
street with like-minded young men, bidding Ahmadinejad farewell with a resounding pro-Mousavi slogan: 
“Ahmadi bye bye.”370  More to the point, sensing the political shield provided by the campaign, they 
declared “Assistance from God [leads to] imminent victory death to this deceptive government.” See 
Goodzila82.  “20 Km Human Chain in Tehran-June 8th.”  Online video clip.  YouTube.  8 June 2009.  
Accessed 24 September 2013. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PP-iji4VTQQ>. 
371 Dabashi, Hamid.  Iran, the Green Movement, and the USA.  London and New York: Zed Books, 2010, pp 
12.  
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leadership—have focused on civil rights rather than revolutionary change372 or armed 
struggle.373   
Some of the movement’s detractors have gone so far as to categorize it as just 
another Islamist movement that shares in the symbolism and worldview of the ruling 
Islamic system.  On the face of it, this labeling also has some credibility.  Mousavi, 
Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani, all of which are veteran leaders of the Islamic 
Republic, are the main political figures associated with the movement.  Mousavi and 
Rafsanjani were especially close to Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic 
Republic.  Mousavi is considered “Imam’s prime minister”374 as he was Iran’s premier 
throughout much of the eighties when Khomeini was the final arbiter of power, and 
Rafsanjani was one of Khomeini’s closest aids—so close in fact that he is credited with 
persuading him to end the ruinous 8-year war with Iraq.375  While it is true that activists 
on the ground spearheaded the movement frequently causing Mousavi and others to 
                                                 
372 It would certainly be difficult to argue that the leaders of the movement, or rather the personalities 
around which the movement often gathered, including Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani, 
sought revolutionary change. These leaders are some of the Islamic Republic’s senior statesmen and have 
long worked for rather than against the foundation of the system of governance.  
373 There was very little about the movement to suggest that an armed insurrection or a civil war was ever 
on the political horizon. Of course, that didn’t prevent some from positing sensationalist analyses. For 
instance, on the eve of the Iranian government’s most vaunted political holiday—the anniversary of the 
revolution’s victory (February 11)—Reza Aslan wrote: “as Iran braces for what could be the largest and 
most violent demonstrations since the election that returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power, the 
country may be on the brink of civil war.” See “Iran on the Brink”. The Daily Beast, 8 Feb 2010. When that 
theory failed to materialize, he offered another equally sensationalist prophecy three days later: “If the 
mullahs and the merchants begin joining forces with the protesters, even as the Revolutionary Guard 
becomes more entrenched in the political sphere, a civil war may be inescapable.” See “Iran’s Eerily Silent 
Streets”, The Daily Beast, 11 Feb 2010. 
374 “Faryād-i āzādi-ye nakhost vazīr-i emām dar dāneshgāh-i amīr kabīr”. Kaleme.  14 April, 2014. 
<http://www.kaleme.com/1393/01/25/klm-180544/>. 
375 Eshragi, Ali Reza, and Baji, Yasaman.  “Debunking the Rafsanjani Myth”.  Al Jazeera.  21 Feb 2012. 
Accessed 24 Sept 2013. <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/2012215164958644116.html>. 
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comment on an event after the fact376, nevertheless his role must be acknowledged as he 
was the candidate behind whom the movement rallied and crystallized in the first place.  
That such “Islamic” figures are associated with the Green Movement and that some of the 
movement’s slogans were—on the face of it—religious in theme, have prompted many to 
condemn the movement as part of an internal Islamist power struggle. 
The point is not to choose a categorization because the movement was all of these 
and none of these at the same time.  Any attempt at categorizing a multi-faceted 
movement is a disservice to the plurality of voices and worldviews predominant in the 
uprising.  Millions of Iranians from all political persuasions protested under the banner of 
“the Green Movement” and invoked religious symbolism—as well as symbols that have 
come to be associated with religion, such as what the state refers to as “Islamic 
Palestine”—in order to pursue a variety of aims. Such objectives ranged between 
canceling the election results, protesting the government’s brutality, advocating for 
women’s rights, as well as goals that transcended Ahmadinejad’s “victory,” including the 
the complete overthrow of the Islamist system, of which the Islamic constitution and 
Khamenei’s position of the Guardian Jurist (valī-ye faqīh) are its cornerstone. 
If it is possible to circumvent these labels and challenge the traditional notion of 
what it means for a movement to be “revolutionary,”377 then the conversation changes 
entirely.  In the most basic context of protest movements—notwithstanding any radical 
                                                 
376 It was only after demonstrators adapted their protest activities to the new security climate by using 
the occasion of Beheshti’s anniversary to stage anti-government demonstrations that prompted Mousavi 
to instruct demonstrators to use such political holidays to give continuity to the movement in order to 
renew their demands. 
377 The debate regarding what constitutes a revolutionary movement is too cumbersome to outline here. 
For the sake of brevity and for the point at hand, suffice it to say that a movement can be considered 
revolutionary in its most basic form if it seeks to replace the governing system with an entirely different 
polity, i.e. replacing the monarchy with a republic. 
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change pertaining to social relations and the means of production—“revolutionary” often 
describes a movement that seeks a revolutionary change in the system of governance.  
The military coups that overthrew the monarchies in Egypt in 1952 and Iraq in 1958 were 
championed as “revolutionary” since they both abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a 
republic.378  Iran’s leaders hailed its 1978-79 protest movement as “revolutionary” as it 
laid waste to the entire monarchical order and its ruling political, financial 379 , and 
military brass.  Indeed, members of the financial elite that supported the pre-
revolutionary order were either put to flight or executed. The Shah’s generals who 
presided over the military—one of the main pillars of the Pahlavi dynasty380—were 
                                                 
378 That throngs of people came out in support of the coups by flooding the streets thereby blocking roads 
and preventing a counter-coup military mobilization, lends credence to the argument that the coups were 
“coups-turned-revolutions.”  This is especially true in Iraq, where a small group of men drew up the coup 
plans in secrecy and without the involvement of the people in the initial stages of the “revolution.”  
Subsequent popular participation, however, was integral to the revolutionary change that swept the 
country.  Specifically, at least 100,000 poured into the streets of Baghdad to show their support for the 
coup. Their numbers were vital to safeguarding the coup from counterrevolutionary activity or armed 
interference by members of the Baghdad Pact, the potential intervention of which expressly concerned 
many of the coup plotters before the event. Hanna Batutu observes that by crowds “clogging streets and 
bridges not only in Baghdad but in many other towns, it hindered possible hostile counteractions.”  Most 
of the 3,000 troops who had spearheaded the destruction of the monarchy did not carry any ammunition, 
but the bodies of the demonstrations literally provided sufficient arms in ensuring that the action was not 
a brief moment in history but a coup that had morphed into a popular revolution. See Batutu, Hanna.  The 
Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial 
Classes, and of Its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, 
pp. 805. Interestingly, when Bani Sadr was based out of Paris before the revolution and before the Algiers 
Accord (1975) ended animosities between the Shah and Saddam, personnel from the Iraqi embassy 
approached Iran’s future president and advised him that there was no other way but through the military 
to bring about change in Iran, and that he should establish contacts with the officer corps inside the 
country. Bani Sadr retorted that just because such a plan worked in one country like Iraq or Egypt, it didn’t 
mean that it had universal application, and that “the problem of Iran belongs to Iranians and whatever we 
do is for us to decide, and that it would be better if you didn’t involve yourself in these affairs.” See 
Abolhassan Banisadr. Interview recorded by Zia Sedghi, 21, 22 May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral 
History Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 4 (seq. 84). Accessed 22 April 2015 
379 The financial elite entail “business and industrial figures” who left the country and took with them a 
“drain of capital… into the billions of dollars.” See “The Khomeini Era Begins”. Time. 12 Feb 1979, pp. 40. 
380 This is a constant theme throughout Abrahamian’s Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), but he specifically stresses the point in periodic detail from page 135 onwards.  
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likewise executed or fled the country.381  The Islamist government not only purged the 
military but created parallel armed forces, most notably, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps, which was founded with the main purpose of safeguarding the 
revolution’s leadership—the defense of which was deemed a necessity given the Iranian 
military’s role in implementing the Anglo-American coup against Premier Mossadeq in 
1953.382  The judiciary, media, educational system, even the physical landscape of the 
country, and most important of all—the constitution—were Islamized thereby producing 
an entirely new and revolutionary order—notwithstanding the lack of change in terms of 
the social classes and their relationship to the means of production. 383   This total 
transformation stands in stark contrast to the endurance of the vested interests in Egypt in 
the era of the Arab Uprisings. The lack of deep-seeded change in Egypt has been credited 
with the counter-revolutionary coup that ousted the democratically-elected Muhammad 
Morsi in 2013.384  
If the discussion continues to be confined to whether the Green Movement was 
revolutionary in a Marxist sense or simply by virtue of whether it sought to completely 
change the system of governance, then some of the most fascinating and historical 
                                                 
381 My grandfather, Major General Sohrab Jahangiri, was one such military officer who was put to flight.  
382 As early as 10 days before Khomeini’s historic return to Iran, Ayatollah Montazeri’s son, Muhammad, 
first argued for the necessity of a “revolutionary guard corps” to “preserve the revolution”—by which it is 
doubtless that he meant the revolution’s leadership—Khomeini in particular—whose return was 
imminent.   See Rafiqdoost, pp. 48.  The need to “preserve” the revolution was indeed real, as some 
Mossad officials at the time felt that Khomeini would not constitute a threat because the Shah’s security 
apparatus would assassinate him. See Alpher, Yossi. Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.  
383 Parsa talks about this in detail in Social Origins, arguing that little changed socially other than a new 
albeit Islamist elite eradicating and replacing the old elite.  
384 Egypt in the era of the Arab Uprisings provides an effective case study. The revolutionary change in 
Egypt was not comprehensive like in 1979 Iran thereby allowing the Mubarak-era vested interests in the 
military, media, and the economy—the so-called “deep state”—to stage a comeback in the form of a 
counter-revolutionary coup in the summer of 2013.  For further reading, see Alimagham, Pouya.  “The 
Iranian Legacy in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Military Endurance and U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities”.  
UCLA Historical Journal.  Vol. 24 Iss. 1, 2013, pp. 45-59. 
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aspects of the Green Movement will inescapably be marginalized.  Doubtless, elements 
within the movement may have sought a radical change in terms of Iran’s polity, but the 
potency and enduring legacy of the movement lay in the fact that it was innovative in an 
entirely different manner, which itself constituted an altogether different revolution. In 
other words, the Green Movement was revolutionary on its own terms, not for what it 
wanted but for what it did: it seized all of the Islamic Republic’s symbols and with them 
their emotive power, and rebranded and reprogrammed them in order to deploy them 
against the state which relied on those very symbols to legitimate itself. To put it in 
Moaddel and Gramsci’s words, the Green Movement appropriated all of the Islamic 
Republic’s ideological symbols thereby harnessing the power of the state’s understanding 
of what constitutes “common sense,” 385  subverted them and used them as symbolic 
weapons to either infuse their protests with emotive power against the government or 
altogether “negate”386 the state’s ideology.   Palestine is one of the most potent symbols 
in the ideological armory of the Islamic Republic that the Green Movement masterfully 
co-opted and leveled at the state’s ideology with devastating fervor.  
As with before, the discussion of Palestine as a symbol of contestation must be 
viewed in the wider context of protest against the Iranian state.  Although it is instinctual 
to analyze the 2009 protest movement through the events that unfolded on the streets of 
Iran as they were the most visible, dramatic—and in terms of the number of 
participants—the most breathtaking and memorable, this chapter furthers the thesis that if 
the reader wants to fully understand the gravity of the Green Movement’s revolution and 
                                                 
385 Butko, Thomas J.  “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam”.  
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, May 2004, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 43. 
386 Moaddel, Mansoor.  Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution.  New York and Oxford: 
Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 268. 
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challenge to the government in 2009, it must not view the movement as a phenomenon 
beholden to the date and location of its occurrence.   Although the movement erupted in 
2009, it drew upon a history of struggle to deliver its post-Islamist attack on the state.  
Indeed, the historical context must be included in any discussion of the Green Movement 
as it adds critical meaning, for example, to the symbolic value of Palestine in the Iranian 
theatre of radical protest.   Furthermore, some of the most important displays of defiance 
were not confined to the street.  The Digital Age has created opportunities to launch new 
and creative ways of protest.  As such, acts of dissent on the streets will be part of a 
larger canvas entailing acts of protest online and social media. 
Before the chapter addresses the fateful events of 2009, it is prudent to first 
outline a brief history of Palestine in relation to Iran before, during, and after the Iranian 
Revolution in order to provide the foregrounding necessary to appreciate the power of 
Palestine as a symbol in the Iranian context—an understanding central to a pivotal 
moment in the history of the Green Movement, Quds Day. 
 
 
III. Iran and Palestine: A Brief History 
 
 The establishment of a Jewish state in Mandate Palestine affected the calculus of 
the entire region, including “non-Arab” Iran. 387   When Zionist leaders declared an 
independent State of Israel in Palestine in 1948, the Shah’s government faced a dilemma. 
The Shah viewed Israel’s establishment as strategically beneficial since Arab money, 
manpower, attention, and resources would be directed toward confronting the Jewish 
                                                 
387 I put “non-Arab” in quotes because such a phrase is not very useful, especially since Iran has a large 
Arab minority it its southern regions. Incidentally, it’s just as problematic to refer to Iraq as an “Arab 
country” since it has a very sizeable Kurdish population, or Israel as a “Jewish state” when it is not 
governed by Jewish law and has a rapidly growing Muslim population. 
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state instead of Iran.  This was especially important to Iran as it saw “Arab Iraq” as a 
specific regional threat.388  During the October War of 1973389, for instance, Iraq sought a 
guarantee from Iran that it would not take advantage of Iraq removing its troops from its 
border with Iran and committing them to the Syrian battlefront of the war.390 
While Israel indeed helped regional rivals like Iraq divert attention away from 
Iran, the Shah nevertheless had to maintain a balancing act in order to avoid both Arab 
scorn across the region and popular antipathy at home.  So important was this balancing 
act that when false rumors of Iran’s formal recognition of Israel spread to Qom, Iran’s 
center of religious learning, the Shah’s government was forced to profusely deny the 
rumor to quell the uproar.391   Furthermore, when Nasser accused Iran of recognizing 
Israel, the Shah’s government strongly rebuked the allegation, expelled Egypt’s 
ambassador, and severed diplomatic relations with the most populous Arab country in the 
world to make its point.392 Despite such political grandstanding, however, Iran under the 
Shah frequently tilted in the direction of close ties with Israel.  The Jewish state shared 
mutually-hostile relations with its surrounding Arab states and it sought to penetrate the 
wall of isolation by forming alliances with non-Arab states such as Iran, Turkey, and 
                                                 
388 Three decades later this suspicion was realized when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on 
September 22, 1980.  It is also relevant to note that many Arab states, with the exception of Syria and 
Libya, supported Iraq with funds, equipment, and even manpower. Moreover, it is widely believed that 
Saddam invited King Hussein of Jordan to fire the opening shot that officially launched Iraq’s invasion of 
Iran.  
389 Also known as the Yom Kippur War and the Ramadhan War.  
390 Lowrie, Cairo, to Department of State, November 7, 1973, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE219402_b.html.  
391 Montazeri, Khāṭerāt: beh rasmīat shenākhtan-i isrāīl tavasoṭ-i shāh va mokhālefat-i ṭollāb bā ān”, pp. 
146-9.  
392 “Iran Cuts Cairo Tie In Dispute on Israel”. Reuters.  28 July 1960, pp. 1.  
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Ethiopia as well as forming pacts with religious minorities such as Lebanese Christians, 
and non-Arabs including the Kurds.393 
 This strategy, known as the Periphery Doctrine, meant that the longevity and 
stability of the Pahlavi regime was an absolute priority for Israel.  Consequently, Israel’s 
national intelligence agency, the Mossad, in collaboration with the American CIA394, 
helped form and train Iran’s own intelligence agency, SAVAK, which was notorious for 
its efficiency in torturing and “disappearing” dissidents.395  One of the reasons why Iran’s 
                                                 
393 Ibid, pp. 21. 
394 The Shah himself admitted that “…Many SAVAK officials went to the U.S. for training by the CIA.” See 
Pahlavi’s Answer to History, pp. 157. It’s also worth noting that such training included methods that were 
“based on German torture techniques from World War II.” See McCoy, Alfred. A Question of Torture: CIA 
Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror.  New York, Owl Books, 2006, pp. 74.  Iranian 
Marxists, who bore the brunt of the SAVAK’s repression, justifiably blamed successive American 
presidents for arming the Shah “…with billions of dollars of U.S. arms…” and providing “…the most 
extensive secret police network and mechanisms for repression developed by the U.S.”  See “Shah’s U.S. 
Visit: Newest Plot Against Iranian People”. Resistance (A Publication of I.S.A.U.S., Member of 
Confederation of Iranian Students). (Vol. 4, No. 8). September, 1977. 
395 In 1975, Amnesty International (AI) issued a sharp condemnation of the Shah’s regime in its annual 
report, noting: “The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the highest rate of death penalties 
in the world, no valid system of civil courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief.” See Ennals, 
Martin. Amnesty International Annual Report 1974/75. 1975, pp. 8. A more detailed account can be found 
on page 128, where AI offers an unconfirmed range of between 25,000 to 100,000 political prisoners in 
Iran.  One of the worst kinds of modernization that the Shah imported from the West was its torture 
techniques, which were rooted in science and designed to inflict maximum pain on its victims in order to 
prompt dissidents’ to divulge information.  See Abrahamian, Ervand.  Tortured Confessions: Prisons and 
Public Recantations in Modern Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 106-7. One 
legendary guerrilla, Ashraf Dehghani, who was captured and tortured before undertaking any armed 
action, describes in her memoirs her agonizing torture, which included multiple rounds of beatings, the 
whipping of the soles of her feet, after which she was forced to painfully walk on them, electric shocks, 
rape, sodomy, the pouring of boiling hot water in her rectum, and much more.  See Dehghani, Ashraf. 
Hemaseyeh moqavemat. Siahkal.com. 1971. Accessed 25 April 2015. Chapter 2. 
<http://www.siahkal.com/english/part1.htm#Chambers>. So serious and effective were these torture 
techniques that guerrillas often kept cyanide tablets on their bodies in the case of their imminent capture 
at hands of the Shah’s.  As a result of the real fear that even the most committed guerrilla fighter might 
break under such effective torture and reveal critical information about their organization, many kept 
cyanide tablets with them if the necessity for “revolutionary suicide” arose. Interestingly, one guerrilla 
considered his tablet as the only “weapon” he carried. See ʿAlireza Mahfoozi. Interview recorded by Zia 
Sedghi, 7 April 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 1 (seq. 7-
8). Accessed 24 April 2015. Dehghani described how “revolutionary suicide” was indeed a weapon when 
one of her comrades poisoned himself rather than being taken alive, opining: “Comrade Kazem once 
again proved the regime’s impotence and inefficacy through a true revolutionary’s glorious self-sacrifice.” 
See Dehghani, pp. 4 (Chapter 1).  The idea is that despite the Shah’s vaunted security apparatus, guerrilla 
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1979 revolution was so anti-Israel is precisely because Israel “helped set up the SAVAK 
secret police that later terrorized the nation,”396 a fact not unknown to the population that 
reeled from SAVAK’s heavy boot:  
“This close identification of Israel with the Shah’s regime and its 
repressive policies was widely held and largely accounted for anti-Israeli 
sentiments. Even before the revolutionary forces took power, the Shah’s 
alignment with Tel Aviv was condemned by his last prime minister, 
Shahpour Bakhtiar…”397 
 
Indeed, nearly three weeks before the Shah’s final departure from Iran, Khomeini 
underscored Israel’s hand in the Shah’s repression: “Israel is the biggest supporter of the 
Shah and is responsible for setting up SAVAK. For this reason, Israel is a partner in the 
crimes of the SAVAK and the Shah.”398  That Israel helped create a police state in Iran, 
however, was only one reason that garnered the aversion of Iranians. The issue of 
Palestine also prompted many amongst Iran’s clergy, radical student groups, and even 
state officials to hold Israel in contempt. 
 For the militant clergy, Palestine was an Islamic issue that affected all Muslims 
regardless of sect, ethnicity, or nationality.  Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, did not 
recognize the ethnic and national divisions amongst Muslims. For Khomeini, what fate 
                                                                                                                                                 
fighters, armed with light weapons and revolutionary zeal, maintain sovereignty over their bodies—their 
ultimate weapon. Thus, in the case of their imminent capture, militants have the freedom to die through 
revolutionary suicide rather than surrender their bodies to a state that would certainly torture them in 
order to extract information.  
396 “Iran cuts Israel ties”. The Boston Globe. 19 Feb 1979.  
397 Ramazani, R.K.  Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East.  Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 151. 
398 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Bayān-i dīdgāh-i islām dar mored-i masā’el-i mokhtalef”. Interview. 28 Dec 1978, 
Neauphle-le-Château, Paris. Vol. 5, pp. 295. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=5&tid=70>.   
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befell the Muslims of Afghanistan or Palestine was not confined to the national 
boundaries of those countries, but concerned Muslims all over the “Islamic World”399:  
“…We do not regard Islam as being confined to Iran. Islam is Islam 
everywhere. It is the same Islam in Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, the Hijaz, Syria 
and other places. We cannot separate our fate from that of other 
Muslims… We cannot consider the Arabs or the destiny of the Arabs, nor 
that of the other (Muslim) countries, as being separate from ours. It is the 
same Islam everywhere, and all Muslims – we included – are duty bound 
to protect Islam wherever it is.”400 
 
In his book Kashf al-Asrar (The Revealing of Secrets), published nearly four decades 
before he would go on to lead a revolution in the name of Islam, he argued forcefully that 
“the walls they have erected throughout the world in the name of countries are the 
products of man’s limited ideas” and that the world is “the homeland of all the masses of 
people… under the law of God....”401 Almost 30 years later in his seminal tract, Islamic 
Government, he argued against the continued existence of such nation-states, blaming the 
imperial powers for dismembering the Ottoman Empire when they “separated various 
segments of the Islamic nation from each other and artificially created separate nations… 
about ten to fifteen petty states.”402  It is important to note that after the revolution, the 
Islamic Republic labored to make Khomeini’s vision for the Islamic World a reality. For 
instance, Khomeinist Iran co-founded 403  the Lebanese Hizbullah, an armed political 
                                                 
399 I use the phrase “Islamic World” rather cautiously because it’s not very descriptive as it seemingly 
suggests Muslims inhabit an entirely separate and different world.  
400 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Ahamīat-i ḥefẓ-i jomhūrī-ye islāmī – naqsh-i roḥānīat dar ṭūl-i tārīkh – ṭarḥ-i 
khīānatbār-i sāzesh bā isrā’īl”.  16 Nov 1981. Tehran. Vol. 15, pp. 369-70. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=15&tid=176>. 
401 Khomeini, Ruhollah.  Kashf alasrār. 1942, pp. 276. 
402 Khomeini, Ruhollah. Ḥokūmat-i islāmī: vilāyat-i faqīh.  mu’aseseh-ye āmūzeshī-ye pazhoheshī-ye emām 
khomeinī,  1970, pp. 30. 
403 I purposely say “co-established” because Khomeini and Iranian guardsmen from the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps were instrumental in its formation but do not deserve all the credit since it 
was militant Lebanese Shiʿites who likewise provided crucial leadership and the foot soldiers for the 
organization.  
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movement established in part to fight Israel in solidarity with what Khomeini referred to 
as “Islamic Palestine”404—a worldview which Hizbullah echoed when they published an 
open letter in 1985 declaring their existence: 
“We are linked by a strong ideological and political connection – Islam.  
From here, what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines 
or anywhere else verily afflicts the body of our Islamic nation of which we 
are an inseparable part, and we move to confront it on the basis of our 
main legal obligation and in the light of a political view decided by our 
leader the Wilayat al-Faqih [Ayatollah Khomeini].”405 
 
Ayatollah Mottahari, one of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution and an architect of 
Iran’s Islamic system and whose assassination in 1979 prompted an official “day of 
national mourning,”406  also warrants mention because he effectively placed Palestine 
within both an Islamic context and history: 
“What would the Prophet of Islam do if he was still alive today? What 
issue would occupy the Prophet’s thoughts? By God we are responsible 
regarding this crisis. By God we have responsibility. By God we are being 
ignorant. By God this very issue would break the heart of the Prophet 
today. The problem that would fill Husayn ibn ʿAli’s heart with sorrow 
today is this issue. 
 
If Husayn ibn ʿAli was here today, he would say ‘if you want to mourn for 
me today, if you want to lament over me, your slogan today must be 
‘Palestine.’’ The Shimr407 of 1300 years ago is dead and gone. Get to 
know the Shimr of today. Today the walls of this city should tremble to 
the slogan of Palestine.  And what efforts have we Muslims exerted for 
Palestine? By God it’s a shame for us to call ourselves Muslims. It’s a 
shame to call ourselves Shias of ʿAli ibn Abi Talib. The enemy has 
ravaged our fellow Muslim’s land, murdered and imprisoned their men, 
                                                 
404 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Hoshdār be moslemīn-i jahān dar mored-i felestīn va efshā-ye jenāyathāye 
rezhīm-i shāh”. Feb 1979. Najaf, Iraq. Vol. 2, pp. 322. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=2&tid=269>. 
405 Jaber, Hala.  Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 54-5. 
406 “Iran mourns killing of top Khomeini aide”. The Jerusalem Post. 3 May 1979, pp. 4. 
407 Shimr, the commander of Yazid’s army, massacred Husayn and his band of followers in the Battle of 
Karbala in 680 AD.   
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violated their women and took their jewelry from their ears and hands… 
Are they not Muslims?”408 
 
By invoking such dramatic and emotive history, Mottahari equated Israel’s treatment of 
the Palestinians as akin to the massacre in Karbala. In doing so, Mottahari’s speech 
situated the issue of Palestine overtly within wider Islamic history in order to provoke a 
call to action: Supporters of Husayn are unable to reverse the course of history and 
prevent his martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala, but they can carry forth his legacy today 
by coming to the aid of the suffering Palestinians.  The implication is that Husayn was a 
Muslim, Palestinians are Muslims,409 and so too are Iranians, which explicitly intertwines 
their timeless fates as the Muslim community, theoretically, is one ummah—or “Islamic 
homeland.”410   
For the militant clergy, however, Palestine was not simply a Muslim issue 
because Palestinians were predominantly Muslim but also because Palestine is home to 
Islam’s third holiest site, al Quds (Jerusalem in Arabic), and is Islam’s original qiblah—
the direction in which the first Muslims prayed.   Furthermore, Jerusalem’s centrality in 
the Abrahamic faiths and the religious wars over the Holy Land, namely the Crusade 
Wars, has prompted an Islamic preoccupation with safeguarding the city.  As Rashid 
Khalidi notes in his seminal Palestinian Identity, 
“[the] idea of Palestine’s special importance is, at least in part, rooted in 
the heightened Islamic concern for Jerusalem and Palestine that followed 
the traumatic episode of the Crusades.  This idea was widespread, and 
                                                 
408 The text of his famous speech is posted in full online and the actual audio clip can be found on YouTube, 
see Ruh.  “Shahīd morteżā motṭaharī va felesṭīn”.  Doshmantarin. 15 Nov 2010. Accessed 24 Sept 2013. 
<http://doshmantarin.blogsky.com/1389/08/24/post-10/>, and Bahmanpour, ʿAlireza.  “Ayatullah’s 
Historical Speech about Palestine”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  18 June 2010.  Accessed 24 September 
2013. <http://youtu.be/-SxOUMLfX7c>. 
409 The Islamist depiction of Palestinians as Muslims is not entirely accurate as around one-fifth to a 
quarter of Palestinians are Christians. 
410 Khomeini, Ḥokūmat-i islāmī, pp. 93.  
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persisted for centuries thereafter. One of the most eminent eighteenth-
century religious figures in Jerusalem, Shaykh Muhammad al-Khalili, in a 
waqfiyya document of 1726 establishing an endowment that survives to 
this day, warned that the transfer of waqf property to foreigners in 
Jerusalem constituted a danger to the future of the city, which must be 
built up and populated if Jerusalem were to be defended against the 
covetousness of these external enemies.”411 
 
The advent of nationalism in the region sparked renewed conflict over the city, and in 
1967 Israelis conquered and occupied East Jerusalem—the site in which Muslims believe 
that the Prophet ascended to heaven and back—and officially annexed it in 1981412.  For 
the city to slip from Muslim control is considered by the likes of Khomeini to be an 
affront to the honor and territorial integrity of the wider Muslim nation, or the “Islamic 
homeland.” 
He repeatedly argued for the return of Palestine and Jerusalem (Quds) to the 
“Islamic homeland” as matter of supreme importance:  
“I ask of God the Blessed and Exalted that our brother nation of Palestine 
will overcome its difficulties. We are their brothers. From this 
movement’s inception more than fifteen years go, I have always, in my 
writings and speeches, spoken of Palestine and brought attention to the 
crimes that Israel has perpetrated there. God willing, after we are freed 
from these fetters then to the same degree that we stood with you at that 
time and are now standing with you, I hope that we will confront the 
problems together like brothers. I beseech God the Blessed and Exalted to 
exalt Islam and the Muslims and to return Quds to our brothers.”413 
 
                                                 
411 Khalidi, Rashid.  Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 30. 
412 This annexation is not recognized by much of the world simply by virtue of the Geneva Conventions, 
which, in summary, considers territorial conquest and annexation unlawful. See Sharon Korman’s The 
Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 224. 
413 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Ghalabeh-ye īmān bar qodrathāye shayṭānī”. 17 Feb 1979. Tehran. Vol. 6, pp. 179. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=6&tid=72>. 
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Even in the final years of his life, the last decade of which he served as the revolutionary 
head of state who had the country’s media and resources at his disposal, he continued to 
call for the return of Palestine to the Islamic fold: 
“Defending the honor of Muslims, defending the lands of Muslims and 
defending their resources is an imperative and we must ready ourselves for 
achieving these divine goals and for defending Muslims. In the present 
circumstances particularly, where the true sons of Islamic Palestine… let 
out the cry of ‘oh Muslims’ as they sacrifice their lives, we should stand 
against Israel and the aggressors with all the spiritual and material strength 
at our disposal…”414 
 
That Khomeini—sanctioned with an authority that was rooted in both his stature as one 
of the most senior religious leaders in the Shiʿite realm and who commanded the fealty of 
religious followers from within and beyond Iran’s borders, as well as his position as the 
undisputed leader of a historic revolution that had brought him to the apex of power of 
the largest Persian Gulf country—referred to Palestine as “Islamic Palestine” affirms the 
sacred value and high priority that Islamic revolutionaries placed on the issue. As such, 
he was unequivocal with regards to Israel even before the Shah’s demise, pledging that a 
future revolutionary Iran would never sell Israel oil nor recognize the country.415 
 Palestine’s importance, however, was not limited to the militant clergy as many 
strata of Iran’s populace sympathized with the Palestinian cause.  Two guerrilla groups, 
the Fada’iyan-i Khalq and the Mujahidin-i Khalq (MKO), galvanized an entire generation 
of radical students in the 1970s by launching an earth-shattering guerrilla war against the 
monarchy.   The war began in 1971 when the Fada’iyan, using as a revolutionary model 
the Moncada Barracks Attack in 1953 that eventually lead to the Cuban Revolution six 
                                                 
414 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Etteḥād shūm qodrathā dar moqābel-i islām”. 28 Feb 1988. Tehran. Vol. 20, pp. 
486. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=20&tid=257>. 
415 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Taẓāhorāt-i tāsūʿa va ʿāshūrā sīāsat-i jomhūrī-ye islāmī”. 11 Dec 1978. Paris. Vol. 5, 
pp. 207. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=5&tid=46>. 
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years later,416 launched a guerrilla assault on a gendarmerie in the northern town of 
Siyahkal, Gilan.  Subsequently, these two groups competed with one another to become 
Iran’s revolutionary vanguard by launching one spectacular attack after another.   
 Although the Cuban model provided a historical precedent, Palestinian 
revolutionary groups such as George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and Yasser Arafat’s Fatah Organization marked the incredible rise of 
guerrilla groups in the late 1960s and 1970s in the Middle East, and served as immediate 
exemplars of action for Iran’s radical student organizations and guerrilla movement. 417  
Such groups, along with their counterparts in Iran, perceived Israel as both a colonial 
enterprise as well as America’s imperial outpost in the Middle East.418 Unlike the militant 
clergy who viewed Palestine through an Islamic lens, Iran’s guerrillas saw the struggle in 
Palestine through the prism of third world liberation movements.   
The Fada’iyan and the Mujahidin aspired to follow the path of Cuban and 
Palestinian revolutionary groups by violently overthrowing the Shah’s government, 
which they likewise viewed as a product of Western imperialism. Said Mohsen, a 
                                                 
416 In his guerrilla manifesto, Ahmadzadeh argued: “Didn’t the Cuban experience show that a small armed 
motor [band of guerrillas] can launch the insurrection thereby gradually provoking the masses [the large 
motor] to join the rebellion?”  See Ahmadzadeh, Massoud. “mobārezeh-ye mosalaḥāneh ham estrātezhī, 
ham tāktīk”.  Siahkal.org, 1971, pp. 30.  
<http://www.siahkal.com/publication/RMassoud-All-chapters.pdf>. It’s not clear exactly when 
Ahmadzadeh wrote this seminal text.  He was executed on March 1, 1972, the Siahkal attack occurred in 
February, 1971, so it must have been written sometime before the guerrilla operation.   
417 The meteoric rise of the guerrillas was precipitated by the monumental Arab defeat in the 1967 Six-
Day War.  Although guerrilla groups existed before the war, afterwards they were augmented by 
volunteers who had lost all hope in the ability of Arab armies to fight Israel using conventional means. It 
was also a time in which Palestinians began to rely more on themselves than their neighbors to alleviate 
their plight and took matters into their own hands unlike never before. The spectacular emergence of 
groups such as al-Fatah and the PFLP galvanized the radicals of the region—Arab and Iranian alike.   
418 Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.  New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 82. 
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member of the Mujahideen’s central cadre, attested to the Palestinian example of armed 
insurrection when he uttered the following defense during his military trial: 
“The present situation leaves one with no choices but to take up arms 
against the royalist regime. Why do we advocate armed struggled? We 
advocated armed struggle because we have examined carefully both the 
revolutionary experiences of other countries and the last seventy years of 
Iranian history: particularly the constitutional movement; the crushing of 
that movement by Reza Khan; the overthrow of Dr Mossadeq in the 
infamous coup of August 1953; and, of course, the bloody massacres of 
June 1963. What is more, the revolutionary experiences of Vietnam, Cuba, 
Algeria and the Palestinians have shown us the new road… We have two 
choices: victory or martyrdom.”419 
 
So important was Palestine to this generation of radical activists that their solidarity 
extended beyond words and into action.   Both groups sent activists to Fatah and PFLP 
guerrilla training camps420 in Lebanon in the 1970s with explosive consequences.  Some 
stayed and fought side-by-side with Palestinian groups against Israel 421 , and others 
returned home, several with Palestinian wives at their side 422 , in order to wage the 
                                                 
419 Translation provided in Abrahamian Ervand.  The Iranian Mojahedin.  New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1989, pp. 133-4. 
420 In his memoirs, Massoud Rajavi, the Mujahidin leader, confirms that the MKO received military 
assistance from Arafat’s al-Fatah organization. See Massoud Rajavi. Interview recorded by Zia Sedghi, 29 
May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 2 (seq. 21). 
Accessed 24 April 2015.  Also, see Saxon, Wolfgang. “Arab leaders Call Iran Shift Historic: Saudis Are 
Worried About Anarchy and Others are Cautious, but the P.L.O. Appears Joyful”. The New York Times. 14 
Feb 1979, pp. A9. 
421 “Facing the New Realities: After the changes in Iran, it’s now or never at Camp David”. Time. 4 March, 
1979, pp. 40.  According to Ostovar, many militants, including Montazeri’s son—Muhammad—and Yahya 
Rahim Safavi, who would later become an IRGC commander, established strong ties with the PLO in 
Lebanon during the 1970s.  Such relations not only resulted in their own training and military involvement 
in PLO operations, but also facilitated the secret deployment of Iranian guerrillas to Lebanon for training.  
See Ostovar, pp. 93. 
422 According to Taleqani’s chief aide, Taleqani’s son, Mojtaba, a member of the Mujahidin sided with the 
Marxist faction during the schism that produced two groups—one that stayed true to its original Islamic 
worldview and the other, the Marxist Mujahidin, which eventually became Paykar. Mojtaba, imprisoned 
in pre-revolutionary Iran for such memberships, fled the country upon his release and went to Lebanon to 
collaborate with Palestinian factions. While in Lebanon, he wed a Palestinian woman who returned with 
him to Iran and occasionally served as a translator between Ayatollah Taleqani’s office and the Palestinian 
diplomatic corps that established an official presence in Iran after the revolution. See Mohammad 
Shanehchi. Interview recorded Habib Ladjevardi, 4 March 1983, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History 
Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 4 (seq. 66-67). Accessed 2 May 2015. 
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guerrilla war. Upon their return to Iran, they staged bold attacks against the regime, 
American installations and personnel.  For example, official American cables noted “28 
confirmed explosions (11 of which [were] directed against US presence)” in the four 
months spanning the spring and summer of 1972. 423  Such attacks were in opposition to 
US support for the Shah and because the US was “trying to stamp out revolutionary 
movements in such places as Vietnam, Palestine, and Oman.”424 Furthermore, in 1972, 
“they bombed the Jordanian embassy to protest King Hossein’s state visit…” in order “to 
revenge Black September, the month in 1970 when King Hossein unleashed his troops on 
the PLO.”425  
 Even senior members of the Shah’s government were sympathetic towards the 
plight of the Palestinian people.  The Foreign Ministry, for example, was especially well-
known for being critical of Iran’s proximity to Israel—criticism more rooted on 
humanitarian grounds than religion or revolutionary politics. Accordingly, one former 
Iranian official stated the reluctance with which they were tasked to cooperate with Israel: 
“Even those technocrats that were helping Israel, in their hearts they were really unhappy 
that Israel was doing these things to the Palestinians.”426  When the matter of Zionism as 
a form of racism was put to vote at the United Nations, “ambivalent feelings of Iranian 
Foreign Ministry bureaucrats about Israel turned out to be a critical factor influencing 
                                                 
423 Farland, Tehran, to Secretary of State, August 10, 1972, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/72TEHRAN4789_a.html. 
424 Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, pp. 140.  The Shah also worked to stamp out such revolutionary 
movements. Specifically, he infamously sent troops to help the Omani sultan put down the Dhoffar 
Rebellion, which was backed by the Soviet Union and the allied People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.  
425 Abrahamian, pp. 140. 
426 Parsi, pp. 63. 
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Iran’s vote.” 427  In other words, even though Iran’s government was closely aligned with 
the Jewish state, sympathetic officials in the foreign ministry nevertheless voted in 
solidarity with the Palestinians and in favor of the resolution.  
 When the Iranian Revolution swept away Israel’s ally, such pro-Palestinian 
sentiments came to the fore.  On February 11, 1979, the day of the revolution’s victory, 
guerrilla groups in tandem with armed volunteers428 dealt the regime its coup de grace by 
attacking police stations, the offices of the secret intelligence, government buildings, 
military barracks, television and radio stations, political prisons, and a “yelling crowd” 
laid siege to Israel’s mission in Tehran.429   
Although the Shah’s government did not have formal diplomatic relations with 
Israel, the mission for all intents and purposes functioned as an embassy, even though the 
Israeli flag “wasn’t flown at the mission and Israeli diplomats did not participate in 
ceremonies that protocol required other diplomats to attend.”430  This was done so the 
Shah could maintain deniability in his relations with Israel so as to not agitate a populace 
and wider region that was emphatically pro-Palestinian.  Revolutionaries, however, were 
aware of the scale of the Shah’s alignment with Israel and, consequently, sacked and 
torched the mission during the final insurrection. 
                                                 
427 Parsi, pp. 64. The resolution passed on November 10, 1975 with 72 voting for it, 35 against, and 32 
abstentions.  A decade and a half later, the US undermined the resolution in a bid to placate Israel after it 
was not invited to join the US-led coalition during the Persian Gulf War.  
428 Rafiqdoost, pp. 41. 
429 “Iran cuts Israel ties”.  One Fada’i guerrilla specifically credits the Fada’iyan with its role in the coup de 
grace when it mobilized fighters to defend the spontaneous Homafaran uprising in Doshan Tappeh 
against the siege of the Imperial Guard. The successful defense of Doshan Tappeh set in motion the series 
of assaults elsewhere that precipitated the culmination of the revolution. See ʿAlireza Mahfoozi. Interview 
recorded by Zia Sedghi,  7 April 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University, 
Transcript 1 (seq. 20-2). Accessed 28 April 2015.  It’s also important to note that the insurrection 
precluded a military coup, which was a likely possibility. See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: moshārekat-i vāqeʿī-ye 
mardom dar ḥokūmat, ramz tadāvom-i enqelāb”, pp. 782. 
430 Parsi, pp. 27. 
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 The attack on the Israeli mission preceded the infamous seizure of the US 
embassy by almost 9 months.  Cutting off relations with Israel was such a priority for the 
Iranian Revolution that  
“Iran’s relations with no other country in the world, even the United States, 
were so quickly and drastically overturned as its relations with Israel were. 
The revolutionary regime’s relations with the United States and all the 
Gulf states, including Iraq, did not deteriorate until after the so-called 
second revolution that destroyed the provisional government of Mehdi 
Bazargan.”431 
 
Even the Shah’s last prime minister432 attempted to appease a mobilized population in 
order to ward off the revolution’s final push towards the total destruction of the state by 
terminating relations with Apartheid South Africa, ending oil exports to Israel, and 
expressing solidarity with the Palestinians: “The government of Iran will continue its ties 
with its Arab brothers and will support them, particularly the Palestinians in achieving 
their goals.” 433   The revolutionary government went so far as to blacklist “foreign 
companies which in the past had indirectly sold oil to Israel” and to “ensure that any 
company buying Iranian oil would not sell it to Israel.”434  Khomeini even took his 
provisional government by surprise when he ordered the termination of diplomatic 
                                                 
431 Ramazani, pp. 151. 
432 Shapour Bakhtiar was the Shah’s last premier insomuch as the National Front leader agreed to the 
position on the condition that the Shah leave Iran on an “extended vacation.” See Khāṭerāt-i shāpūr 
bakhtīār: nakhost vazīr-i īrān (1979). Iranian Oral History Project (Center for Middle Eastern Studies 
Harvard University), Bethesda: IranBooks, Inc., 1996, pp. 100.  In fact, Bakhtiar was a life-long and 
committed opponent of the Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty. Not only did Bakhtiar envision a Mossadeqist 
parliamentary system in which the king would reign and not rule, but Bakhtiar also had a personal 
incentive in opposing Pahlavi rule: The dynasty’s founder, Reza Shah, executed Bakhtiar’s father.  See 
Khāṭerāt-i shāpūr bakhtīār, pp. 110. 
433 “Iran to cut off oil to Israel, South Africa”. The Jerusalem Post.  12 Jan 1979, pp. 1. 
434 “Iran bans firms that sold Israel oil”.  The Jerusalem Post.  8 Mar 1979, pp. 4. 
  
 
 
155 
relations with Egypt in “protest against the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and a gesture of 
support to the Arab states that oppose it.”435  
 That Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, was the 
first world leader to visit Iran a week after the triumph of the revolution should come as 
no surprise.  That he was a leader of a movement and not a head of state that came to Iran 
should also come as no surprise.436 Although he came uninvited, he and his 31-member 
delegation437 received a hero’s welcome with crowds marking his arrival with chants of 
“Palestine will be victorious, Israel will be destroyed” (felestīn pīrūz ast, isra’īl nābūd 
ast).438  When asked why he came to Iran without an invitation, he is believed to have 
retorted: “One does not need an invitation to go home, therefore, I did not need an 
invitation,”439 and reportedly said, “When we flew into Iranian airspace I thought I was 
visiting Jerusalem.”440 Moreover, the keys to the Israeli mission, which was partially 
burned a week prior, were given to Arafat who “proclaimed it the office of the PLO in 
                                                 
435 Kifner, John.  “Khomeini Orders Iranian Regime To Break Relations With Egypt”. The New York Times. 1 
May 1979, pp. A3. Khomeini went on to say that Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was a “betrayal to Islam, 
Muslims, and Arabs…” See Khomeini, Ruhollah, “Ṣolḥ-i meṣr va isrāīl (kamp dayvīd)”. 25 March 1979. Qom. 
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to find a powerful ally to replace Egypt. 
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Iran… and raised the PLO flag to the cheers of 200 onlookers.”441    Arafat hailed the 
‘common goals’ of the Iranian and Palestinian revolutions…,” emphasized the sacred 
importance of Quds 442 , and repeated Khomeini’s slogan, “Today Iran, Tomorrow 
Palestine.”443   
 The optimism of the Palestinian delegation in Iran and the general Palestinian 
movement over the triumph of the Iranian Revolution cannot be overstated.   Beirut, for 
instance, where the PLO was stationed at the time of Iran’s revolution, “echoed with 
machinegun fire” as they “saluted” the revolution’s triumph. 444    Other Palestinian 
factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—a guerrilla group that 
trained many Iranian Fada’iyan fighters in the 1970s—declared that “the victory of the 
Iranian revolution is a victory for the Palestinian people and the Arab masses.”445  So 
hopeful were the Palestinians for Iran’s revolution that they supplied their allies with 
weapons446 and training447, presumably to help revolutionary forces defend their gains. 
                                                 
441 “Iranians vow aid as Arafat takes over Israeli legation”. The Jerusalem Post. 20 Feb 1979, pp. 1.  
442 Ramazani, pp. 153. 
443 Markham, James M. “Arafat, in Iran, Reports Khomeini Pledges Aid for Victory Over Israel”.  The New 
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[Arafat’s forces] developed their own missile launchers and Kalashnikov bullets… During one trip, I bought 
2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 200,000 Kalashnikov bullets, 500 rocket launchers, and 5000 rockets and took 
them to Iran.” See Rafiqdoost, pp. 143. 
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Indeed, the revolution marked Iran’s entry into the Arab-Israeli conflict448, though in the 
worldview of Iran’s Islamist leaders it was a conflict that pitted Muslims against Zionists 
and their imperialist backers—namely the United States.  
 Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this transnational solidarity is that it defies 
common perceptions of the Cold War, which is often viewed through the prism of great 
power rivalry—East versus West, and Capitalism versus Communism.  For many in the 
Developing World, however, struggling against the yoke of colonialism and imperialism 
was more a matter of North versus South, or developed versus underdeveloped countries, 
than between the East and the West.449   Furthermore, this revolutionary camaraderie 
between Iranian and Palestinian militants is especially noteworthy in the context of the 
Shah’s ideology—one that exalted a racial hierarchy in which the Persian Shah, “the 
Light of the Aryans,”450 sat at its apex against the Middle Eastern “Other”—namely the 
                                                 
448 One can make the argument that Iran has long been a party to the conflict through its alignment with 
Israel before the Iranian Revolution.  Time affirmed this point succinctly after Arafat’s visit to Iran: “It was 
the Shah of Iran who sold oil to the Israelis, who used it to power tanks and planes that were fighting the 
Palestinians.” See “Facing the New Realities: After the changes in Iran, it’s now or never at Camp David”. 4 
March 1979, pp. 40. Months before Time made that point, Khomeini affirmed the sentiment in the fall 
during the revolutionary uprising when he said: “The Shah gives Islamic Iran’s oil to Israel to repress 
Muslims.”  See Khomeini’s letter to Arafat: “Tashakor az ‘elām-i hemāyat – poshtībānī az felesṭīn”. 19 Sept 
1357. Najaf. Vol. 3, pp. 476. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=3&tid=289>.  Iran after the 
revolution, however, became a different kind of party to the conflict by switching sides. 
449 For a more thorough account of the struggle between the developed versus the underdeveloped, see 
Gleijese, Piero.  Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976.  Chapel Hill and London: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
450 Heavily influenced by European fascism and Kemalism, the Pahlavi dynasty expounded an ideology in 
which “Iranianness” was constructed along an ethnic line—as determined by language and a selective 
reading of history. Thus, Persian-speakers constituted a normative Iranianness in the eyes of the state 
before the revolution. Afterwards, Shiʿite Islamic identity supplanted the Pahlavi dynasty’s hierarchy of 
ethnic supremacy.  In other words, Persian-speakers, regardless of religion, enjoyed a privileged status 
during the Pahlavi era; after the revolution, Shiʿite Muslims, irrespective of ethnic identity, became the 
new standard, as envisioned by the Islamic government, by which to determine one’s Iranianness.  That 
Iran’s current leader is a Shiʿite Islamic jurist of Azari Turkic origin exemplifies the post-revolutionary 
hierarchy. That is not to say, however, that racism does not persist on a popular level both inside Iran and 
certainly within the expatriate community, as well as on a structural level in Iran. For a more thorough 
reading on the subject, see Asgharzadeh, Alireza.  Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic 
Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
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Arabs.  In other words, revolutionary Iranians were able to make common cause with the 
Palestinians despite the monarchy’s hegemonic “common sense.”  
Such history demonstrates the deeply organic link that existed between the 
Palestinian national struggle and Iranian revolutionaries of all political persuasions.  Thus, 
when the Islamic Republic instituted Palestine as a cornerstone of its ideology, it didn’t 
do so in order to pre-empt allegations that its foreign policy was partial towards Shiʿite 
Muslims.451  Rather, the Islamic Republic situated the liberation of Palestine (and Quds) 
as one of its founding pillars because of the deep concern for the Holy Land, which was 
shared between the Palestinian movement and those who fought to make the Iranian 
Revolution a reality.  Undeniably, it was believed that the victory in Iran would 
eventually translate into victory in Palestine.  
The Islamic Republic institutionalized “Islamic Palestine” after the revolution’s 
triumph by inculcating an entire generation of Iranians in the tenets of Palestinian 
liberation.  In doing so, the government equipped this generation, which was raised under 
the state’s ideology and authority, with a potent discourse that would backfire against 
Khomeini’s successors in 2009. Before the discussion proceeds to the events of 2009, it is 
necessary to outline how and through what symbolism such Palestine-centric discourse 
was taught to this generation. Only then can the slogans, images, and Palestinian symbols 
deployed against the state in 2009 be fully appreciated in terms of their power and 
efficacy.   
                                                 
451 Asʿad AbuKhalil wrote in 2014 that tensions between Hamas and Iran over the war in Syria “hurt Iran 
(and Hezbollah) as that relationship helped dispel the sectarian cast of Iranian policies in the Arab East.”  
“Some determinants of Iranian policy in the Arab East”. al-Akhbar English, 3 Nov 2014. Such a statement 
seemed to suggest that Iran supported Hamas, a militant Sunni Islamist organization, in order to refute 
allegations of sectarianism in which Iran only supported Shiʿite groups such as Hizbullah in Lebanon and 
SCIRI and others in Iraq. The outlined history above, however, underscores the point that for the Islamic 
Republic, the issue of Palestine is vitally Islamic and fully above sectarian considerations. 
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IV. Institutionalizing Palestine in Revolutionary Iran 
 The Iranian government institutionalized Palestine in a multitude of ways ranging 
from textbooks and the country’s religio-political calendar to even its physical landscape.  
A fitting example of such ideological indoctrination can be found in a second grade 
Persian grammar textbook published three years after the revolution.  The emotional 
intensity of chapter 15, a fictional letter written by a Palestinian refugee boy for his peers 
in Iran, warrants full quotation: 
“Do you know me? I am your brother. I am Palestinian, we Palestinian 
children are Muslim. 
 
The name of our country is Palestine and name of your country is Iran. 
You live in your own country and in your own home. But we are refugees 
in the desert because the enemy has occupied our home and homeland. We 
now live in the desert. We spend our days and nights under tents. The tents 
are our schools. But even here, the enemy won’t leave us alone and burns 
our tents.  They show no mercy to our young or old, and they even bomb 
our hospitals. Do you know why? It’s because we want to return to our 
home and country and expel the enemy from our homeland. 
 
Ever since your revolution was victorious, our enemy has grown 
frightened and for this reason harasses us even more.  
 
Our enemy is Israel. Israel is our enemy and is your enemy and the enemy 
of all free peoples.  
 
We will resist Israel until our very last breath and we know that you will 
help us. All free peoples will help us.  We will resist and with the grace of 
God we will be victorious and we will return to our dear country where we 
will live in freedom.  
 
Hoping for victory, God preserve you.”452 
 
The letter is remarkably close to Khomeini’s speeches on Palestine, which were given 
with mature audiences in mind: 
                                                 
452 fārsī: dovvom-i dabestān. (Tehran, S. 1360), pp. 48-51. 
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“…[Israel] is driving the innocent brothers of our faith out of their homes, 
destroying their houses and burning their crops, while the Muslim 
governments remain indifferent to these crimes even occasionally 
partaking in such crimes or busying themselves with pointless negotiations, 
leaving the brave Palestinian freedom fighters to courageously resist Israel 
alone... Our brothers and their defenseless children are burning in the 
flames while facing many dangers.”453 
 
Indeed, in Khomeini’s Iran, children were now exposed to the state’s ideological focus on 
Palestine through such heart-wrenching and real-life stories. They were tasked to 
memorize political concepts as “occupation,” and homework questions derived from the 
letter asked “Where do the Palestinians live?” and “Who has occupied their homeland?” 
as well as “Who is their enemy and what does the enemy do to them?”454  Such questions 
were meant to drill a new generation in the plight of the Palestinian people in an 
unforgettably emotional manner.  The “Letter from a Refugee Child” is inset with a 
drawing of a Palestinian boy and the tents in which he and his refugee family live (Figure 
3.2).455 The enlarged eyes are undoubtedly designed to emphasize a sense of innocence in 
order to invoke deeper sympathy.  What’s more, the letter highlights that while Iranian 
children are fortunate enough to have the luxury of proper schools, they should perhaps 
feel a sense of shame at their privilege because their “brothers” in Palestine undergo 
schooling in tents, which to make matters worse are often set ablaze by Israel—“the 
enemy of all free peoples.”  Not only should they feel guilty, but they should also feel a 
sense of obligation because, as a consequence of Iran’s revolution, “the enemy… 
harasses” them “even more.”  
                                                 
453 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Ḥamleh-ye rezhīm-i ṣahūnīstī be jonūb-i lobnān”. 22 March 1978. Najaf. Vol. 3, 
pp. 358. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=3&page=358>. 
454 fārsī: dovvom-i dabestān. (Tehran, S. 1360), pp. 50-1. 
455 fārsī: dovvom-i dabestān. (Tehran, S. 1360), pp. 48. 
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Figure 3.2. Textbook image of a Palestinian refugee boy 
 
No aspect of the letter is more loaded with Iran’s Islamist ideology than the introduction, 
which treats Palestinians, regardless of sect and the presence of a sizeable Christian 
minority, as Muslims akin to their Iranian counterparts rendering them as “brothers.”  In 
other words, the text employs basic language accessible to a child in order to deliver 
ideological lessons that emphasize the necessity to return “Islamic Palestine” to “the 
Islamic homeland” and Iran’s obligation in that just and noble effort.   Through such 
exposure, Iranian children obtained an early introduction in emotive stories of oppression 
and resistance thereby empowering them with a state-sanctioned discourse that 
legitimized resistance to oppression.  
 Just as these drills were designed to inculcate a generation in the cause of 
Palestine, the revolutionary government likewise sought to drill Iran’s wider population 
in the importance of Palestine’s liberation.  Thus, Khomeini’s masterstroke came with his 
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designation of the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadhan to be Quds Day, a day in 
which Iran ideologically cemented its status as one of the most ardent international 
champions of the Palestinian movement.  
 Ayatollah Montazeri suggested456 the establishment of such a day in order to unite 
“hundreds of millions across the Islamic world over the issue of Palestine, with Muslims 
in each country coming out on a single day…”457 He hoped that governments would 
cooperate with such popular forces thereby facilitating a common platform for the 
liberation of Quds and Palestine.  Heeding Montazeri’s suggestion, Khomeini designated 
the last Friday of Ramadhan as Quds Day with the objective of directing the Islamic 
world’s heightened sense of religiosity to “strive to save Quds”458 from what Khomeini 
called “the usurper”—Israel. In his letter proclaiming the establishment of Quds Day, he 
once again employed the imagery of burning houses in Israel’s contemporaneous assault 
on southern Lebanon in order to underscore the necessity and urgency of such a day of 
solidarity:  
“Over the years I have repeatedly reminded Muslims of Israel the 
usurper’s danger, and it is now increasingly launching savage attacks on 
our Palestinian brothers and sisters in south Lebanon with the aim of 
destroying Palestinian resistance, continuously bombing homes and 
dwellings. I call upon Muslims around the world and their governments to 
unite against Israel and its backers. I invite the Islamic world to 
commemorate the last Friday of Ramadhan, which falls amongst the most 
blessed days of the month, in order to support the Palestinian people. Such 
a day will be known as Quds Day, and Muslims around the world must 
                                                 
456 It important to note that there is a debate as to who was responsible for recommending the 
establishment of Quds Day to Khomeini. Some believe that Mustapha Chamran, Mehdi Bazargan, or the 
Fada’iyan share in the credit.  I blame the confusion on the popularity of the issue amongst all factions at 
the time. See Alipour, Farahman. “Felesṭīn dar āyeneh-ye khāṭerāt-i āyatollāh”.  Rooz Online. 19 Dec 2010. 
<http://www.roozonline.com/persian/wijeh/wijehitem/archive/2010/december/19/article/-
06dcc80b99.html>. 
457 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: ‘elām-i rāhpaymāī-i mīlīūnī barāye āzādsāzīye qods”, pp. 544.  
458 Khomeini, Ruhollah.  “Vīzhegīhāye rūz-i qods”. 16 Aug 1979. Qom. Vol. 9, pp. 276. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=9&tid=94>. 
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gather in solidarity with Palestinians in their pursuit of their lawful 
rights.”459 
 
 The historic first Quds Day witnessed “millions of Iranians” demonstrate in 
solidarity with Palestine “throughout the country,” where they wished “Death to Carter, 
Begin, and Sadat”—the first Arab head of state to formally recognize Israel.460  Khomeini 
marked the occasion with a fiery speech in which he underscored the universal message 
of the day: “Quds Day is the day in which the oppressed stand and face their oppressors,” 
and invoked Iran’s struggle against both the Shah and his foreign backers in order to 
inspire Palestinians and fellow Muslims to rise up against their “oppressors”: “We, with a 
smaller number, revolted in the face of numerous enemies and defeated the 
superpowers… Just as Iran revolted and rubbed the noses of the oppressors in the dirt, so 
should the oppressed of other nations…”461  In doing so, Khomeini used the occasion of 
the first Quds Day to place the Shah in the same category as Israel, and grouped the long 
suffering Iranians with the oppressed Palestinians.  Furthermore, he made certain that 
there was no ambiguity about the connection between Quds Day and the government that 
established it: “Quds Day is not only a day for Palestinians but also an Islamic day. It is a 
day for Islamic government. It is a day in which the flag of the Islamic Republic must be 
raised in other [Islamic] countries.”462  From the first Quds Day after the revolution until 
2009, it has been a day of state-sanctioned mass rallies in which the country’s leadership, 
state ideology, and certain segments of the population walked instep in solidarity with 
Palestine and the Iranian government.   
                                                 
459 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Entekhāb-i ākharīn jomeʿh-ye māh-i ramażān be ʿonvān-i ‘rūz-i qods’”.  7 Aug 
1979. Qom. Vol. 9, pp. 267. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=9&tid=88>. 
460 “Millions Mark ‘Palestine Day’”.  The Washington Post.  17 Aug 1979. 
461 Khomeini, Ruhollah.  “vīzhegīhāye rūz-i qods”. 
462 Khomeini, Ruhollah.  “vīzhegīhāye rūz-i qods”. 
  
 
 
164 
Thus, if an Iranian came of age in Iran after the revolution then he or she was 
exposed to the issue of Palestine through elementary school textbooks. If, however, an 
Iranian already reached adulthood at the time of the revolution, Quds Day provided the 
opportunity to instill in him or her the tenets of “Islamic Palestine.”  If they stayed away 
from such a day, then there’s a chance they would learn about the struggle in Palestine 
through the state media’s relentless focus on the issue.   
For instance, one Tehran Radio communiqué promised that the Iran-Iraq War 
would “continue until attaining the liberation of Qods (Jerusalem) from the Zionist 
domination…”463 Indeed, the decision to continue the war into Iraq after Iran liberated all 
Iraqi-occupied territory in 1982 was publicized under such banners as, “War, War Until 
Victory” and “The Road to Jerusalem Goes Through Karbala.” 464  The government 
resolved to continue the war after one of the most consequential military operations, 
which was named after Quds (ʿamalīāt-i bayt ol-moqadas)465, led to the liberation of 
Khorramshahr after two years of Iraqi occupation. In the same vein, the government 
named the Revolutionary Guards’ external operations unit the Quds Force.  Lastly, if all 
else failed to convince the populace to view the issue of Palestine through a state-
sanctioned Islamic lens in which sympathy for the former necessitated support for the 
government that championed Palestine’s liberation, then the authorities erected statues, 
                                                 
463 Bernstein, David.  “Iran invades Iraq: ‘first stage in liberation of Jerusalem’”.  The Jerusalem Post.  15 
July 1982.   
464 Rafiqdoost, pp. 218.  Abrahamian notes that the slogan actually read: “The Road to Jerusalem Goes 
Through Baghdad.” Perhaps both were used interchangeably as they (almost) served the same sentiment. 
See Abrahamian, Ervand.  A Modern History of Iran.  Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, pp. 171. Ostovar documents how the IRGC viewed the liberation of Quds as the paramount 
priority that was “blocked” by the war with Iraq. Thus, successfully defeating Iraq, the ‘lesser victory,’ was 
necessary in order to commence operations to achieve the ‘greater victory’ of freeing Jerusalem. As 
Ostovar put it, “…Iraq became seen as both the literal and figurative gateway to Jerusalem….”  See 
Ostovar, pp. 89. 
465 Rafiqdoost, pp  212. 
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named streets and districts, and painted murals and slogans in honor of Palestine 
throughout the country.  
Of all the means at its disposal to communicate its worldview, the government 
preferred the visual medium “because it could effectively convey political, religious, and 
ideological notions to the public through culturally familiar metaphors and symbols.”466 
Furthermore, “unlike textual publications, which required literacy, a basic education, and 
time to read, visuals could be grasped quickly and effortlessly by the general Iranian 
viewer.” 467   Thus, the government re-visualized and re-branded Iran’s physical and 
aesthetic landscape in the post-revolutionary period in order to depict, extol, and transmit 
its ideological universe to the country.  
 Katherine Verdery notes that 
“…among the most common ways in which political regimes mark 
space are by placing particular statues in particular places and by 
renaming landmarks such as streets, public squares, and buildings. These 
provide contour to landscapes, socializing them and saturating them with 
specific political values: they signify space in specific ways.”468  
 
Palace Square is one such square that was infused with “specific political values” when it 
was renamed and remade into Palestine Square after the revolution.  Located where 
Taleqani Street meets Palestine Street, both of which were likewise given such names 
after the revolution, the square is situated between Amirkabir University of Technology 
and Tehran University—the bastion of modern Iran’s radical politics.   
Palestine Square is adorned with two murals and a statue that illustrate the Islamic 
government’s legitimating imagery by visualizing the sacrality of Palestine and Islamic 
                                                 
466 Ostovar, pp. 106. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Verdery, Katherine.  The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 39-40. 
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Iran’s role in its liberation.  The first mural in question is one honoring Sheikh ʿAbbas al-
Musawi, Hizbullah’s secretary-general who was assassinated by Israeli helicopter 
gunship in 1992 (Figure 3.3).469 Below al-Musawi is the Dome of the Rock mosque in 
Quds with a Palestinian wearing an ‘Allahu akbar’ arm band, both of which remind the 
passerby of Palestine’s Islamic identity.  The shattered Star of David in this context 
symbolizes the forthcoming Islamic victory over Zionism.  At the center of the square 
where vehicles circle is a statue displaying the heroic David and Goliath struggle over 
Palestine, which is represented by a vertical geographic outline encompassing both Israel 
and the Occupied Territories—the totality of historic Palestine.  That a silhouette of the 
Dome of the Rock is carved out of the middle of the statue only affirms the significance 
of Quds to the dispute (Figure 3.4).470  What’s more, on one side of the statue is a 
Palestinian gripping a rock, which highlights the asymmetry of the conflict while also 
underscoring Palestinian defiance and identity (Figure 3.5).471  The stone, intrinsic to the 
iconography of the story of David, is one of the many symbols associated with the 
Palestinian movement around the world.   
In addition to the kufiyyah, the Palestinian472 scarf/headdress, the rock is likewise 
an emblematic symbol organically linked to the Palestinian movement and warrants 
special attention given the manner in which Green activists utilized it to register their 
protest in 2009. So important is the rock to the Palestinian narrative of resistance that it 
transcends both space and time, figuring prominently in transnational Palestinian culture.  
                                                 
469 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-1”.  2006. JPEG File. 
470 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-2”.  2006. JPEG File. 
471 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-3”.  2006. JPEG File. 
472 The kufiyyah is often referred to as a Palestinian scarf, even though Arabs and non-Arabs across the 
region claim it as their own. Kurds often don the head scarf, and Iranians have their own version of it 
called the chafiyeh, which Khamanei often wears.  
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Palestinian brides and grooms, for instance, are often welcomed to their wedding hall 
through the zaffe, traditional dancing and singing that includes the chorus from the 
popular song, “Mommy, they demolished our house”:  
“Mother, they demolished our home, and the home of my brother and our 
neighbor. But don’t be upset my precious mother, for they increased our 
stones. We are Palestinians, we are not terrorists. Ours is a just cause, 
mother, and we just want to return to our home.”473 
 
Along with the stone, a second Palestinian in the statue is clutching a Qur’an 
thereby symbolizing the centrality of the religious identity of most Palestinians, affirming 
that steadfast belief in the holy book, God, and his final prophet will empower them to 
overcome the hardship of the Israeli military occupation (Figure 3.6).474  The other side 
of the statue recognizes the matriarchal role of women in the struggle as a Palestinian 
mother, covered in Islamic headdress, is likewise defiantly gripping a stone while holding 
her lifeless son (Figure 3.7). 475  The bottom right is a shattered Star of David, 
underscoring the belief that faith and resistance will triumph over Zionism.   
Lastly, there is a second mural along the sidewalk below the image of Sheikh al-
Musawi (Figure 3.8).476  Contrasting with both the statue and the mural above—both of 
which are related to Palestine in a manner that does not directly involve Iran—this second 
mural includes the presence of Iranian soldiers. In doing so, it situates Iran in the context 
of the struggle over Palestine not only as a party to the conflict but also its vanguard as it 
                                                 
473 Atshan, Sa’ed.  29 Dec 2014.  12:30 p.m. Facebook Comment. These lyrics of resistance are such an 
important and enduring part of Palestinian culture that when Jordanian singer Omar al-Abdallat came to 
the West Bank, audiences requested the same song three times.  When he was asked about his 
experience performing in Palestine, he responded, “I feel I am in Jordan, because the audiences request 
the same songs.”473  The majority of Jordan’s population and the queen are of Palestinian descent. See 
“‘Mommy they demolished our house’ top song at Ramallah performance”. Ma’an News Agency.  4 Oct 
2008.  <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=205420>. 
474 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-4”.  2006. JPEG File. 
475 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-5”.  2006. JPEG File. 
476 Alimagham, Pouya. “Palestine Square-6”.  2006. JPEG File. 
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affirms the leadership role of the clergy. Indeed, one of the two clerics in the mural is 
directing the soldiers to a target, which tellingly is a black crow whose claws are 
insidiously usurping three Islamic holy sites.  That the Dome of the Rock mosque in 
Jerusalem is included in the three emphasizes not only Israel’s “usurpation” of the 
mosque but also Iran and the clergy’s sacred role in returning it to the “Islamic fold.”   
 In sum, the “specific political values” visualized in Palestine Square illustrate that 
Palestine is a hallowed Islamic issue because of the presence of Quds and the 
generalization that Palestinians are Muslims; and that revolutionary belief in Islam and its 
holy book—in contradistinction to any foreign and godless ideology—will lead to victory; 
and Islamic Iran, empowered with an Islamic government, is endowed with the duty, 
leadership, and moral strength to spearhead Palestine’s total liberation.  Furthermore, the 
same sentiment depicted in Palestine Square was given mundane normality in the form of 
Iranian currency whereby Khomeini—the personification of the Islamic Republic both 
during and after his death—is pictured on the front side of the 1000 rial bank note and 
Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock on the other  (Figure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.3. Palestine Square mural of Sheikh ʿAbbas al- Musawi 
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Figure 3.4. Statue at Palestine Square 
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Figure 3.5. Close-up of the Palestine Square statue 
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Figure 3.6. Close-up of Palestine Square statue from a different angle 
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Figure 3.7. Close-up of the Palestine Square statue from a third angle 
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Figure 3.8. Second mural at Palestine Square  
 
 
Figure 3.9. Jerusalem-themed Iranian banknote 
 
The revolutionary movement in 1978-79 was emphatically pro-Palestinian and the 
Islamists institutionalized Palestine as a symbol for two purposes.   The most obvious 
reason was because the leaders of the revolution and those on the ground who voted for 
the revolution with their feet were pro-Palestinian either out of religious solidarity, 
humanistic ideals, comrades-in-arms fighting for liberation, or a combination thereof.  A 
secondary reason was because Palestine was and continues to be an issue towards which 
many in the Islamic World and beyond feel a deeply emotional attachment.  Dabashi 
rightly observes that  
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“The geopolitics of the region cannot, of course, be reduced to the 
Palestinian predicament; however, nor can it be ever divorced from it. The 
fundamental historical fact of the last half century is that there is no 
bleeding wound on Arab and Muslim consciousness deeper and more 
hurtful than the plight of the Palestinians and the barefaced theft of their 
homeland.”477 
 
As a consequence of that emotive power, leaders of much of the Middle East have sought 
to utilize those passions for their own political purposes.478  The Islamic Republic is one 
such government that has championed the Palestinian movement out of sincere 
conviction but not without gain.  Iran’s government affirms its revolutionary credentials 
by supporting the quintessential revolutionary movement of the region, one that as 
outlined above carried a distinct aura of resistance that captivated and inspired Iranians 
from across the political spectrum.  To put it plainly, the government added to its 
legitimacy—at the expense of other Iranian factions sympathetic to Palestine—through 
its pro-Palestinian credentials. 
 Thus far, this chapter has outlined the role Palestine symbolically played before, 
during, and after Iran’s own revolution, and underscored its ideological utility in the 
hands of the Islamic Republic.  The Iranian government’s discursive use of Palestine was 
manifest in a multitude of ways, such as in politically infused stories taught to young 
Iranian pupils, annual rallies on Quds Day, statues, murals, or squares wrought with 
                                                 
477 Dabashi, Hamid.  Iran, the Green Movement, and the USA: The Fox and the Paradox.  London and New 
York:  Zed Books, 2010, pp. 120. 
478 The most obvious and dreadful example can be found in 1991, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein 
fired scud missiles at Israel “in solidarity with Palestine” during the US-led coalition’s bombing of Iraq.  At 
the onset of the conflict, President George H.W. Bush enlisted the support of Arab states such as Egypt 
and Jordan in order to counter Saddam’s claims that the American-led bombing of Iraq was a war against 
Arabs and Muslims.  Israel was not invited to join the coalition so as to keep the Jordanians and Egyptians 
in the coalition. They did not want to be seen as fighting alongside Israel against a fellow Arab country.  
Saddam’s missile attacks were designed to provoke an Israeli response so as to prompt the Arab states to 
withdraw from the coalition.  Saddam, a leader who paid much lip service to the Palestinian cause and 
erected statues of himself pointing towards Jerusalem, like many of his fellow Arab heads of state, sought 
to use the issue of Palestine to his benefit. This was especially the case in the first Persian Gulf War.  Using 
loan guarantees, Bush Sr. persuaded Israel to not respond for the sake of preserving his coalition. 
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emotion, all of which were chronicled in order to provide the foregrounding necessary to 
understanding the scale of the Green Movement’s ideological challenge to the state in 
2009.  It is precisely this history and powerful symbolism that was harnessed and 
deployed to attack the state that derived its legitimacy in part through that very 
symbolism.  The brilliance and dynamism of the Green Movement is that it took 
Palestine as a state-sanctioned symbol and contested its meaning and uses.  
There were two overriding trends within the Green Movement in relation to 
Palestine:  The first and seemingly more dominant trend was the repudiation of Palestine 
as a means by which to attack the legitimacy of the state; The second and probably more 
consequential for the regime was the Green Movement’s appropriation of the legitimacy 
of Palestine as a symbol and its conversion into a Green Movement ideological weapon, 
which activists subsequently leveled against the same state that legitimated itself through 
such symbolism.    
 
V.I. Palestine Contested 
 
By September, 2009, the government had adapted to the opposition strategy of co-
opting regime holidays in order to stage anti-government rallies, and cancelled two such 
events, the Night of Power and Taleqani’s anniversary, thereby depriving activists of the 
opportunity to demonstrate.  Quds Day, however, could not be cancelled without the 
government losing “too much face,”479 so it opted to issue several warnings instead.   
                                                 
479 Director Alan Eyre, Iran Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., September 14, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI378_a.html. 
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No warning was more important than the one delivered by Khamenei during his 
first sermon since the Friday after the June election.  Responding to the post-Islamist 
challenge of the demonstrations, he defended the Islamic identity of the Islamic Republic: 
“…if politics is separated from morality, it becomes devoid of spirituality. 
Consequently, politics takes on a bankrupt nature serving as a means for 
acquiring power at any cost, obtaining wealth, and advancing one’s 
interests ahead of everything else…This sort of politics becomes a plague 
onto the people. One of the dangers of separating politics from religion—
which some have always promoted in the Islamic world and in our country 
as well, and today unfortunately some are raising the issue of separating 
religion and politics—is that when politics is separated from religion then 
morality and spirituality also become separated.”480 
 
In a clear warning to the opposition, he went on to promise that although the system 
tolerates differences of opinion, it will deal harshly with those who challenge the 
“foundation of the system.”481  The sermon, which occurred one week before the annual 
Quds Day rallies, was an attempt to control the message of the forthcoming day. In 
contrast to Khomeini’s first Quds Day message when he called for solidarity with 
Palestinians while also declaring that it was “a day for Islamic government,” 482  his 
predecessor noted that “Quds Day is devoted to the issue of Quds, in which Iranians show 
their unity,” and that they should “be cautious so that no one could use the occasion of 
these gatherings to create divisions between us”483—a clear attempt to pre-empt and 
caution against anti-government activity.  Not only did Khamenei warn demonstrators 
ahead of the Quds Day rallies, but the state broke with tradition and appointed Ayatollah 
Ahmad Khatami—a staunch conservative—to give the Quds Day sermon instead of 
Rafsanjani, who had customarily given the address and whose last sermon on July 17, 
                                                 
480 Khamenei, Ali. “Khoṭbehhāyeh nāmāz jomeʿh-ye tehrān”.  11 Sept 2009. 
<http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=8033>. 
481 Ibid.  
482 Khomeini, Ruhollah.  “Vīzhegīhāye rūz-i qods”. 
483 Khamenei, Ali. “Khoṭbeh hāyeh nāmāz jomeʿh-ye tehrān”.   
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2009 served as an occasion for massive protests. 484     Despite the government’s 
maneuvering and threats, the opposition continued to mobilize in order to turn Quds Day 
into a “Green Day.”485 
In keeping with its thirty-year tradition, the Iranian government organized pro-
Palestinian protests on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadhan, which in 2009 fell 
on September 18. Iran, the country in which Quds Day was established with the express 
purpose of mobilizing Muslims across the world to show their support for Palestine, 
witnessed not only its usual protests but also extraordinary demonstrations with an 
unprecedented counter-programmed message.  As they had done before with preceding 
political holidays, the Green activists used the occasion of Quds Day to show their 
strength after a two-month lull on the streets and they did so not simply to express 
solidarity with the Palestinians, but to also bring attention to brutality at home.  
Despite a massive security presence and official warnings to the crowd not to 
hijack the annual display of solidarity with the Palestinians with “deviant slogans”486, 
“tens of thousands” 487  of people gathered to renew their protests in such cities as 
Mashhad, Rasht, Tabriz, Shiraz, Isfahan, Bushehr, Kerman, Ahvaz, Yazd, and central 
                                                 
484 Hosseini, Sina.  “Mokhālefat-i rahbarī bā eqāmeh-ye nāmāz jomeʿh-ye rūz-i quds tavasoṭ-i hāshemī”. 
Rahesabz.  16 Sept 2009. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/1613>. 
485 Alongside calls from opposition leaders including Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami to use Quds Day as a 
day of action, organizers campaigned online and on the streets to encourage protesters to come out.   For 
instance, 9 days before the Quds Day rallies activists hung a banner on a pedestrian overpass under which 
thousands of vehicles pass daily, including an image of Mousavi’s face above a caption that read: “Quds 
Day, Green Day” (rūz-i qods, rūz-i sabz).  See mirhosseinsabz.  “Otūbān-i nīāyesh sho’ār-i rūz-i qods rūz-i 
sabz”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  9 September 2009.  Accessed 13 March 2015. 
<https://youtu.be/4G9BEt3VLKA>. 
486 “Hoshdar-i shadīd-i sepah beh ekhlālgarān dar rahpaymaī-ye rūz-i quds”. Alef. 17 Sept 2009. 
<http://alef.ir/vdcc1mqp.2bq1p8laa2.html?5wml>. 
487 “Ḥozūr-i gostardeh-ye moʿtareżān dar rūz-i quds dar īrān”. BBC Persian. 18 Sept 2009. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/09/090918_ba-quds-rally.shtml.  To confirm that the 
opposition’s protests were indeed massive, see forougheirani. “Taẓāhorāt-i rūz qods 88”. Online video clip. 
YouTube. 18 September 2009. Accessed 12 March 2015. <https://youtu.be/eAEl9bUfPk8>. 
  
 
 
179 
Tehran, which hosted the largest gatherings. 488   Even though “marchers celebrating 
Jerusalem Day generally outnumbered the protesters” in the capital, “there were parts of 
the city where the opposite was true.”489  The large crowd in Tehran declared “Death to 
the dictator, whether the leader [Khamenei] or the doctor [Ahmadinejad]” (marg bar 
dīktātor, cheh rahbar cheh doktor)490 and warned, “Ahmadi, Ahmadi, this is the last 
message, the Green Movement of Iran is ready to revolt!” (aḥmadī, aḥmadī, īn ākharīn 
payāmeh, jonbesh-i sabz-i īrān āmādeh-ye qīyāmeh).491   
 
V.II. “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran” 
 
The most common slogan of the Quds Day anti-government rallies was “No 
Gaza, no to Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran” (na ghazeh, na lobnān, jānam 
fadā’-ye īrān).492  Lebanon was mentioned in the same vein as Palestinian Gaza because 
much of Iran’s foreign policy in terms of supporting armed groups that repeatedly 
exchange fire with Israel includes Hamas, which controls Gaza, and Lebanon’s 
Hizbullah.493  The slogan was not necessarily an expression of Iranian isolationism or 
                                                 
488 Timothy Richardson, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al, September 20, 2009, Wikileaks 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI386_a.html. 
489 Worth, Robert F. “Despite Warning, Thousands Rally in Iran”. The New York Times. Sept 18 2009.  
Accessed 24 Sept 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/world/middleeast/19iran.html?_r=0> 
490 Tazahorat2009.  “iran september 18, 2009 qods day anti regime rally part 6.”  Online video clip.  
YouTube.  18 September 2009.  Accessed 10 August 2010.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pj68-
4fEzc0>. 
491 Peive17.  Vesal St. Iran Tehran 18 sep 2009 P36”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  18 September 2009.  
Accessed 11 August 2010.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OzK3t58QUY>. 
492 2009IranRevolution. “2009 Iranian Revolution – Nasrolla poster & “No to Gaza, No to Lebanon…” Sept 
18”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  21 September 2009.  Accessed 14 May 2014.   
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDD-UhSPsvU>.  Also, see forougheirani. “taẓāhorāt-i rūz qods 88”.  
493 Iran’s support of Hizbullah has long been a central foreign policy prerogative.  Iran played a critical role 
in Hizbullah’s formation in terms of organization, arms, funds, ideology, and even guidance.  Hizbullah was 
formed with the express purpose of establishing an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Lebanon and to resist 
Israel. The former objective has largely been abandoned.  It’s important to note that Iran had no such role 
in the origins of Hamas and Iran’s support for Hamas is not on par with its support for Hizbullah. For a 
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pro-Israeli sentiment.  On the face of it, the crowd gave voice to a current of Iranian 
nationalism that abandoned the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy priorities.  
In his response to the Green Movement’s leaders who criticized the slogan, one 
writer using the penname “Jamal Irani” authored a revealing piece in defense of the 
slogan by explaining the rationale behind its use. In the article, Jamal criticized 
opposition leaders494 for recommending changes to the slogan, stating that “Just as Mr. 
Mousavi and Karroubi repeatedly declared that the leaders of the movement are the 
people and whatever slogan stems from the heart of the popular gatherings and is decided 
upon by the people cannot be changed...”495 The author affirmed that the slogan “in no 
way supports Israel’s oppression of the people of Gaza and Palestine,” adding a scathing 
rhetorical question: “How can a people who are themselves suffering from oppression 
under a tyrannical regime accept the same fate for another defenseless people?”496 
Jamal argued that the people are simply fed up with the Iranian government 
taking advantage of the Palestinian issue for its own political objectives: 
“The government’s exploitation of Palestine and Lebanon for its own 
propagandistic purposes, and its exploitation of its animosity for Israel for 
its domestic politics has caused the people to hold a negative view in 
relation to the issue of Palestine and the entirety of the conflict… The 
government’s excessive news coverage of Palestine, Hizbullah, Lebanon, 
and Israel over the past 30 years has caused people to be entirely agitated 
with anything related to them.  It is likely that 30 percent of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
selection of the rapidly expanding literature regarding Hizbullah, see Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of 
Hizbullah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004; Jaber, Hala. Hezbullah: Born with a Vengeance. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997. For a good primer, see Norton, Richard August. Hezbollah: A Short 
History.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
494 Mousavi, Karroubi, and Kadivar, the latter of which is in exile in the US and was a pupil to dissident 
cleric and one-time successor to Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, all came out against the slogan and 
advised demonstrators to foster pro-opposition and pro-Palestine slogans such as “Yes to Gaza, yes to 
Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran.” 
495 Irani, Jamal.  “Cherā mardom goftand: ‘na ghazeh na lobnān, jānam fadā’ye īrān”. Rahesabz.  23 June 
2010.  Accessed 24 Sept 2013. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/18060/>. 
496 Ibid. 
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government’s media coverage over the past 30 years has been devoted to 
Palestine alone. This has caused the people to have a negative reaction 
towards Palestine.”497 
 
In other words, Jamal highlights two critical points: 1) The Palestinian cause has lost 
credibility in the eyes of a segment of the opposition because of its association with the 
Iranian government and the fact that it has been seemingly forced onto them; 2) The 
movement is recognizing the government’s political use of Palestine and Lebanon as 
“exploitation” for “propaganda purposes.” The government’s implied argument has long 
been that it warrants not only domestic support but also wider Islamic support because it 
champions the quintessential “Islamic” cause—the liberation of Palestine and Quds— 
both of which are dear to millions in the Muslim World and beyond.   In other words, to 
support the Islamic government is by extension akin to supporting the Palestinian cause. 
Jamal and those who shouted “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon…,” however, repudiated that 
outlook by labeling the government’s strategy as “exploitation,” thereby refusing to allow 
the state to legitimize itself through its solidarity with the Palestinians.  To put it plainly, 
the slogan strategically attacked a central issue important to the government ideology in 
order to attack the very basis of the Islamic government.    
What’s more, conversations with activists and sympathizers of the movement 
have yielded another popular reason, which was echoed by Jamal when he wrote: 
“The government’s one-sided and unjustified support for Hizbullah and Hamas while the 
people of Iran are in need of that support has consequently intensified the people’s hatred 
for the two.”498  One social media user in Iran added that although he’s only 17 years of 
age, he strongly believes that “If these countries were in a better situation than us they 
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would never help us.”499  There is no way of knowing if such a calculus is true but that is 
beside the point. Rather, his frustration illustrates a distinct viewpoint in which a large 
segment of the population has grown increasingly weary of the Iranian government 
seemingly prioritizing Palestine at the expense of Iranians. Indeed, another user 
commented that her priority is “first Iran and my countrymen and then others.”500   Lastly, 
Hizbullah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, garnered the antipathy of such activists 
when he supported Khamanei “at a time when he is giving a sermon of blood in Iran and 
killing youths,” which “has caused people to hate him [Nasrallah] and take sides against 
him.”501 
  Thus, although expressly a nationalist slogan, “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I 
sacrifice my life only for Iran” condemns the government’s exploitation of Palestine and 
Lebanon, and highlights their guilt-by-association in the eyes of many Green Movement 
activists and supporters. More importantly, the slogan is an attack on a central foreign 
policy prerogative and an ideological tenet, which as detailed above, the government has 
emphasized in a variety of ways for thirty years.  Part of the government’s ideological 
foundation rests on its support of the Palestinians but such slogans called that foundation, 
and by default, the legitimacy of the state into question.  More succinctly, by repudiating 
Palestine they were “negating” a fundamental pillar in the Islamic government’s 
ideological foundation. 
 
V.III. “Palestine is right here” 
 
                                                 
499 Hatami, Nima.  27 May 2013.  12:19 a.m. Facebook Comment. 
500 Ramazani, Yalda.  27 May 2013.  12:12 a.m. Facebook Comment. 
501 Irani, Jamal.  “Cherā mardom goftand: ‘na ghazeh na lobnān, jānam fadā’ye īrān”. Rahesabz.  23 June 
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  More consequentially, however, was a second strand within the movement, 
which did not repudiate Palestine but altogether appropriated it in order to infuse its 
protest with an undeniable potency.  For these activists, Palestine was a revolutionary 
symbol of defiance against tyranny and did not belong to the state, but was identifiable to 
all peoples suffering under the yolk of oppression.  It is precisely through such discourse 
that the state’s thirty-year emphasis on Palestine backfired.  These Green activists 
subverted Palestine in terms of both the state’s rhetoric and the political language that it 
had drilled into the minds of a generation of Iranians, reprogrammed it giving it a new 
revolutionary meaning, and leveled it against the regime as a devastating attack on the 
state’s ideology.  
 On the eve of the first Quds Day after the election results, Jalal Salehpour 
underscored the efficacy of such a strategy in a piece he published on an opposition 
website: 
“Putting the Iranian state on par with the Zionist regime, which the 
Islamic Republic has long condemned as the symbol of usurpation and 
oppression, is a serious attack on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. In 
doing so, the Green movement is placing itself beside the issue of 
Palestine, appropriating such a state-legitimized symbol in order to de-
legitimize the Iranian regime.”502 
 
Salehpour went on to elaborate the utility of co-opting Palestine and the precise target of 
their “attack on legitimacy of the state”: 
“…Adopting the second trend or position can be a fatal blow to the 
legitimacy of the regime. The meaning of this blow can be realized when 
we consider the inner core of the regime’s ideology, and that consists of 
the absolute power of vilāyat-i faqīh, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. 
By claiming the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist leadership of the Islamic 
world in the past three decades, the state has been able to mobilize 
                                                 
502 Salehpour, Jalal.  “Cheh ghazeh cheh īrān”. Rahesabz.  17 Sept 2009.  Accessed 13 Mar 2015. 
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segments of the people in order to legitimize its regime. Now, if the Green 
Movement could show that its sympathy for the Palestinians is devoid of 
any personal or political benefit and is genuinely rooted in humanistic 
ideals and against the racist and oppressive Israeli government, then it can 
disarm the regime by depriving the state of one its most effective 
instruments used for acquiring legitimacy.503 
 
To put it plainly, subverting the regime’s meaning and uses of Palestine as a symbol 
amounted to an attack on the vilāyat-i faqīh, the essence and cornerstone of the Islamic 
Republic.  
 Interestingly, Salehpour labeled such a strategy as “political jiu-jitsu,” explaining, 
“Among the martial arts, jiu-jitsu is a method of fighting in which one 
fighter neutralizes the opponent by turning the opponent’s attack against 
himself while expending the least amount of energy. Using symbols 
associated with the Israel-Palestine issue can likewise be an example of 
this political jiu-jitsu. Green activists can use these legitimated symbols in 
order to de-legitimize the state.504 
 
The following day, Quds Day—the government-sanctioned day of solidarity with 
Palestine and Jerusalem—tens of thousands of Iranians deployed such “political jiu-jitsu” 
in a multitude of ways in order to “disarm’ the state on an ideological basis. 
Demonstrators marched through one of Tehran’s main thoroughfares, Vali Asr 
Street, and harnessed the emotive force of Palestine for their own fiery political ends by 
asking the explosive and highly suggestive question, “People, why are you sitting down 
when Iran has become Palestine?” (mardom cherā neshastīn, īrān shodeh felestīn?)505, as 
well as affirming: “Whether Iran or Gaza, stop the killing” (che īrān che ghaze, koshtan-i 
mardom baseh).506  Furthermore, one protester hoisted a sign that read: “My Palestinian 
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friend, now I better understand your pain.”507  The power of such slogans and signs 
undoubtedly lies in the belief that if what is happening in Palestine is unjust, as the 
Iranian government has stressed for three decades, then how is it possible to accept the 
injustice transpiring in Iran?  By giving voice to such discourse, Green activists equated 
the Iranian government with Israel, a state that the former has long viewed as an 
illegitimate usurper oppressing the Palestinians. In doing so, the opposition challenged 
the government’s ruling ideology to its very core in an unprecedented manner.  In other 
words, if Mottahari argued that if Iranians wanted to properly mourn Husayn’s 7th 
century martyrdom then they should battle the Shimr of today—Israel—then Green 
activists situated the Iranian government alongside both Shimr and Israel on the most 
potent of days. 
 Artist Golrokh Nafisi affirmed Salehpour’s sentiment through her artwork that 
placed the Palestinian struggle in the same breath as the protesters’ struggle in Iran in 
2009 (Figure 3.10).508 
                                                 
507 AbuKhalil, Asʿad.  “Protesters’ slogans in Iran”.  The Angry Arab News Service.  22 Sept 2009.   Web. 
Accessed 24 Sept 2013. <http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2009/09/protesters-slogans-in-iran.html>. 
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Figure 3.10. “This land is ours, Tehran – Quds” 
 
Nafisi’s drawing emphasizes the transnational solidarity between the people of Palestine 
and the Green Movement—a solidarity that is mirrored in the aforementioned history of 
the 1970s—by wrapping the wrists of both activist women, one Palestinian and the other 
Iranian, with bands made from the color of the Green Movement.  Their faces are 
covered to symbolize the necessity of concealing their identities from the repression of 
their respective rulers—one a brutal military occupation and the other a militarized state 
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confronting unarmed demonstrators with paramilitaries, police units that looked more 
like battalions, and its praetorian guard—the IRGC. In contrast, the white doves signify 
the nonviolent resistance of the two movements.509 That both are women underscores the 
critical role Palestinian and Iranian women play in their respective movements. Lastly 
and most importantly, Nafisi’s caption “This land is ours, Tehran – Quds,” highlights that 
the land and sovereignty ultimately belong to the people, not the state—whether Islamic 
or Jewish in name. In doing so, she emphasizes that such solidarity is rooted not in 
Islamist ideology—as prescribed by the state—but in humanistic ideals that transcend 
religion, ethnicity, and nationalism.  To put it plainly, Palestinians and Iranians are bound 
together not by religion but by their shared humanity in resisting their rulers.  
For Nafisi and her counterparts on the streets of Iran shouting against the killing 
in Iran and Palestine, the struggle against state repression did not recognize borders: “In 
my opinion, the Green Movement does not only support the people of Palestine, but all 
oppressed peoples of the world”510—a sentiment that was relayed in other poignant 
images of the Green Movement that conveyed a powerful Palestinian-themed message of 
resistance and camaraderie.  One image in particular warrants special attention because it 
is rooted in the work of political cartoonist Naji al-ʿAli. 
One of the most emotionally charged and well-known symbols of the Palestinian 
movement, which likewise was employed by Green Movement activists, is Handhala, the 
signature character in Naji al-ʿAli’s political cartoons. Al-ʿAli’s work, which always 
included Handhala, was published daily in Cairo, Beirut, Kuwait, Tunis, Abu Dhabi, 
                                                 
509 Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation, despite media portrayals, is largely nonviolent.  
The mainstream media, however, typically prefers sensationalist news stories, which predictably have the 
cumulative effect of depicting Palestinian resistance as exclusively violent.   
510 Nafisi, Golrokh. “Re: Palestine-Green Movement Artwork”. Message to Pouya Alimagham. 5 May 2013. 
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London, and Paris, garnering widespread popularity thereby prompting The Guardian in 
1984 to designate him as “the nearest thing there is to an Arab public opinion.”511 He was 
indeed “the most famous (and best paid) cartoonist in the Middle East” until his 
assassination in 1987 512 , and Handhala was his signature—“an icon of Palestinian 
defiance.”513  Handhala was a 10-year-old refugee with his back to the viewer, barefoot 
and raggedy, all of which symbolized Palestinian dispossession, poverty, and a refusal to 
accept their dreadful fate. Al-ʿAli specifically chose the age of 10 for his character 
because the cartoonist himself was forced from his Palestinian homeland at that age and 
Handhala will “always be 10 years old” until he’s able to return “and then he will start 
growing up."514 
 Handhala has become an international symbol for the Palestinian cause to such an 
extent that his image can be found on “keyrings and posters and other Palestinian 
memorabilia, and in recent years on the concrete slabs of the ‘separation wall’ that 
divides Israel from the West Bank.”515  Handhala likewise adorns the walls of Palestinian 
refugee camps (Figure 3.11) 516  and pro-Palestinian student groups sell t-shirts 
emblazoned with his recognizable image on their respective American campuses.517   
                                                 
511 Haifaa, Khalafallah.  “This pen is mightier…”. The Guardian.  21 Sept 1984, pp. 17.  
512 There has been much speculation behind al-ʿAli’s assassination, prompting one writer to say that he is 
“the Tupac of cartooning.” Al-ʿAli had many powerful enemies, including Arab heads of state, Yasser 
Arafat, and the Israelis. That the Scotland Yard arrested the assassins, who turned out to be double agents 
working both for the PLO and the Israeli Mossad, only made it more difficult to determine who ordered 
the murder. See Lashmar, Paul and Shraga Elam, “MI5 was feuding with Mossad while known terrorists 
struck in London”. The Independent. 19 June 1999. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/mi5-
was-feuding-with-mossad-while-known-terrorists-struck-in-london-1101024.html>. 
513 Black, Ian.  “Drawing defiance”.  The Guardian.  10 March 2008.  Accessed 25 Sept 2013. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/10/israelandthepalestinians1>. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Alimagham, Pouya. “Shatila-1”.  2008. JPEG File. 
517 As an undergraduate, I went to the first Palestine Solidarity Conference at UC Berkeley in the spring of 
2002 and purchased one such t-shirt.  
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Although Handhala has been transformed partially into a commodity, Green 
activists reaffirmed his original message of defiance when they carried his image onto the 
streets of Iran in 2009.  In other words, if pro-Palestinian activists painted images of 
Handhala to show their opposition to the ‘separation wall’ in the West Bank, then pro-
Palestinian Iranian activists lifted his image above their heads to show their opposition to 
the Islamic government on the most meaningful of days. 
 
Figure 3.11. Al-ʿAli’s Handhala inserted in the text of a wall in the Shatila refugee camp in southern Beirut, 
Lebanon. The slogan repeatedly states: “All the territory is the Palestinian national home.” 
 
 On Quds Day 2009, Iranian activists wielded Handhala’s emotive power and all 
the history of the Palestinian movement behind it in order to attack the legitimacy of the 
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state. They foisted images of Handhala wrapped in green518, the color of the protest 
movement, inscribed with four dramatic words: “Palestine is right here” (Figure 3.12).  
Alongside the image, activists provocatively wielded green-wrapped rocks 519 , the 
quintessential David and Goliath symbol of Palestinian resistance (Figure 3.13). What’s 
more, social media enabled activists to continue their Palestine-themed protest even after 
they were forced to withdraw from the streets.  Digital activists took the same image of 
Handhala wrapped in a green scarf and displayed it as their default profile pictures 
(Figure 3.14). 520   In doing so, they equated the justness of the Palestinian cause—a 
justness laboriously aggrandized by the Islamic Republic—with their own protest 
movement, and equated the government’s treatment of the protesters with that of Israel’s 
treatment of the Palestinians. 
 
                                                 
518 Semienejad, Mojtaba.  “Palestine is right here”.  Tehran. twitpic. Web. 18 Sept 2009.  Accessed 25 Sept 
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one noticeable face in the image in order to protect the identity of the protester.     
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Figure 3.12. “Palestine is right here” 
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Figure 3.13. The Green Movement’s Palestinian symbols of resistance  
 
 
Figure 3.14. Green Handhala as a Twitter profile picture 
 
 Just as Jamal Irani explained the rationale behind the slogan “No to Gaza, no to 
Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran,” Foad Shams penned a searing piece leaving 
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little doubt as to the meaning behind their Quds Day message of “Palestine is right here.” 
The brevity yet forcefulness of the piece warrant its full quotation: 
“Handhala does not only symbolize Palestinian refugee children.  
Handhala does not just originate in Palestine. Handhala has not only 
turned his back on Israelis and the Arab collaborator regimes.  Palestine is 
not just a sliver along the Mediterranean Sea. Palestine is anywhere where 
oppression and tyranny exists. Palestine is right here.  
 
Handhala represents all peoples who are displaced due to tyranny and 
oppression and whose eyes can only see the tall cement block wall from 
the Gaza Strip to [Iran’s] Evin Prison. 
 
Handhala is born everywhere where people have lost their homes and 
livelihoods at the hands of history’s tyrants.  Today, Handhala is born on 
the streets of Tehran. If yesterday Handhala was shouting for freedom, 
prosperity, peace, and equality for all of humanity from Gaza, Bethlehem, 
and Beirut then today Handhala is shouting beside us on the streets and 
alleys of Tehran. 
 
Handhala symbolizes our long lost idealism and radicalism, which, 
thankfully, the awakened people of Iran have once again found.  Today, 
Handhala is beside us not only turning his back to Israel, imperialism, and 
the Arab collaborator regimes, but is beside us turning his back against all 
of history’s tyrants under any name or uniform.  Today, it is not us staring 
at the television screens in shock as we watch the crimes taking place in 
Palestine. Today, it is Handhala beside us on the streets of Tehran staring 
in shock shedding tears as he understands that he is not alone in his 
displacement.   It is not just him and his Palestinian sisters and brothers 
who have been served with bullets and tear gas. He sees that his Iranian 
sisters and brothers are not excluded from the same table of tyranny. 
Handhala knows—as we do—that peace, prosperity, and freedom will 
prevail in Palestine only when the interference of the Israeli occupation 
and its imperialist supporters and the Arab collaborationist regimes, and 
most important of all, the undue and harmful meddling of the Iranian 
government in Palestine, comes to an end. 
 
Handhala is standing beside us and we are beside him shouting together 
that we only want peace and freedom for all the people of the world and 
the Middle East, regardless of their race, language, ethnicity, nationality, 
or religion!”521 
 
                                                 
521 Shams, Foad.  “Ḥanẓaleh dar kenār-i māst”.  Akhbar Rooz.  12 Sept 2009.  Accessed 25 Sept 2013.  
<http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/article.jsp?essayId=23831>. 
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Rather than repudiating Palestine in order to condemn the state as Jamal and 
many like-minded activists had done, Shams used the potency of Palestine to offer a far 
more severe condemnation of the government.  Utilizing “political jiu-jitsu,” he argued 
that Iranians like their Palestinian counterparts are “not excluded from the same table of 
tyranny,” thereby placing the Iranian state in the same category as “Israel, imperialism, 
and the Arab collaborationist regimes.”  Furthermore, his concluding statement echoed 
Jamal’s message but in a different manner. While Jamal criticized the Iranian state’s 
support of Palestine because “the people of Iran are in need of that support,” Shams calls 
for an end to Iran’s support of the armed resistance to Israel because that patronage 
amounts to “harmful meddling” and is an obstacle to “peace, prosperity, and freedom.”   
Shams did not question the legitimacy of the Palestinian issue.  On the contrary, 
he affirmed the cause of Palestinian liberation in order to condemn the government and 
its interventionist role as counterproductive and harmful.  In doing so, Shams attacked the 
legitimacy of Iran’s support of the Palestinians.  Thus, if the Iranian state legitimated 
itself by showcasing its support of the Palestinians, then Shams negated that support as 
“harmful,” in order to  “disarm the regime by depriving the state of one its most effective 
instruments used for acquiring legitimacy”—the strategy that Salehpour outlined the day 
prior to Quds Day.522 
A year later, the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, 
relayed Shams’ blistering attack on the Iranian state.  After Ahmadinejad, whose election 
“win” sparked the protests, criticized Abbas for negotiating with Israel, the PA’s 
spokesman retorted:  
                                                 
522 Salehpour, Jalal.  “Cheh ghazeh cheh īrān”. Rahesabz.  17 Sept 2009.  Accessed 13 Mar 2015. 
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"He who does not represent the Iranian people, who forged elections and 
who suppresses the Iranian people and stole the authority, is not entitled to 
talk about Palestine, or the President of Palestine…We have fought for 
Palestine and Jerusalem and the Palestinian leadership has provided 
thousands of martyrs and tens of thousands wounded and prisoners (and) 
did not repress their people, as did the system of Iran led by 
Ahmadinejad…”523 
 
That the rejoinder came from the head of the PA, the internationally recognized 
representative of the Palestinian people524, bolsters Shams’ accusation that the Iranian 
state does not have the credibility to talk about justice in Palestine when its conduct 
mirrors that of the Israeli military occupation.  
Foad Shams, a journalist and University of Tehran student, was arrested nearly 
three months later on another day of action, Student Day.  His file contained around 30 
such provocative articles, of which his piece on Handhala was counted amongst them.525 
Consequently, he was convicted of such Orwellian crimes as “spreading propaganda 
against the state.”   Interestingly, the charge and Shams’ piece affirm a fascinating aspect 
of what transpired in the protests in 2009.  The Iranian government had drilled an entire 
generation in the tenets of Palestinian liberation.  Through the story of Palestine, the state 
taught young pupils political concepts of injustice, usurpation, occupation, and the 
righteousness of resistance. Children’s grammar books, for example, taught these 
concepts as instances of historical injustice warranting heroic and steadfast opposition. 
                                                 
523 The CNN Wire Staff.  “Palestinian leader blasts Ahmadinejad over Mideast peace comments”.  CNN. 4 
Sept 2010.  Accessed 25 Sept 2013. 
<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/04/west.bank.abbas.ahmadinejad/index.html>. 
524 That is not to say that the PA does not face enormous credibility issues inside the Occupied Territories. 
However corrupt, inefficient, and unpopular the PA may be, it is representative—at least in theory—of 
the Palestinian people. It is worth noting that many argue that the PA should disband as it is the 
government of a non-state whose territory is still largely controlled and increasingly encroached upon by 
Israel and its expanding settlements.  
525 Shams, Foad. “Re: ‘Ḥanẓaleh dar kenār-i māst’”. Message to Pouya Alimagham. 16 Sept 2013. Facebook 
Message. 
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Moreover, it empowered them with the discursive language to articulate such concepts.  
That political education backfired when the same discourse was now being employed in 
the service of a movement that was targeting homegrown injustice—what the protesters 
effectively equated to be a usurping power that robbed them of their election victory.   
Shams, for instance, first learned of Handhala through a state-televised 
documentary dubbed into Persian and broadcast to the entire nation.526  Equipped with 
that knowledge, which the state sanctioned and popularized, he wielded the emotive 
power of Handhala in a subversive manner that put to flames Iran’s ideologically-laden 
Palestine rhetoric.  The question implicitly asked in the piece, and reiterated by Arafat’s 
successor, is how can the Iranian state champion justice in Palestine when it has 
abandoned it at home?  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In pre-revolutionary Iran, Iranians from various walks of life ranging from student 
and armed guerrilla groups to the militant Islamist clergy and even bureaucrats in the 
monarchy’s Foreign Ministry viewed the Palestinian movement with great sympathy and, 
in terms of the guerrilla groups, as a source of inspiration.  Some guerrilla fighters went 
so far as to go to Lebanon to receive guerrilla training from various Palestinian factions.  
Thus, it made perfect sense that the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, came to Iran after the 
revolution to salute its victors.   
After the triumph of the revolution, the state institutionalized Palestine as a 
central ideological pillar.  In doing so, the state derived legitimacy from an 
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internationally recognized and vaunted movement, one in which millions in the Islamic 
world exalt because of the “sacred” issue of Quds. The Iranian government raised an 
entire generation in the importance of the liberation of Palestine and Quds, instilling in 
them the discourse of justice and the righteousness of resisting tyranny.   
In 2009, such lessons came to bear in unprecedented and consequential ways, 
which become all the more apparent after circumventing the false win-lose and start-
finish binaries.  Deconstructing these binaries creates the space to unpack important 
happenings throughout the uprising, including the Green Movement’s ingenuity in 
harnessing Palestine’s emotive power, history, and the Iranian discursive focus on 
Palestinian liberation in order to challenge the state on its own terms—quite literally.   
The Green Movement did not voice its demands or objectives in unison.  Some 
wanted the election results to be annulled while others wanted the ouster of Iran’s 
supreme leader—the personification of Iran’s Islamic system.  In terms of Quds Day, 
there were two very distinct strands, one declaring “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I 
sacrifice my life only for Iran,” and another, which in effect said: “Yes to Gaza, yes to 
Lebanon, and yes to the Green Movement; no to Israel, no to the Islamic Republic, and 
no to oppression.” Both slogans and approaches, however, took aim at a central tenet in 
Iran’s state ideology: the liberation of Palestine and Quds and the Iranian government’s 
vanguard role in that endeavor.  One Quds Day slogan negated Palestine in order to 
negate the state that championed it, and the other employed a wider approach 
encompassing slogans, artwork, powerful articles and symbolism in order to co-opt 
Palestine in a subversive manner thereby equating the state with Israel in a form of 
“political jiu-jitsui.” 
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The disparity between the two slogans underscores the futility in trying to 
categorize such a multi-faceted movement.  It can be said, however, that it was 
revolutionary not necessarily because of what it wanted in terms of Iran’s governing 
system, but through the methods it employed to criticize the government and undermine 
and “disarm” its ideology.  To put it plainly, activists took the most prized international 
symbol of the Iranian state, one in which the authorities championed and showcased for 
three decades, and turned it on its head—a revolutionary act in itself.  In doing so, the 
Green Movement used new and creative forms of digital media to continue their protests 
even when the streets became unsafe for their presence.  Both physically on the streets 
and on the Internet, they contested the meaning and ownership of Palestine as a symbol in 
order to contest the Islamic Republic—the outcome of the Iranian Revolution.  
Despite the IRGC’s warnings, Khamenei’s cautionary sermon a week prior, and 
the presence of security forces in large numbers, the anti-regime rallies on Quds Day did 
not result in major clashes like the ones that immediately followed the June 12th 
election.527 As the movement endured, however, the crackdown intensified in the months 
after Quds Day (September 18). The increasing repression both on the streets and through 
the arrest of countless activists, forced confessions, publicized trials, reports of rape and 
torture in Iran’s prisons—most notably Kahrizak—and even executions all resulted in a 
hardening of views within the movement. Before December, 2009, voices within the 
movement calling for the cancellation of the elections existed side-by-side with calls for 
the complete destruction of the Islamic system. The continued repression, however, 
served to marginalize the moderate demands of the former tendency in favor of the 
                                                 
527 Timothy Richardson, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al, September 20, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI386_a.html. 
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radical calls of the latter persuasion.  By the time of ʿAshura (December 27th), the subject 
of the following chapter, the severity of the state crackdown sidelined moderate forces in 
favor of more radical calls for a revolutionary change in the government, specifically, the 
ouster of Ayatollah Khamenei—the “Leader of the Islamic Revolution.” 
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Chapter 4: Montazeri the Post-Islamist and Challenging the State 
through Mourning Ceremonies 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 If Palestine—the Islamic government’s most valued foreign policy prerogative 
and a central tenet in the state’s Islamic ideology—was appropriated in its historical 
totality and subversively deployed with all its symbolic value against the government and 
its ideology, then there is no surprise that ʿAshura, the anniversary of Imam Husayn’s 
martyrdom, likewise became an occasion for protest and confrontation.  In other words, 
just as activists made common cause with the occupied Palestinians by depicting the 
Iranian government as an oppressive usurper akin to Israel, they made common cause 
with the righteousness of Imam Husayn and his band of followers by equating the Islamic 
Republic with Yazid—the Caliph who ordered the massacre in Karbala. In doing so, they 
provoked the backlash of the authorities more than any other day of action because they 
harnessed that day’s sacred and emotive power to imbue their protest with a potent 
discursive force.   
Just as the history of Palestine with regards to the Iranian Revolution and its 
ideological institutionalization in revolutionary Iran are important to understanding the 
gravity of the Jerusalem (Qods) Day protests on September 18, 2009, the history of 
ʿAshura, its role in the historic mobilization during the climactic days of the Iranian 
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Revolution, and its institutionalization are similarly necessary to understanding the 
resilience of the Green Movement’s dramatic protests on December 27, 2009.  
 The ʿAshura protests of 2009 are especially infused with historical importance 
because they coincided with the culmination of the 7-day mourning period for Grand 
Ayatollah ʿAli Montazeri—a regime architect who turned into one of the state’s most 
powerful and influential critics, employing religious discourse to level scathing critiques 
of the government that transcended Iran’s borders and delved into the wider Shiʿite 
Muslim world.   In other words, he used his authority not only to condemn the Iranian 
government in the eyes of his Iranian followers, but also in front of Shiʿite Muslims 
around the world, specifically in Iraq—the abode of Shiʿite Islam’s most important 
shrines. 
 Montazeri’s stature and legacy are important not only because his death became 
another critical juncture for the Green Movement to resurface and renew its protests, but 
also because his transformation from a regime architect to foremost dissident underscores 
what Asef Bayat calls “the post-Islamist turn.”  
 This chapter affirms how the protest movement in 2009 constitutes a historic 
phenomenon unfolding in Iran known as post-Islamism.  By exploiting the occasion of 
Montazeri’s death and ʿAshura 7 days later, which coincided with Montazeri’s 7th day of 
mourning, the Green Movement utilized and deployed the state’s Islamists symbols—as 
it did on Jerusalem Day—against the very state that derived its Islamic legitimacy from 
those symbols.  In doing so, they highlighted the central thesis of this work: although the 
Green Movement failed to cancel the election results or overturn the system that ratified 
them, the protesters nevertheless found success in failure. A non-linear approach to the 
  
 
 
202 
events of 2009 demonstrates how Green activists succeeded in drawing upon a wider 
Iranian and Islamic history in order to create a new discourse in which Islamic symbols 
are not used to legitimate but to condemn the Islamic government.  To put it plainly, they 
denounced the system by successfully subverting the ruling Islamist ideology through the 
appropriation and subversion of important Iranian and Islamic history as well as the 
state’s own symbolism. 
 This chapter also argues that Montazeri is the quintessential post-Islamist, 
illustrating how his death became another day of protest, and outlining how and why 
ʿAshura—the annual mourning of Imam Husayn’s 680 CE martyrdom—became the most 
fiery and violent day of action in the post-election turmoil.  The two events, Montazeri’s 
funeral and the ʿAshura protests, are combined into one chapter for a number of reasons. 
First, they are separated by only 7 days and Montazeri’s 7th day of commemoration fell 
on Tasuʿa and ʿAshura, the 9th and 10th day of mourning in the holy month of Muharram.  
Moreover, both his funeral and ʿAshura are intrinsically religious in theme and 
orientation. Montazeri was a senior religious leader and the observance of his death was 
naturally replete with ritual. Secondly, ʿAshura is likewise a day of mourning rooted in 
Shiʿism.  Thus, the two provide opportune examples of how religiously imbued events 
were subverted as days of action against a state that is ideologically rooted in religion.  In 
other words, they are prime instances in which Iran’s post-Islamist trend came to the fore.  
This section begins with Montazeri since his death occurred a week before the 
ʿAshura protests. Subsequently, the chapter will outline a detailed history of ʿAshura’s 
pre-revolutionary and transnational history, which is intertwined with modern 
interpretations of the legacy of Imam Husayn and the Battle of Karbala, in order to place 
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ʿAshura in its proper modern political context. In doing so, such foregrounding helps 
illuminate the gravity of one of the most momentous occasions of the Green Uprising in a 
manner that affirms the ʿAshura day protests’ historic nature, potency, and post-Islamist 
overtones in 2009 and beyond.   
 
II. Montazeri as a Post-Islamist 
 
 In his seminal work, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-
Islamist Turn, Asef Bayat argues that post-Islamism marks the stage in which “once-
ardent supporters” of Islamism undergo a qualitative shift after a period of trial-and-error.  
They spend years and copious amounts of energy and resources to erect a much theorized 
Islamic government.  Through hands-on experience, however, they learn that an Islamic 
government as an actual tangible experiment is very different from the blueprint they 
envisioned on paper.  As a consequence of popular pressure from below and mistakes 
from atop, these ardent supporters transition from being architects and proponents of an 
Islamic system to becoming reformists—often times dissident reformists—who seek “to 
marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity 
(something post-Islamists stress), to achieve what some scholars have termed an 
‘alternative modernity.’”528   As such, they abandon rigidity and call to question the 
“monopoly of religious truth” in favor of “religiosity and rights.”529  They do not shed 
their personal religious beliefs, but seek to emphasize civil rights and empowerment 
while respecting their own religious convictions. They focus on “faith and freedom” and 
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Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 10-1. 
529 Ibid. 
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attempt to “turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights 
instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than 
fixed scripture, and the future instead of the past,” all of which constitute a qualitative 
shift from the state-espoused Islamism.530 
 Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the two reformist candidates who 
alleged election fraud in 2009, are not only early proponents of Islamism but they 
constitute the Islamic Republic’s founding leadership.  Mousavi is famously referred to 
as the “Imam’s prime minster” 531  since he was the longest serving premier during 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s vilāyat (guardianship).  Ayatollah Montazeri, however, is a better 
case study than Mousavi or Karroubi because he was not only designated to be 
Khomeini’s heir in 1985 but was also a senior cleric, unlike Mousavi—a layperson, and 
Karroubi—a junior cleric.  Most importantly, Montazeri is the co-founder of the Islamic 
Republic.  
So close was Montazeri to Khomeini and his worldview that the latter mandated 
him to serve as his top lieutenant and main representative in Iran during Khomeini’s 14-
year exile in neighboring Iraq.532  The 1970s witnessed the height of repression in Iran 
                                                 
530 Bayat, pp. 11 
531 “Faryād-i āzādi-ye nakhost vazīr-i emām dar dāneshgāh-i amīr kabīr”. Kaleme.  14 April, 2014. 
<http://www.kaleme.com/1393/01/25/klm-180544/>. 
532 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: vekālat nāmeh az ṭaraf-i emām khomeini”, pp. 281. It is worth noting that 
Khomeini spent the first few months of his exile in Turkey, where he saw first-hand the Kemalist state’s 
imposed secularism. Doubtless, his experience in Turkey helped shape his political worldview. He spent 
the next 14 years in Najaf, Iraq, where he formulated his theory of Islamic government—until Saddam 
Hussein, in collaboration with the Shah, both of which had reconciled by the late 1970s—pressured him to 
leave so he wouldn’t be so close to Iran, Iranian visitors, and pilgrims.  Through the contacts of his aides, 
he famously found temporary residence in a Paris suburb in the final months of the revolutionary uprising.  
Although he was farther from Iran geographically, he nonetheless had better access to world media, 
which inadvertently provided him with an amplified voice to direct the revolution underway in distant 
Iran.  Incidentally, Bani Sadr notes in his memoirs that it was Sharif-Emami’s decision to have Saddam 
deport Khomeini to Europe so that once there, he could expose his retrograde views to the liberal 
opposition based in Europe, specifically in Paris, and would thus deprive himself of some of his luster.  
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under the Shah’s rule, and Montazeri, who was on the frontlines in the struggle against 
the monarchy, was swept up in the state’s dragnet. The cleric was imprisoned for four 
years in 1974 during which time he was tortured.533 He was amnestied in 1978 in a failed 
attempt to placate the opposition during the protracted revolutionary uprising.  
After the revolution, Khomeini entrusted his most ardent supporter and dedicated 
Islamist revolutionary to head the body tasked with writing Iran’s Islamic constitution—a 
duty he loyally performed when he “championed enshrining the principle of [the] 
‘Supreme Jurisprudent’ in the Constitution.” 534   The referendum on the Islamic 
constitution, held in throes of the hostage crisis535 , gave Iran’s Islamic Republic its 
critical Islamic framework in which Ayatollah Khomeini served as the Supreme 
Jurisprudent. 
Khomeini, who by 1985 was 83 years of age, spent much time pondering the 
future of the Islamic Republic in the event of his passing, and appointed Montazeri as his 
designated successor. Montazeri was one of a handful of clerics who enjoyed both the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Whatever the reason for Khomeini’s arrival in Paris, it proved to be immensely consequential nonetheless.  
See Abolhassan Banisadr. Interview recorded by Zia Sedghi, 21, 22 May 1984, Paris, France. Iranian Oral 
History Collection, Harvard University, Transcript 5 (seq. 100). Accessed 22 April 2015.   
533 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: zendān-i qazal qalʿeh va shekanjehhāyeh vaḥshīhāneh”, pp. 333. Montazeri 
sustained permanent partial hearing loss in his left ear as a result of the abuse (see page 376). He also 
underwent psychological pressure when he was made to listen to the beating of his imprisoned son next 
door—a tactic the cleric believed was designed to crush his spirit (see page 340).  
534 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 20, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI539_a.html. 
535 It is worth mentioning that countless analysts and historians have argued that Khomeini exploited the 
frenzy of the hostage crisis in order to rush through his constitution. The hostage crisis occurred against 
the backdrop of Iranian fears that the US would try to stage a coup through the US embassy—much as it 
had done in 1953—against the revolution in favor of royalist forces. Thus, when the Shah was admitted 
into the US for cancer treatment on October 22, revolutionaries in Iran feared that this was the first stage 
in a counter-revolutionary coup to be spearheaded by the US through its embassy in Tehran. 
Consequently, militant students sacked the embassy and held its staff hostage in order to ward off any 
such conspiracy.  Khomeini did not order the seizure but capitalized on its popularity and sanctioned it 
afterward.  Furthermore, exploiting anti-imperialist sentiment, he argued that voting against the Islamic 
constitution would be a vote in favor of imperialism.  
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highest religious and revolutionary authority, and perhaps most important of all, 
recognized and respected the authenticity and legality of the vilāyat-i faqīh as an Islamic 
institution.  
Vilāyat (or wilāya in Arabic) means ‘guardianship’ and it was commonly 
employed to denote clerical guardianship over orphans, for example.  Vilāyat-i faqīh 
(wilāyat al-faqīh in Arabic) was coined by Mullah Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1828) who 
expanded the purview of the vilāyat by arguing “forcefully for the right of the mujtahid 
[an Islamic scholar capable of interpreting Islamic law] to act as a successor to the Imam 
and vest him with all the power of the Imam.”536  The idea rested on the notion that the 
only legitimate authority in the absence of the Hidden Imam—the Prophet Muhammad’s 
twelfth direct descendant who went into a State of Occultation in the 9th century—is 
“vested” in a leader who is most familiar with the Imam’s will: 
“If the sole legitimate successor of the Prophet, if the sole wielder of 
legitimate authority after him is no longer present on the earthly plane, 
that means that inherently any worldly power that claims to exercise 
authority must ipso facto be illegitimate unless it can demonstrate in a 
clear and indisputable fashion that it exercises on behalf of the absent 
imam.”537 
 
Accordingly, only the Hidden Imam has the right to rule and all worldly authority is 
illegitimate in his absence. A qualified mujtahid, a learned Islamic scholar who has the 
skill to engage in “independent reasoning with respect to legal questions” 538  can, 
however, exercise authority “on behalf of the absent imam.” In other words, with the 
Hidden Imam in a State of Occultation, such a mujtahid is the least illegitimate authority 
because he is most in tune with the will of the Hidden Imam.  Thus, in the era of the 
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Occultation, the just and knowledgeable faqīh, according to Khomeini, “has the same 
authority as the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams… and it will be the duty of all 
people to obey him.”539   Khomeini does not suggest that the faqīh enjoys the same status 
and the infallibility of the Prophet and the Imams, of course.  Rather, he argues that the 
faqīh serves the same temporal function, especially with regards to implementing the 
Sacred Law.540 
Naraqi intended for the position to serve as a counter-balance to treacherous 
monarchs, not as a substitute. 541  Khomeini, however, radically expanded Naraqi’s 
concept by giving it a modern application when he developed vilāyat-i faqīh “beyond the 
legal-religious to the political sphere within the context of the modern nation-state.”542 
Montazeri, as head of the body that drafted Iran’s modern constitution, ensured 
that Khomeini’s controversial theory of the vilāyat-i faqīh, a concept that enjoys the 
support of a minority543 of senior clerics in the wider Shiʿite Islamic realm, was codified 
into the constitution. 544  The constitution empowered the faqīh with vast legislative, 
executive and judicial powers ranging from the right to appoint the judiciary chief, who 
must be a mujtahid, six of the twelve members of the powerful Guardian Council—the 
                                                 
539 Khomeini, Ruhollah. Ḥokūmat-i islāmī: vilāyat-i faqīh.  mu’aseseh-ye āmūzeshī-ye pazhoheshī-ye emām 
khomeinī, 1970, pp. 39.  
540 Ibid.  
541 Jaber, pp. 181. 
542 Jaber, pp. 181. 
543 Jaber, pp. 183.  Many of the most senior religious leaders in the Shiʿite world including Ayatollah ʿAli 
Sistani, who is based in Najaf, Iraq, and is probably the most senior and influential Shiʿite leader, do not 
accept the legitimacy of the vilāyat-i faqīh as an institution in its current form.  Sistani’s predecessor, 
Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoe’i, likewise took issue with the institution as it is implemented in Iran. 
544 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: gonjāndan aṣl-i vilāyat-i faqīh dar qānūn-i asasī”, pp. 455-58.  Montazeri, 
however, argues in his memoirs that he never envisioned the faqīh having such expansive constitutional 
powers: “Of course, my opinion was that the other clauses of the constitution meant that the jurist had a 
more supervisory role over legislation and the management of the country in order to ensure that system 
is Islamic. The limitations on the authority of the jurist were determined in the constitution but they 
[other members of the Assembly of Experts such as Beheshti] added the word ‘absolute’ when the 
constitution was being reviewed.” (see page 455).  
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other six of which are appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, which is headed by 
faqīh-appointed chief of the judiciary—to endorsing the election of the president or 
dismissing him from office.  He is also empowered with appointing the heads of the 
country’s radio and television networks. Perhaps most important of all, the faqīh and not 
the elected president is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appoints all the 
military commanders, and is the final arbiter of matters related to declaring war and suing 
for peace.545 
Montazeri was the cleric responsible for enshrining Khomeini’s version of the 
vilāyat-i faqīh in Iran’s Islamic constitution, though amendments to the constitution in 
later years augmented the faqīh’s powers.546  Despite Montazeri’s efforts to create the 
Islamic framework by which his mentor would rule Iran, he was not an exact replica of 
Khomeini. Although both leaders had spent time as political prisoners, Montazeri 
experienced the unforgettable torment of torture.  What’s more, he was among a small 
group of leading ayatollahs547 who had the opportunity to share prison time with fellow 
political prisoners, spending hours with leftist dissidents discussing philosophy, ideology, 
                                                 
545 All such powers are stipulated in one very consequential clause of the constitution, Clause 110. See 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Trans. by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980, pp. 67-8. 
546 Montazeri, until his final years, remained adamant that his intention was always to empower the 
citizenry to “elect” the faqīh and “supervise his work.” See Montazeri, Hossein.  “Payām-i āyatollāh 
alʿoẓmā montaẓerī beh marājeʿ-i ʿeẓām-i taqlīd, ʿolāmā’ va ḥozeh hayeh ʿelmīeh”. Personal Website.  13 
September 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010. <http://goo.gl/vbg6jq>. 
547 Montazeri notes in his memoirs that Taleqani was famously warm towards other political prisoners, 
regardless of their beliefs. See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: khāṭerāt rājeʿ beh zendegī-ye āyatollāh tāleqanī”, pp. 
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and armed struggle 548 , such exchanges of which enabled him, according to one 
biographer, to “acquire a better understanding of their causes.”549   
Thus, these experiences caused Montazeri to differ with Khomeini in terms of 
implementing the Islamic government. The former was more sympathetic to the plight of 
political prisoners in revolutionary Iran and had a bitter disagreement with Khomeini 
over the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988. That Montazeri opposed the 
executions, of which the majority were members of the MKO, is all the more astounding 
given that Montazeri’s son—a veteran of the revolutionary struggle—was killed at the 
hands of the MKO.550  
Historian Ervand Abrahamian opines that one plausible explanation for the 
executions of at least 2,800 prisoners551 was part of Khomeini’s strategy to  
“Leave behind disciples baptized in a common bloodbath. The killing 
would test their mettle, weeding out the halfhearted from the true believers, 
the weak-willed from the fully committed, and the wishy-washy from the 
resolute. It would force them to realize that they would stand or fall 
together.”552 
                                                 
548 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: bāztāb-i taghīr īde’olozhī-ye sāzemān-i mojāhedīn-i khalq dar zendān”, pp. 381-
382. 
549 Moin, Baqer.  “Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri”.  The Guardian.  20 Dec 2009. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2009/dec/20/grand-ayatollah-hossein-ali-montazeri-
obituary>. 
550 Montazeri even invoked Muhammad’s peaceful conquest of Mecca, which the Prophet completed by 
showing mercy to his long-time enemies, in order to provide the Islamic Republic’s leadership with a 
precedent to stop the massacre.  See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: payvast-i shomāreh 155”, pp. 628.   
551 The mass execution was carried out in revenge of the MKO’s invasion of Iran from Iraqi territory and 
with Saddam’s support in the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War.  Many of the prisoners who were executed 
out of vengeance had long been imprisoned and had no knowledge or involvement in the MKO’s assault 
(Operation Mersad). What’s more, many weren’t even members of the MKO and were caught in the 
crossfire of the MKO’s invasion and the government’s retributive mass execution, which Montazeri 
estimated to be between 2,800-3,800 victims. See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: eʿterāż beh eʿdāmhāye bī ravīeh”, 
pp. 628.  An annual event is held in Berkeley, California, to mark the executions, the commemorators of 
which estimate the death toll to be 8,000 political prisoners—more than double Montazeri’s estimate. 
Many participants are former activists or survivors of the revolutionary power struggle now living in exile 
decades after their struggle helped defeat the monarchy.  
552 Abrahamian, Ervand.  A History of Modern Iran.  Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 
2008, pp. 182. 
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Montazeri, as history can attest, was not a “true believer” in such a vision and dissented 
when thousands of political prisoners were executed without proper trials. 553   He 
registered his protest by writing a series of strongly worded letters to the Ayatollah and 
the judiciary in which he provocatively asked: 
“…We are upset with the Mujahidin’s crimes in the west [of Iran], but we 
are bringing their original verdicts and the entire judiciary into question by 
exacting vengeance upon the prisoners of old without them having 
committed any new crimes. Under what criteria is a prisoner who was 
sentenced to a lesser punishment now being executed?  Now that they 
have cut off the prisoners’ visits and telephone calls, what will they tell 
their families tomorrow [after their executions]?”554 
 
 Montazeri’s criticism dropped like a bombshell, provoking Khomeini to write a 
searing response in which he accused his would-be successor of being “naïve” and for 
believing the “lies of the foreigners.”555  However “broken-hearted” Khomeini claimed to 
be as a result of Montazeri’s criticism, he went on to threaten him of the fate that awaited 
him in both the afterlife and in the temporal realm if his apprentice didn’t change his 
ways: 
“Since you became a mouthpiece of the hypocrites556 and your speeches 
have conveyed their wishes to the people via the mass media, you have 
inflicted heavy blows on Islam and the revolution.  This is a great act of 
treason against the unknown soldiers of the Lord of the Age [the Hidden 
Imam], may our souls be sacrificed for him, and against the sacrifices 
made by the illustrious martyrs of Islam and the revolution.  If you wish to 
save yourself from hellfire, you had better confess to all your sins and 
mistakes and maybe then God will help you… If you continue your deeds 
                                                 
553 Montazeri’s relative, Mehdi Hashemi, was also executed by the regime in 1987 for leaking secrets to a 
Lebanese newspaper that ultimately evolved into the “Iran-Contra Affair.”  His execution certainly 
brought the reality of such post-revolutionary political executions to Montazeri’s home and personal life. 
554 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: payvast-i shomāreh 155”, pp. 636.   
555 Khomeini’s letter is reprinted in Persian both in Montazeri’s memoirs (pp. 673-4) as well as the 
collection of Khomeini’s letters and proclamations (pp. 330-1). 
556 “Hypocrites” is a derogatory euphemism that has been part of the state lexicon for the past three 
decades to describe the Mujahidin-i Khalq. 
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I will definitely be obliged to do something about you. And you know me, 
I never neglect my obligation.”557 
 
Subsequently, Montazeri was demoted from being the designated successor to Khomeini 
to enemy of the state.  
 Had Montazeri refrained from issuing such historically consequential 
condemnations of the mass executions, he would have assumed office after Khomeini’s 
passing a year later and would have been empowered to end such malicious and 
irreversible practices with a simple stroke of the pen. Understandably, many continue to 
ask why Montazeri didn’t keep quiet when he was the designated successor to Khomeini, 
an increasingly frail cleric in his late 80s who was fast reaching his end.  Montazeri 
answers the timeless question, positing that as a man of religion he had an Islamic duty to 
act then and not later, especially since he felt partially responsible as a senior founding 
member of an Islamic system that was carrying out the executions in the name of his faith: 
“I was part of this revolution. Thus, I too felt responsible for any innocent person that 
was executed under the Islamic Republic.”558 
As such, Montazeri’s official political career ended—a demise best visualized by 
the removal of his image from all state institutions and political occasions.559 Before his 
                                                 
557 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “ʿadam-i ṣalāḥiat barāye taṣadī-ye rahbarī-ye neẓām-i jomhūrī-ye eslāmī”. 26 Mar 
1989. Tehran. Vol. 21, pp. 331. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=21&tid=196>. 
Incidentally, pro-government media heartlessly re-published Khomeini’s letter dismissing Montazeri on 
the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the latter’s passing. See “Beh monāsebat-i sālgard-i fot-i āyatollāh 
montaẓerī, nāmeh-ye ʿazl-i āyatollāh montaẓerī tavasoṭ-i emām khomeinī”. Qabas.  22 Dec 2014. 
http://tnews.ir/news/E0C434837011.html#. The historic nature of the letter prompted Princeton 
University to translate it into English, see Khomeini, Ruhollah.  “Letter Dismissing Montazeri”.  Iran Data 
Portal (Princeton University). 26 March 1989. <http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/supreme-
leader/khomeini/dismissing-montazeri/>. 
558 Montazeri goes into considerable detail in his memoirs as to why he wrote such consequential letters.  
See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: ʿeterāż beh eʿdāmhāye bī ravīeh”, pp. 628-644. 
559 Even soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War prepared for battle by ritually beating their chests to Shiʿite 
hymns while holding pictures of both Khomeini and Montazeri. See, ipouya.  “Shiʿism: From Defeat to 
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demotion, it was commonplace to see pictures of Montazeri beside those of Khomeini, 
especially in public institutions—a gesture that extended Khomeini’s legitimacy onto 
Montazeri and prepared the country for the continuity of the Islamic Republic in the 
persona of Montazeri. After stripping Montazeri of any future in government, the state 
ordered all public institutions to remove his pictures.   
As a result of Montazeri’s fall from grace, Khomeini in the twilight of his life and 
rule orchestrated the amending of the constitution that allowed for junior clerics without 
the requisite clerical authority but with the necessary political and revolutionary acumen 
to succeed him and serve as the faqīh. In doing so, he paved the way for Iran’s longest 
serving president during the tumultuous 1980s, then-Hojjat al-Islam ʿAli Khamenei—a 
junior cleric—to become the next “Leader of the Revolution” in 1989.560    
 Montazeri’s criticism of the political executions of the late eighties, which also 
claimed the life of his son-in-law Mehdi Hashemi,561 ensured that his break with the 
government was total and permanent. Over time, Montazeri grew more outspoken about 
the Islamic republican system, attacking its figurehead—Khamenei—the political role of 
the clergy as a whole, and the overall authoritarianism of the state.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Defiance”. Online video clip.  YouTube. 9 January 2009. Accessed 2 June 2015. 
<https://youtu.be/HbHAQwZXPaY>. 
560 Iran experienced two short-lived presidencies in the early years of the Islamic Republic. One was 
chased out of the country and the other was assassinated while in office. Khamenei’s presidency became, 
relatively speaking, the most stable and lasting during the 1980s. 
561 Hashemi was executed for leaking information about Iran buying American weapons through Israel 
during the Iran-Iraq War. The leak ultimately led to the “Iran-Contra Affair” that almost brought about the 
impeachment of President Ronald Reagan.  The Hashemi leak has been attributed to internal power 
struggles in which Hashemi sought to embarrass political rivals such as Rafsanjani. The objective backfired 
when Hashemi was executed for leaking vital state secrets and embarrassing the Islamic Republic—a state 
that had long been championing anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism yet was exposed to be buying 
American weapons through Israel during the war. 
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He criticized expanding the powers of the Guardian Council from only ensuring 
that parliament’s legislation was in compliance with Islamic law and supervising 
elections to also vetting candidates for the presidency, which effectively hindered and 
narrowed the republican aspects of the system.562  He also opposed state control of the 
radio and television stations as well as the government’s intolerance of political parties. 
Furthermore, in an embarrassing blow to Khamenei’s legitimacy, Montazeri—one of the 
most senior clerics in the Shiʿite realm—argued that Khamenei did not have the religious 
authority to rule. 563  More importantly, he opined that the clergy should “guide” the 
people while “allowing them to decide matters that affect them.”564 Such extraordinary 
and unnerving criticism from a scion of the revolution garnered the wrath of the state, 
which consequently put him on house arrest from 1997 to 2003—only lifting his house 
arrest because of ill health.565 
Montazeri’s opposition represents the “qualitative shift” that Bayat noted when he 
wrote that “once ardent supporters” transition through the process of trial-and-error into 
reformists who seek “to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with 
democracy and modernity… emphasizing rights instead of duties.” This transition is best 
encapsulated in the words and actions of Montazeri when he broke with the regime over 
                                                 
562 See Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: moshārekat-i vāqeʿī-ye mardom dar ḥokūmat, ramz tadāvom-i enqelāb”, pp. 
783. The version of the constitution that Montazeri helped formulate did not grant such intrusive powers 
to the Guardian Council. They were added in revisions years later.  
563 Moin, Baqer.  “Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri”.  The Guardian.  20 Dec 2009. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2009/dec/20/grand-ayatollah-hossein-ali-montazeri-
obituary>. 
564 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: moshārekat-i vāqeʿī-ye mardom dar ḥokūmat, ramz tadāvom-i enqelāb”, pp. 783. 
565 House arrest commonly puts undue psychological pressure on the sentenced, which, in the case of 
senior prisoners, often leads to a decline in health.  Thus, the state did not want Montazeri to die while 
under house arrest because then it would have been partially responsible for the death—or at least it 
would have been perceived to be partially responsible—and the opposition would have hailed Montazeri 
as a martyr. 
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the mass executions, and in subsequent years argued that the clergy should advise the 
people while entrusting them with the “reason and intelligence” (ʿaql va hūsh) to decide 
“matters that affect them.” Perhaps none of Montazeri’s criticisms and stances affirm 
Bayat’s theory more than Montazeri’s views on the Bahá’í Faith.   
The Bahá’í Faith was founded in the mid-19th century as a new religion for the 
new age, or what Bahá’ís call “progressive revelation.” Rooted in the millenarian Babi 
movement, believers posit that the Almighty sends a new prophet every one thousand 
years or so to establish a new Abrahamic religion based on similar tenets, of which 
foremost among them is tawhid (monotheism), for a new era. As with its forerunners, the 
Bahá’í Faith’s roots reside with the preceding religion, which in this case is Shiʿite Islam.  
Predictably, Muslim clerics in Iran and elsewhere believe that the Prophet Muhammad 
constitutes the Seal of the Prophets—the final prophet for all mankind—and consider the 
Bahá’í Faith, a religion that is effectively post-Islamic insomuch as it supercedes Islam 
and its predecessors, a heresy and is heavily persecuted in Iran.  In the eyes of the state 
belonging to the Bahá’í Faith in Iran amounts to apostasy, which is a capital offense in 
the same league as murder, rape, sodomy, and drug trafficking.566 
As such, members of the Bahá’í Faith exist in a state of limbo in which they are 
born in Iran, speak one or more of the country’s various languages, know the culture and 
history just as any Iranian does, and whose faith is not discernible through their attire or 
appearance567 on the streets of the country, yet suffer from legal restrictions and penalties 
that uniquely apply to them.  The state, for instance, does not recognize Bahá’í marriages 
                                                 
566 Human Rights Watch.  “World Report 2013: Iran”.  New York, NY: 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2013/country-chapters/iran?page=1>. 
567 Bahá’í women just like all the other women in Iran, irrespective of faith, are mandated to wear the 
hijab.  
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thereby effectively calling into question the dignity of women who consummate their 
unrecognized marriages.568  Thus, the state situates Iranian Bahá’ís in a dubious place 
beneath that of full citizens: 
“Iran’s theocracy…defines members of the nation by their willingness to 
accept the rule of the supreme jurisprudent and to be subordinate to the 
apparatus of Islamic law, over which he presides. In a sense, only Shiʿite 
Muslims are full citizens (only a Shiʿite may be president), with minorities 
being ranked in the following order: Sunni Muslims, Christians, Jews, and 
Zoroastrians. Baha’is and secularists have at many points been defined as 
persons outside the nation altogether because by definition they cannot 
sincerely accept the rule of the jurisprudent and because he cannot define a 
legitimate Islamic niche for them to occupy.”569 
 
It is precisely this issue of Bahá’ís and their due rights under the Islamic government that 
allows for an informative lens by which to assess Montazeri as a case study in post-
Islamism. 
On May 24, 2008, Montazeri re-affirmed his belief that the Bahá’í Faith, unlike 
Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims, does not have a divinely inspired “heavenly 
book” and is “not considered one of the religious minorities” recognized by the Islamic 
constitution, which affords only such officially recognized religious minorities civil 
rights and representation in the Iranian parliament. Breaking with the rigidity of the 
theocracy, however, the one-time Islamist revolutionary and one of the most senior 
Shiʿite clerics in the world, conceded: “Since they [Bahai’s] are the citizens of this 
country, they have the right of citizenship and to live in this country. Furthermore, they 
must benefit from the Islamic compassion, which is stressed in the Qur’an and by the 
                                                 
568 Cole, Juan R.I. “The Baha’i Minority and Nationalism in Contemporary Iran”.  In Nationalism and 
Minority Identities in Islamic Societies. Edited Maya Shatzmiller.  Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005, pp. 142. 
569 Ibid, pp. 128-9. 
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religious authorities.”570  With such a pronouncement, he attempted to alter the basis of 
Shiʿite jurisprudence that protected the right of the Shiʿite faithful in favor of protecting 
the rights of the citizens, regardless of their faith. In doing so, Montazeri championed the 
“individual choice and freedom” of all Iranians as matter of “rights” and “citizenship.”  
In other words, Bahá’ís, according to Montazeri, may believe in a heretical religion, 
which clerics pejoratively refer to as a “deviation,” but they are nonetheless Iranian 
citizens deserving equal rights on par with the “faithful” and must enjoy the same 
protection by the law without prejudice.   
Montazeri’s affirmation of the citizenship of Iranian Bahá’ís stands in stark 
contrast to the state narrative best exemplified by a 2013 fatwa issued by Khamenei that 
called upon the “faithful”—Shiʿite Muslims—“to avoid any sort of interaction with the 
deviant and misleading cult [the Bahá’í Faith].”571  Montazeri, who after Taleqani’s death 
turned down Khomeini’s offer to become Tehran’s Friday Prayer leader—one of the most 
influential positions in post-revolutionary Iran—and instead recommended Khamenei for 
the position thereby facilitating his meteoric rise, 572  defied the state that Khamenei 
personified in 2008 by opposing such state-sanctioned Islamist discrimination in favor of 
equal rights for all—including those with whom he disagreed as a matter of faith.   As 
such, Montazeri’s position underscores the evolutionary process unfolding in Iran 
                                                 
570 Montazeri, Hossein ʿAli.  “Pāsokh beh so’ālāt-i sīāsī”. Website for the Office of Grand Ayatollah 
Montazeri.  24 May 2008. <http://www.amontazeri.com/farsi/pop_printer_friendly.asp?TOPIC_ID=27>. 
571 “Tāzehtarīn fatvā-ye rahbarī darbāreh-ye estefādeh az enternet, māhvāreh, moʿāmeleh bā sherkathāye 
ṣahūnīstī, eżāfeh kārī va…”. Tasnim News Agency. 30 July 2013. Accessed 19 May 2015. 
<http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/107422>. 
572 Montazeri, “Khāṭerāt: takīd bā eqāmeh-ye namāz jomeʿh dar sarāsar-i keshvar”, pp. 441-5. According 
to Ahmad Khomeini, his father reacted in astonishment when he heard Montazeri admit that Khamenei’s 
sermons were “stronger” than his own, reportedly saying of Montazeri: “This is what is called being 
simple.” 
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through a new post-Islamist discourse that stresses rights over “duties” and individual 
freedom and democracy.   
While Montazeri’s position on Bahá’ís was indeed a watershed moment in 
Islamism in Iran, his continued opposition to the Islamic system in Iran in the run-up to 
the 2009 presidential election and during the post-election turmoil cemented his legacy as 
an opposition stalwart.    
 Montazeri not only openly condemned the state in his capacity as an Iranian 
citizen, but he also used his standing and eminence in the Shiʿite Muslim world to 
question the government’s religious legitimacy in the eyes of senior clerics outside Iran—
especially after the 2009 presidential elections—and urged them to vocalize their 
discontent with the regime.  More than a year after proclaiming his new stance vis-à-vis 
Iranian Bahá’ís, he wrote a letter addressed to the “Honorable marjaʿs and scholars of 
Qom, Najaf, Holy Mashhad, Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz and all other corners of the 
Islamic world,” rallying senior Islamic clerics to join the opposition against the Islamic 
government three months after the elections: 
“Under these circumstances, the honorable marjaʿs and the Shiʿite clerics 
have greater responsibilities… they must see to the added task of 
defending the dignity of the religion and cleansing from it the illicit acts 
performed by the government in its name. These illegitimate acts have 
been done under the banner of religion and Islamic law and are also 
against the goals of the revolution... The honorable and respected marjaʿs 
understand the power and influence of their words, and the government 
needs their approval for the sake of its own legitimacy…The marjaʿs are 
also aware that the government takes advantage of their silence to its own 
benefit. Thus, is it advantageous to remain silent on such important issues 
including dignity and respect for religion, concern for the rights of large 
groups of people, and the survival of religious beliefs among our youth, 
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especially since the people could consider such silence, God forbid, as 
amounting to the marjaʿs’ approval of the aforementioned acts?”573 
 
It was through such clarity coupled with his emphatic opposition to the mass executions 
of the late eighties—an opposition that cost him his political future—that prompted 
Shirin Ebadi, Iran’s first Nobel laureate, to refer to Montazeri as “the father of human 
rights in Iran,”574 and Green activists to exalt him as the “spiritual leader” of their protest 
movement.575 
Montazeri’s political and religious authority gave his dissent a weight and 
sanction that constituted an unavoidable thorn in the eye of the Islamic Republic.  For the 
Iranian government, that thorn was only sharpened when he died in the most untimely 
moment.  
 
III. Mourning Montazeri as Protest  
 
On December 19, 2009—20 years after the death of Khomeini—Montazeri 
passed in his sleep as a result of heart failure at the age of 87—virtually the same age as 
his would-be predecessor.  While Khomeini’s death in 1989 became an internationally-
televised event in which millions of the Islamic Republic’s supporters chaotically576 
                                                 
573 Montazeri, Hossein.  “payām-i āyatollāh alʿoẓmā montaẓerī beh marājeʿ-i ʿeẓām-i taqlīd, ʿolāmā’ va 
ḥozeh hayeh ʿelmīeh”. Personal Website.  13 September 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010. 
<http://goo.gl/vbg6jq>.  So important is this letter that Rahesabz, a key opposition website, marked the 
anniversary of its writing. See M., Maysam. “nakhostīn sālgard-i nāmeh-ye āyatollāh montaẓerī khaṭāb 
beh marājeʿ-i taqlīd”. Rahesabz. 13 Sept 2010. Accessed 3 June 2015. 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/23215>. 
574 Spencer, Richard.  “Mourners shout anti-regime slogans as clashes mar Ayatollah Montazeri’s funeral”.  
The Telegraph.  21 Dec 2009.   
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/6857034/Mourners-shout-anti-regime-
slogans-as-clashes-mar-Ayatollah-Montazeris-funeral.html>. 
575 “Yādnāmeh-ye panjomīn sālgard-i dargoẕasht-i pedar-i mʿanavī-ye jonbesh-i sabz”. Rahesabz. 28 Oct 
2014. Accessed 4 June 2015. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/87270/>. 
576 The New York Times observed that “So huge and so emotional were the crowds, estimated at three 
million, that there was doubt whether the authorities would be able to push through them to bury the 
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mourned his passing, the death of Khomeini’s one-time designated successor manifested 
an altogether different emotion. Indeed, Montazeri’s death could not have been more 
opportune for the opposition looking for yet another occasion to continue their uprising, 
and, conversely, his passing could not have been more ill-timed for the government that 
was struggling to suppress it.  
Although the government marked his death by recognizing him as a leader of the 
revolution and founder of the system it had birthed, official announcements attempted to 
minimize his role at the same time.  Some state media rather disrespectfully omitted his 
clerical rank and did not acknowledge any of his scholarly or political activities after he 
was unceremoniously removed as Khomeini’s successor in 1989.577   Fars News, the 
agency associated with the Revolutionary Guards, briefly mentioned Montazeri’s passing 
while noting that he was once Khomeini’s chosen heir, and then reduced Montazeri’s 
demotion as consequence of him “taking positions against”578 the Islamic government—a 
vague attempt to avoid the fact that Montazeri broke with the regime over the mass 
political executions.  Khamenei himself issued a brief statement begrudgingly 
recognizing Montazeri’s personal and physical contributions to the revolution as well as 
his clerical stature, only to offer a sanitized summation regarding Montazeri’s falling out 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shiite Muslim patriarch… As the Ayatollah’s body, transferred to an army helicopter when the refrigerated 
truck carrying it was unable to get through the crowds, first arrived at the burial site at about 11 this 
morning, a shrieking crowd fell on the coffin… as the excitement grew, the body of the Ayatollah, 
wrapped in a white burial shroud, fell out of the flimsy wooden coffin, and in a mad scene people in the 
crowd reached to touch the shroud. But even as the soldiers pushed the body back into the helicopter, 
the crowd swarmed over the craft, dragging it back down as it tried to take off.” Kifner, John. “Amid 
Frenzy, Iranians Bury The Ayatollah”. The New York Times. 6 June 1989, pp. A1, A7. On the 26th 
anniversary of the funeral, the BBC reported that several hundred were injured and 8 were crushed to 
death in the flurry of mourners who tried to touch the body of their deceased leader, noting that the 
funeral grounds hosted several million mourners who constituted a “sea of black.” “The Death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini”. BBC World Service. 2 June 2015 <http://bbc.in/1ANjZYl>. 
577 Director Alan Eyre,Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 20, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI539_a.html. 
578 Ibid. 
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with the state: “Montazeri failed a difficult and dangerous test near the end of Imam 
Khomeini's life, yet I ask God to show him mercy by accepting his other positive 
deeds.”579 
 Such words illustrate how there was certainly a part of Khamanei that was 
relieved that Montazeri was no longer alive to offer such scathing criticisms of both the 
Islamic Republic and Khamenei’s political and religious authority. As recently as the 
month after the June 12th presidential election Montazeri, a religious figure whose stature 
towers over Khamenei’s, offered an edict that many construed to be an indirect challenge 
to Khamenei’s legitimacy to rule.  After concluding that the election was rigged, 
witnessing the post-election state crackdown and the show trials, Montazeri—without 
specifically naming Khamenei—effectively judged that the “unjust” supreme leader is 
“illegitimate” and, therefore, automatically dismissed from his position.580 Montazeri’s 
scathing criticism, however, did not only target Khamenei. In the same summer, 
Montazeri went on to argue that the Islamic Republic was “neither a republic nor was it 
Islamic.”581 In other words, one of the most senior Shiʿite leaders in the world invoked 
                                                 
579 Khamenei, ʿAli.  “Payām-i taslīat-i rahbar-i moʿaẓam-i enqelāb-i eslāmī dar pay-ye dargoẕasht-i faqīh-i 
bozorgvār āyatollāh montaẓerī”.  leader.ir. 20 December 2009.  
<http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/?p=contentShow&id=6231>. 
580 “Āyatollāh montaẓerī: velāyat-i kesī keh bā sharʿ va ʿaql va mīsāq hāyeh mellī mokhālefat konad 
jā’erāneh ast”. BBC Persian. 11 July 2009. Accessed 3 June 2015. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/07/090710_op_ir88_montazeri_kadivar.shtml>. Also, see 
Sahimi, Muhammad. “Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s Fatwa”. Tehran Bureau. 12 July 2009. Accessed 3 June 
2015. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/grand-ayatollah-montazeris-
fatwa.html>. 
581 The original article was first published on Montazeri’s personal site but is no longer available, probably 
as a result of government pressure. Western Persian language services, however, ensured that his forceful 
words remained online. See “Āyatollāh montaẓerī: mas’ūlān cheshm va gūsh va del bar ḥaqāyeq 
bastehand”.  Radio Farda. 27 Aug 2009. 
<http://www.radiofarda.com/content/o2_montazeri_intellectuals_response/1808375.html>. “Āyatollāh 
montaẓerī: īn ḥokūmat nah jomhūri ast nah eslāmī”. VOA. 27 Aug 2009. 
<http://ir.voanews.com/content/a-31-2009-08-27-voa8-61545592/567831.html>.  The full letter can be 
found on Gooya News: “Pāsokh-i āyatollāh montaẓerī beh nāmeh-ye 293 nafar az roshanfekrān va 
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his learned knowledge of Islamic law in order invalidate Khamenei’s authority as well as 
that of the entire system of governance in Iran.  
Khamenei’s relief that Montazeri was no longer alive to issue such forceful 
declarations was short-lived, as Green activists appropriated his death and used the 
occasion of his passing to honor and defend Montazeri’s legacy, repudiate Khamenei’s 
words, and denounce the elections and the state as a whole.  Moreover, that they 
organized demonstrations around one of the state’s founders attests to the symbolic 
power imbued in this one figure. Montazeri was an integral part of the regime’s origins 
yet the final stages of his life, death, and burial ensured that his legacy became integral to 
the Green Movement’s negation of the very state and ideology he labored to establish. 
According to Katherine Verdery,  
“Dead people come with a curriculum vitae or résumé—several possible 
résumés, depending on which aspect of their life is being considered. They 
lend themselves to analogy with other people’s résumés. That is, they 
encourage identification with their life story, from several possible 
vantage points. Their complexity makes it fairly easy to discern different 
sets of emphasis, extract different stories, and thus rewrite history.”582 
 
For the regime, Montazeri’s résumé couldn’t have been more problematic as he was one 
of the most important architects of the Islamic system and who became its most relentless 
and authoritative critic. The opposition extolled the “set” of facts that “emphasized” how 
one of the state’s forefathers now stood and died in opposition to that very state.  To put 
it plainly, they didn’t mourn him only as a senior religious scholar who made significant 
contributions to Islamic thought, but paid their respects to him as a revolutionary who 
fought both the Shah’s regime and the Islamic Republic, the former of which imprisoned 
                                                                                                                                                 
nokhbegān: eʿlām konand in ḥokūmat nah jomhūrī ast va nah eslāmī va hīch kas ham ḥaq-i eʿterāż 
nadarad”.  Gooya News. 26 Aug 2009 <http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2009/08/092747.php>. 
582 Verdery, Katherine.  The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 28-9. 
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and tortured him, and the latter of which monitored, harassed, and placed him on house 
arrest for six years. That he rebelled against the latter—the state he co-founded—only 
adds to his political bona fides in the eyes of a movement that championed him as one of 
its own as it stood in steadfast opposition to the state he bequeathed.  
As such, crowds spontaneously came out onto the streets in Tehran the night of 
his death in order to poignantly congratulate him on obtaining his freedom through death 
from a government that went to great lengths to silence him, chanting: “Montazeri the 
honorable, congratulations on your freedom” (montaẓerī-i bā ghayrat, āzādīet mobārak).  
Invoking the protest color of green, they declared that “Today is a day of mourning, the 
green nation of Iran is mourning” (ʿazā ʿazāst emrūz, rūz-i ʿazāst emrūz, mellat-i sabz-i 
īrān ṣāḥīb ʿazāst emrūz).583  Such mourning-as-protest was a prelude of things to come. 
Tens of thousands (some accounts put the number at hundreds of thousands)584 of 
people commemorated his death on December 21, 2009, by attending his popular funeral 
in Qom at the shrine of Fatima Ma’sumeh, the sister of the only one of the twelve Imams 
to be buried in Iran, Imam Reza.585   At the shrine, activists held pictures of Montazeri 
with a black stripe on the edge to symbolize mourning and a green backdrop to highlight 
his identification with the post-election protest movement.  They drowned out 
                                                 
583 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 20 dec 09 (29 Azar) Tehran Mohseni Sq Protest After death of Ayatollah 
Montazeri P2”. Online video clip.  YouTube. 20 December 2009.  Accessed 14 August 2010. 
<http://youtu.be/ogadF_IZjTc>. They also chanted, “This is the month of blood, Seyyed Ali will be 
overthrown” (īn māh māh-i khūn ast, seyyed ʿalī sarnegūn ast), variations of which were common as the 
holy month of Muharram began and ʿAshura drew near. A more detailed discussion on the topic and 
slogan is to follow. 
584 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 22, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI543_a.html.  Footage from the event corroborates 
that there were indeed at least tens of thousands of mourners commemorating Montazeri’s death while 
chanting anti-regime slogans. See Video Blog of the Green Movement.  “The Funeral of Grand Ayatollah 
Montazeri – Qum, Iran – Part 1”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  23 December 2009.  Accessed 14 August 
2010.  <http://youtu.be/_KwSHb8cwkI>. 
585 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 22, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI543_a.html. 
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Khamenei’s pre-recorded statement of condolence broadcasted on the shrine’s 
loudspeakers by chaotically jumping up and down with their hands raised, chanting 
“Death to the dictator” and “Khamenei is a murderer, his vilāyat [guardianship] is null 
and void” (khāmeneī qātele, vilāyatash bāṭele).586  They held the hands of the person 
standing next to them above their heads while giving voice to the popular Arabic slogan: 
“We will never submit” (heyhāt mennā zella)587 and condemned the Islamic Republic 
with slogans from the revolution that brought it to power: “Assistance from God [leads 
to] imminent victory, death to this deceptive government” (naṣron min allāh fatḥon 
qarīb, marg bar īn dowlat-i mardom farīb). 588   
Montazeri’s death and funeral occurred in the holy month of Muharram, the 
month in which the Battle of Karbala occurred in 680 AD.  In that fateful year, a massive 
Umayyad589 army surrounded the rebellious Imam Husayn—the third holy Shiʿite Imam 
and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad—and his 72 companions590 in the city of 
Karbala—what Washington Irving, the 19th century historian, referred to as “The 
Sepulchre of Hosein” 591 —in modern-day Iraq.  The Damascus-based caliph, Yazid, 
offered the Imam two choices: Pledge allegiance (baīʿah) to his authority or perish.   
                                                 
586 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 21 dec 09 (30 Azar) Qom Funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri p18”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  21 December 2009.  Acessed 14 August 2010.  
<http://youtu.be/AUlUZkj8q3Y?list=PLB4DB22F42A4DD1DA>.  
587 The Persian pronunciation renders the transliteration as such. The Arabic pronunciation only slightly 
differs. 
588 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 21 dec 09 (30 Azar) Qom Funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri p19”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  21 December 2009.  Accessed 14 August 2010.  
<http://youtu.be/4tWAm4dyrm0?list=PLB4DB22F42A4DD1DA>. 
589 The Umayyads were the first dynasty in the Islamic era. After the death of the Prophet, four successors 
had been chosen through consensus.  After the death of ʿAli, the fourth caliph or successor, the Umayyads 
took control of the caliphate and turned it into a dynasty, ruling between 661-750 CE. 
590 Fischer offers a breakdown of the number, noting that 30 of the 72 were horsemen and the remaining 
42 were on foot.  See Fischer, Michael.  Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980, pp. 19. 
591 Irving, Washington. Lives of Mahomet and His Successors. Paris, A. and W. Galignani and Co., 1850, pp. 
350.  
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Preferring death over what he considered submission to tyranny and a perversion of 
Islamic rule, Husayn revolted and was killed alongside his companions thereby giving 
real-life application to the mantra: “It is better to die on one's feet than to live on one's 
knees”—doing so more than a millennia before the timeless phrase entered the lexicon of 
resistance.592  What’s more, Husayn did not force his family and followers to make the 
supreme sacrifice for his ideals. On the contrary, when Husayn urged his supporters to 
flee before the final battle, it is reported that his half-brother, ʿAbbas, responded: “We 
shall not do that, for how can we live after your death?”593  
According to the Shiʿite account, he died because “he refused to acknowledge the 
sovereignty” of the Umayyad’s who had usurped the caliphate and turned it into a 
hierarchal “godless” dynasty. 594    Michael Fischer argues that Husayn’s death and 
defiance is “the third part of the origin legend of Muhammad, ʿAli, and Husayn,” and 
constitutes “The Karbala Paradigm,” which is  
“…the part that is the most emotionally intense and concentrated, and is 
the reference point for almost all popular teaching. It is, however, only 
intelligible as the climax to the story of ʿAli. Its focus is the emotionally 
potent theme of corrupt and oppressive tyranny repeatedly overcoming (in 
this world) the steadfast dedication to pure truth; hence its ever-present, 
latent, political potential to frame or cloth contemporary discontents. The 
complete origin legend, which might be called the paradigm of the family 
of the Prophet, focuses rather upon model behavior. Muslims should 
model themselves on the behavior of Muhammad, ʿAli, Fatima, Husayn, 
and Zaynab (the Prophet, his cousin and son-in-law, his daughter, his 
grandson, and his granddaughter).”595 
 
                                                 
592 The quote is attributed to Emiliano Zapata (d. 1919), a leader of the Mexican Revolution. The Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, which emerged onto the political landscape of Mexico in the mid-90s as a 
resistance force, takes its name from Zapata. 
593 Nakash, Yitzhak.  The Shiʿis of Iraq.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 144. 
594 Heglund, Mary.  “Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village”. In 
Religion and Politics in Iran: Shiʿism from Quietism to Revolution. Ed. by Nikki R. Keddie. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 226. 
595 Fischer, pp. 13.  
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Husayn exemplified an integral part of that model by the fact that, “knowing he would 
die, went to Karbala to witness for the truth, knowing that his death would make him a 
martyr, an enduring, immortal witness, whose example would be a guide for others.”596  
His legacy indeed endures more than millennium later.  
Green activists in 2009 invoked “The Karbala Paradigm” in order to exalt 
Montazeri as a fighter of truth and justice in the same vein as Imam Husayn, and to 
challenge Khamenei’s sovereignty and “corrupt and oppressive tyranny”—a sentiment 
they conveyed by equating “the Leader of the Revolution” with Yazid, the caliph who 
ordered the massacre at Karbala in 680 CE, by declaring outright: “This month is the 
month of blood, Yazid will be toppled” (īn māh, māh-i khūn ast, yazīd sarnegūn ast).597  
In doing so, activists were once again decisively using the state’s Islamic discourse 
against itself.  
The mourning ceremony inside the shrine compound concluded with Montazeri’s 
body placed atop a truck covered in black mourning drapes and driven slowly through the 
streets so the immense crowd outside could pay its respects.  Affording Green activists 
the opportunity to continue their anti-government protests, the crowd again invoked 
Islamic history to affirm its fiery message.  Carrying Montazeri’s portrait, the crowd 
pledged: “We are not from Kufa to stand behind Yazid” (mā ahl-i kūfeh nīstīm, posht-i 
yazīd baīstīm)598—a powerful slogan in reference to the Kufans of 680 CE who had 
invited Imam Husayn to Kufa to receive their pledge of allegiance to him, but failed to 
come to his support in his hour of need when he was surrounded en route and eventually 
                                                 
596 Ibid, pp. 25. 
597 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 21 dec 09 (30 Azar) Qom Funer of Ayatollah Montazeri p19”.  
598 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 21 dec 09 (30 Azar) Qom Funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri p15”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  21 December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/sq-
MyQza_Zc?list=PLB4DB22F42A4DD1DA>. “Kufeh” is the Persian rendering of the Iraqi city of Kufa. 
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massacred at Karbala. 599   A similar quote was famously utilized during the Iranian 
Revolution when Saddam Hussein, as a favor to the Shah, deported Khomeini from Najaf 
to Paris, where Iranian revolutionaries anticipated his incoming by hanging a banner in 
Neauphle-le-Château, declaring: “We are not the people of Kufa” (mā ahl-i kūfeh 
nīstīm).600   The implication was that the movement in 1978 would continue until it 
succeeded in the revolutionary overthrow of the monarch—the Yazid of the time. 
Mourners in 2009 used the promise from 1978 to likewise pledge that the movement will 
not abandon its leaders and persevere until the “toppling” of Khamenei—the new Yazid, 
“the Leader of the Revolution, and the personification of the Islamic Republic.”  One 
political analyst inside Iran affirmed the parallel between then and now by stating: 
“Today we had a very great demonstration in Qom, a small provincial city and the 
ideological centre of the Islamic regime… The slogans people were chanting were 
indirectly against the Islamic regime and similar to what was chanted before the 
revolution against the Shah.”601  Not all the chants were so indirect.  
Although there were reports of skirmishes between the crowd and the hardline 
Basij militia, security forces were able to take control of the streets only after the 
mourners dispersed on their own.  In order to prevent further collective action, they 
blocked all the roads around Montazeri’s home and took control of the grand mosque in 
                                                 
599 The guilt with which these Kufans were afflicted is famous. In subsequent years, many such Kufans 
engaged in a suicidal military campaign against the Umayyads in order to redeem abandoning Husayn. See 
Ostovar, pp. 24. 
600 Dabashi, Hamid.  Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest.  Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011, pp. 15-6. 
601 Tait, Robert.  “Funeral of Iranian cleric Montazeri turns into political protest”.  The Guardian.  21 Dec 
2009.  <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/21/iran-funeral-ayatollah-montazeri-protest>. 
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Qom.602  Consequently, Montazeri’s family cancelled “the traditional prayer ceremony, 
scheduled to be held in Qom’s Azam Mosque the night of December 21, after it learned 
that the mosque had been filled in the hours leading up to the ceremony by Basij and 
IRGC-affiliated persons.”603  Furthermore, regime supporters attacked the homes of both 
Ayatollah Saneʿi—another high-ranking critic of the government—and Montazeri, going 
as far as tearing down mourning posters commemorating his death and smashing the 
windows of his office, both of which were done reportedly in revenge for the fiery anti-
regime and anti-Khamenei slogans voiced during Montazeri’s funeral.604   Thus, after 
failing to control his mourning procession, the government prompted the cancellation of 
the traditional prayer ceremony immediately after his mass-attended and politically-
infused funeral, 605 and the attacks on Montazeri’s home and office further prompted his 
son, Ahmad, to cancel the customary 3rd and 7th day of commemorations.606 As in life, 
however, Montazeri refused to be silenced and the government’s cancellation of semi-
private indoor commemorations only facilitated the opposition’s ability to observe his 
mourning cycle on the streets.  Thus, the opportunity to protest provided by Montazeri’s 
death persisted despite the government’s best attempts.  This is especially the case as his 
                                                 
602 Worth, Robert F. and Nazila Fathi.  “Cleric’s Funeral Becomes Protest of Iran Leaders”.  New York 
Times.  12 Dec 2009.  Accessed 15 Aug 2010.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/world/middleeast/22cleric.html?_r=2&hp>. 
603 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 22, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI543_a.html.   
604 Ghazi, Fereshteh. “Qom dar āstāneh-ye jang-i moqaledān-i āyāt”. Rooz Online. 23 Dec 2009. Accessed 3 
June 2015. <http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/archive/2009/december/23/article/-
7361f881e6.html>. Also see, “Rāhpaymāī-ye havādārān-i dowlat dar qom va ḥamleh-ye tāzeh beh daftar 
āyatollāh yūsef-i ṣāneʿī”. Radio Farda. 23 Dec 2009. Accessed 3 June 2015. 
<http://www.radiofarda.com/content/o2_hardliners_hit_dissident_ayatollah/1911057.html>. 
605 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 23, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI545_a.html.   
606 Ghazi, Fereshteh. “Qom dar āstāneh-ye jang-i moqaledān-i āyāt”. 
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7th day of mourning converged with ʿAshura thereby creating an explosive day of passion 
and spirited defiance.  
In Shiʿite Islam, grieving families and friends come together to commemorate the 
3rd, 7th, and 40th day of mourning.607  Until as early as half a century ago, these gatherings 
were often apolitical.  As Islamist opposition grew against the monarchy in the run-up to 
the Iranian Revolution, elements within Islamic culture were politicized in order to 
mobilize against the Shah.  Charles Kurzman, a sociologist and expert on modern Iran, 
argues that 
“… the forty-day mourning cycle is a cultural resource that exists in Shiʿi 
Islam but does not exist in some other cultures. It is part of the cultural 
context out of which Iranian protest grows. In more strategic terms, it is 
part of the ‘tool kit,’ ‘repertoire,’ or ‘cultural reservoir’ on which Iranian 
protest can draw.”608 
 
That it is not to say that Shiʿism is inherently revolutionary. During Qajar rule, which 
spanned over a century, Shiʿite clerics—the self-styled guardians of Shiʿism—often 
acquiesced and defended the status quo of the feudal monarchy.609 It does, however, 
mean that there are certain aspects within Shiʿite history, culture, and discourse that can 
be organically drawn upon and invoked to inspire political mobilization. The 
politicization of the mourning cycles in 1978, for example, were instrumental in ensuring 
that the Iranian Revolution continued to build momentum in the face of severe 
government repression.  These 40-day mourning periods, known by their Arabic 
terminology as arba’īn, brought more people onto the streets in protest, which ultimately 
devolved into clashes with the Shah’s military resulting in the deaths of scores of 
                                                 
607 This ritual is akin to the shiva and the shloshim mourning periods in Judaism, which last 7 and 30 days 
respectively.  
608 Kurzman, pp. 56. 
609 The Tobacco Revolt of 1890-1892 is when many Shiʿite clerics began to challenge the status quo and 
played a decisive role in the revolt’s success. 
  
 
 
229 
activists. These “martyrs” in turn had their 40th day of mourning which tragically 
produced more “martyrs” who would then have their 40th day of mourning thereby 
facilitating another day of action. Three of these Shiʿite mourning cycles, which the Shah 
bemoaned as “bereavement tactics,”610  helped bring the revolution to a crescendo in 
1978.  
The innovative and strategic revolution-era mourning cycles were appropriated 
and utilized in 2009 to politicize Montazeri’s passing and protest the very state that came 
to power through such tactics. Fatefully, Montazeri’s 7th day of mourning fell on Tasuʿa 
and ʿAshura, the two days of commemoration that coincided with the anniversary of 
Imam Husayn and his half-brother’s 7th century martyrdom. As with the mourning cycles, 
ʿAshura is a part of the Shiʿite Iranian repertoire of action that can readily be activated in 
order to mobilize the population. 
 Before the discussion proceeds to outline the ʿAshura day uprising in 2009, it is 
first important to show what ʿAshura means in terms of the modern history of political 
mobilization for Shiʿites in general and Iranians in particular.  The politicization of 
ʿAshura precipitated the most important day of action in the history of the Iranian 
Revolution. After the revolution’s triumph, the state incorporated ʿAshura and Husayn’s 
legacy as central tenets in Iran’s Islamist ideology. Only after that historical context is 
taken into consideration can the gravity and potency of the Green Movement’s 
appropriation of ʿAshura to renew their uprising on December 27—the final and perhaps 
most consequential major day of action in the history of the movement—be properly 
unpacked and appreciated.  
                                                 
610 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History: By Mohammad Reza Pahlavi The Shah of Iran. New York: 
Stein and Day Publishers, 1980, pp. 163. 
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IV. Revolutionary ʿAshura in the 1970s 
 
As noted above, Shiʿism is not automatically revolutionary but it has a discourse, 
culture, and history that are laden with defiant symbolism that can be easily activated in 
order to mobilize people for political purposes.  No other aspect of Shiʿism is more 
readily available for such activation than ʿAshura, the annual commemoration marking 
the 7th century martyrdom of Imam Husayn—the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the third Imam that the Shiʿites believe to be infallible, just, and the rightful heir 
(after his father Imam ʿAli and older brother Imam Hassan) to the leadership of the 
burgeoning Muslim community after the Prophet’s passing in 632 CE.  In the 1960s and 
70s, Shiʿite leaders across the Muslim world began to harness the power of Husayn’s 
martyrdom in order to inspire their followers to mobilize against the injustice that many 
of their communities faced in the Middle East—often times because they were Shiʿites. 
The customary mourning of Husayn’s martyrdom is usually confined to 
believers611 gathering for sermons and eulogies, partaking in rituals of weeping and self-
flagellation612, and providing food and refreshments in the name of Imam Husayn. There 
is an important cleansing component to the weeping as well as a strong machismo aspect 
to the self-flagellation, as Yitzhak Nakash explained: “A man participating in a 
procession of flagellation would feel lofty and proud for doing so, knowing that he was 
                                                 
611 I use the term “believers” reluctantly as even the nominally pious partake in what is often considered a 
cultural event as well as a religious one.  
612 The flagellation ranges from simple chest beating to the striking of foreheads with dulled swords 
known as the qamāt (qameh in Persian), which can result in the profuse bloodletting. Clerics have 
prohibited the more severe forms of self-flagellation such as the cutting of the foreheads, though it is still 
practiced in places such as Iraq or rural Lebanon. 
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being noticed by the crowd.”613  Most importantly, it is believed that such activities place 
the pious “on good terms with the imams or imamzadehs (the imams’ progeny) so as to 
increase the chances of receiving assistance from them when it is needed.”614  Believers 
hold that the most critical form of assistance can come on the Day of Resurrection.  The 
closer one is to the Imams then the likelier that they will intercede on their behalf on the 
Day of Resurrection. 615   The devout especially believe Imam ʿAli to be “the most 
effective protector, aide, and intercessor on behalf of believers, both immediately after 
their death, when their acts were judged by the two angels Munkir and Nakir, and on the 
day of resurrection.”616  This is the main reason why the Wadi al-Salam cemetery near 
Imam ʿAli’s mausoleum in Najaf, Iraq is one of the largest if not the largest cemetery in 
the world; the closer spiritually and physically to Imam ʿAli, the higher the chances of his 
assistance at such critical junctures.617 
Millions of Shiʿites across the Muslim world commemorate ʿAshura, and such 
observances vary by local customs and circumstances.  For dispossessed Shiʿite 
minorities in Lebanon and Iraq, for example, it was an occasion to express group identity 
and solidarity throughout much of the modern period.  In the 1970s, however, Shiʿite 
clerical leaders across the Muslim world imbued ʿAshura with a modern political 
meaning in order mobilize their constituents for political purposes.   In other words, “it 
became practical to stress that the Karbala paradigm is not a passive weeping for Husayn 
                                                 
613 Nakash, Yitzah.  The Shiʿis of Iraq.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 151. 
614 Heglund, pp. 222. 
615 Nakash, pp. 185. 
616 Nakash, pp. 186. 
617 Many Afghan Shiʿites believe that Imam ʿAli was ultimately interred in the Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif, 
where they believe his remains are laid to rest at the famous Blue Mosque.  
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but rather an active fighting for Husayn’s ideals, and it is not merely a personal and 
individual commitment but a social one.”618 
In the religiously diverse Lebanese context,619 Shiʿite Muslims were the most 
disenfranchised of all the religious groups.  Iranian-Lebanese cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr, 
launched a movement, ḥarakat al-muḥrimīn (Movement of the Downtrodden) in order to 
organize and empower Lebanese Shiʿites to have a greater share of political and 
economic power in a system that deprived them of both. On the occasion of ʿAshura in 
1974, for example, al-Sadr gave Husayn’s martyrdom modern political application in 
order to inspire his constituents: 
“A great sacrifice was needed to… stir feelings.  The event of Karbala was 
that sacrifice. Imam Hussein put his family, his forces, and even his life, in 
the balance against tyranny and corruption. Then the Islamic world burst 
forth with this revolution.  This revolution did not die in the sands of 
Karbala; it flowed into the life stream of the Islamic world, and passed 
from generation to generation, even to our day. It is a deposit placed in our 
hands so that we may profit from it, that we draw out of it a new source of 
reform, a new position, a new movement, a new revolution, to repel the 
darkness, to stop tyranny and to pulverize evil.”620 
 
He affirmed that simply mourning Husayn’s martyrdom was a disservice to his 
legacy, proclaiming: “Husayn had many enemies, but those who wish to confine the 
anniversary of his death simply to mourning and lamentation are the most dangerous for 
they threaten to erase his legacy and motivation to die fighting tyranny.”621  Such political 
interpretations laid the groundwork amongst many Lebanese Shiʿites to heed Khomeini’s 
call for Islamic Revolution half a decade later.  Although al-Sadr officially founded the 
                                                 
618 Fischer, pp. 213. 
619 Lebanon is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the Middle East with nearly 20 religious 
communities registered in a country of about 4.5 million people. 
620 Translation in Ajami, Fouad.  The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 143. 
621 Ajami, pp. 144. 
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Shiʿite group Amal (meaning “Hope” in Arabic), he is considered the father of all 
Lebanese Shiʿites. Indeed, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of 
Hizbullah—the Shiʿite militant group 622  that was co-founded by militant Lebanese 
Shiʿites and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps—referred to al-Sadr as “the 
imam of the Resistance, the imam of the homeland, the imam of freedom, and the imam 
of liberation…” and most significantly, as the “founder of the Resistance [Hizbullah] in 
Lebanon.”623  In the same year of al-Sadr’s fiery ʿAshura speech, Iraqi Shiʿites likewise 
used the occasion of Husayn’s martyrdom to register their protest against a state that 
marginalized their community both politically and economically.  
Iraqi Shiʿites, although constituting a “numerical majority, had to [sic] all intents 
and purposes, the disadvantaged status of a minority,”624 mirroring the lack of political 
power of their counterparts in Lebanon.  Iraqi Shiʿites were prevented from having any 
real voice in government virtually from the onset of the country’s establishment as a 
modern nation-state. Iraq’s founding monarch, King Faisal, attested to this political 
reality when he callously said, “taxes and death are for the Shiʿi and government 
positions for the Sunnis”625—a reality that was intensified with the rise of the Baʿath 
Party:  
                                                 
622 I use the phrase “militant group” because there’s no consensus on how to describe Hizbullah. Nasrallah 
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624 Bengio, Ofra. “Shiʿis and Politics in Baʿthi Iraq”.  Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. Taylor and Francis 
Group. Jan. 1985, pp. 1-14, pp.  2. 
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“Out of a total of the 53 members of the top command that led the Baʿath 
party from November 1963 to 1970, 84.9 percent were Sunni Arabs, 5.7 
percent Shiʿi Arabs, and 7.5 percent Kurds, whereas the period up to 
November 1963, the comparable sectarian composition for the population 
was 38.5; 53.8; and 7.7 percent.”626 
 
What’s more, the nominal percentage of Shiʿites in positions of political power decreased 
as the Baʿath Party tightened its grip on power. For instance, there wasn’t a single Shiʿite 
in the Baʿath Party’s most powerful body, the Revolutionary Command Council, between 
July 1968 and September 1977.627 
As a consequence of such marginalization, Iraqi Shiʿites in 1974 transformed 
ʿAshura from a day of mourning to a day of action against the government.628  That the 
Baghdad regime consequently banned the annual processions in 1977 attests to ʿAshura’s 
growing political potency, which by then became synonymous with anti-government 
agitation. In other words, observing the anniversary of Husayn’s martyrdom became a 
revolutionary act in Baʿathist Iraq in the late 1970s.  
Upholding ʿAshura’s defiant message, al-Da’wa—the main Shiʿite opposition 
group in Iraq at the time—organized a march of 30,000629 “mourners” from Najaf to 
Karbala, the site of Husayn’s martyrdom. These “revolutionary mourners” or mourners-
turned-protesters gave real-life application to “The Karbala Paradigm” by harnessing the 
power of Husayn’s death as a means by which to demonstrate their anti-state anger on the 
most potent of days. Reminiscent of Yazid’s forces cutting off Husayn en route to joining 
his followers in Kufa in 680 CE, an armored division cut the marchers off en route to the 
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holy city in 1977. The “mourners”—defiant in the face of the desecration of their 
politicized Shiʿite ritual—stormed a police station shouting: “Saddam clear off! The 
people of Iraq don’t want you” and “The memory of Husayn cannot be obliterated.”630 
The demonstration was violently dispersed and scores were killed—at least several 
hundred631—with even more arrested, prompting two days of rioting that engulfed much 
of Iraq’s southern Shiʿite heartland.  Iraq, the hallowed grounds of Husayn’s martyrom, 
was now producing a new resistance that marched under the banner of his legacy—a 
legacy that was born in Iraq but had a timeless transnational impact that even reached the 
shores of Saudi Arabia—the modern-day bastion of anti-Shiʿite ideology. 
 Saudi Shiʿites, a restive minority in Saudi Arabia’s eastern oil region, likewise 
have a long history of political, social, and economic marginalization.  Since the 
establishment of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, the ruling Saudi royal family 
discriminated against its Shiʿite subjects as a matter of state policy, considering them 
heretics worse than non-Muslims.  No quote better exemplifies this sentiment than the 
words of the founder of the Saudi state, Ibn Saud, to his British confidant, John Philby: "I 
should have no objection in taking to wife a Christian or a Jewish woman...The Jews and 
Christians are both people of the book; but I would not marry a Shiʿa... [who] have been 
guilty of backsliding and shirk [polytheism]..."632 Such prejudice was not confined to the 
Saudi state’s early years but was echoed in the 1990s by Abdul Aziz ibn Baz, the chief 
state cleric who issued a "ruling against the Shiʿites, reaffirming that they were 
                                                 
630 Translation in Soeterik, Robert.  The Islamic Movement of Iraq (1958-1980). Amsterdam: Stichting 
MERA, 1991, pp.  20. 
631 The Guardian notes as much as 2,000 could have been killed. See Hirst, David.  “Bagdad reaps a 
religious whirlwind”. The Guardian. 1 Mar 1977, pp. 2.  
632 Translation in Nakash, Yitzak. Reaching for Power: The Shiʿa in the Modern Arab World. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 44. 
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infidels…” thereby “prohibiting Muslims from dealings with them.” 633   The ultra 
conservative clerics in Saudi Arabia are partners in the country’s power structure and 
such an edict is legally binding.634 
 Saudi Shiʿites like their brethren across the Muslim world utilized the potent 
symbolism of ʿAshura, the commemoration of which was forbidden in Saudi Arabia635, in 
order to march in the streets of cities and villages in protest against the government 
during the heyday of the Iranian Revolution—1979 and into early 1980.  Under the 
banner of Husayn’s defiant martyrdom, they flouted the government ban on ʿAshura by 
raising “pro-Khomeini placards”636 as they demanded “an end to… discrimination,” the 
release of detained Shiʿite activists, and that the oil from their eastern province remain in 
the ground since “the revenues are not coming back to those [Shiʿites] who work in the 
oil fields.”637  The uprising continued sporadically for nearly four months in Dhahran 
province, the nerve center of the peninsula’s eastern oil region, ending only after 
government forces rushed in twenty thousand troops638, killed several protesters, arrested 
hundreds more, and pledged to improve Shiʿite living conditions.639  For Saudi Shiʿites to 
face down a powerful state that battled them because of their Shiʿite identity only 
enlivened the Karbala Paradigm thereby sanctioning their resistance with Husayn’s 
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legacy in which their spilt blood empowered real-life potency that transcended mere 
slogans that invoked the Third Imam. 
 While Shiʿites in Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia rallied under Husayn’s flag to 
defy their marginalization, Iran—the most populous Shiʿite country in the world—
harnessed the discursive power of Imam Husayn not only to resist one of the third 
world’s most powerful states, but ultimately to bring it to a definitive end.  In his exile in 
Paris, Khomeini invoked Husayn and the start of the holy month of Muharram to sanctify 
and embolden the uprising in Iran a week before the historic ʿAshura revolutionary 
march:  
“Our people are the followers of the greatest man in history [Imam 
Husayn] who with only a few followers launched the great ʿAshura 
movement and forever buried the Umayyad dynasty in the graveyard of 
history.  God willing… the dear people [of Iran], the true followers of the 
Imam [Husayn], will likewise sacrifice their blood and bury the satanic 
regime of Pahlavi, and raise the flag of Islam throughout this country and 
elsewhere.”640 
 
According to Khomeini, the revolting Iranian people—largely unarmed and who fell in 
droves—were akin to Husayn and his band of rebels, while the Shah and his supporters 
constituted the modern-day “regime of Yazid.”641 As such, if Husayn sacrificed his blood 
to resist Yazid, and if Iranians believed in Husayn’s example, and their blood was no 
more precious than the “Lord of all Martyrs,” then continued resistance was similarly a 
must and compromise an impossibility.642  The more the Shah intensified his crackdown, 
                                                 
640 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Koshtār-i mardom-i mosalmān – lozūm-i farār-i sarbāzān az sarbāzkhāneh-hā va 
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641 Ibid, pp. 152. 
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the more Iranians exemplified Husayn’s legacy through their spirited and revolutionary 
sacrifice.  
Almost two months after the Jaleh Square massacre on Black Friday (September 
8, 1978), Muhammad Reza Shah appointed a military government on November 6 to 
stem the growing tide of the revolutionary movement.  Armed forces “flooded Tehran 
with armored vehicles and deterred street protests around the country.” 643   The 
opposition, however, adjusted to the new security climate and waited for the arrival of the 
holy month of Muharram a month later.    
 The 9th and 10th (Tasuʿa and ʿAshura) are the holiest days of Muharram, the 
month on the Islamic calendar in which Shiʿite processions commemorate the 7th century 
martyrdom of Imam Husayn and his valiant half-brother ʿAbbas.  The opposition sought 
to utilize the occasion of these two holy days not only to continue the struggle against the 
Shah, but also to mobilize an immense march that would serve as an unofficial 
referendum644 on the monarchy in Iran.  In other words, since the government continued 
to cling to power after nearly a year of uprising, opposition leaders planned to organize a 
massive demonstration in which the street would serve as the ballot and the people would 
decide the Shah’s fate by voting with their feet.  
                                                                                                                                                 
our blood more valuable than that of the Lord of All Martyrs? Why should we fear offering our blood and 
lives, especially in the path of resisting a cruel monarch who claims to be a Muslim. Yazid was as good a 
Muslim as the Shah. But, as he treated the Muslims oppressively and cruelly, the Lord of All Martyrs 
deemed it necessary to resist him even at the cost of his own life.” See Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Qorbānī 
dādan dar rāh-i khodā sīreh-ye anbīā ast”. 25 Oct 1978. Paris. Vol. 4., pp. 151-2. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=4&tid=20>. 
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  The Khomeini-appointed Revolutionary Council, a body tasked with 
commandeering the revolution, mandated liberal opposition leaders to negotiate with the 
military government for permission to stage the historic march-turned-referendum. The 
military government relented two days before the arrival of the holidays, and agreed to 
ease the start of the curfew to 11:00 PM instead of 9:00 PM.645 
There was, however, the real fear that the military government permitted the 
marches in order to gather as many of the revolution’s supporters in one place and put a 
violent end to the movement in one fell swoop—a massacre analogous to Black Friday 
two months prior but on a much more decisive and larger scale.  The New York Times 
affirmed this fear in the run-up to the demonstrations by noting:  
“There remains the potential for bloodshed… In a show of strength this 
afternoon, more troops rolled into town and British-built Chieftain tanks 
and Soviet-built armored personnel carriers took up positions on the 
airport road. Helicopters buzzed back and forth above downtown roots.”646  
 
The military government also informed the opposition that it would station troops nearby 
in case they “were needed to quell violence,” 647  and demanded that the processions 
remain “religious and peaceful, not political—a risky proposition considering that the 
Shah’s principal foe is the nation’s principal religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.”648  
Furthermore, thousands of Iranians left the capital out of fear of a potential military 
onslaught.  The Tehran traffic department recorded that at least “130,000 automobiles 
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had left the capital during the day.”649  Rumors abounded that thousands of activists 
prepared for martyrdom by purchasing their burial shrouds. 650   In anticipation of a 
possible bloodbath, the American embassy warned all of its citizens in Iran “to stay home 
during the two-day holiday…”651  Ayatollah Bahu’uddin Mahallati in Shiraz likewise 
cautioned: “Maybe we’ll be killed tomorrow. We’re facing guns, rifles and tanks. 
Whoever is afraid shouldn’t come.” 652  One activist, however, underscored both the 
enormous cost that might be incurred by attending the march and the potential benefit: 
“Yes, yes, it may go up in smoke. Liberty does not come at no cost… and one generation 
is only a drop in the life of a nation.”653 
 Perhaps no quote captured the tension, the real possibility of death, and the 
militancy of that historic ʿAshura than a banner that hung in the famed Tehran bazaar that 
invoked Husayn’s defiance: “Every day is Ashura and everywhere is Karbala.”654  The 
captivating implication is that Husayn’s 7th century martyrdom was timeless and not 
confined to the desert of Karbala.  Like the unforgettable words of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 
1974 when he invoked Husayn’s sacrifice to inspire his followers to confront modern-day 
“tyranny,” the Tehran banner effectively proclaimed that to believe in the justness of 
Husayn’s struggle as an exemplar of action, then one must be prepared to make the 
ultimate sacrifice in the face of tyranny anywhere and at any time—including Iran in 
1978.  To put it differently, the ʿAshura of the Iranian Revolution is especially historic 
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because it marks how Shiʿites transformed what was typically a day of reflection, self-
flagellation, weeping and mourning into a day in which the proper observance of 
Husayn’s martyrdom necessitated a revolutionary march.  Thus, the Karbala Paradigm 
had developed into a force whereby “passive weeping for Husayn” gave way to “active 
fighting for Husayn’s ideals”—to live, struggle, and, if necessary, to die resisting 
tyranny.655  Consequently, the ʿAshura of 1978—a time of total mobilization—became 
one for the ages.  
 On December 10, possibly the single largest protest event in world history until 
that point unfolded on ʿAshura to mark the climactic revolutionary upheaval in Iran.  The 
opposition put the number of marchers at 7 million (Dabashi puts the number at 17 
million656)—anywhere between a fifth to half of the country’s total population.657 The 
estimates are all the more staggering considering that many stayed away because of the 
prospects of a military crackdown.  Nevertheless, with military helicopters circling 
above, millions participated in an unofficial referendum on the monarchy by braving the 
possibility of bloodshed to vote with their feet, prompting The New York Times to note: 
“…It is widely agreed that the size of the processions, even though they were peaceful, 
dramatized the lack of support for the monarch…”658 That the protest began from eight 
different starting points in Tehran and converged in the square near the airport “that bears 
the name “Shahyad – ‘Remembrance of the King’ – symbolizes Iran’s 2,500 unbroken 
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years of monarchy,”659 only underscored the meaning and demands of the marchers.  In 
other words, millions of mourners-turned-protesters used the occasion of ʿAshura to stage 
what The Guardian called “the Great March,”660 which culminated at the very square 
devoted to the monarchy thereby negating the 2,500-year-old institution.  The Shah was 
left with little choice but to prepare for his departure—the second instance where he was 
forced to flee the country. This time the US and the UK—however much they had 
subverted public will in 1953 with the coup—would not be able to restore him to his 
throne.  
 
V. Shiʿism: A Shared Emotive Universe 
 
 It must be noted that although millions took to the streets on ʿAshura in order to 
challenge the monarchy, it doesn’t mean that every revolutionary believed in Husayn’s 
martyrdom or was pious or even Muslim.  The revolution was triumphant because all the 
various classes and factions such as the Islamists, liberals, communists, and many ethnic 
and religious communities came together in what Mansoor Moaddel calls “fantastic 
harmony” in order to demand “the overthrow of the monarchy…”661 They did so using a 
shared emotive universe that included ʿAshura, nighttime chants of “Allahu akbar,” and 
even the hijab, all of which in the context of the uprising provided a discourse ripe with 
revolutionary fervor. In terms of ʿAshura specifically, whether the revolutionary was 
Muslim or Christian, Communist or Islamist, he or she was raised in a country in which 
Husayn’s martyrdom was part of the social fabric of the culture. A communist may not 
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have believed in Husayn’s infallibility, the Imamate, or the existence of God, but they 
understood the emotive force of the Imam’s sacrifice—especially when it was politicized 
in order to spearhead the revolution in 1978.  Such religiously themed discourse created a 
“sacred canopy”662 under which Iranian revolutionaries of all worldviews gathered to 
rally against a relentless and powerful government that enjoyed the financial, political, 
and military backing of the more dominant superpower of the time—the US. 
One Jewish Iranian, for example, recounted the days when millions of Tehran’s 
residents heeded Khomeini’s call and went to their rooftops to shout the quintessential 
Islamic slogan, “Allahu akbar,” in support of the revolution. He and his family “found 
themselves up on their rooftop shouting the same words as forcefully as their Muslim 
compatriots.”663  “Allahu akbar” is a phrase especially powerful in the context of Islam’s 
early days when the Prophet Muhammad’s message of monotheism—that God is one and 
the greatest (Allahu akbar)—challenged the polytheism of his clan and the city of his 
birth, Mecca. 664  In 1978, Iranians regardless of worldview proclaimed the distinctly 
Islamic slogan, “Allahu akbar,” as a potent show of support for an uprising whose 
undisputed leader was an aged religious scholar-turned-revolutionary. That is not to say 
that all Iranian Jews supported Khomeini and the revolution, but it does highlight that 
many Iranians, irrespective of their faith and proclivities, “found” themselves employing 
such Islamic discourse as a means by which to express their solidarity with the revolution 
and negate the ideology of the monarchy. 
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 Perhaps the most effective example of the political utility of Husayn’s martyrdom 
as an integral part of Iran’s emotive universe and revolutionary discourse can be found in 
Khosrow Golsorkhi’s military trial.  Golsorkhi, a journalist, and 11 others were accused 
of plotting to kidnap the Shah’s son, and were consequently put on trial in the spring of 
1973.  One historian who followed the trial contemporaneously considered the 
proceedings to be a farce: 
“Not all the members of the group were in contact with each other, or even 
knew each other. It seems that the trial of the group was an attempt by the 
shah's secret police (SAVAK) to exaggerate the danger of the armed 
opposition and to achieve a perceived success against the guerrilla 
movement, with accompanying propaganda value.”665 
 
Under pressure from international human rights groups, the government decided to 
televise the trial in order to show a semblance of transparency. While many of the other 
defendants admitted666 to all the allegations, plead for their lives, and were given light 
sentences, five of the defendants including Golsorkhi used the opportunity of the 
televised trial not only to reject the charges but also to condemn the regime in the eyes of 
the nation. Golsorkhi employed the shared Shiʿite symbolism of Imam Husayn (and 
Imam ʿAli) to connect to his national audience in order to denounce the state. 
 He began his defense by deploying a popular Arabic proverb that “Life is to have 
a belief and to fight for it” and invoked “Husayn the great martyr of the peoples of the 
Middle East,”667 declaring that he is a “Marxist-Leninist” and that he “first learned about 
social justice through Islam,” which ultimately served as a conduit for him to adopt 
socialism. He promised to “not beg” for his life and that he “hails from a brave and 
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struggling people.”  He emphasized universal Islamic discourse by noting: “I started my 
words with Islam” because “true Islam… is a mandate for the liberation movements in 
Iran.”  Invoking Husayn’s father, ʿAli, he offered his Marxist critique of Iranian society:  
“Marx says that in a class society wealth concentrates on one side and 
poverty and hunger on the other side… while those who produce the 
wealth are the deprived class, and Imam ʿAli said, ‘No palace is built 
unless thousands go poor.’ Thus, one can cite ʿAli as the world’s first 
Socialist.”  
 
Husayn’s sacrifice, however, was the overarching message in his defense, which 
Golsorkhi intertwined with his fate: 
…Our lives mirror that of Husayn’s who put his life on the line for the 
deprived… and our lives are likewise in jeopardy in this court.  Husayn 
was in the minority, and Yazid had palaces, armies, rule and power. 
Husayn resisted and was martyred. Even though history mentions Yazid 
but what continues in the dynamics of history is Husayn’s path and 
resistance... People followed and are following Husayn’s path. In a 
Marxist society, true Islam is compatible. We affirm ʿAli and Husayn’s 
Islam.”668 
 
Golsorkhi poignantly argued that his life as well as that of all the accused “mirror that of 
Husayn’s.” In doing so, he placed his battle alongside Husayn’s struggle against the 
powerful Yazid, who “had palaces, armies, rule and power.”  In the context of a military 
trial in which the head of state also had “palaces, armies, rule, and power,” Golsorkhi 
inescapably implied that the Shah was the modern-day Yazid, and that the Karbala 
Paradigm provided the discourse for even a Marxist-Leninist to condemn the state in a 
manner that was understood by every witnessing Iranian, regardless of their faith, 
ideology, and ethnicity.   
                                                 
668 Manjanigh12.  “manjanigh 12 Khorsrow Golesorkhi and Keramat Daneshian’s Full Defense”.  Online 
video clip.  YouTube.  16 February 2013.  Accessed 1 August 2014.  
<http://youtu.be/jyvjhUsJyNg?list=PLPyPwMMrlbHNfQbr27Iy6LaUNIgdaAefT>. 
  
 
 
246 
 Five years later, millions of Iranians echoed Golsorkhi’s rhetoric and marched on 
ʿAshura against a monarch whom they identified “with the murderers of Hussein…”669 
The politicization of ʿAshura provided an oppositional discourse in which Iranians 
harnessed its potency in order to negate the ideological universe of the monarchy.  Thirty 
years later, the next generation of Iranian activists would do the same but this time 
against the very state that rooted its ideology in Islam and the Imamate.  
 One final point must be addressed before the discussion proceeds to the electric 
and explosive ʿAshura protests of 2009.  The Islamic government came to power through 
the politicization of ʿAshura in the 1970s, culminating in the largest demonstration in the 
14-month long revolutionary movement—the massive ʿAshura commemorations-turned-
referendum. After the triumph of the revolution, the Islamic Republic institutionalized 
ʿAshura—as it did Palestine through the establishment of the annual Quds Day rallies—
as a central tenet of the government’s ideology and discourse.  It raised an entire 
generation of Iranians to learn not only about Husayn’s sacrifice, but to take inspiration 
from it and to view the Islamic Republic as carrying forth Husayn’s righteous struggle. In 
2009, they deployed those lessons not to legitimate the state, as the government intended, 
but to castigate it. 
 
VI. The Islamic Republic and Husayn’s Martyrdom 
 
Husayn’s death, according to Hamid Dabashi, solidified defiance and resistance 
as an integral component to Shiʿism that can be activated at any juncture. The death of 
the Prophet’s grandson cemented a legacy in which Shiʿism’s moral authority is based on 
                                                 
669 Apple, R.W.  “Religious Ferment in Iran: A Long History: ‘A Strong Mutual Attraction’”.  The New York 
Times.  12 Dec 1978, pp. A12. 
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its posture of resistance.  Once it achieves power, it ceases to be the Shiʿism of Husayn’s 
martyrdom—one of defiance against power and oppression—instead assuming the 
mantle of those that slayed Husayn.  Shiʿism is “morally triumphant when it is politically 
defiant, and that it morally fails when it politically succeeds.”670   In other words, Shiʿism 
thrives on failure and fails upon success.  This in part explains why Shiʿism has a long 
history of revolt—from the time of Husayn and those who after his martyrdom sought to 
avenge his death to subsequent Shiʿite uprisings like the Nuqtavi and the Hurrifiyya and 
against the Ilkhanids in Sarbedaran, and the relatively recent Babi revolts, which were 
rooted in Shiʿite millenarianism.  Dabashi affirms that in order for Shiʿism to remain 
morally potent, it “must always be in a posture of resistance.”671   
Perhaps this perspective offers a partial explanation of the Islamic government’s 
long history of foreign policies that challenged the Israeli occupation and the growing 
American military presence in the Middle East—an anti-status quo posture shared 
between Syria, Hizbullah, and Islamic groups in the Palestinian Territories—constituting 
what is known as the “Resistance Bloc.”  The Iranian government, however, framed this 
resistance language long before groups such as Hizbullah came into existence.  
During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, world powers including virtually all the 
Arab states672 supported Iraq’s war with Iran. The US navy even intervened on Iraq’s 
behalf and sank much of Iran’s naval forces. Yet, the Iranian government did not 
surrender, and instead embraced the David and Goliath struggle by naming many of its 
                                                 
670 Dabashi, Hamid.  Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest.  Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011, xvi. 
671 Dabashi, Shiʿism, pp. 313. 
672 Syria and Libya are important exceptions, especially the former as it prevented Iraq from exporting its 
oil through the pipelines that ran through Syria. In doing so, the Syrian government inhibited to an extent 
Iraq’s ability to finance the war with Iran. 
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military operations after Imam Husayn, Karbala, and ʿAshura.673  Propaganda videos 
from the war drilled Iranian audiences—civilian and military alike—in such a worldview 
thereby affirming that the Islamic Republic and the Leader of the Revolution were the 
flag-bearers of Husayn’s legacy. One such archival video includes footage of Iranian 
soldiers courageously and selflessly mobilizing for the war effort while an orator 
hypnotically recites, “Whosoever obeys Khomeini’s orders is swearing by God to walk 
the path of Husayn.”674 The implication is that Iran’s Islamic soldiers, who are under 
Khomeini’s righteous command, are carrying forth Husayn’s struggle against tyranny in 
the “Holy Defense”—the phrase the Iranian state employed in reference to its 8-year 
military campaign against the “imposed war” (Figure 4.1). Other videos, for instance, 
include Iranian soldiers ritually beating their chests to Husayn’s name in preparation for 
combat.   Chest-beating, a religious custom typically reserved for the annual 
commemoration of Husayn’s martyrdom, morphed under the direction of the Islamic 
Republic into a potent means by which to inspire soldiers to internalize the belief that 
they were exemplifying Husayn’s legacy by carrying forth the banner of the Islamic 
Revolution in battling the Yazid of the post-revolutionary era: Saddam Hussein. During 
and after the war, the government instituted public commemorations marking the 
anniversary of Husayn’s death in order “to mobilize support for the regime” 675 —a 
sentiment the state visualized in propaganda murals throughout the country (Figure 4.2).   
                                                 
673 See Efraim Karsh’s The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988.  (Oxford: Oxprey Publishing, 2002). 
674 ipouya. “Shiʿism: From Defeat to Defiance”. Online video clip. YouTube.  9 January 2009.  Accessed 5 
August 2014. <http://youtu.be/HbHAQwZXPaY?list=UUte8CGBvRwAlSrni5gP9Zvg>. 
675 Kurzman, pp. 55. 
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Khomeini often even referred to the Islamic Revolution as the “ʿAshura Movement” or 
“Imam Husayn’s Movement.”676 
 
Figure 4.1. By placing the famous Shrine of Imam Husayn in the background while including the 
tribute to ʿAbbas, the mural situates a martyred Iranian soldier (center) in the same breath as the martyrs of 
the Battle of Karbala.677 
 
                                                 
676 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Bayān-i ʿelal-i mokhāletfat hāyeh doshmanān – pāsokh beh ettehāmāt – falsafeh-
ye gīyām-i emām ḥusayn”.  14 Dec 1978. Qom. Vol. 10. pp. 315. 
<http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=10&tid=84>. 
677 Fotini, Christia. “Peace be with you Abu al-Fazl al-Abbas”.  Tehran propaganda mural collection. July, 
2006. JPEG File. <http://goo.gl/7yFJAv>. 
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Figure 4.2. This Tehran mural similarly places a lifeless Iranian soldier literally in the hands of the 
quintessential Shiʿite martyr figure, emblazoned with the caption: “Martyrdom is the inheritance of the 
Prophet and his family to their followers.”678 
 
More than half a year after the victory of the revolution, Khomeini reminded 
Shiʿites that although the Shah was indeed a modern-day Yazid, oppressors abound 
nonetheless:   
“The great phrase ‘Every day is ʿAshura, and every land is Karbala,’ is 
often misunderstood. Some incorrectly think it means lamenting every day. 
What was the role of the land of Karbala on ʿAshura? All lands should 
serve that role insomuch as the Lord of all Martyrs accompanied by a few 
men stood against the oppression of Yazid’s regime. With only a few, they 
confronted the emperor of the time, and sacrificed themselves instead of 
submitting to his oppression. Their refusal was a defeat for the tyrant. The 
mantra, ‘Every day is ʿAshura’ means that we must all stand and fight 
oppression every day, the command is unlimited in terms of time and  
                                                 
678 Fotini, Christia. “Martyrom is the inheritance of the Prophet and his family to their followers”.  Tehran 
propaganda mural collection. July, 2006. JPEG File. <http://goo.gl/n6nny5>. 
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place. Karbala is right here and we must enliven Karbala’s example. The 
example of the Battle of Karbala is not confined to its actual location or its 
participants… All lands should perform the role that Karbala served, that 
is, people must resist oppression whenever and wherever it occurs, and 
fight it without regard to forces available.”679 
 
In sum, according to Khomeini and his followers, it was the revolutionary reading of 
ʿAshura that inspired millions to mobilize for the revolution and brave the Shah’s 
vaunted army.  Yet, the struggle continues as many equivalents of Yazid persist. 
Furthermore, as the one giving voice to such a worldview, Khomeini implicitly casts 
himself and the government that he personifies—especially since Shiʿite Islamism is the 
state ideology—in the same breath as Husayn.  Thus, supporting and fighting alongside 
Iran under the Islamic Republic is the modern-day equivalent of righteous struggle beside 
Husayn. Conversely, opposing or challenging the Islamic Republic is akin to siding with 
the oppression of Yazid.    
 Israel, various Middle Eastern governments, the UK, and above all, the United 
States are embodiments of modern-day Yazids who oppose the Islamic Republic, 
therefore, warranting steadfast Husayn-like resistance. In 2009, the year of the Green 
Uprising, Iran was surrounded by the armed forces of the world’s sole remaining 
superpower, spanning dozens of American bases in Iraq and Afghanistan—Iran’s two 
largest neighbors—as well as in the Persian Gulf680 region, notably Qatar and Bahrain but 
also in the waters of the gulf. For three decades, the Iranian government has portrayed 
itself, especially to its domestic audience, as the outnumbered righteous defender of truth 
                                                 
679 Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Moqāyeseh-ye rezhīm-i pahlavī bā dowlat hāyeh ommavī va ʿabbasī – falsafeh-ye 
ʿazādārī-ye emām ḥusayn (ʿa) – żarūrat-i ḥefz jomhūrī-ye eslāmī bā mohtavā-ye eslāmī”. 26 Sept 1979. 
Qom, Vol. 10. pp. 122-123. <http://farsi.rouhollah.ir/library/sahifeh?volume=10&tid=26>. 
680 Dabashi is right to ridicule the debate between Arabs and Iranians about the historical name of the 
Persian Gulf. In reality, Dabashi, argues, it’s an “American Gulf.” 
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similar to Husayn in the face of a superior and “arrogant”681 global enemy—the United 
States and its “local agents.”  Three months after ordering a crackdown on the nonviolent 
uprising, Khamenei continued to present the Islamic Republic in such a paradigm by 
which it represented resistance to oppression, and not its perpetrator: 
“All the governments in the world have enemies and they have friends. 
This has been true throughout history. Everyone has some friends and 
some enemies, both domestic and abroad... The prophet's government and 
ʿAli's government both had friends and enemies… The Islamic system 
also has some friends and some enemies. But the issue is who are the 
enemies and the friends. If the government is such that all those cruel and 
unjust governments and the Zionists are enemies of it, then this is 
something to be proud of… All the Shimrs of the world oppose the 
Islamic Republic, and all the oppressed support it. There are indeed 
enemies like America, Britain, which has a 200 year history of animosity 
against Iran, and the Zionists. Let these enemies be the enemies.”682 
 
This worldview was visualized when a mural was hoisted in Iran before ʿAshura in 2013, 
portraying President Obama as Shimr—Yazid’s commander who massacred Husayn and 
his followers (Figure 4.3). 683 
                                                 
681 Government officials often refer to the US as the embodiment of “global arrogance.” See Khamenei’s 
speech marking the anniversary of the US embassy seizure: Ayatullah Khamenei Speeches English. 
“[English Sub] National Day Against Global Arrogance-Ayatullah Ali Khamanei speech 2013”. Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  16 November 2013.  Accessed 6 August 2014.  <http://youtu.be/8VYEsbv-U2s>. 
682 “Khoṭbeh-ye namāz jomeʿh-ye tehrān.” Khamenei.ir.  11 September 2009. 
<http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=8033>. Also, see Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central 
Intelligence Agency, et al., September 14, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI379_a.html. 
683 “Naṣb-i tāblo-ye bozorg-i “bārāk obāmā” dar maydān-i valiʿasr-i tehrān (+ ʿaks)”. ʿAsriran. 15 Jan 2013. 
<http://goo.gl/Aqwjb5>. 
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Figure 4.3. The Tehran mural was located on one of the capital’s main thoroughfares, Vali Asr. The caption 
reads “Be with us, be safe,” implying that US sanctions on Iran were as unjust and harmful as Shimr’s 
unacceptable invitation to Husayn’s followers to abandon their leader in return for safe passage. In other 
words, to abandon the Islamic Republic in favor of President Obama was analogous to siding with Shimr 
against Husayn. 
 
Domestically, however, the government has much more difficultly in deploying 
Husayn’s symbolism to legitimate itself.  The inherent calculus between the ruler and the 
ruled places the government—irrespective of the fact that it is a Shiʿite theocracy—in a 
position of power, which is diametrically opposed to Husayn’s legacy of resistance and 
martyrdom in opposition to power, especially unjust power. In other words, while the 
Islamic government in Iran is doctrinally rooted in Shiʿism via the vilāyat-i faqīh, it is 
paradoxically and counter-intuitively assuming the mantle of those who murdered the 
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Prophet’s grandson, the cornerstone of Shiʿism’s martyrology.  In sum, the Iranian 
government is in a “posture of resistance” internationally but loses that posture 
domestically because it is the ultimate arbiter of power. This domestic paradigm becomes 
especially pronounced when it faces homegrown resistance that invokes that same 
Islamic discourse. 
The Green Movement’s slogans espoused during Montazeri’s funeral invoked the 
holy month of Muharram thereby underscoring the doctrinal contradiction inherent in a 
system of governance that is rooted in Shiʿism.  As mentioned above, slogans such as 
“We are not from Kufa to stand behind Yazid” and “This is the month of blood, Yazid 
[Khamenei] will be overthrown” are obvious examples, but none is more scathing than 
the one that highlights the paradox of a government that represses in Husayn’s name: 
“Husayn, Husayn is their slogan, yet Kahrizak is their pride” (ḥusayn, ḥusayn, 
shoʿāreshūn, kahrīzak eftekhāreshūn).684   
Kahrizak is the detention center that became a lightning rod for criticism after 
reports emerged that several activists died in custody, probably under torture. The 
occurrence of such abuse became increasingly undeniable for the government when the 
son of a prominent conservative advisor to presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai, a former 
Revolutionary Guards commander, died in prison.685  The reality of prisoner abuse in 
post-election Iran caused activists to give voice to a slogan that poignantly contrasted the 
source of the state’s legitimacy—one that is theoretically rooted in the justice of the 12 
                                                 
684 Mehdi Saharkhiz.  “Iran 21 dec 09 (30 Azar) Qom Funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri p55”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  21 December 2009.  Accessed 14 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/v3pOiaRU-mM>. 
685 Timothy Richardson, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al, July 27, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI301_a.html. For the results of the commission 
tasked with investigating prisoner abuse, see Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et 
al., January 12, 2010, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10RPODUBAI11_a.html. 
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Imams—with that of the injustice delivered by the same state via Kahrizak—the symbol 
of how far the government was from the self-professed “ʿAshura Movement” of 
resistance against oppression. 
It is often said that repressive governments get the enemies that they deserve, and 
the Islamic government produced a resistance to it in the form of the Green Movement 
that was not necessarily “Islamic” but utilized the emotive power of Shiʿism in order to 
legitimate its defiance and discredit the totality of the state. Furthermore, according to 
Dabashi, the uprising in 2009 is in keeping with a long history in which avowed Islamic 
states breed opposition movements on exactly the same Islamic terms: 
“From the Umayyads (661-750) to the Abbasids (750-1258) down to all 
other major and minor Islamic empires and dynasties, there has never been 
an Islamic form of government that has not been radically challenged and 
opposed in precisely Islamic terms. As soon as a dynasty has come to 
power in Islamic terms of legitimacy, a revolutionary movement has 
arisen to challenge it in precisely Islamic terms.”686 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the dynamism of the Green Movement 
certainly cannot be reduced and categorized as “Islamic,” but it arose to challenge the 
Islamic Republic “in precisely Islamic terms.” Strategically appropriating and subverting 
the core Islamic symbols of the state such as ʿAshura, the uprising in 2009 dealt an 
ideological attack on the state more powerful than any weapon.  The potency of the 
Green Movement’s nonviolent challenge, especially on ʿAshura, is precisely why the 
government dealt more harshly with protesters arrested on that day than on any other day 
of action.  The state accused captured demonstrators with “waging war on God”687 and 
                                                 
686 Dabashi, Hamid.  Iran: A People Interrupted.  New York and London: The New Press, 2007, pp. 218. 
687 “Ezheī  az eʿdām-i 3 nafar az dastgīrshodegān-i ʿashūrā khabar dād”. Rahesabz.  1 Jan 2009 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/6865/>. 
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“desecrating”688 the anniversary of Husayn’s 7th century martyrdom simply because they 
used Husayn’s Islamic legacy—a legacy of steadfast and exemplary resistance against 
unjust power—to castigate a government that laid claim to his mantle.   
 
VII. Repression, Radicalism, and Revolutionary Mourning in ʿAshura 2009 
 
 The first week after the elections witnessed the largest protests in post-
revolutionary Iran prompting international news agencies to refer to the uprising as “the 
largest and most widespread demonstrations since the 1979 Islamic revolution…”689 
There were few clashes during that first week.  Only after Khamenei’s Friday sermon—
what activists refer to as “The Sermon of Blood”—did the state launch a systematic and 
comprehensive crackdown. The following day, mobile-phone camera footage captured 
the dramatic death of Neda Agha Soltan, the 27-year-old bystander.  The footage was 
subsequently uploaded onto YouTube, the video sharing online service, and spread like 
wildfire across the world causing one journalist to opine that her death was “probably the 
most widely witnessed death in human history.”690 
 The video captured the moment after she was struck in the chest by a bullet, 
forcing her onto her back.  Lying on the ground, activists and her music teacher screamed 
her name while trying to stop the bleeding by placing their hands over her chest-wound. 
                                                 
688 “Rāhpaymāī-ye mardom sarāsar-i keshvar ʿalayh-i bīḥormatī be ʿashūrā”. KhabarOnline. 30 Dec 2009 
<http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/33396/>. 
689 Hafezi, Parisa.  “Thousands mourn Iranians killed in protests”.  Reuters. 19 June 2009. 
<http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-40437520090618>. 
690 Mahr, Krista.  “Top 10 Heroes: 2. Neda Agha-Soltan”.  Time.  8 Dec 2009. 
<http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1945379_1944701_1944705,00.html>. 
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The bullet had cut through her lungs filling them with blood, which consequently and 
vividly came gushing out of her mouth and nose.691   
 The footage of her violent death brought international condemnation of the state’s 
brutal crackdown. The subject of countless documentaries and articles, her life and death 
helped people all over the world identify with the uprising as she became a rallying point 
and the face of the movement.  Concurrently, her death also symbolized the brutality of 
the government crackdown, striking fear into the hearts of thousands of Iranians— 
especially parents who didn’t want their sons and especially their daughters to suffer a 
similar fate—which caused many parents to prevent their children from continuing to 
participate in such protests.692 
  Under the weight of such repression, the protests evolved from daily events to 
ones staged under the cover of political holidays dispersed between 6 consecutive 
months. Yet clashes continued and scores were arrested throughout the period.  
Predictably, the repression had a deleterious effect on the continuity and vitality of the 
movement. Misagh Parsa, in his Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, notes: 
“Repression is a key factor affecting opportunities for action. In general 
reduced repression increased the likelihood of insurgency, while an 
upsurge in repression reduces the likelihood of protest by raising the cost 
of mobilization and collective action. Under repressive situations, victims 
of social processes find themselves incapable of overcoming their 
adversaries, not because they cannot conceive of alternative possibilities, 
but because they are unable to maintain their resources, networks, and 
solidarity structures in the face of repression.”693 
 
                                                 
691 FEELTHELIGHT.  “Iran, Tehran: wounded girl dying in front of camera, Her name was Neda”.  YouTube. 
20 June 2009.  <http://youtu.be/bbdEf0QRsLM>. 
692 Rezaian, Jason.  Telephone interview.  26 July 2010.   
693 Parsa, Misagh.  Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution.  New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989, pp. 24. 
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Perhaps no quote captures the severity of the government repression better than the words 
uttered by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a conservative stalwart and head of the powerful 
Guardian Council: “If you show weakness now, the future will be worse. There is no 
room for Islamic mercy.”694  
By the time of the ʿAshura protests in December 2009, which culminated on the 
7-day mourning period for the death of Ayatollah Montazeri 695 , the repression had 
significantly reduced the number of participants ready to brave the government’s threats 
and come onto the streets.  According to one activist, many stayed home because the state 
had warned protesters that any protest on ʿAshura amounted to ‘waging war against 
God’ 696 —a crime that could carry a death sentence. 697  Those who did come forth, 
however, were the most committed and radical; therefore, they were able to withstand 
family pressure to avoid the protests.698   
 It is important to note that many parents were sympathetic to the cause of their 
activist children, not only because they agreed with them in the belief that the 
government was unjust, repressive, and had stolen the election, but also because they 
                                                 
694 “Aḥmad jannatī: do nafar rā eʿdām kardīd, dastetān dard nakonad”. Radio Farda. 29 Jan 2010. 
<http://www.radiofarda.com/content/F11_Iran_postelection_Janati_Executions_Dissidents/1943483.htm
l>. 
695 “Nakhostīn vākonesh-i rahbar īrān beh ḥavādes-i rūz ʿashūrā”. BBC News.  30 Dec 2009. 
<http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/12/091230_ap_iran_khamanei_alamolhoda.shtml>. 
696 V., Shahin.  Personal interview.  15 April 2014. 
697 Moḥārebeh is an Islamic concept rooted in the Qur’an in which verses call for death against those who 
wage war on God, his final prophet, or sow corruption in society.  Many Islamic scholars believe that the 
intention of such verses was to protect civilians and property in times of war. The Iranian government has 
deployed the charge against anyone who threatens the Islamic Republic.  
698 Doostdar, ʿAlireza.  Email interview.  2 August 2010.  This very important point is echoed in the leaked 
US diplomatic cables: “…ongoing regime violence against protesters has decreased GPO [Green Party 
Opposition] turnout, from the millions of June 15 to a smaller committed core of (at most) hundreds of 
thousands…Although the number of GPO'ers willing to take to the streets has decreased from the days 
immediately following the June election, those remaining on the streets seem to have radicalized…” See 
Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., January 12, 2010,  Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10RPODUBAI13_a.html. 
  
 
 
259 
themselves participated as empassioned youth in a historic revolutionary uprising that 
claimed the lives of thousands of their fellow compatriots three decades prior.  Many 
parents simply saw their children as continuing a process they started thirty years ago and 
understood the power of their conviction.  One organizer who was expelled from the 
University of Tehran for her activism aptly captured such continuity when she 
summarized what her mother told her: “I don’t want you go to but I am not going to stop 
you because you’re standing up for what you believe in and I’m not going to stop you for 
doing that because I would’ve and I did the same thing.”699   
While the pro-government forces were able to disrupt Khatami’s speaking 
engagement on Tas’ua, the state was unable to cancel ʿAshura commemorations. Tas’ua 
is typically a day of private mourning in which Iranians stay indoors. Khatami—a 
reformer and former president who emphatically supported the uprising—was scheduled 
to give a Muharram speech at Jamaran Mosque, which is famous for hosting Khomeini 
for his many speeches. Yet, the sanctity of the event and its locale did not stop his 
opponents from shouting down the speaker thereby prompting the event’s cancellation.700 
ʿAshura, however, was a major public event steeped in Shiʿite and Iranian culture and 
could not be cancelled.  
Consequently, Green activists used the occasion of Imam Husayn’s annual 
commemoration in order to harness the power of his fabled and defiant martyrdom to 
renew their fiery protests.  On December 27, 2009, the emotive universe of Shiʿite Islam 
was brought to the fore in a common language that equated the activists with Husayn, and 
                                                 
699 T., Golnar. Personal interview. 22 October 2013. 
700 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 28, 2009, Wikileaks, 
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the government with his murderers.  In no way is this more apparent than the chant, 
“O’Husayn, Mir Hussein”—the mantra of Mousavi’s candidacy in the run-up to the 
elections that was transformed into a resistance slogan in the post-election uprising.  
“O’Husayn, Mir Hussein”701 was especially poignant in the month of Muharram, the 
month of Husayn’s martyrdom, because it directly placed Mousavi and the movement’s 
struggle with the government in the same breath as Husayn’s battle with tyranny fourteen 
centuries earlier. What’s more, the slogans also symbolized how the demonstrators who 
came onto the streets on that specific day were emboldened to confront the violence of 
the security forces. In other words, these activists emerged on a day enshrined in the 
legacy of spirited resistance and martyrdom, and faced off against a state that was 
undoubtedly intensifying its crackdown on such gatherings; they came to resist and were 
in no mood to absorb the government’s attacks.  
In one battle, an angry crowd pinned down a sizeable contingent of riot police 
against shuttered stores and pelted them with stones and bottles while shouting. When 
one of the policemen fired a shot that struck a protestor, the crowd descended upon the 
policemen in a rage of fury.  With their backs against the wall, the security forces swung 
their batons as the crowd threw projectiles from close range. Outnumbered and 
overwhelmed, the riot police took a defensive posture and refrained from using their 
batons as the crowd torched all of their motorcycles.  With car alarms wailing, the 
demonstrator’s blood on the ground, and the flame from the motorcycles flaring 
ceaselessly and spreading to nearby stores, they chanted a slogan that captured the 
militancy of the day: “I will kill the one that killed my brother” (mīkosham, mīkosham, 
                                                 
701 GREENUNITY4IRAN.  “Iran 27 Dec 09 Tehran Hafez Talaghani Protest”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 
December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010. <http://youtu.be/RDfEXvDuaSU>. 
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ānkeh barādaram kosht) 702 —another slogan appropriated from the era of the 
revolution—and proceeded to engage the policemen in fist fights.703  One policeman was 
separated from the group and beaten badly while other demonstrators tried to stave off 
the crowd in order to save his life—a scene that was replicated elsewhere when another 
policeman was captured, beaten, and then rescued from the rest of the crowd.704 
In another skirmish, an angry crowd chased down a group of riot police on 
motorcycles throwing two policemen off of their motorcycles.  Before they could flee, 
the crowd quickly set their motorcycles ablaze and pummeled the policemen.  In another 
incident, the crowd attacked a police van, shattering the windshield as others kicked and 
rocked the van and pulled the driver out of the vehicle in order to beat him.705   
In yet another clash, men and women faced off against riot police. With some 
distance separating them, they threw stones and were consequently put to flight by riot 
police.  One man, however, urged the crowd not to flee, and they halted their flight. 
ʿAshura was the quintessential day in which the crowd faced its enemy. As such, one 
protestor emerged in front of the crowd waving a green Husayn flag while another man in 
front urged them to “come forward” (bīyān jolo).  Many heeded his call with chants of 
“Death to the Dictator” emerging from the crowd.  Emboldened, they rushed forward 
                                                 
702 One interview subject opined that of all the slogans from the movement, this one resonated with her 
the most: “In that moment the thing I wanted to do most, and it’s interesting because I’m extremely 
opposed to killing, violence, and even capital punishment, but this particular slogan really resonated with 
me… At that moment I felt like, not kill them, but I felt like I could do something to them [security forces] 
because I had seen so much death in front of my eyes and felt that I could use my hands to transmit the 
pain that they have given me right back to them.” T., Golnar. Personal interview. 22 October 2013. 
703 Sohrab1901.  “Nabard-i tan beh tan va nafas gīr-i mardom bā gārd-i vīzheh - ʿashūrā”.  Online video clip.  
YouTube.  27 December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/JZ2urTPUGf0>. 
704 GREENPOWER0.  “Ātash zadan-i lebās-i nīrū-ye enteẓāmī – Tehran dec 27”.  Online video clip.  YouTube. 
27 December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <https://youtu.be/kN1FDnz3P_0>. 
705 IranDoost09.  “27 Dec 09 Tehran People stop a police car and free protesters from Inside it”.  Online 
video clip.  YouTube. 27 December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010. <http://youtu.be/-ihMFrNcUkM>. 
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towards the riot police, invoking Imam Husayn as they shouted “O’Husayn.”  Inspired, 
protestors in the back of the large crowd began chanting “Death to Khamenei.” Once the 
chants reached the front of the crowd who were squaring off against the riot police, the 
chanting became unanimous—as if a wave had moved through the ocean until it reached 
the shore.706 
 Had the riot police not antagonized the protestors or had the motorcyclists not 
tried to break up the demonstrations, it is easy to assume that ʿAshura 2009 would not 
have been so violent.  Montazeri’s son in an interview affirmed that much of the violence 
on ʿAshura was responsive: “Ordinary people have no interest in setting property on fire. 
They wanted to demonstrate for their legitimate interests. They were provoked by the 
state.”707  Unable to prevent the ʿAshura protests, security forces worked to ensure that 
they would come at a physical cost to the protesters, often attacking demonstrators 
without being provoked.  Footage from one procession, for example, clearly showed 
thousands of revolutionary mourners marching through the street with their hands up in 
the form of the victory sign, only to reach a blockade of security personnel who quickly 
assaulted them with batons and tear gas.708 Opposition websites reported that the wailing 
of ambulance sirens could be heard in central Tehran with flames and columns of smoke 
changing the skyline.709  Not all events, however, were overtaken by violence.   
                                                 
706 IranDoost09.  “27 Dec 09 Tehran Clashes between protesters and security forces in Iran”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  27 December 2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/Y68hw0a6CDA>. 
707 “Saeed Montazeri on Protests in Iran.”  Spiegel Online International.  5 January 2010.   Accessed 16 
August 2010.  <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,670071,00.html>. Also, see Director 
Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., Janurary 3, 2010, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10RPODUBAI1_a.html. 
708 sherlock72.  “Police attack peaceful procession of mourners – Iran 27 Dec 2009 Ashura”.  Online video 
clip.  YouTube.  2 January 2010. Accessed 15 August 2010. <http://youtu.be/xwv6VtHtoSI>. 
709 “Sotūn hāyeh dūd va ātash bar farāz-i khīābān hāyeh markazī-ye tehrān”.  Rahesabz.  27 Dec 2009.  
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/6364/>. 
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In one Tehran street march where no security personnel were present to 
antagonize demonstrators, several protestors carried Husayn flags as they chanted, “We 
love Husayn, we are supporters of Mir Hussein” (mā āsheq-i ḥusaynīm, yāvar-i mīr 
ḥusseinīm), and again invoked Kahrizak in order to criticize the state that rules in the 
name of Islam yet commits such atrocities: “Rape in prison? Is this also in the Qur’an?” 
(tajāvoz tūye zendān, īnam būd tūye qu’rān?).710  As they marched near Polytechnic 
University, they reminded the government of the legitimacy it had lost after its dramatic 
murder of Neda Agha Soltan: “Coup government, you are Neda’s murderer” (dowlet-i 
kūdetaī, to qātel-i nedāī).711  In another march, a large crowd walked past the offices of 
the Petroleum Ministry and, in a gesture of defiance, asked: “What happened to the oil 
money?  It was spent on the Basij” (pūl-i naft chī shodeh, kharj-i basījī shodeh), 712 
implying that the oil wealth was financing the repression of the very population that 
should be benefiting from the “black gold.” 
The slogans that invoked Husayn’s martyrdom, however, were the most forceful, 
to the point, and befitting his annual commemoration, such as “This month is the month 
of blood, the regime will be toppled” (īn māh, māh-i khūneh, rezhīm sarnegūneh),713 
which was aired by a marching crowd on Revolution Street, or “This army of Husayn 
supports Mir Hussein” (īn lashkar ḥusayneh, yāvar-i mīr ḥusseineh)714, which was voiced 
on Azadi (Freedom) Street. In the same vein, these radicals gathered under a bridge to 
                                                 
710 Millioniollim.  “27-12-2009-IRAN-TEHRAN-650”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 December 2009.  
Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/Djo7QRALhqc>. 
711 Ibid. 
712 GREENUNITY4IRAN.  “Iran 27 Dec 09 Tehran Hafez Talaghani Protest”.  
713 GREENUNITY4IRAN.  “Iran 27 Dec 09 Tehran Enghelab St”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 December 
2009.  Accessed 15 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/PKJtj61F5FA>. 
714 UNITY4IRAN.  “Iran 27 Dec 09 Tehran Azadi St Protest”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 December 
2009.  Accessed 5 July 2015.  <https://youtu.be/dKbDojqsl4c>. 
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recognize the significance of the holy month by chanting: “Today is a day of mourning, 
the green nation of Iran is mourning” (ʿazā ʿazāst emrūz, rūz-i ʿazāst emrūz, mellat-i 
sabz-i īrān sāḥib ʿazāst emrūz).  Furthermore, the crowd trampled a banner-size picture 
of Khamenei while proclaiming “Death to the dictator,”715 and destroyed a street sign 
named in honor of “the Leader of the Revolution.”716 Such acts and slogans intertwined 
with the symbolism of the day to ensure that there was no doubt about the subject of their 
wrath—a man of power cast as the symbolic manifestation of Yazid facing “Husayn’s 
army” of unarmed marchers in 2009’s ʿAshura. 
What’s more, crowd participants in another scene observed the importance of the 
day as coinciding with the 7th day of mourning for Montazeri, commemorating, 
“Montazeri is alive, long live the Source of Emulation” (montaẓerī zendeh ast, marjaʿ 
pāyandeh ast), and appropriated one of the most famous slogans from the revolution to 
denounce Ahmadinejad: “Mahmoud the traitor, you’ve abandoned and destroyed your 
country, God is greatest, you’ve put hundreds of youth in burial shrouds, God is greatest, 
death to you, death to you, death to you, death to you” (maḥmūd-i khā’en, āvāreh gardī, 
khāk-i vaṭan rā, vīrāneh kardī, koshtī javānān-i vaṭan, allāhu akbar, kardī hezārān tū 
kafan, allāhu akbar, marg bar to, marg bar to, marg bar to, marg bar to).717   Such 
demonstrations and slogans were not confined to Tehran with protests reported in Tabriz, 
Shiraz, Arak, Mashhad, Ardebil, and, of course, Najafabad—Montazeri’s hometown.718 
                                                 
715 GREENUNITY4IRAN.  “Tehran Hafez Talaghani Protest”. 
716 Esteqlāl, āzādī, jomhūrī īrānī. “27-12-2009-IRAN-TEHRAN-310”. Online video clip. YouTube. 27 
December 2009. Accessed 5 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/V7nLezMYAT4>. 
717 Millionoillim.  “27-12-2009-IRAN-TEHRAN-270.”  Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 December 2009.  
Accessed 16 August 2010.  <http://youtu.be/XbUTK6oNp7M>. 
718 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 28, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI549_a.html. 
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The protests continued into the night with people shouting nighttime chants of 
“Allahu akbar” from their rooftops—just as they had done in the first weeks after the 
election results when they co-opted and subverted the 30-year pro-government and 
revolution-era ritual. The Iranian government long used the legacy of that revolution’s 
symbolism to create its discursive hegemony through which it legitimated itself. In 2009, 
Green activists appropriated those symbols and re-programmed them in a manner that 
legitimated their protests while undermining the state ideology that rested on that 
symbolism. The rooftop chants were an integral part of that strategy and were widespread 
for several weeks after the elections, continuing sporadically throughout the uprising.  On 
ʿAshura, however, they were “markedly more extensive than in recent memory”719 and 
were especially potent given the highly emotive and religious nature of the day.  
Furthermore, the anonymity of the nighttime chants enabled the countless sympathizers 
and supporters of the Green Movement to participate in the ʿAshura uprising without 
fearing the state’s retribution, which was fully underway almost immediately after the 
historic day of action. 
 The spontaneity of the ʿAshura protests cannot be overstated.  Not only did the 
authorities fail to anticipate such an uprising, but the de facto leader of the opposition, 
Mir Hussein Mousavi, was likewise surprised:   
“For the commemoration of ʿAshura, despite several requests, neither 
Karoubi, Khatami, myself nor any other friend issued any statement. Yet, 
people spontaneously came to the scene and showed that the extensive 
social networks formed spontaneously during and after the election, would 
not wait for statements and announcements.”720 
 
                                                 
719 Ibid. 
720 Mousavi, Mir Hussein.  “Bayāneh-ye shomāreh-ye 17 mīr ḥussein mūsavī va rāh-i ḥal hāyeh bīrūn raft 
az boḥrān”.  Kaleme.  1 January 2010.  Accessed 16 August 2010.  
<http://www.kaleme.org/1388/10/11/klm-7047>. 
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ʿAshura proved that although Mousavi had used preceding holidays on Iran’s political 
calendar to call for protests, they would have happened without his direction.  Activists 
were indeed their own organizers and they did not rely on any one leader to coordinate 
events.   
 After the dust settled, state media tallied the torching of “9 residential buildings, 9 
vehicles, 7 shops, 2 banks and 3 power stations” as well as “18 garbage bins.”721  Eight 
protesters were killed including Mousavi’s 42-year-old nephew, Seyyed ʿAli Mousavi.  
Some even believed that his death was “intentional, to increase pressure on Mousavi.”722 
The government, however, was unapologetic.  On the contrary, the state considered the 
events of ʿAshura a desecration on par with the greatest of sins.  The conservative 
Guardian Council released a statement condemning the incidents, which it believed 
“showed that the rioters are against the religious beliefs of the nation.”723 The IRGC-
affiliated Fars News quoted a senior official who accused protesters of being 
“seditionists,”724 while another affirmed that “our revolution has its roots in ʿAshura and 
Imam Husayn…” and ʿAshura’s “desecration” was the outcome of a foreign plot, the 
masterminds of which were the US, UK, Zionists, and Bahá’ís.725 Consequently, the 
authorities threatened a “crushing response” was in order for “those who show no respect 
to religious sanctities,” while other conservative bodies accused those who “resorted to 
                                                 
721 “In Iran, extent of unrest damage determined”.  PressTV.  28 December 2009.  Accessed 16 August 
2010. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=114838&sectionid=351020101>. 
722 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 28, 2009, Wikileaks,  
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI549_a.html. 
723 “Widespread condemnation of ʿAshura protests”.  Tehran Times.  29 December 2009.  Accessed 16 
August 2010.  <http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=210803>. 
724 “Shekastan-i ḥormat-i ʿashūrā chehreh-ye aṣlī-ye jāhelān va fetnehgarān rā āshkār kard”. Fars News 
Agency. 29 Dec 2009.  Also, see Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 
28, 2009, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI549_a.html. 
725 “Ahamīat-i rāhpaymāī-ye emrūz labbayk be rahbarī ast”. Fars News Agency. 30 Dec 2009.  
<http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8810081569>. 
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insults on ʿAshura” as “not [being] Muslim or Shia because they would respect ʿAshura 
rituals even if they had objections.”726  Furthermore, the state arrested scores of political 
leaders from the opposition—to say nothing of the activists—in what amounted to the 
largest wave of arrests since the uprising’s early days.727  
 The government’s fierce reaction was a result of two factors: the state was 
increasingly frustrated that the movement endured despite the government’s best efforts 
to suppress it—especially after an explosive December in which Student Day, 
Montazeri’s funeral, and ʿAshura coalesced to renew the movement’s momentum; and 
the Islamic Republic, which rode to power atop the massive ʿAshura protests of 1978, 
was now being equated with Yazid on the most potent of days.  To put it in the words of 
one prominent reformist, “ʿAshura is never a good day to be seen as an oppressor.”728 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The history of ʿAshura’s politicization during the 1970s and especially during the 
Iranian Revolution is especially instructive. Shiʿite Muslims in Lebanon, Iraq, and pre-
revolutionary Iran harnessed the defiance inherent in ʿAshura by invoking Husayn’s 
legacy of resistance and martyrdom in order to confront the homegrown tyranny of the 
day.  Thus, while the Islamic government alleged blasphemy in 2009, the demonstrators 
were in keeping with ʿAshura’s recent history of political mobilization.  For the 
                                                 
726 “Widespread condemnation of Ashura protests”.  Tehran Times.  29 December 2009.  Accessed 16 
August 2010.  <http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=210803>. 
727 Alipour, Farahmand. “Sedāye pāye kūdetā dar tehrān; mowj-i jadīd va gostardeh-ye dastgīrī-ye faʿālān-i 
sīāsī āghāz shod”. Rahesabz.  28 Dec 2009.  <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/6517/>. The BBC noted that 
Iran’s police chief, Ismail Ahmadi Moghaddam, claimed that over 500 people were arrested in the 3 days 
after ʿAshura. See “Supporters of Iran’s government stage big rallies”.  BBC News.  30 Dec 2009.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8435007.stm>. 
728 Ibid. 
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authorities, however, the protesters’ most unforgivable crime was their appropriation of 
ʿAshura in order to condemn the Islamic Republic.  In doing so, Green activists were 
abiding by ʿAshura’s political message of resistance in the face of unjust power thereby 
situating the Islamic Republic in the same breath as the Baʿathist regime in Iraq, the 
Lebanese state’s marginalization of its Shiʿite community, the US-backed monarchy in 
pre-revolutionary Iran, the Israeli occupation729, and, most importantly, Caliph Yazid, his 
commander Shimr, and those who beheaded the Prophet’s grandson in the Battle of 
Karbala in 680 CE.  This was an intolerable insult of the highest order for a government 
that came to power through the historic and revolutionary ʿAshura of 1978 and which 
professed to rule in accordance with the justness of the Imamate and Husayn’s righteous 
example. 
On December 27, 2009, the ʿAshura protests created an entirely new discourse in 
Iran, asserting that although the Iranian government, specifically the institution of the 
vilāyat-i faqīh, derives its legitimacy from Shiʿism and the 12 Imams (the Imamate) it 
does not have a monopoly on their uses and meanings.  Iran and Shiʿite Islam’s emotive 
universe is a shared discourse, and the activists effectively appropriated the state’s 
                                                 
729 As noted in detail in chapter 3, Mottahari’s famous speech forcefully argued: “What would the Prophet 
of Islam do if he was still alive today? What issue would occupy the Prophet’s thoughts? By God we are 
responsible regarding this crisis. By God we have responsibility. By God we are being ignorant. By God this 
very issue would break the heart of the Prophet today. The problem that would fill Husayn ibn ʿAli’s heart 
with sorrow today is this issue. If Husayn ibn ʿAli was here today, he would say ‘if you want to mourn for 
me today, if you want to lament over me, your slogan today must be ‘Palestine.’’ The Shimr of 1300 years 
ago is dead and gone. Get to know the Shimr of today. Today the walls of this city should tremble to the 
slogan of Palestine.  And what efforts have we Muslims exerted for Palestine? By God it’s a shame for us 
to call ourselves Muslims. It’s a shame to call ourselves Shiʿites of ʿAli ibn Abi Talib. The enemy has 
ravaged our fellow Muslim’s land, murdered and imprisoned their men, violated their women and took 
their jewelry from their ears and hands… Are they not Muslims?” The full text of his speech is posted 
online and the actual audio clip can be found on YouTube, see Ruh.  “Shahīd morteżā moṭaharī va felesṭīn”.  
Doshmantarin. 15 Nov 2010. Accessed 24 Sept 2013. 
<http://doshmantarin.blogsky.com/1389/08/24/post-10/>, and Bahmanpour, ʿAlireza.  “Ayatullah’s 
Historical Speech about Palestine”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  18 June 2010.  Accessed 24 September 
2013. <http://youtu.be/-SxOUMLfX7c>. 
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language and its revolutionary credentials, both of which have roots in that same emotive 
universe, in order to castigate that very state on its own terms.  This is most apparent in 
an online discussion regarding the meaning of ʿAshura in the modern context. Summing 
up what ʿAshura meant, one user rather poignantly opined: “Oppression, oppressor, 
Zeinab’s patience, the children’s thirst, freedom, chivalry, courage, morning prayers, 
and… O’Husayn, Mir Hussein.”730  The social media user placed Mir Hussein Mousavi’s 
struggle against the Iranian government in the same breath as Husayn’s rebellion in 680 
CE not only by situating Mousavi’s name alongside Husayn’s, but also by including vivid 
and iconic moments of the Battle of Karbala in which Yazid’s forces surrounded Husayn 
and his followers in the arid desert and prevented them from accessing the wells—an 
unforgivable act that insults long established customs.  The parched lips of the children 
symbolized Yazid’s “oppression.” Imam Husayn and his half-brother’s sacrifice in their 
resolute refusal to accept the sovereignty of the “oppressor” exemplified their “chivalry” 
and steadfast “courage.”  Zeinab’s endurance in surviving the battle and traversing the 
Islamic world to share the story of her brother’s martyrdom ensured that Husayn’s legacy 
did not perish with him in the land of Karbala but transcended time and place, so much so 
that activists in Iran invoked Husayn in their uprising against “oppression” both in 1978 
and again in 2009. 
Just as their predecessors had done in 1978, Green activists used the occasion of 
ʿAshura in order to empower their discourse with a revolutionary meaning.  Unlike 1978, 
however, they used ʿAshura not to negate the ideological universe of the state the way 
revolutionaries did three decades prior. Rather, activists in December 2009 used the 
                                                 
730 Iranpour, Mohammad.  15 Nov 2013.  10:12 a.m. Google+ Comment. 
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state’s own discourse to legitimate their struggle and condemn the government that ruled 
in the name of Islam and Husayn’s legacy. In doing so, they reminded the Islamic 
Republic that Husayn—the quintessential Muslim rebel—never held power but died 
fighting it thereby becoming Shiʿite Islam’s martyr par excellence.731 
The ʿAshura revolt coincided with Ayatollah Montazeri’s 7th day of mourning, 
which undoubtedly added to the intensity of the day. His death on the 19th along with 
Student Day on the 7th ensured that December was the most explosive month of protest 
after June when the post-election results marked the launch of the uprising.  
 In life and even in death, Montazeri constituted a dangerous threat to the 
legitimacy of the Islamic government. A deeper look at his transition from regime-
architect to foremost dissident exemplifies a trend in Iran that constitutes an even bigger 
threat to the state.  In what Asef Bayat calls the “post-Islamist turn,” many such leaders 
and supporters of the Islamic Republic have shed their once-ardent ideological beliefs in 
favor of a system that focuses on civil rights instead of doctrinal rigidity. That protesters 
used much of the state’s own discourse to challenge the state on ʿAshura of all days only 
underscores this historic development in “Islamic Iran.” 
Above all, Montazeri’s life as a religious scholar and revolutionary, transition 
from state co-founder to opponent in his final years, and consequential death all coalesce 
with the Green Uprising and its potent use of Islamic symbolism to illustrate that 
although Islam can be exploited to serve power, the Abrahamic faith can also be 
harnessed to produce a powerful discourse of popular resistance—the cornerstone of 
                                                 
731 This phrase is borrowed from Fischer, who wrote: “The theme of martyrdom was of course central to 
the revolution. Husayn is the martyr par excellence.” Fischer, pp. 214. 
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Husayn’s transnational and undying legacy.  In doing so, Montazeri and the Green 
Movement saved Islam from the banditry of the republic that rules in its name. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Iran has a long and storied history of resistance both against the autocratic state 
and its foreign backers. Mossadeq’s oil nationalization campaign (1951-53) epitomizes 
mobilization against the latter, while the Tobacco Revolt (1890-92) and the Iranian 
Revolution (1978-79) exemplify popular revolts against a combination of both colonial 
control and its local agents—monarchs beholden to imperial powers—that facilitated 
both foreign and domestic political repression and economic exploitation. The Green 
Uprising, however, centered almost exclusively on defying the repressive state.  In doing 
so, all of the movement’s multi-faceted energy was harnessed to level a focused and 
devastating attack on the state’s ideology thereby undermining the legitimacy of not only 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but of the entire political system governing Iran.  
 This work has argued against the false and narrow win-lose binary by noting that 
although the Green Movement failed to cancel Ahmadinejad’s election “victory” or the 
state’s overthrow, both of which at certain junctures were expressly the aims of the 
movement, it nonetheless succeeded in that “failure.”  Indeed, the Green Uprising 
succeeded in challenging the Islamic Republic in a manner unprecedented in its thirty-
year history. The government’s power lies with its highly organized and efficient security 
apparatus as well as its potent ideological foundations, which are rooted in a combination 
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of Islam and the Iranian Revolution.  While the Green Movement did not contest the 
government in military terms, it did contest it on an ideological and discursive level 
amounting to a post-Islamist challenge. Green activists appropriated and subverted the 
totality of the state’s ideological symbolism and used it against that very state on its own 
terms. Even the government’s praetorian guard, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps—the state’s most loyal, ideological, and powerful line of military defense—did not 
evade the movement’s nonviolent ideological assault.  
 
Figure 5.1. Emblems of the (from left) Badr Brigade, Hizbullah, and the IRGC. The far right is a Green 
Movement appropriation of the IRGC banner.  
 
 Among the many Green Movement attacks on the state’s Islamist ideology, 
chapter two also outlined how students sang revolutionary songs on Student Day 
(December 7) to an image of the Iranian flag that was purposefully devoid of the Islamic 
Republic’s emblem.  Just as Iran’s flag was contested, so was the banner of its main 
ideological military force—the IRGC.  On October 14, 2009, Mousavi’s Facebook page, 
a key organizing tool for those who could access the social media website, published a 
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forceful image in which the IRGC’s iconic logo had been subverted with a new message 
(Figure 5.1).732 
 The original IRGC emblem (second from the right) includes as its focal point a 
defiant fist clutching a rifle, above which is a Qur’anic verse in Arabic that reads: 
“Prepare against them whatever arms and cavalry you can muster…”—a call to arms in 
the path of “righteous militancy.”733 Underneath the rifle is a representation of the Qur’an 
from which an olive branch extends, representing both “the desire for peace and the 
garden of heavenly paradise.” 734   The globe, likewise a feature of various Iranian 
guerrilla groups’ banners, symbolizes the fact that both the IRGC and the Islamic 
Revolution are not confined to Iran’s borders, but are international in terms of their 
outlook. The year of the military force’s establishment—1979—is noted at the bottom 
and its full name is inscribed in Persian on the right.   The IRGC’s role in the founding of 
Lebanon’s Hizbullah and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq735 and its armed wing—
the Badr Brigade—is evident in the configurations of their respective banners (the left 
two), which are modeled after the IRGC logo.   
 The Green Movement’s appropriation of the IRGC banner (right) includes a 
defiant hand clenching a pen instead of a rifle thereby highlighting both the movement’s 
peaceful nature and its ideological challenge through the power of the written word.  
Such a preference for the pen over “righteous militancy” is affirmed by the Qur’anic 
verse enshrined above the pen: “By the pen, and what they inscribe.” The year of the 
                                                 
732 Mir Hossein Mousavi Facebook Page.  “qalam”. 14 Oct 2009.  12:30 p.m. Facebook Post. 
<https://www.facebook.com/mousavi/photos/a.82250529453.75658.45061919453/154196369453/?typ
e=1&theater>. 
733 Ostovar, pp. 112.  
734 Ibid.  
735 The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq was originally known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq until it changed its name in 2007 to reflect Iraq’s new post-Baʿath reality.  
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movement’s historic uprising—2009—is noted at the bottom and an unofficial name is 
given to the digital force rebelling against the state on the Internet: “The Online 
Resistance Unit of the Mobilized Green Pen Corps.”  Furthermore, green—the color of 
the movement—predominates in the image, and the Qur’an remains situated to the right 
of the arm thereby refuting claims that the movement is anti-religion.  Lastly, the entire 
logo is superimposed on a globe, underscoring the movement’s transnational and diverse 
support base, the global Iranian community, many members of which identified with the 
uprising, and certainly its worldwide audience via increased global connectivity.   
The co-option of the IRGC’s banner highlights the common theme outlined 
throughout this study—how the uprising ingeniously used the government’s own 
discourse and symbolism against itself.  After the climactic month of December, the 
Green Movement looked ahead to the state’s most prized political holiday—the 
anniversary of the Iranian Revolution’s victory—to likewise appropriate the day in order 
to deliver a final ideological blow to the state. This concluding chapter will show how the 
government defeated the uprising’s street presence on February 11, 2010, while also 
showing how the Green Movement endures even though the state prevented it from co-
opting yet another state-sanctioned political holiday.  In doing so, this chapter will ask 
and propose an answer to the very important question: What does it mean for the Green 
Uprising to be “over”? 
 
II. Repression and the Crowd’s Failure to Appropriate Revolution Day 
 The ʿAshura protests on December 27 represented both a hardening of the 
movement as well as the state’s resolve to crush it. Eight died on Husayn’s 
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commemoration, amounting to one of the bloodiest days in the course of the uprising. 
What’s more, the state intensified its crackdown afterwards in order to discourage 
continued protests, especially with the upcoming Revolution Day holiday (22 Bahman)—
an annual political event in which the state’s supporters march instep with the 
government.  
 To dissuade activists from likewise hijacking 22 Bahman (February 11), the 
regime began trying detained protesters, of which those arrested on ʿAshura were dealt 
with especially harshly—nearly a dozen were even sentenced to death for “waging war 
on God.”736  More to the point, the state started executing prisoners—including Arash 
Rahmanipour and Mohammad Reza Alizamani, both of which were convicted of political 
crimes that likely took place before the uprising. The timing of their executions prompted 
many to believe that their punishments were hastened to terrorize a mobilized 
population.737  What’s more, televised forced confessions—a mainstay of modern Iran 
both before and after the revolution when it reached unprecedented heights in the early 
post-revolutionary period—were revitalized during the government’s crackdown on the 
uprising thereby humiliating such victimized activists in order to sow fear in the hearts of 
the audience.738 
                                                 
736 “Ārash raḥmānīpūr va moḥammad reżā ʿalīzamānī, eʿdām shodand”. Rahesabz. 28 Jan 2010. Accessed 
10 July 2015. <http://rahesabz.net/story/8919/>. 
737 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., February 2, 2010, Wikileaks,   
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10RPODUBAI27_a.html.  
738 One such victim of these forced confessions speaks about it in length in his memoirs, noting that as an 
international journalist of dual Iranian and Canadian citizenship, he was forced to admit to the falsehood 
that he was part of an international conspiracy whereby the foreign media worked in tandem with foreign 
governments in order to pave the way for a velvet revolution in Iran much like the ones that swept 
through Georgia in 2003 or Ukraine in 2004. See Bahari, Maziar.  Then They Came for Me: A Family’s Story 
of Love, Captivity, and Survival.  New York: Random House, 2011, pp. 162-173.  Although he was never 
tried, Bahari had this to say about the show trials he observed: “A number of sources told me that the 
trials were produced on Khamenei’s direct orders, meant to show the strength of the regime and disgrace 
the reformist leaders who were paraded in front of the press in their prison uniforms.” (Bahari, 225).  
  
 
 
277 
 What’s more, just as the Internet was a weapon in the hands of the activists who 
harnessed it either to coordinate action through social media or to broadcast raw footage 
of events to a global audience via YouTube, the medium was also a weapon in the hands 
of the state that used it to suppress the revolt. Disturbingly, the government published 
photos of protesters and invited fellow citizens to identify them so they can be arrested.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Mehdi Saharkhiz, the point man for activists’ footage from the uprising, responded to the forced 
confession of his father—a journalist imprisoned before the election after publishing letters critical of 
Khamenei—by co-opting and subverting the state’s tactic of televising such confessions with his own 
“confession” in which he stated: “I confess. I confess that I am the son of a prisoner, my father is a 
prisoner. I confess that I am not ashamed that my father is in prison and I am proud of him. I confess that 
my father is not a thief, he is not a murderer, he is not a looter nor a rioter. He is one of the “Dirt and 
Dust” and a friend of the “Dirt and Dust.” I confess that my father disrupted the comfortable sleep of 
some people, and gave them nightmares. Those same people who filled their own pockets by stealing the 
nation’s wealth and left people in nightmares. I confess that my father is famous for his honesty. And I 
confess his bravery had made life harder for the cowards in power in our time. I confess that they 
kidnapped my father and broke his ribs. I confess that they did not even take him to a hospital, and 
instead took him to solitary confinement. I confess that my father was denied the right to an attorney. He 
was not even allowed to phone his daughter on Father’s Day. I confess that for weeks we had no word 
from him and even on my mother’s birthday we did not receive any news. I confess that my mother spent 
her wedding anniversary in loneliness. And I confess that this year, my father could not visit my martyred 
uncle’s grave because he was in jail. I confess that Isa Saharkhiz is a soldier of war and a brother of a 
martyr. I confess that he did not use his positions to gain money or power in this regime. I confess that he 
has worked for years either when he was an official in the Ministry of Culture or when he was the head of 
the news department in the Islamic Republic News Agency or even when he was working for the IRNA 
office in the United Nations.  I confess that my father works in a country where the representative of the 
judiciary system bit him. I confess that in my country the person who bites gets a promotion and later 
becomes a minister. I confess that the wolves that are running the country now don’t even think the 
savage who bites should be fired. I confess that my dad’s greatest sin is being innocent. I confess he is 
guilty of speaking justly. I confess that he has already expressed his views and beliefs before he was 
kidnapped and whatever they have him confess is a pure lie and not his opinion. I confess that I am proud 
of having a father like him.  I confess that I wish maybe someday I can be just a little like him. That would 
be the greatest achievement of my life. I confess that my father and his friends were not only detained 
but tortured. We confess that we voted and they stole our votes.  We confess that this one was not an 
election but a coup d’etat. We confess that no court was assembled and what was shown on State TV was 
nothing but a movie of big lies. We confess that our brothers and sisters were not only tortured but were 
raped in the most savage way possible. We confess that Kahrizak was not a jail but a place for torture and 
rape. We confess that those who are running the country are far from being human. We confess that we 
are fighting together for our rights and will not back down.  We confess that it is you [the government] 
that is scared of us as we are not scared because we are standing together. We confess that we will fight 
until the very last drop of our blood for our absolute right to a free Iran. We confess that we have faith in 
victory and getting our rights.” Mehdi Saharkhiz. “I Mehdi Saharkhiz Confess for Isa Saharkhiz (please 
make your own”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  15 August 2009.  Accessed 17 May 2015. 
<https://youtu.be/AZjdLq3H1S8>.  For a detailed history of forced confessions in modern Iran, see 
Abrahamian, Ervand.  Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999.  
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As early as June, Gerdab—a news outlet tied to the IRGC—published 28 photos with 
protesters’ faces encircled, beseeching state-supporters to identify the “rioters” who 
served the agenda of “the hypocrites, monarchists, terrorist groups, and counter-
revolutionaries.”739  The state’s tactic of encouraging citizens to reveal the identities of 
their neighbors continued throughout the uprising and came to a head in the post-ʿAshura 
crackdown when the commander of the security forces announced that 70 percent of 
ʿAshura “rioters” were identified and arrested after the publication of such photos.740 
Although the percentage is almost certainly an exaggeration designed to intimidate 
activists, there should not be any doubt that many were indeed identified and detained 
through such an approach. 
 The government’s use of the Internet to suffocate the movement is an ominous 
sign of things to come. Iran in 2009 is an early example of how governments around the 
world are using the Internet and mobile phones to monitor their own citizens. This is not 
a phenomenon unique to “those people over there,” but also a growing reality in the 
United States—the so-called “Beacon of the Free World.”  As revealed by Edward 
Snowden, the analyst who defected from National Security Agency (NSA) and leaked a 
massive trove of classified information about the government’s shadowy techniques to 
intrude into the lives of its citizens, government surveillance is indeed a reality not just 
“over there.”  Accordingly, the ever-expanding surveillance state in the US has the ability 
and authorization to activate the microphones on Americans’ cellular phones and listen to 
                                                 
739 “Eghteshāshgarān rā shenāsāī konīd (līst-i avval)”. Gerdab.  21 June 2009. Accessed 9 July 2015. 
<http://gerdab.ir/fa/pages/?cid=407>  
740 “70 darṣad-i eghteshāshgarān bā moʿarefī-ye mardom dastgīr shodand”. Mehr News. 11 Feb 2010. 
Accessed 9 July 2015. <http://goo.gl/JCvmsn>. 
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personal conversations, and monitor online and phone activity—including text messages 
as the person is typing in real-time: 
"As you write a message, you know, an analyst at the NSA or any other 
service out there that's using this kind of attack against people can actually 
see you write sentences and then backspace over your mistakes and then 
change the words and then kind of pause and — and — and think about 
what you wanted to say and then change it. And it's this extraordinary 
intrusion not just into your communications, your finished messages but 
your actual drafting process, into the way you think.”741  
 
Furthermore, in an unnerving article, Ana Marie Cox at The Guardian noted that 
governments and companies collect our online activity in the form of “data.” In doing so, 
they can predict and possibly influence our behavior:  
“The masters of modern spycraft have learned from the masters of 
marketing the science of predicting human behavior. One of the main 
reasons for ‘bulk’ collection, one that seems less alarming on its surface, is 
to watch for patterns of behavior that indicate possible terrorist activity. 
But when an organization is sufficiently skilled at predicting human 
behavior, the next phase, almost inevitably, is to try to influence it.”742 
 
In sum, one of the legacies of the Green Uprising is to both demonstrate how effective 
the Internet is in coordinating protest activity as well as suppressing it, the latter of which 
is only an ominous sign of things to come both in Iran and elsewhere.  
 In addition to the ever-widening security net that by February was ensnaring 
opposition members of all strata, the state also implemented measures designed to 
neutralize Green activists on Revolution Day. It disrupted the Internet, SMS and 
telephone services in order to prevent coordination, lined the main street of the pro-
                                                 
741 Edward Snowden. Interview by Brian Williams. 28 May 2014.  Moscow, Russia. NBC News. Accessed 9 
July 2015. <http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/edward-snowdens-motive-
revealed-he-can-sleep-night-n116851>.  Also, see Greenwald, Glenn. No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, 
the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State.  New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014; as well as Morozov, 
Evgeny.  The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2011. 
742 Cox, Ana Marie.  “Who should we fear more with our data: the government or companies?”. The 
Guardian. 20 Jan 2014.  Accessed 6 Sept 2011. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/obama-nsa-reform-companies-spying-data>. 
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government march with thousands of security personnel, and, for the first time, installed 
loudspeakers along the 6-mile (10 km) march route to drown out potential anti-
government slogans.743  The government even took advantage of Revolution Day falling 
on Thursday—the day before Iran’s day of rest—and a religious holiday at the end of the 
weekend to announce a long holiday in order to encourage would-be protesters to go on 
vacation.744   
 The state’s systematic measures were not the only means by which it ensured that 
the Green Movement would not be able to co-opt Revolution Day. The authorities 
coupled their crackdown and attempts to control the day’s message with a relentless 
effort to encourage its supporters to flood the streets of the country, specifically in Tehran 
where the day’s events were planned to culminate at Azadi Square—the scene of the 
unofficial referendum on ʿAshura in 1978 and the Green Movement’s most impressive 
gathering on June 15, 2009.  The state-led coordination aimed to produce a colossal show 
of force in support of the revolution, “the Leader of the Revolution,” and to take a 
physical stand by hammering “the last nail in the seditionists’ coffin.” 745   To put it 
differently, the “opportunity” to co-opt another political holiday in order to rally against 
the state—a tactic the opposition employed to great effect on previous holidays to 
circumvent state repression and renew its protest—was no longer available. 
While the government was preparing the death knell for the uprising’s street 
presence, Green activists still hoped that they would evade the state’s efforts to stop them 
and successfully hijack the government’s most politically potent holiday: Revolution 
                                                 
743 Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to Central Intelligence Agency, et al., February 10, 2010,  Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10RPODUBAI33_a.html. 
744 Ibid. 
745 Ibid. 
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Day—the day in which a protracted popular revolution brought the Shah’s seemingly all-
powerful state to a definitive end thereby precipitating the rise of the Islamic Republic.  
In doing so, many hoped the appropriation of such an important day would amount to the 
beginning of the government’s end—a hope best visualized by an image posted on 
Mousavi’s Facebook page (Figure 5.2).746 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The hourglass of the movement’s major days of action 
  
                                                 
746 Mir Hossein Mousavi Facebook Page.  “Green hourglass”. 26 Nov 2009.  Facebook Post. 
<https://www.facebook.com/mousavi/photos/a.172726419453.118347.45061919453/186592339453/?t
ype=3&theater>. 
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The image noted all the uprising’s main days of action: June 15, Quds Day (September 
18), National Struggle Against Global Arrogance Day (November 4), Student Day 
(December 7), Tasuʿa and ʿAshura (December 26 and 27), and the last of which was 
going to be Revolution Day (February 11). All but June 15—the single largest day of 
protest in the history of the uprising—were state-sanctioned holidays, which the Green 
Movement appropriated and subverted.  More to the point, the hour glass ended with 
Revolution Day, symbolizing the forthcoming victory of the uprising, or as one observer 
noted, the Green Movement’s “D-Day.”747 
 If the struggle between the Green Movement and the government was a poker 
game, then both sides went “all in,” leaving one winner, which was undoubtedly the 
government.  The state’s repressive measures coalesced with its efforts to amass its 
supporters thereby ensuring that the day went off as the government planned.  State 
media boasted that 50 million people across the country, 5 million of which were in 
Tehran, marched to “burst” the “bubble of America’s seditious plot.” 748  While such 
estimates from Kayhan, the editor of which is personally chosen by Khamenei, are highly 
exaggerated, helicopter footage does provide an aerial view confirming an undeniably 
massive and unprecedented show of force for the government.749  More tellingly, the 
state’s most conservative daily, Kayhan, proclaimed that the “epic march” demonstrated 
                                                 
747 Win Dayton. Istanbul, to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, January 29, 2010, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ISTANBUL40_a.html. 
748 “Ḥobāb-i fetneh-ye āmrīkā tarakīd ḥamāseh-ye bi sābeqeh-ye mellat dar 22 bahman”. Kayhan. 16 Feb 
2009. Accessed 11 July 2015. <http://kayhanarch.kayhan.ir/881127/14.htm#other1401>. 
749 zelzalosolh. “[MUST SEE | Part 1 | Bahman 22 2010] Helicopter over Tehran 5 Million Dawn”.  Online 
video clip.  YouTube.  12 February 2010.  Accessed 15 May 2015.  <https://youtu.be/HbYqckFvUJI>. 
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the people’s affirmation of Khomeini’s ideals by renewing their oath of allegiance 
(baīʿah) to Khamenei’s authority (vilāyat).750 
 Baīʿah is an Islamic concept that goes back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
who, along with his successors, secured loyalties not through written agreements but via 
such powerful and binding oaths.  So important were these pledges that their violation 
amounted to perjuring oneself before God.751 That state media framed its victory on 
February 11 using such terminology only demonstrates its self-legitimating reliance on 
Islamic symbolism, history, and discourse, all of which the Green Movement co-opted 
and subverted to legitimate itself and condemn the Islamic Republic using its very own 
terms. 
 Subsequent to Revolution Day, however, the opposition was shocked and 
demoralized after viewing such footage, which the state broadcast to the nation. Many 
simply could not fathom that the state enjoyed such support. Others argued that the 
attendees either didn’t know any better, were lured with the promise of a free lunch, or 
were simply coerced to participate.  The truth is, however, that the government endured a 
storm that inundated many of its counterparts in neighboring Arab countries two years 
later in the Arab Uprisings because of such support, which cannot so easily be reduced to 
such generalizations.  
 In comparison, the Shah’s government lacked such organic roots when the 
revolutionary upheaval began to shatter his authority in 1978-79.  The few supporters the 
Shah had simply transferred their wealth abroad, packed their suitcases, and left the 
                                                 
750 “Ḥobāb-i fetneh-ye āmrīkā tarakīd ḥamāseh-ye bi sābeqeh-ye mellat dar 22 bahman”. 
751 Mottahedeh, Roy.  Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980, pp. 42. 
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country when it became apparent that the revolution would triumph. Indeed, historians 
often remark that the Shah’s dictatorship can be fixed with a “one-bullet solution,” in 
which one assassin could potentially cause the destruction of the state since so much 
power and decision-making was vested in one man. In other words, once decapitated with 
the death of the monarch then the state would crumble.  The Islamic Republic, on the 
other hand, has been building institutions from the onset throughout the country and, 
consequently, has an enormously entrenched state that reaches deep into society. A prime 
example can be found in the IRGC, which was established to protect the leadership of the 
revolution and now controls a large percentage of the Iranian economy—investments that 
amount to billions.  Such business ventures coupled with its ideological zeal and 
institutional capacity for violence ensure that it has a vested and unshakable interest in 
maintaining the status quo.  In contrast, the Shah’s vaunted army continuously unraveled 
in the face of the revolutionary uprising in 1978, barely maintaining a semblance of 
cohesion by early 1979—until various guerilla groups in tandem with revolutionary 
volunteers delivered its coup de grace on February 11, 1979, or Revolution Day.752 
 Thus, the Islamic government was able to harness that institutional power along 
with its corresponding support base in order to shut down the opposition’s plans to co-opt 
the state’s most important political holiday.  The mere fact that it was also able to 
                                                 
752 Kurzman notes: “Each military operation exposed the troops to fraternization and further appeals from 
protesters. Dissident officers therefore encouraged more deployment of soldiers in the streets, while 
loyalists such as the head of the ground forces proposed keeping the soldiers away from nefarious 
influences: ‘We should round up the units and send them someplace where [the demonstrators’ won’t 
have any contact with the soldiers. Because yesterday they came and put a flower in the end of a riffle 
barrel, and another on the [military] car… The soldiers’ morale just disappears.’ On several occasions, 
eyewitnesses reported that large throngs of protesters had persuaded soldiers to give up their arms, 
throw off their uniforms, and join the demonstrations.” (Kurzman, pp. 115). 
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commandeer such a massive display of support prompted many Green activists to believe 
that changing the status quo through street action was becoming a hopeless endeavor.  
In his analysis of the causes of the Iranian Revolution, Charles Kurzman argues 
that there is too much confusion in a revolution to try to explain with complex theories. 
Rather, it’s a real-time decision on the ground in which “fence-sitters” decide at a critical 
juncture that revolution is viable and that an alternative to the regime is possible—an 
epiphany that subsequently prompts their participation. According to Kurzman, until that 
point was reached when those fence-sitters—the bulk of the people who ultimately made 
the Iranian Revolution—crossed that mental threshold, only the die-hard revolutionaries 
were on the streets fighting for change.  His explanation or what he calls the “anti-
explanation… runs counter to the project of retroactive prediction… Instead of seeking 
recurrent patterns in social life, anti-explanation explores the unforeseen moments when 
patterns are twisted or broken off.”753 
 A number of factors came together to cause many sympathizers to cross that 
mental threshold in the early winter of 1978, believing that the victory of the revolution 
was a very real possibility and that their personal participation made it all the more likely.  
Consequently, the ʿAshura protests of December 10, 1978, were undoubtedly the largest 
protest event in modern Iranian history.   In contrast, severe government repression in 
February 2010 coupled with an immense public outpouring of support for the state 
provoked the opposite sentiment; that the Green Uprising may not win and that one’s 
personal participation may not make a difference—in fact it could come at great personal 
cost.   
                                                 
753 Kurzman, pp. 138 
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III. The Uprising Endures: Complicating the Claim of its Finality 
 What does it mean to say that the Green Uprising is “over”? What does it mean 
when The Economist echoes the sentiment of Iran’s leaders by referring to the revolt as a 
“failed” revolution? 754  It is certainly true that the movement failed to abrogate 
Ahmadinejad’s election “win.” It is also undoubtedly true that it did not succeed in 
overthrowing the state. The win-lose and start-finish false binaries, however, are simply 
too narrow a lens by which to analyze the uprising, especially since it is this study’s 
contention that it is far from over in many ways. 
 In his seminal book, The Other Cold War, Heonik Kwon supplants the dominant 
Cold War paradigm that focuses on the two superpowers of the day in favor of examining 
how the global struggle impacted the people on a grass-roots level. In doing so, he argues 
that the Cold War didn’t end for many of its victims with the fall of the Berlin Wall or the 
implosion of the Soviet Union. The war’s end or a sense of closure, for instance, didn’t 
come to families with sons who fought and died for both sides of the American war in 
Vietnam until the communist state finally allowed those families to administer the proper 
burial rights—rituals previously banned as feudal superstitions.  Thus, it was only after 
the revolutionary state relinquished and allowed such families to formally acknowledge 
their dead that empowered them with a sense that the war was finally over—a feeling 
realized several years after the formal end of the Cold War.755 
                                                 
754 “The revolution is over”. The Economist. 1 Nov 2014. Accessed 11 July 2015 
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21629338-changes-iran-make-nuclear-deal-more-likelynot-
month-perhaps-eventually>. 
755 Kwon, Heonik.  The Other Cold War.   New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
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 The Iran of today likewise continues to grapple with the ramifications of the 
events of 2009.  Three of the uprising’s leading personalities, Mir Hussein Mousavi, 
Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi have been under house arrest since early 2011. 
Furthermore, the state ordered the press not to mention the name or publish the image of 
Khatami—the popular reformist former president who publicly backed the movement.756  
Many activists still wither away in Iran’s political prisons, and more continue to reel from 
the physical and psychological trauma of those tumultuous days. Furthermore, the 
uprising is a daily lived experience full of grief for those families who lost loved ones—
especially if they never obtained a sense of closure because the state prevented them from 
having a proper burial out fear that it would serve as a rallying cry for the opposition.757  
More counter-intuitively, a closer look at modern Iranian history is instructive in 
analyzing the supposed finality of the Green Uprising. 
 When the Shah’s military violently crushed the June 1963 Uprising, many young 
activists who were members of opposition groups such as the Liberation Movement 
became radicalized as a result, and broke from their organizations’ peaceful approach in 
favor of the belief that such a crackdown proved that nonviolent struggle against the 
Shah’s regime was futile:  
                                                 
756 Qazi, Fereshteh. “Jaʿfarī-dowlatābādī modīrān-i nashrīāt rā tahdīd kard”. Rooz Online. 10 Feb 2015. 
Accessed 13 July 2015. <http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem2/article/-cc06e1f063.html>.  
757 Makhmalbaf accused the government of seizing the dead body of Mousavi’s nephew in order to 
prevent “both an impartial examination of the corpse and a burial.” See Director Alan Eyre, Dubai, to 
Central Intelligence Agency, et al., December 28, 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RPODUBAI549_a.html. Other instances abound, such as 
when the families of Mostafa Kashani Rasa and Fatemeh Semsarpor were disallowed from observing 
customary mourning practices. “Enteshār-i asāmī-ye 112 tan az jānbākhtegān-i ḥavādes-i bʿad az 
entekhābāt”. Rahesabz. 12 June 2012. Accessed 11 July 2015. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/54490/>. 
There is also much information about how the state tried to or succeeded in suppressing Neda Agha 
Soltan’s burial. I am reluctant to include a citation because much of the sources rely on the testimony of 
her fiancé, Caspian Makan, whose credibility has been undermined. There should not be any doubt, 
however, that the state succeeded to a certain extent in controlling the funeral of the uprising’s most 
famous martyr.  
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“The Uprising of 5 June (15 Khordad) is one of the most important events 
in all Iranian history and the most bloody event in contemporary Iranian 
history. It has forced us to draw the following…conclusions: …that the 
unarmed struggle – however popular and widespread – cannot possibly 
succeed against such a bloodthirsty regime. The only way to bring down 
this detestable regime is through a concerted armed struggle.”758 
 
Consequently, such spirited activists were baptized in the blood of the 1963 Uprising and 
went on to eventually establish guerrilla groups that fought an earth-shattering guerrilla 
war with the Shah in the 1970s. Their war demonstrated to a population that however 
high-powered the Shah’s military may have been—especially in terms of perception—it 
was not invincible. In doing so, their bold attacks helped foster the belief that revolution 
was possible, even going so far as to lead the insurrection that precipitated the state’s 
final collapse on Revolution Day (February 11, 1979).  
 That is not to say a guerrilla uprising is on Iran’s political horizon in the aftermath 
of 2009. On the contrary, the circumstances that gave rise to such ferocious groups in the 
1970s are wholly absent today. Rather, the point is that the end of the uprising in 1963 
constituted only the beginning of a new kind of struggle for many. For Khomeini, the 
leader of the 1963 Uprising, it was only the opening salvo in a protracted struggle that 
culminated more than 15 years later in the revolutionary overthrow of the monarchy. 
History can indeed be non-linear with the conclusion of one event igniting the start of the 
next chapter.  
Likewise, the defeat that the Green Movement faced on Revolution Day in 2009 
may well be the beginning of an entirely new page in Iran’s modern history, one that may 
                                                 
758 Translation provided in Abrahamian Ervand.  The Iranian Mojahedin.  New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1989, pp. 85. 
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well be, but is not limited to, a cyber war—quite possibly the future (if not the present) of 
nonviolent underground resistance.   
There are already numerous examples after Revolution Day that refute the claim 
that it is “over.”  First, many in the Arab world looked to Iran in 2009 as an exemplar for 
action, as articulated by an Egyptian activist: 
“During the Iranian elections, we Egyptians were surprised to find out that 
Iranian women, who we’ve heard of as being oppressed and covered from 
top to bottom, have gone to streets demonstrating against the elections, 
asking for their political rights. Young university students, who we are 
told are marginalized and oppressed by the Islamic government, are also 
demonstrating against the system and the Mullah. And so, we were all, 
without exception, fascinated by the situation in Iran and wanted to 
support this call for change. At the same time, there was a recurring 
thought in the media and in people’s minds that, I remember, was clearly 
articulated by an Iranian activist, living and studying in the USA on CNN. 
He said: ‘If it happened in Iran, it would happen in Egypt.’ That is exactly 
what was on our minds, if Iranians could stand up to its extremely 
oppressive and theocratic government, then we Egyptians can easily break 
the vicious cycle of our autocratic government.  We can do the same.  In 
helping Iranians, we were helping our dream for a democratic nation to 
come true, we were helping ourselves. We thought that this was the time 
to garner the attention of the international community to the Middle East 
to Iran first then to the rest of the countries there that still suffer from 
oppressive governments.”759  
 
She and many of her revolutionary counterparts had a vested interest in seeing the Green 
Uprising succeed and, consequently, used Google Translate to translate into Persian and 
post alerts on Twitter pertaining to which embassies in Tehran were offering first aid to 
injured demonstrators. 760  After the Iranian government succeeded in crushing the 
uprising, Egyptians found their inspiration in the inferno of revolution that started in 
Tunisia two years later and spread like wildfire across the region. Once Tunisia’s 
                                                 
759 Dalia Ziada (Egyptian blogger and human rights activist).  Interview by Sherine El-Taraboulsi. 18 April, 
2010. Accessed 14 July 2015. transcript.  
760 Ibid.  
  
 
 
290 
strongman, Zine El ʿAbidine Ben ʿAli, fled the country on January 14, 2011, Egyptians 
and Yemenis quickly mobilized to follow suit. On February 11, 2011, 32 years after 
Iran’s Revolution Day, Egypt’s dictator was ousted. Three days later, protests caught fire 
in Libya, Bahrain, and Iran—the first non-Arab country inspired by the Arab Uprisings to 
revolt. As such, Iranian demonstrators harnessed the energy of their neighbors, and 
declared, “Mubarak, Ben ʿAli, now it’s the turn of Seyyed Ali [Khamenei]” (mubārak, 
ben ʿalī, nowbat-i seyyed ʿalī)761—prompting the state to place Mousavi, Rahnavard, and 
Karroubi on indefinite house arrest. 
 Another example of the movement belying claims that it is “over” can be found in 
the election of centrist candidate, Hassan Rouhani.762 Explicitly, activists gathered in 
Tehran at night to mark his election win in 2013—a full four years after the June 2009 
election turmoil—declaring: “The Green Movement is not dead, it has brought Rouhani 
to power (jonbesh-i sabz namordeh, roḥānī ro āvordeh), “Long live the Green 
Movement, long live Mousavi” (jonbesh-i sabz zendeh bād, mūsavī pāyāndeh bād)763, 
                                                 
761 Mardomak News.  “Mubārak, ben ʿalī, nowbat-i seyyed ʿalī”.  Online video clip. YouTube.  14 February 
2011.  Accessed 14 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/QqmkvTsH1FY>. 
762 Worried about disillusionment in the political process after the 2009 post-election crisis, Khamenei 
beseeched citizens for the first time to vote in the election even if they did not agree with the Islamic 
Republic: “My first and most important recommendation is participation in the election as the most 
crucial thing for the country. It is possible that some—for whatever reason—will not support the Islamic 
Republic but should still want to support their country. Thus, they should go and cast their vote.  
Khamenei, ʿAli.  “2 rūz māndeh beh entekhābāt – nokāt-i entekhābātī-ye rahbar-i enqelāb”.  leader.ir. 12 
June 2013.  <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/package?id=22298&news_id=22904>.  What’s more, it can be 
argued that the state permitted Rouhani to run in an attempt to make amends with the opposition. It is 
also worth noting that the government learned from the experience of the 2009 election when it 
loosened restrictions on the Internet in order to facilitate interest in the elections but then had to also 
contend with activists using online mediums for coordination. In 2013, however, the authorities 
encouraged voter participation but “throttled” the Internet in order to “preserve calm”—a euphemism 
meaning to prevent another uprising. See, “Vazīr-i ertebāṭāt: dalīl-i oft-i sorʿat-i īnternet dar ayyām-i 
entekhābāt amnīatī būd”. Tasnim News Agency. 25 June 2013. Accessed 14 July 14 2015. 
<http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/85703>. 
763 Kaleme.com Official YouTube Channel. “barādar shahīdam rayeto pas gereftam”.  Online video clip.  
YouTube.  15 June 2013.  Accessed 14 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/fGwga1VErN4>. 
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“Mousavi, Mousavi, we have retrieved your vote” (mūsavī, mūsavī, rayeto pas 
gereftīm)764, “Martyred brother, we have retrieved your vote (barādar shahīdam rayeto 
pas gereftam)765—the fulfillment of a promise pledged on the streets four years ago766—
and demanded the release of political prisoners767 and an end to the house arrest of the 
movement’s leaders.768  Likewise, when Rouhani’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, returned from negotiations with western powers over Iran’s nuclear program, 
citizens welcomed his triumphant return after he secured a preliminary deal by greeting 
him at the airport with slogans that offered condolences to Israel and Kayhan, the two 
critics of the agreement, and invoked the Green Uprising, “O’Husayn, Mir Hussein.”769 
When the deal was finalized three months later in Vienna on July 14, 2015, activists 
celebrated on the streets of Iran by chanting: “The next deal shall be about our civil 
rights” (tavāfoq-i ba’dī-ye mā hoqūq-i shahrvandī-ye mā)—more than 5 years after the 
uprising supposedly “ended.”770 
 The demand for civil rights serves as an important reminder that the history of 
modern Iran is one in which political movements as far back as the Tobacco Revolt 
                                                 
764 Erfan Salehi. “Mūsavī, mūsavī, rayeto pas gereftīm”. Online video clip. YouTube. 15 June 2013. 
Accessed 14 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/ZGZPqASKxDw>. 
765 Kaleme.com Official Youtube Channel. “barādar shahīdam rayeto pas gereftam”. 
766 Ninashnash864.  “Barādar shahīdam rayeto pas mīgīram”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  17 July 2009. 
Accessed 14 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/O-ha8NrexQA>. 
767 Ali adabi. “Jashn-i mardom shab-i 25 khordād dar moḥavateh-ye farhangestān-i honar”. Online video 
clip. YouTube. 17 June 2013.  Accessed 14 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/8zsi8YJzDXU>. 
768 Sabzjamehgan.  “Mūsavī,mūsavī,parcham-i īrānamo pas gereftam/dar jashn-i pīruzī-ye roḥānī rouhani 
tehran election june 2013”.  Online video clip.  YouTube.  16 June 2013.  Accessed 14 July 2015. 
<https://youtu.be/O7HI_5CrKQs>. 
769 “Esteqbāl az ẓarīf dar forudgāh bā shoʿār  ‘ya husayn mīr hussein’”. Kaleme. 3 April 2015. Accessed 14 
July 2015. <http://www.kaleme.com/1394/01/14/klm-212990/>. 
770 khabarnet info. “tavāfoq-i baʿdī-ye mā hoqūq-i shahrvandi-ye ma”.  Online video clip.  YouTube. 14 July 
2015.  Accessed 14 July 2015.  <https://youtu.be/iDnoGcMTe04>. Although American politicians credit 
the debilitating sanctions for prompting Iran’s participation in the negotiation process, it should also be 
mentioned that the government, which has a long history dealing with sanctions, was undoubtedly more 
willing to negotiate because it feared that the economic situation would so deteriorate as to re-ignite the 
uprising. Thus, the Green Uprising can also be credited for indirectly facilitating a compromise.  
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(1890-92) and moving through to the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11), Mossadeq’s 
nationalist movement (1951-53), the Iranian Revolution (1978-79), and the Green 
Uprising (2009)—the latest chapter in this history of resistance—all share an important 
attribute. Each constitutes a renewed struggle by which the next generation of Iranians 
rose up against the country’s leadership that either refused to establish the rule of law—as 
with the last Qajar shahs—or operated as if it were above it—as with the Pahlavi dynasty 
and the Islamic Republic.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The “history from below” or “grassroots history”—the vantage point by which the 
history of the uprising was chronicled in this work—empowers the reader to see beyond 
the win-lose binary in order to observe other important and consequential developments, 
such as the uprising’s post-Islamist challenge and its unprecedented discursive attack on 
the Islamic Republic’s symbols and ideology. Such a window allows for a more 
unpacked reading of the uprising thereby illustrating that the revolt is not over in a way, 
especially its repercussions and its impact on Islamism in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and possibly elsewhere. Indeed, how can the state persist in its current form and argue 
that it leads by carrying forth Husayn’s banner when it killed over 112 unarmed activists 
throughout the uprising, 8 of which died resisting the powerful state on ʿAshura in 
2009?771  How can the authorities continue to distract their citizenry from internal issues 
                                                 
771 Rahesabz published a complete list of the profiles for all the deceased on the third anniversary of the 
election. Admittedly, the list cannot encompass the entire death toll as some names have yet to be 
released. A breakdown of the age and gender of the dead offers a window into the demographics of the 
uprising. Of the 112 who died in the uprising, 12 were female and 100 male, the youngest of which was 12. 
14 were teenagers, 33 were between 21 and 25 years of age, 22 between 26-30, 11 between 21-40, and 7 
were 41 years or older. The breakdown does not reflect the percentage of female involvement in the 
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by invoking the specter of external enemies such as Israel when it was accused on Quds 
Day 2009 of being as unjust as Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinians?772 
 This study began by noting the Islamic Republic’s preferred slogan to summarize 
its reading of the Iranian Revolution: “Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic”—
signifying how the revolution marched onwards in order to wrest its independence from 
the United States, its freedom from the tyranny of the Shah, and how the Islamic 
Republic constitutes the guarantor of both prized ideals. This powerful mantra was given 
mundane normality when the state emblazoned it on the country’s early 5000 and 10000 
rial bank notes whereby an image of Islamic revolutionaries march under such a banner 
(Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3. Iranian banknote underscoring “Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic” 
                                                                                                                                                 
revolt, especially since they were far less aggressive in engaging offensive security forces, therefore, 
amassed fewer casualties. The percentage of youth dead, however, does affirm that the youth comprised 
the bulk of the protesters. What’s more, the number of people dead over the age of 40 illustrates that it 
was not exclusively a youth movement but a multi-generational one.  See “Enteshār-i asāmī-ye 112 tan az 
jānbākhtegān-i ḥavādes-i bʿad az entekhābāt”. Rahesabz. 12 June 2012. Accessed 11 July 2015. 
<http://www.rahesabz.net/story/54490/>.  
772 Iran is but one example of governments using external threats to distract from internal issues and 
justify the state’s encroachment on civil liberties.  
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Fittingly, this work now concludes with the most potent mantra of the latest 
chapter in Iran’s storied history of resistance—“Independence, Freedom, Iranian 
Republic” (esteqlāl, āzādī, jomhūrī-ye īrānī)—which Green activists voiced on a number 
of occasions throughout the uprising,773 and which they relayed in similar form on the 
country’s bank notes (Figure 5.4).774  Money indeed “talks.” 
 
 
Figure 5.4. The bank note in the back tellingly has a question mark above the “Islamic” in “Islamic 
Republic of Iran” and has the “Republic” crossed out to emphasize the anti-democratic nature of the system, 
especially with regards to the outcome of the presidential election—a point affirmed in the other bank note 
that has “Republic” crossed out in favor of the “dictatorship” handwritten above. To the left is a quote 
                                                 
773 See, for instance, the footage from the protests on November 4, the anniversary of the US embassy 
seizure, GREENPOWER000. “Esteqlāl āzādī jomhūrī-ye īrānī 13 ābān-i sabz”. Online video clip.  YouTube.  4 
November 2009.  Accessed 13 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/FLvFaCPYyrM>; or this clip from ʿAshura: 
GREENPOWER0. “Tehran dec 27 - esteqlāl āzādī jomhūrī-ye īrānī =6dey”. Online video clip.  YouTube.  27 
December 2009.  Accessed 13 July 2015. <https://youtu.be/tGWrjbQHVtI>. 
774 Rahesabz innumerated the  reasons as to why people were writing slogans on Iran’s currency, of which 
the fourth point is especially telling as the author argues that it’s a form of “popular media” in which the 
anonymity of the citizen journalist is guaranteed thereby securing their protection from the state’s 
ubiquitous crackdown.  Nowruzi. N. “9 dalīl barāye eskenās nevīsī”. Rahesabz. 21 Jan 2010. Accessed 13 
July 2015. <http://www.rahesabz.net/story/7005/>. 
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attributed to the anti-clerical Islamist ideologue, ʿAli Shariʿati (d. 1977), noting: “Don’t believe what a 
government says if that government is the only entity that has the right of expression.”775 
 
Just as the state’s favored slogan encapsulated its understanding of the Iranian 
Revolution, this motto epitomizes the Green Movement’s post-Islamist challenge, 
stipulating that independence and freedom are not synonymous with an Islamic Republic. 
Rather, Iran enjoys “independence without freedom”776 because it is governed by an 
Islamic Republic, and that a post-Islamist republic—it is so forcefully argued by the 
uprising—aspires to succeed where Iran’s experiment with Islamism has woefully 
“failed.” 
                                                 
775 This image along with 13 others were posted on Payvand. See “Exhibit: Iranian banknotes uprising”. 
Payvand. 16 November 2009. Accessed 13 July 2015. 
<http://payvand.com/blog/blog/2009/11/16/exhibit-iranian-banknotes-uprising/>. That the government 
even managed to stamp out this innovate tactic illustrates the severity of the crackdown. The central bank 
announced that it would no longer accept currency with such writing on it thereby preventing such 
“popular media” from circulating in the first place. See “Neveshteh hāyeh eskenās-hā pāk mīshāvānd”. 
Tabnak. 7 July 2009. Accessed 13 July 2015. <http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=79871>.  The 
government’s measures are probably in response to a public recommendation made by Morteza Talaei in 
October, 2009. See, “Vākonesh-i ṭalāī beh shoʿārnevīsī ru-ye eskenās va dīvār”. Aftab News. 11 Oct 2009. 
Accessed 13 July 2015. <http://aftabnews.ir/vdcbszb9.rhb59piuur.html> 
776 To quote the title of R. K. Ramazani’s Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013). 
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